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A Note on Transliteration 
In the transliteration of Ottoman Turkish, I chose the simplest form of latini-
zation except for differentiating between “ع” (‘a or ‘i) and “ا” (a) in certain 
cases to avoid confusion with respect to the meaning. For the sake of simplic-
ity, names and terms that are well known in contemporary English are ren-
dered in conventional form. Therefore, I use Sharia not Şeriat, and Jihad not 
Cihad. For the same reason, I prefer Şeyhülislam to Sheikh-ul Islam. Names 
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Je suis l'Empire à la fin de la decadence. 
–Paul Verlain, Langueur 
ong before the rising scholarly interest in the homefront in the histori-
ography of the First World War, a Turkish academic and journalist as 
well as a witness to the war, Ahmed Emin [Yalman], wrote a chapter entitled 
War Morals in his well-known work Turkey in the World War. He asserted 
that “people in Turkey were, from the viewpoint of morality, less prepared to 
resist the social and economic effects of the war than any other belliger-
ents.”1 On the other hand, Ottoman intellectuals of various ideological back-
grounds continuously mentioned the problem of moral decline at the turn of 
the twentieth century, which, according to them, reached a peak during the 
First World War. This study sheds light on these polemics of moral decline 
and their preconditions on the Ottoman homefront during the First World 
War. It argues that morality had important political, social, and cultural im-
plications in this particular period. How was morality related to the war? This 
single question allowed me to see through the social and cultural transforma-
                                                      
 1 Yalman, Turkey in the World War, 239. 
L 
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tion that the late Ottoman society experienced in times of political and so-
cial turmoil. 
Apart from this question, my interest in the topic arose from the central 
place of morality in the political and social environment of contemporary 
Turkey. Intermingled with discussions about lifestyle, a powerful discourse on 
morality, it can be argued, is part of Turkish identity. Every Turkish citizen 
knows the motto: “We will adopt the technology of Europe but not Euro-
pean morality.”2 On the other hand, moral discourses employing the terms of 
religion, patriarchy, and tradition prevail in daily life – particularly in provin-
cial towns of Turkey – thereby constituting an important dynamic that sup-
presses potential challenges to the extant social order. Contributing to the 
literature, this research draws attention to strong parallels between contem-
porary and one-hundred-year-old debates on morality. The following chap-
ters sketch, in different ways, how fault lines in today’s Turkish society are 
grounded in the sociopolitical context of the late Ottoman Empire. 
The present work explores discourses of moral decline in the context of 
the First World War. This war not only paved the way for the territorial disso-
lution of the empire, but also contributed decisively to its socio cultural trans-
formation on which the Republic of Turkey would be founded. Despite the 
constant debates among late Ottoman intellectuals on morality as an impor-
tant aspect of Ottoman-Muslim identity, this field has remained largely un-
touched in Ottoman-Turkish historiography except for a few studies. On the 
other hand, the topic has been studied at great length by theologians because 
morality debates are closely associated with religion, in particular with Islam.3 
A recurrent characteristic of such studies is that they treat late Ottoman texts 
on morality (especially texts written by the Ottoman Islamic scholars, 
ulemâ) as if they are timeless, ahistorical works to be taken as guides for life 
for all time. However, a close look at these morality texts reveals the context 
                                                      
 2 See Yalçınkaya’s work on debates on science in the nineteenth century in which he shows how 
morality and science came to be associated with one another. Yalçınkaya, “Their Science, Our 
Values.”  
 3 See Çağrıcı, Anahatlarıyla İslam Ahlâkı; See, for instance, Kaya, Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e 
Osmanlı’da Ahlâk Eğitimi; Erdem, Son Devir Osmanlı Düşüncesinde Ahlâk. 
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of intellectual disputes following from the social and political conditions of 
the period in question. This does not imply that the effects of these dis-
courses remained limited to the time of their emergence. These historical dis-
putes over morality have shaped the manner and tone with which social and 
cultural conducts is discussed today. The contest over morality still prevails in 
Turkish society in line with ideological and cultural confrontations. 
As I started to work on so-called moral decline in the context of the late 
Ottoman Empire, I had two assumptions in mind that came to be challenged 
as the study progressed. My first conviction was that the concept of “moral 
decline” was a reflection of anxiety in society resulting from increasing pros-
titution due to the circumstances of war. My second assumption was that I 
would find many punitive measures regarding the protection of public mo-
rality on the Ottoman homefront. This was partly because a single party – 
namely the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) – ruled the Ottoman 
state and came to be regarded as an authoritarian power deriving strength 
from the extraordinary nature of wartime. With respect to my first assump-
tion, prostitution was indeed a major topic in morality discussions; however, 
the direction of the causal link between immorality and prostitution was not 
as I had assumed. In most contemporaneous accounts, prostitution was not 
regarded as the reason for moral decline; rather, it was treated as one of the 
consequences of moral degeneration. Also, the definition of prostitution was 
broader than I had assumed and encompassed several kinds of misconduct. 
This also means that prostitution per se was only part of a broader discussion 
on moral decline. With respect to my second assumption, the CUP govern-
ment truly attached great importance to the protection of public morality, 
but it never introduced punitive measures – at least not measures as harsh as 
expected – no matter how heated the debate became. Despite many rumors 
during wartime about the introduction of new measures, the government 
defined the violation of public morality broadly and left final decisions to 
the discretion of the courts. However, as shown in this study, moral anxieties 
indeed played an important role in the penetration of the state into the 
realm of family. Protecting the honor of Ottoman citizens was important as 
part of mobilization efforts. While eliminating prostitution and related vices 
went hand in hand with anxieties about fading Muslim identity and imperial 
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prestige, fears over the destructive effects of the war on society constituted 
the precondition for rethinking the limits of the state intervention. In some 
cases, immorality in the forms of prostitution and trafficking of women was 
prosecuted on grounds of national security. Yet, surprisingly, it was not the 
wartime CUP government but the Ankara Government and the Turkish re-
public that would realize the expected punitive measures in the name of pro-
tecting public morality, including the prohibition of alcohol in 1920 and of 
prostitution in 1930. Before presenting the detailed arguments of this study, 
I would like to present the conceptual and contextual framework. 
§ 1.1  The Concept: “Moral Decline” in the History of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Terminology of Morality 
The Oxford Dictionary defines morality as “principles concerning the dis-
tinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior.”4 In Ottoman 
Turkish, the word for morality is the Arabic ahlâk, the plural form of hulk or 
huluk. Şemseddin Sami’s Kâmûs-i Türkî defines ahlâk as a “spiritual and in-
ner condition that humans possess either by creation or education.”5 
While keeping these basic definitions in mind, this study avoids both a 
strict definition of morality as well as an analysis of moral philosophy. This is 
for the sake of contextualization purposes. Instead of limiting the reader’s 
perspective of morality with a strict definition, this study maintains a broad 
concept of morality that transcends the Hegelian distinction between ethics 
and morals. As a work of social and cultural history, anything described or 
referred to as morality or immorality in primary sources falls under the scope 
of our analysis. This does not mean that this study negates the importance of 
philosophical and sociological analysis; instead, it utilizes them to enhance 
the understanding of the works of Ottoman intellectuals, for sociological 
analyses have a distinctive place in the study of morality. Throughout this 
                                                      
 4 “Morality,” Oxford Dictionaries, accessed May 12, 2017, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/morality.  
 5 “…insanın yaradılışda haiz olduğu veya terbiye ile istihsal ettiği ahvâl-i ruhiye ve kalbiye.” 
Şemseddin Sami, Kâmûs-î Türkî, 82. 
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study, I consider morality to be a contested area in which several actors were 
involved encompassing both external and internal developments in the 
broader context of the war. These actors ranged from intellectuals to military 
men and from ordinary people to state elites. 
In a similar vein, this study avoids presenting a single definition of 
“moral decline.” Instead, I argue that this concept is abstract in form yet un-
derstood when employed to define certain phenomena. Contrary to the 
common view that moral decline is merely a consequence of increasing pros-
titution; this study offers a broad understanding of morality and a novel per-
spective that encompasses political, cultural, and social dynamics. Broadly 
speaking, the term moral decline was often used to refer to degradation of 
social and moral values among the Ottoman Muslims. To my knowledge, no 
intellectuals of the time who were commenting on morality denied the exis-
tence of moral decline. However, the definitions of that decline and the solu-
tions for it varied. Throughout this study, I evaluate these ideas in juxtaposi-
tion. As the context of the First World War provides a deep insight into the 
points of debates, I attempt to limit certain preconditions of moral decline 
with the war context.  
A glimpse at the history of the Ottoman Empire shows that morality dis-
courses had a significant place in political and social life long before the 
nineteenth century. The nasihatnames (advice letters), for instance, exem-
plify the motives and context of moral discourse in the early modern Otto-
man Empire. This literary genre, which appeared in the second half of the 
sixteenth century and continued up until the eighteenth century sought to 
teach manners and advise statesmen on various issues. They were similar to 
European literary products such as Machiavelli’s The Prince.6 The authors of 
this genre employed a strict moral discourse with an emphasis on growing 
corruption and the degradation of moral and social life that accompanied a 
discourse on the decline of state power and the disruption of the world order 
(nizâm-ı âlem). Abou-El-Haj argues that the “moral polarization” between 
the virtuous and avaricious characters in these stories actually referred to po-
                                                      
 6 Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State, 23; Abou-El-Haj, “The Ottoman Nasihatname 
as a Discourse over ‘Morality',”18.  
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litical struggles among the ruling elites. Nasihatname writers such as Koçu 
Bey and Mustafa Ali manifested their discontent as they were losing political 
power to new social classes.7 According to Abou-El-Haj, the nasihatnames 
and the rise of moralistic discourses were the products of a socio economic 
context in which great transformations and crises were emerging in terms of 
the land system, taxation, and the rise of commercialization.8 In addition, 
gender relations were central to these moralistic discourses. This was clearly 
depicted in one of the most popular nasihatname of the sixteenth century, 
Kınalızade Ali Efendi’s Ahlâk-ı Alâî (Supreme Morality). As discussed by 
Baki Tezcan, Kınalızade’s work was based mainly on the “idea of equilib-
rium” among social “classes” and associated the continuation of the political 
order with the preservation of the patriarchal family as the latter was essential 
for establishing the hierarchy among members of the household.9 In a similar 
vein, moral discourses that accompanied clothing laws in the eighteenth cen-
tury emerged from the considerations of the ruling classes hoping to preserve 
the social order on the basis of gender, class, and ethnic separation.10 In this 
way, the Ottoman state institutionalized moral authority as a means of re-
storing order, particularly after crises that were followed by loss of territo-
ries.11 Kırlı emphasizes the importance of the context of political crisis for the 
emergence of sumptuary laws targeting public spaces such as coffeehouses, 
taverns, and similar venues.12 
From this perspective, it is possible to argue that transitory periods had a 
significant role in the rise of moralistic discourses. However, each period 
must be evaluated in light of its own peculiarities. I believe that the point 
about nineteenth-century polemics of moral decline that distinguishes them 
from those of early-modern discourse was their inclusivity. Owing partly to 
                                                      
 7  Ibid., 19-20. 
 8 Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State, 40–41. 
 9 Tezcan, “Ethics as a Domain to Discuss the Political: Kınalızâde Ali Efendi’s Ahlâk-ı Alâî,” 
112-114. 
 10 Quataert, “Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,” 409. 
 11 Ibid., 411. 
 12 Kırlı, “The Struggle over Space,” 38-49. 
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the development of the press, the rising literacy rate, and the wide circulation 
of the newspapers particularly after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, mo-
rality debates had become polyphonic with the participation of new authors 
and audiences coming from different social backgrounds. The popularity of 
these debates also contributed to the changing nature of morality discourses 
from monologs to dialogues, particularly with the participation of women in 
the discussion. This implied that the monopoly over moral authority by the 
ruling elites and their entourages became vulnerable and open to challenge. 
The growing economic integration of the Ottoman Empire with European 
capitalism increased social and economic conflicts, and the consequences of 
this integration manifested itself in increasing cultural polarization.13 Par-
ticularly apparent in literary works, morality came to be identified with these 
problems, and it was translated into a common discourse of anxiety.14 As 
shown in the following pages, the discourse of moral decline in Ottoman re-
formist circles also reflected intellectual debates about decadence, degenera-
tion, and regeneration in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century 
Europe.  
There are a few studies that mention discourses of moral decline and their 
reflections in politics and society. I only mention some briefly here since the 
chapters deal with them in detail. Along with sumptuary laws and various 
measures, public education in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth cen-
tury has become the subject of scholarly attention in terms of its emphasis on 
morality. Given that education was central to the Ottoman bureaucratic and 
military modernization process, Selçuk Akşin Somel discusses the fact that 
public education during the Tanzimat and Hamidian eras was an instrument 
for inculcating modern notions such as order, discipline, and material pro-
gress together with the ideology of the Ottoman state and Sunnism in pro-
                                                      
 13 For the history of the penetration of capitalism in the Ottoman Empire, see Pamuk, Osmanlı 
Ekonomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme, 1820-1913; Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popu-
lar Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908. 
 14 Müge Özoğlu discusses this anxiety from the masculine standpoint with reference to the 
declining power of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the twentieth century in literary works. 
See Özoğlu, “Modernity as an Ottoman Fetish.” 
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vincial areas.15 According to him, until the 1860s, Ottoman educational re-
forms retained “the ancient tradition of viewing education as a means of in-
culcating religious and moral values,” through which “obedience and loyalty” 
for the central authority were reproduced.16 He asserts that particularly during 
periods of political crises, children and adults were forced by the central 
authority to frequent mosques and attend Quranic schools.17 On the other 
hand, morality textbooks such as Ahlâk Risalesi by Sadık Rıfat Paşa were rep-
resentative of educational policy during the Tanzimat era and provided both 
religious and rational justifications for shaping ideal social norms.18 During 
the Hamidian era, additional emphasis was put on moral and religious values 
in school curricula. Benjamin Fortna examines the gravity of “Islamic moral-
ity” in “secular” schools and argues against the “presumed split between ‘re-
ligious’ and ‘secular’” while drawing attention to the combination of the tra-
ditional Islamic “underpinning that had been crucial to official Ottoman 
legitimation for centuries” and “the optimism engendered by the relatively 
new conception of education as worldly or profane science (maarif).”19 Moral 
instruction in public education, according to him, was a general trend in the 
nineteenth century instead of being unique to the Ottoman or Hamidian 
cases. 
Such simultaneity suggests that there was a common world-time reac-
tion to the perceived speeding up of time, to concerns about keeping 
abreast with the “demands of the present,” and to the feeling that 
flight from the “traditional” theological understandings of the way in 
which the world worked was accelerating, leading to moral decay. 
New-style education appeared as a seemingly universal beacon of 
                                                      
 15 See Somel, The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908. 
 16 Ibid., 6. 
 17 Ibid., 7. 
 18 Ibid., 62–64. 
 19 Fortna, “Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman ‘Secular’ Schools,” 375. 
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hope, particularly when it was meant to convey a reworked but “tra-
ditionally” inspired notion of morality.20 
Hamidian public schools thus sought to instrumentalize moral instruction to 
fight “foreign encroachment and internal moral decline.”21 
Betül Açıkgöz, in her doctoral thesis on Ottoman school textbooks be-
tween 1908 and 1924, argues that moral instruction was central to public 
education even after the Hamidian era, but in a different way: “In the Con-
stitutional years, morality was needed not only to make God content and 
the other world secure, but also for the purpose of this world’s rescue and 
happiness, which was prosperity and progress. The latter was overemphasized 
and prioritized the former.”22 During the Balkan Wars and the First World 
War, a “regeneration thesis” that argued that the loss of morality in the Ot-
toman Empire resulted in the loss of lands in the battles was also integrated 
into school textbooks.23 
There is a positive correlation: as political crisis increases so does emphasis 
on morality. Another crisis that came to surface particularly in the turmoil of 
the First World War was formulated by Elizabeth Thompson as the crisis of 
paternity. In her book Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privi-
lege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon, she employed the term “crisis 
of paternity” to describe the “widespread gender anxiety” encompassing 
both the First World War and the postwar years to which French rule added 
another dimension in Syria and Lebanon.24 Following years of war and fam-
ine, “a climate of profound uncertainty and social tension” altered tradi-
tional definitions of paternal authority, family, and community. 
The woes of World War I fell upon the Syrian provinces of the Otto-
man Empire like a nightmare. Communities, families, and even per-
                                                      
 20 Ibid., 373. 
 21 Ibid., 375. 
 22 Açıkgöz, The Epistemological Conflict in the Narratives of Elementary School Textbooks 
(1908- 1924), 80. 
 23 Ibid., 81. 
 24 See Thompson, Colonial Citizens. 
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sonal identities were transformed, sometimes beyond recognition.… 
The general struggle for food fueled a mad and cut-throat competi-
tion between citizen and state, peasant and landlord, consumer and 
merchant, even parent and child. Gender norms of honor and protec-
tion between men and women were also violated. Memories of this 
world seemingly turned upside down would haunt the postwar era. 
For many, it would take years to piece together their shattered lives. 
For all, the subversion of order and authority at home and in the 
community produced a pervasive crisis of paternity.25 
As discussed throughout this study, emphasis on gender roles and sexual 
norms constituted a major part of the moral decline thesis among the Otto-
man intellectuals.26 It is possible to think of Thompson’s “crisis of paternity” 
together with the “crisis of family” voiced by intellectuals and novelists of 
the 1910s and the decades that followed. As Zafer Toprak notes, the novels of 
these decades are particularly important for historiography because they fill 
the vacuum of what history books have excluded.27 In this respect, Behar and 
Duben’s study of Istanbul households evaluates late Ottoman and early Re-
publican novels with specific emphasis on the “crisis of family.” They reach 
out the conclusion that the discourse of crisis increased during the war years 
and encompassed themes of moral decline, the clash of generations, and the 
lack of paternal authority. 
                                                      
 25 Ibid., 19. 
 26 This leads to the assumption that sexual immorality was central to moral decline. Nonetheless, 
the notion of moral decline had complex social and political implications. Some descriptive 
accounts were published on moral decline, social problems, and prostitution during the First 
World War and the armistice period, predicating a story of an inevitable social and moral dis-
integration without questioning the term moral decline itself. For instance, see Özer, 
“Mütareke ve İşgal Yıllarında Osmanlı Devletinde Görülen Sosyal Çöküntü ve Toplumsal 
Yaşam”; Yetkin, “II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi’nde Toplumsal Ahlak Bunalımı: Fuhuş Meselesi,”; 
Ulu, “I. Dünya Savaşı ve İşgal Sürecinde Istanbul’da Yaşanan Sosyal ve Ahlaki Çözülme 1914-
1922.” 
 27 Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935), 283. 
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 At the beginning of the 1910s the situation starts to be viewed in 
crisis proportions as Ottoman society frees itself from nearly three 
decades of repressive authoritarian rule under Abdülhamid II. It is dur-
ing this period, and especially during the war years and the 1920s, 
that reference is made to a 'family crisis'.”28 
As Toprak discusses in detail, the crisis also offered reform-minded intellectu-
als the opportunity to demand social change in line with the idea of creating 
a “national family.”29 
The terminology of moral decline, indeed, speaks for itself. Several ex-
pressions were used to define this phenomenon in the works of Ottoman in-
tellectuals: moral crisis (ahlak buhranı), moral decay or decline (ahlâkî 
çöküş), social crisis (ictimâî buhran), movement of immorality (ahlaksızlık 
ceryanı), social ills (ictimâî hastalık). On the other hand, state documents 
referred to the phenomenon in a rather different way: acts against morality 
(ahlâka mugâyir hareketler), violation of public morality (ahlâk-ı 
umûmîyeye hıyanet) and breaking public morality (ahlâk-ı umûmîyeyi 
iskât). The point these expressions had in common was emphasis on “acts” or 
“behaviors” that promoted decadence. In this respect, state documents 
treated immorality more concretely and approached it as a type of crime. To 
be discussed in detail, this further illustrates that the Ottoman State consid-
ered morality within the wider scope of protecting public order. 
§ 1.2  The Context: The Ottoman Empire in the First World War 
The Ottoman state declared its mobilization on August 2, 1914, and entered 
into the war in late October on the side of the Central Powers – Germany 
and Austria-Hungary – against the Entente Powers – namely Britain, Russia, 
and France. At the time, the ruling party was the Committee of Union and 
Progress, the organization behind the victorious Constitutional Revolution 
that had overthrown the regime of Abdülhamid II in 1908. After the Tripoli 
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War with Italy in 1911 and the subsequent outbreak of the Balkan Wars, the 
empire was on the verge of territorial dissolution. Faced with a difficult deci-
sion when European powers called upon it to mobilize following the murder 
of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in June 1914, the Ottoman government 
hoped to restore its previous territorial losses with the help of the Central 
Powers. In Turkish historiography, the decision of the Ottomans to enter the 
war is discussed at great length with emphasis on the role of the “triumvi-
rate,” – the three powerful men in the CUP: Enver, Talat and Cemal – in the 
decision to side with Germany, ultimately to be defeated in the First World 
War. In his book, Mustafa Aksakal presents a complex picture of the Otto-
man Empire’s entrance into the war that employs both internal and external 
dynamics.30 Indeed, in political circles in the Ottoman Empire, the war was 
an opportunity “to transform the empire into a politically and economically 
independent, modern country by removing foreign control and cultivating 
a citizenry that would be loyal to the state.”31 We should highlight the latter 
for the sake of our topic: wartime constituted a laboratory for reformers ad-
vocating social reform as a means to regenerate the Ottoman-Muslim com-
munity. They were convinced that national revival would only be possible 
when its social aspects were taken into consideration. 
Expecting to revive opposition in the Muslim colonies of France and 
Great Britain as well as in the Muslim territories of Russia and to establish a 
religion-based unity with Arabs and Kurds in the empire, the Ottoman gov-
ernment proclaimed jihad in November 1914.32 Hence, the war became “sac-
ralized” both at home and abroad to legitimize and popularize the mobiliza-
tion among the Muslim masses in Anatolia.33 As discussed in this study, the 
declaration of jihad added to concerns about morality and strengthened 
moral discourse in both international and domestic debates regarding the 
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legitimation of the holy war. Acting in line with the Islamic principles and 
morality became a standard to test the legitimacy of an Ottoman-led jihad.  
The Ottoman Empire succeeded on two fronts: Kut al-Amara and 
Çanakkale along with the conquest of the Transcaucasian region in 1918 and 
successful campaigns in Galicia and Romania in 1916-17. Especially Çanak-
kale became symbol of Ottoman resistance and blessed in public as a mo-
ment of national revival. However, on other fronts, especially on the Cauca-
sian front against Russian troops, the Ottoman counter-offensives resulted in 
disastrous defeats. The Arab Revolt in 1916 led by Sharif Huseyn in Mecca 
with the support of British forces as well as attacks by British troops in Pales-
tine and Mesopotamia broke the Ottoman resistance. Furthermore, Ottoman 
soldiers were poorly equipped and suffered from starvation and diseases in-
cluding malaria, typhus, typhoid, syphilis, cholera, and dysentery.34 Desertion 
was a significant problem caused both by harsh conditions on the battlefront 
as well as conditions on the homefront that made Ottoman soldiers and their 
families vulnerable.35 In October 1918, with the defeat of Bulgaria, the Cen-
tral Powers lost their territorial continuity. The Ottoman government imme-
diately resigned and the new government started the process that resulted in 
the Armistice of Mudros on October 31, 1918.36 
A significant amount of the scholarly work on the war points out that the 
homefront inquiry is as important as the battlefield. The very concept of “to-
tal war” implies the central role of domestic mobilization. The Ottoman Em-
pire was no exception in this regard. However, homefront dynamics that 
dominate Ottoman historiography are ethnic conflicts. Along with tensions 
that occurred upon the arrival of the Muslim refugees from territories the 
empire had lost, massacres targeting the Armenian community dominate 
homefront narratives. Moreover, hunger, poverty, compulsory labor, and the 
heavy taxation of agriculture and husbandry as well as the constant attacks of 
deserters and plunderers on villages defined the living conditions of the Ot-
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toman people on the homefront.37 The urban population was affected by 
economic privation due to lack of access to transport. Istanbul was signifi-
cantly affected by such privation, due to its reliance on imported goods. At 
the beginning of the war, the city met consumption needs with existing 
stock, but as the war went on, speculation, black marketeering, and rising 
inflation accompanied shortages. Eventually, a new class of war profiteers 
emerged from this scene.38 These profiteers are discussed in both political and 
intellectual contexts as their lifestyles were often associated with moral de-
cline. 
As discussed by Mehmet Beşikçi in his book on the Ottoman mobiliza-
tion, the concept of total war highlights the role of the state in total mobili-
zation by which it gradually expanded its power, but the concept also refers 
to the reciprocal relationship between state power and society.39 Also, the 
need for “mass participation” in the war increased the state’s reliance on the 
people.40 This point addresses the changing nature of the relationship be-
tween the state and society. Yiğit Akın explores this point in his work on sol-
diers’ families by referring to the changing relationship between women and 
state authorities in the absence of male family members.41 Through an analy-
sis of women’s petitions submitted to state authorities, he states that  
Implicitly or explicitly, the women argued that the state was obliged 
to support their families, whose sole breadwinners had been taken 
away by the state and the army. The rhetoric they employed clearly 
displayed their awareness of the moral obligation that the state had 
towards soldiers’ families, whom it promised to shield in the absence 
of their protectors.42  
                                                      
 37 Akın, “The Ottoman Home Front during World War I,” 133–134. 
 38 See Toprak, Ittihad Terakki ve Cihan Harbi. 
 39 Beşikçi, The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War, 7. 
 40 Ibid. 
 41 Akın, “War, Women, and the State.” 
 42 Ibid., 26. 
M O R A L  C R I S I S  O N  T H E  O T T O M A N  H O M E F R O N T  
15 
In this study, we discuss this point with reference to morality and family, 
emphasizing the protection of soldiers’ family members from sexual assault. 
In addition, we highlight the importance of polemics on social values in the 
formation and dissolution of Muslim families, which, in turn, acted as a pre-
text for the Family Decree of 1917. 
The occupation of Istanbul and some parts of Anatolia was marked by 
moral discourses that juxtaposed the occupiers and their collaborators with 
the national resistance movement in Anatolia. Together with occupation 
forces, the arrival of refugees from Russia who escaping the Russian Revolu-
tion brought about a change in the public sphere, entertainment, and leisure 
in Istanbul that for some contemporary observers – such as the famous neu-
ropsychiatrist Dr. Mazhar Osman – resembled the Pompei of the Roman 
Empire.43 With a few exceptions, the occupation years not fall within the 
scope of this study for both practical and contextual reasons. Although the 
period is fruitful in terms of discourses of moral decline, in many respects 
there were fundamental differences in the perception of immorality. 
§ 1.3  Between Progress and Decline: The Intellectual Context of 
Discourses of Moral Crisis in the Late Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries 
What were the characteristics of discourses of moral decline in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries? What was the contribution of political 
and social upheavals like the First World War to intellectual debates on moral 
decline in the European context? The broader intellectual context of the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century better clarifies how and why 
discourses of moral decline became popular among Ottoman intellectuals. 
Such a contextualization eliminates a particularistic approach to the Ottoman 
history while at the same time clarifies the distinctive characteristics of the 
Ottoman case. This further contributes to overcoming the biased view that 
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the preconditions for discourses of moral decline can be reduced to the rise of 
prostitution. The notion of a “sense of decadence” has a long past dating 
back to the political thought of ancient Greek and Roman civilizations, but 
at that time, the discourse was part of a cyclical understanding of history that 
presupposed that “what goes up also come down.”44 Koenraad argues that the 
decline of the Roman Empire particularly influenced European thought to 
the extent of obsession “in the hope of finding an answer to the question of 
how their own society could escape a similar fate.”45 Moral decay in a society 
attracts intellectual and political interest as it was believed that such a decline 
in virtue constituted the major reason behind the decline of the Roman civi-
lization. This thought is well expressed in Cicero’s famous exclamation “O 
tempora, O mores!” by which he referred to corruption of his age.46 
The idea of decadence prevailed in the medieval ages, as well; however, it 
was not perceived as integral to a natural course of events in which things 
“go up and down.” Rather it was part of a “divine scheme preceding the ul-
timate salvation of the elect.”47 With the Renaissance, this gloomy under-
standing of history began to transform into an optimistic approach to fu-
ture.48 Although complaints about the current state of affairs continued in 
later periods, what made nineteenth century unique was the insistence on 
the inevitable victory of progress despite the intrusion of decadence. Moreo-
ver, decadence was treated as a necessary step; the old system had to diminish 
to open up space for the “birth of a new superior phase of civilization.”49 At 
this point, we should also take into account nineteenth-century discourses of 
“degeneration” which also applied to morality. Initially coined in psychiatry 
to define a deteriorated mental condition, the term dégénérescence had a 
powerful appeal in the natural sciences, particularly with reference to the 
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theory of evolution.50 Darwin’s followers expanded the theory of evolution 
to cultural and social realms in search of affirmation of progress in human 
populations from a scientific point of view. In the context of the nineteenth 
century, such views became popular, and references to physical and moral 
degeneration led to infamous biological determinisms and eugenics.51 Daniel 
Pick notes that by combining the ideas of evolution and progress, the lan-
guage of degeneration in the nineteenth century had a different connotation 
from that of early sentiments that insisted on “the notion, or at least the 
question, of things getting worse”: the language of degeneration “moves 
from its place as occasional sub-current of wider philosophies and political or 
economic theories, or homilies about the horrors of the French and the Indus-
trial Revolutions, to become the center of a scientific and medical investiga-
tion.”52 However, it needs to be underscored that the term degeneration was 
not only used to characterize racial differences but also to identify internal 
dangers and crises within Europe involving moral decadence in terms of 
crime, alcoholism, prostitution, and suicide.53 Paradoxically, these “social pa-
thologies” emerged from rapid urbanization and industrialization as a conse-
quence of “progress.” Finding the “pathologies” to remove obstacles to pro-
gress came to be regarded as the scientific solution for degeneration. 
Degeneration and progress developed dialectically in a way that “civilization, 
science and economic progress might be the catalyst of, as much as the de-
fense against, physical and social pathology.”54 Koenraad also draws attention 
to how paradoxical concepts – progress and decadence – combine: “It is, for 
example, not at all illogical to be convinced that in certain fields like religion 
or morality serious decline has taken place and yet to believe at the same 
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time that in other areas like science and art great progress has been 
achieved.”55 
The language of degeneration is strongly connected to tensions and con-
stant conflicts in the society that emerged in the course of the nineteenth 
century. The case of France is representative and important given the vast 
influence of French scholars on Ottoman intellectuals. Late nineteenth-
century French republicans were inspired by the ideas and methods of 
Auguste Comte’s positivism and anticipated the triumph of progress over re-
ligion: “Thus, a lay Republic that sought to replace religion with a ‘scientific’ 
morality, while preserving the ‘natural’ structures of the social order, could be 
regarded as a progressive force in history.”56 Auguste Comte, the leading fig-
ure of sociology and positivism, condemned the French Revolution in his 
search for social order, authority, and an organization to facilitate progress.57 
Emile Durkheim, the first professor of sociology, studied the years of tension 
between the revolution and the counter-revolution during the Third Repub-
lic.58 Durkheim developed his theories as a means of overcoming political and 
social disintegration in French society and sought the means of “national 
regeneration.”59 In this respect, morality and moral values were important for 
reinforcing the ties among individuals that would eventually lead to the “di-
vision of labor” and harmonious social life.60 This point, indeed, is crucial for 
understanding the approach of reformist Ottoman intellectuals who regarded 
science as an ultimate guide and sociology as the queen of the sciences with 
respect to coping with the problems of moral decline and establishing a new 
understanding of morality.61 
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Interestingly, fin-de-siècle discourses on “decadence” together with the 
decadent movement in literature had lost its influence in France by the eve 
of the First World War. “A new state of mind” emerged among a new gen-
eration “who became known for their realistic attitude toward life, their in-
terest in action and sport, and their antipathy to excessive speculation and 
self-analysis.”62 The war was welcomed as a step towards further regenera-
tion.63 Ottoman intellectuals guided by the sociological insights summarized 
above continued to believe that Ottoman society was experiencing the same 
sense of crisis, though in a belated fashion. Like the French case, they argue 
of the crisis was a sign of progress and a signifier of an upcoming national 
regeneration. On the other hand, a divine understanding of moral decay 
continued to dominate religious circles intermingled with contests over 
moral, political, and social authority. While discourses on “decadence” corre-
sponded with discourses on moral decline in the late Ottoman context, “de-
generation” had more to do with early republican eugenics, another – albeit 
more biological and medicalized – approach to morality.64 Yücel Yanıkdağ’s 
analysis of the concept of degeneration among Turkish neuropsychiatrists 
demonstrates that Turkish neuropsychiatrists such as Mazhar Osman, Fahret-
tin Kerim and İzzettin Şadan approached the First World War as a watershed 
moment that revealed inherited pathological conditions among prisoners of 
war, including the mental disorders.65 In this sense, their medical claims 
served the ideals of reviving the nation by equating the health of the nation 
with the health of individuals. 
The First World War brought about profound changes in the social, cul-
tural, and political realms that had a long-lasting impact on intellectuals and 
public opinion. During the war, more than eight million men lost their lives 
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on the battlefield.66 The number of civilians killed during the war may have 
been even greater given that they were exposed to systematic violence by 
enemy countries through sieges, deportations, forced labor, mass executions, 
and bombardments targeting civilians.67 Civilians were also targeted by their 
own governments and exposed to similar violence, including massacres such 
as that of the Armenian population living in the Ottoman Empire.  
“For communities at war, military casualties predominate. The funda-
mental reality is loss of life and limb. All other considerations are secondary,” 
wrote Adrian Gregory, drawing attention to the moral power of sacrifice 
evoked in the new ideals in society: “The needs of 'total war' subverted the 
dominant idea of political economy, the idea that the common good was 
served by the pursuit of self-interest. In its place it resurrected new forms of 
older ideals, those of Christian martyrdom and ‘republican’ civic humanism 
in which self-interest was contrasted to the common good.”68 On the home-
front, hunger and famine overshadowed other concerns, adding to the mor-
alization of everyday life. “Moral judgment” worked well to distinguish be-
tween “profiteers and the nation at war” and reinforced senses of collective 
solidarity and the common good.69 
On the other hand, significant loss of young men during the war put 
great pressure on the traditional family given the high number of widows 
and orphans left behind. Those men who returned home were “destroyed” by 
the physical and mental effects of the war. Many of committed suicide some 
found solace in alcohol or, as Mazower wrote, “tried to reassert their authority 
by beating their wives and children.”70 “A newly fatherless community” had 
emerged further provoking the sense of moral and social disorder.71 At the 
end of the war, the rate of population decline triggered governments to in-
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crease not only the quantity but also the quality of their nations’ popula-
tions.72 For contemporary observers, the war broadened the reach of the idea 
of degeneration from psychiatry to different contexts.73 In this context, fam-
ily and family values – with a strong emphasis on motherhood – came to be 
more central to interwar European politics and ideology than before.74 
The new morality of the collective good was reflected in the foundation 
of secular morality of the early Turkish republic in line with other continui-
ties between late Ottoman and republican thought.75 In 1931, Mustafa Ke-
mal Atatürk explicitly wrote in the book titled Vatandaş İçin Medenî Bilgiler 
(Civics for the Citizen) that 
Turks have a shared morality. This high morality does not resemble 
that of any other nation.… When I say moral, I do not mean advice 
given in books on morals.… Morals are above individuals, and they 
can only be societal, national.... Some people say that religious unity 
can play a role in nation formation, but we see the opposite in the 
Turkish nation.76 
§ 1.4  Arguments and Plan of the Study 
This study explores discourses of public morality and moral crisis at three in-
terrelated levels. The first is the intellectual level and focuses on polemics of 
moral decline among Ottoman intellectuals in juxtaposition with each other. 
Considering morality as a contested space among the conflicting ideologies 
of the period, I examine journals that represent these ideologies, namely the 
Journal of Islam (İslam Mecmuası), New Journal (Yeni Mecmua), and 
Straight Road (Sebilürreşad). Since debates on morality revolved around the 
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place of women in society, I also include articles from several women’s jour-
nals such as Homeland of Knowledge (Bilgi Yurdu), Young Woman (Genç 
Kadın), Women’s World (Kadınlar Dünyası), and Flowing (Seyyale). 
Through the analysis of several articles on morality, this study shows that mo-
rality played a vital role in ideological conflicts of the time. The conflict was 
especially clear between Turkish nationalists and political Islamists.77 There 
were some preconditions for this increasing tension. The First World War, in 
particular, brought an urgency to discussions of social problems in Ottoman 
society. For moral decline polemicists, the war served as a laboratory in which 
to ground their theories on the destructive effects of immorality. The war 
exacerbated a sense of anxiety both about diminishing traditional values and 
about so-called corruptive new adaptations. On the other hand, particular 
political and ideological developments such as the rise of Turkish nationalism 
added to these tensions, the background of which started with the revolution 
of 1908. 
The CUP government was challenged in the immediate aftermath of the 
constitutional revolution by the liberals (Ahrar Fırkası) that sought to decen-
tralize the empire and the religious class – the ulema – who organized around 
the idea of “restoring the Islamic Law” – although the Sharia had not been 
abolished at all. In 1909, the opposition against the CUP turned into an 
armed movement shedding blood in the streets of the capital city and voic-
ing demands that Islamic principles (including prohibition of bars and the-
atres, the prohibition of photography, and imposing restrictions on the free-
dom of movement of women) be imposed along with some other political 
demands such as marginalization of some of the Unionists. The event, 
known as the Uprising of 31 March, left its mark on the collective memory 
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of the late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic as a counterrevo-
lution. It was a remarkable, as well, since moral crisis was central to the calls 
of Sheikh Vahdeti, the leader of the uprising: “The empire is collapsing; the 
foundation of this collapse is in the Western morality.”78 With the Uprising 
of 31 March, morality discourses gained a new political meaning. 
The years following the event were characterized by bitter political strug-
gle up until 1913. In 1913, the CUP took the power via a military coup 
known as Bâb-ı Âli Baskını. The CUP leadership aimed at establishing abso-
lute authority in order to prevent further territorial loss after the outbreak of 
war in the Balkans. From then on, the Ottoman government was under the 
control of the CUP and the powerful figures of Enver, Cemal, and Talat Pa-
shas.79 Amit Bein calls this period as the “political marginalization of the 
ulema.”80 In this period, a discourse on the similarity between European 
clergy and the ulema accompanied radical steps to eliminate the jurisdiction 
of the şeyhülislam over sharia courts and remove his seat from the cabinet. 
The administration of religious endowments (evkaf) was transferred to the 
newly established Ministry of Religious Foundations (Evkaf Nezareti). Is-
lamic schools (medrese) were brought under the authority of the Ministry of 
Education, and their curriculum was modernized.81 Throughout the history 
of the Ottoman Empire, family law had remained a stronghold of the ulema. 
With the introduction of the new Family Decree of 1917, its religious tone 
notwithstanding, the ulema lost its monopoly over the formation and the 
dissolution of the marriages. Also, the ulema traditionally had the right to 
officially answer moral and ethical questions in the Ottoman Empire. Such 
moral judgments were not mere intellectual exercises, they constituted the 
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basis of both religious and secular lawmaking.82 In this respect, morality dis-
courses had political implications. This explains how and why tensions re-
garding moral polarizations escalated so quickly and occupied such an impor-
tant position in political conflicts. In addition, while the CUP eliminated the 
political power of the Ottoman ulema to an extent, it adopted a pragmatic 
approach to the relationship between politics and religion. The declaration of 
jihad as part of the war effort during the First World War clearly shows this. 
The committee’s grand vizier was Said Halim Paşa, who was a declared politi-
cal Islamist. Such paradoxical attitudes were the result of complex political 
relations and developments. At the end of the war, when the CUP lost power, 
Mustafa Sabri, the new şeyhülislam and an opponent of the CUP regime, 
dedicated his office “to revers[ing] the emasculation of the religious estab-
lishment and reassert[ing] the observance of traditional Islamic norms and 
practices in the public sphere.”83 He used the anti-CUP political atmosphere 
to revive the moral authority of the ulema. Through a “morality commis-
sion” established under the Islamic Academy (Dar’ül-Hikmet’il-İslamiye) in 
1918, he prioritized the regulation of public morality by issuing official de-
crees and “guidelines” as well as the reporting of cases of violated morality to 
police and necessary institutions.84 Such cases ranged from alcohol consump-
tion to the violation of the fast during Ramadan, to immoral content in 
theater plays and the press, to disregard for gender segregation, and to 
women’s attire and public appearance. I mention this commission while dis-
cussing intellectual views on morality. 
                                                      
 82 Rifaat Abou-El-Haj, “The Ottoman Nasihatname as a Discourse over ‘morality,’”25. Zarinebaf 
explains the notion of justice as follows: "The notion of justice in the Ottoman Empire was 
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The declaration of jihad during the war made the Ottoman Empire more 
vulnerable to critique targeting lifestyles within the empire that were “in-
compatible” with Islam. In this framework, morality was of broad and in-
tense interest in discussions of the legitimacy of the caliphate. The sensitive-
ness of the political situation increased with defeat at the end of the war. 
Therefore, the fight over morality became more explicit among the intellec-
tuals, particularly between Turkish nationalists and political Islamists. Inter-
estingly, in this intellectual contest both parties accused the other of being 
the ideological carrier of degeneration. Especially during the end of the war, 
the contest was clearly due to increasing political tensions. Since the Otto-
man Empire was defeated on the battlefield, the ideology around the Caliph-
ate and jihad was questioned, as well. This counterpropaganda was particu-
larly evident in the British press which explicitly argued that the Ottoman 
Empire did not qualify for a “holy war” due to widespread amoral behaviours 
observed among the Ottoman Muslims. In addition to British propaganda, 
the anti-Ottoman propaganda of Arab nationalists’ further questioned the 
sultan’s right to the caliphate. Sharifian propaganda against Ottoman rule 
was based on the claim that Sharif Husayn was against those who had vio-
lated the sharia by ordaining secular laws and lifestyles.85 This increased the 
anxiety of Islamists with respect to moral decline and added a dimension that 
can be formulated as “the whole Muslim world is watching us.” 
As a matter of fact, the discourse on moral decline was accompanied by a 
discourse on the need for “social reform” and the transformation of the Ot-
toman Muslim mentality that was perceived as medieval and backward. 
Moreover, there was a dilemma that came to the surface during the war: 
while the Ottomans were at war with the Entente Powers, at the same time 
they admired the progress and advancement of “enemy countries” such as 
France and Britain. The influence of yet another country, Germany, was 
growing in the Ottoman Empire. As a result, fears about the growing influ-
ence of European culture and the loss of authentic Muslim identity solidified. 
As the war progressed, social problems became even more visible and this 
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caused a gradual increase in the morality discourse. Therefore, for moral de-
cline polemicists, the issue was deeper than the problems of increasing prosti-
tution and venereal diseases. 
This study shows that political tension between the Islamists and Turkish 
nationalists was transfigured in the intellectual realm as a conflict about the 
sources of morality. While Islamists insisted that Islam and Islamic principles 
were the only sources of morality, nationalists argued for the need for a new 
morality, namely “national morality,” which would transcend the scope of 
religious principles and encompass progressive ideals. What united these two 
ideologies was their critique of the Tanzimat era – wherein European values 
had penetrated into the society – as well as their critique of materialism with 
reference to the Russian Revolution of 1917. 
In fact, it was the nationalist challenge to traditional Islamist thought 
that triggered the heated debate on morality. Ziya Gökalp invented the con-
cept of “national morality” through which he theorized a “new life” for Ot-
toman Turks. In an article he published under the pseudonym Demirtaş, ti-
tled “Yeni Hayat ve Yeni Kıymetler” (New life and new values), he asserted 
that “we have achieved the political revolution; now we are confronted yet 
with another task: To prepare for the social revolution.”86 Among the princi-
ples of new life, morality occupied a central role: “A new life means, obvi-
ously, a new form of economy, a new form of family life, new aesthetic stan-
dards, a new morality, a new conception of law, and a new political 
system.”87 He developed this idea further in his book “Principles of Turkism” 
in which he classified morality under several headings.88 His idea of solidarity 
(tesanüd) was also established on the basis of new morality. New life would 
be implanted in the new family to create a national identity.89 By question-
ing the content of the morality that Islamists defended, he opened the gate 
for the reform of untouched zones in Ottoman society. The idea of social 
                                                      
 86 Ziya Gökalp, “Yeni Hayat ve Yeni Kıymetler, Genç Kalemler, no.9 (1911), quoted in, Berkes, 
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 87 Ibid., 56. 
 88 Devereaux, The Principles of Turkism. 
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reform indeed became the genesis of the new values and new morality that 
would serve the purposes of the advancement of society and the collective 
good. Obviously, the family and women were important for achieving this 
purpose. 
How, then, could reformists claim the need to reform the very areas tradi-
tionally claimed by the sharia? Niyazi Berkes convincingly evaluates this 
point in The Development of Secularism in Turkey and concludes that both 
the Islamists and the Turkish nationalists agreed on the necessity of reform in 
the name of progress. The real struggle was to define the limits of sharia and 
to determine what needed to be changed or replaced in Islamic society. The 
Islamists “persistently sought arguments for enlarging the scope of the Sharia 
to cover areas of life that were traditionally regarded as outside the Sharia.”90 
The “New Life Group” on the other hand, penetrated the stronghold of the 
ulema with a simple question: “Which of the traditional institutions are in a 
state of decline, are thus factors of cultural maladjustment, and therefore are 
to be eliminated as a pre-condition of reforming those parts of life related to 
them?”91 I argue that the last stronghold was morality, and the state of moral 
decline indeed strengthened the claims on both sides. The new morality, as 
formulated by the nationalists, prevailed and constituted the basis for early 
republican secularism. Claiming and re-claiming the spheres of religion is an 
ongoing debate; its form becomes concrete particularly on morality-related 
issues. 
Following this summary of the intellectual debates on morality, I turn 
my interest to the second level: political regulations and their limits regard-
ing the protection of morality. This study assesses the extent to which moral 
decline debates were reflected the political sphere. In this regard, two dimen-
sions of the Ottoman homefront call for careful analysis: the abolition of the 
capitulations and the expansion of military power due to the extension of 
martial law. Only after the unilateral abolition of the capitulations at the out-
break of the war was the Ottoman government finally able to control broth-
els and take action to prevent the trafficking of women by foreign citizens 
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in the empire. The proclamation of martial law expanded the power of the 
military to undertake measures to ensure public morality. Based on archival 
research conducted in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık 
Osmanlı Arşivleri, BOA), this chapter reveals the deportation and banish-
ment of those engaged in prostitution. Accordingly, some civilians whose 
settlement in territories under martial law was considered harmful were ban-
ished from these territories for the sake of the mobilization. This measure was 
applied to those inciting violations of public morality, such as prostitutes, 
procurers, and debauchers. Their cases were considered an issue of national 
security during the mobilization. The punishment of immorality ordered by 
the military was a significant phenomenon of the war, contextualizing it as a 
national security concern. Given the insecure environment that emerged 
during the war, foreign citizens living in the empire applied for Ottoman 
citizenship. In this study, I examine citizenship applications of foreign na-
tionals that were declined due to immorality. The fact that none of these ap-
plicants obtained citizenship shows how moral judgment and national secu-
rity concern intersected. Such wartime measures enabled the dismissal of  
“undesirable” elements in the society. 
Obviously, the Ottoman government’s motivation for eliminating pros-
titution in certain areas concerned the spread of venereal disease. As dis-
cussed in this chapter, this was also the case in many belligerent countries in 
the First World War. I consider prostitution as a space that one can observe 
the cultural rivalry that intensified over the course of the war. For many con-
temporary writers, prostitution was not the reason for moral decline, but 
rather the result of it.  
For state authorities, the violation of public morality was a part of the 
concern for public order. Despite heated debates that even involved state 
elites, the Ottoman government kept the definition of public morality of-
fenses under the discretionary authority of the courts and never attempted to 
define the limits of violations of public morality. Through the end of the war, 
Tanin, the mouthpiece of the government published two editorials on issues 
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of morality.92 The articles argued that moral decline manifests itself in three 
ways: first, prostitution and public manners; second, war profiteering; and 
third, the misuse of official services. After these two articles stressed the duty 
of the government to protect public morality, the public apparently consid-
ered these editorial articles as new measures. Tanin therefore published a short 
notification indicating that the government had no intention to take new 
steps to uphold morality; rather, the newspaper reminded the people of exist-
ing laws in the Ottoman Penal Code. On prostitution, though, the notifica-
tion said that the offices were collecting information on prohibitive meas-
ures.93 
In daily life, the protecting public morality had broader implications than 
counteracting prostitution. Therefore, I include a sub-chapter on the sumptu-
ary laws, war profiteering, regulation of entertainment venues and conspicu-
ous consumption, and official approaches to alcohol and gambling. By juxta-
posing the popular perceptions of immorality and political measures, I argue 
that the Ottoman government’s pragmatic approach towards “vices” consid-
ered signifiers or causes of immorality intensified during the war. This was 
partly due to limitations on the state power that accompanied financial con-
cerns, as such “vices” constituted a good amount of the state’s budget. 
In the final chapter, I focus on the Ottoman family and dynamics in 
provincial areas that contributed to the involvement of the state in the fam-
ily vis-à-vis morality. I examine rape, sexual assault, and adultery cases that 
involved soldiers’ families. Throughout the war, soldiers, the women of their 
families, and locals such as village elders and military officers continuously 
sent complaints to the Ministry of War, the Ministry of the Interior Affairs, 
and in some cases to provincial authorities or the Ottoman parliament. I con-
sider these petitions as instruments calling state authorities to take measures 
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to prevent rapes, abductions, assaults, and threats. I argue that moral con-
cerns lay behind the attempts at legislation regarding the protection of fami-
lies. Hitherto in the historiography, these laws are examined separately. 
Moreover, researchers often suppose that the motivation of the state for 
penetrating the family was as a means of modernization. However, a close 
look at individual cases shows that given the circumstances of war, state in-
volvement in the family showed a reciprocal character. In line with the previ-
ously discussed point on the changing relationship between the state and so-
ciety, I argue that state intervention not only stemmed from the keen 
interest of the state or military alone but was also shaped by demand from 
below in cases concerning honor. 
I consider four main attempts at legislation in this chapter. The first was a 
general order by the Ministry of the Interior Affairs announcing measures to 
be undertaken against the perpetrators of sexual attacks. Second, I focus on a 
provisional law by which cases of sexual assault of soldiers’ relatives were 
taken to martial courts. Third, I explore an unsuccessful legislative attempt 
by the Ministry of War entitled “Adultery Draft” that would have authorized 
the military to file complaints and initiate the legal process against unfaithful 
wives on behalf of soldiers. Finally, I turn my attention to the Ottoman 
Rights of Family Decree of 1917 (Hukûk-u Aile Kararnamesi) and contextu-
alize it within the moral dynamics. 
Although statistics of morality-related crimes are not available, the fre-
quency of attempts to legislate them along with the immense interest of Ot-
toman intellectuals show that crimes violating morality resulted in the ques-
tioning of existing social norms and moral values in society. I argue that the 
willingness of state authorities to regulate family formation and dissolution, 
and intellectual concerns about the moral codes of society are interrelated. 
The ruling elite as well as ordinary people were thereby convinced that it 
should no longer be taboo to regulate the family realm. As the focus of these 
regulations was “protecting the honor of the soldiers,” I argue that social un-
rest caused by sexual assaults contributed to these regulations. The sexual as-
saults, rapes, and abductions targeting soldiers’ relatives not only contributed 
to concerns about morality but also contradicted official war propaganda re-
garding the protection of women in soldiers’ families. In the long run, state 
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intervention paved the way for more radical but legitimate steps to be taken. 
I evaluate the topic together with debates on social reform that were based on 
the degeneration of Muslim families. When advocates of family reform ques-
tioned the degeneration of Muslim families, they ended up struggling with 
existing moral values. Can legislation change the norms in society? Appar-
ently, Ottoman intellectuals and reformers introduced legislation as a means 
of introduce new family values. The advocates of family reform linked the 
wellbeing of adolescents, women, and men to those of the nation, legitimiz-
ing the need for reform. 
Besides the current literature on the First World War, this study is based 
mainly on documents in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in Istanbul 
and on periodicals and newspapers that were published during the period in 
question. Especially chapters 3 and 4 rely on archival sources. Among the 
catalogs in the archives, I benefited from the documents of the Ministry of 
the Interior Affairs (Dahiliye Nezareti) which include files belonging to the 
Interior Administration (İdare-i Umumiye) and the Police Department 
(Emniyet-i Umumiye). I also benefited from the First World War collection 
in the Archives of Turkish General Staff (ATASE). Beside the archival docu-
ments of state officials, I examined letters and petitions from people ban-
ished from martial law areas to central Anatolia in order to better present the 
lives of people who carried the stigma of immorality. Given that petitions are 
among the very few sources in social history that present the voices of ordi-
nary people, I consider the letters from soldiers and the women in their fami-
lies to various state departments as primary sources that reveal how moral 
anxieties played a role in state intervention in the family. In addition, such 
letters indicate the bilateral nature of this intervention. The stories in these 
documents also expose the wartime circumstances on the homefront that 
contributed decisively to social and political transformation in the empire. 
Along with archival documents, the newspaper articles and the minutes of 
the Ottoman parliament cited in this study help to frame the morality discus-
sion. Articles from various journals that represent the views of the Ottoman 
intelligentsia offer details on how morality became contested in the turmoil 
of the war. The term morality was itself a battlefield. 
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Throughout this study, significant space is reserved for the “women issue” 
in morality debates. The points of departure for discussions about morality 
show that Muslim women’s participation in social and economic life was a 
common question. This was partly due to the fact that as more women be-
came visible in the public sphere, their role in the society was discussed more. 
As harsh economic conditions prevailed in cities, women on the Ottoman 
homefront – like in other belligerent countries in the First World War – were 
employed in war factories and state institutions as well as in municipalities 
and marketplaces. Many middle class women undertook active roles in war 
aid societies including the Red Crescent (Hilâl-i Ahmer).94 For the first time 
in the history of the Empire, women had right to pursue university education 
following the foundation of the Women’s University (İnas Darülfünunu). 
Although small in number, women also served in labor battalions. All these 
facts contributed to the heated debates about women’s place in society and 
their political and economic rights.95 
The Ottoman feminist movement also contributed to these debates. 
Starting in the 1890s, the movement demanded the inclusion of women in 
the public sphere in a society where gender segregation and inequality were 
justified with reference to Islamic law.96 The movement questioned practices 
such as polygyny in Muslim families. The voices of Ottoman women in the 
mid- and late nineteenth century were echoed in literature when the literacy 
rate among Ottoman urbanites increased due to education campaigns and 
increasing participation of elite women in the press.97 The Constitutional 
Revolution of 1908 completely changed the social and cultural lives of the 
Ottoman people, and women started to openly ask for legal rights, for family 
reform, for recognition in social life, to work outside the house, and to have 
access to higher education. Toprak argues that the ideals of the constitutional 
monarchy (meşrutiyet) paved the way for the socialization of women within 
the framework of a new public sphere that replaced the old, exclusively male-
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dominated order.98 By the end of the war, the focus of the “women problem” 
had shifted from “Muslim women” to the “Turkish women” in line with ris-
ing nationalism. Despite this shift, morality continued to be a dominant as-
pect. For example, Nezihe Muhiddin, the leading feminist figure of the time, 
formulated an ideal Turkish womanhood that would respect rationality, na-
tional consciousness, and national morality.99 
Immediately after the end of the First World War, many observers were 
aware that things had changed in the societies of the belligerent countries, 
and this change was often expressed with gloomy words such as corruption, 
degeneration, and disorder. Authorities and intellectuals did not welcome this 
change, regardless of its description. The war had created widespread moral 
anxiety in almost all belligerent countries including their colonies. At the 
end of the war, along with emphasis on the need for population growth, fam-
ily and its power to regenerate the nation became major points of interest. 
Many works were published regarding the negative effects of war on moral-
ity. It was in this environment that the “Einstein of Sex,” the German sex-
ologist Magnus Hirschfeld, would write The Sexual History of the World 
War.100 Sudhindra Lal Roy, the Indian columnist, would contribute to the lit-
erature with a book correlating war and immorality, showing “the moral loss 
of the human society from war.”101 
The war years were reconstructed in the literary works during the early 
Republic of Turkey as a moment of moral polarization providing further 
clues to interpret the prevailing mentality of the time. Even decades later, 
moral degeneration stories continued to evoke the devastating effects of the 
war and occupation in the collective memory of the Turkish people. Leading 
figures of Turkish literature such as Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar, Yakup Kadri 
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Karaosmanoğlu, Reşat Nuri Güntekin, Peyami Safa, and Halide Edip were all 
inspired by the theme of moral crisis. The imagery of moral degeneration was 
influential in the formation of Turkish secularism and nationalism. 
I intend this study as an integrated account that considers wider internal 
and external political and social developments together with the experiences 
of common men and women; however, I abbreviate the political and military 
history of the period because they have been told by many scholars in a com-
prehensive fashion.102 I also limit the discussion to moral crisis, and this study 
does not claim to offer an exhaustive historical account of prostitution, vene-
real disease, sexual norms, and moral conduct. 
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The Intellectual Contest Over Morality, and Interpreta-
tions of “Moral Crisis” 
Vicdanlarda artık yaşamayan akide ve âyinleri, aile 
ve hükümet tarzlarını, ahlâkî vazîfe ve mefkûreleri 
zorla yaşatmaya çalışmak, istenilen neticelerin ta-
mamiyle aksini tevellid eder. Binâenaleyh 
bugünkü ahlâk buhranının devâmından mesûl 
olanlar, birinci derecede yeni ahlâkı tedvîne ve 
neşre çalışmayan mütefekkirler ise, ikinci derecede 
de eski ahlâkı zorla idâmeye çalışan muhafazakâr 
kuvvetlerdir. 
–Ziya Gökalp, Ahlâk Buhranı 
his chapter focuses on debates about moral crisis among the Ottoman 
intelligentsia with a particular emphasis on the historical context of the 
First World War. Despite the difficulty of contextualizing a relatively abstract 
topic such as morality – or more precisely, immorality – the following pages 
attempt, in various ways, to assess the implications of discourses of moral de-
cline with regard to wartime conditions. For this reason, I have chosen war-
time periodicals that elaborate on this topic at great length. This study con-
siders morality as a contested space; therefore, I select representative, 
T 
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competing ideological perspectives from the Ottoman political spectrum.  
The journals I evaluate put forward polemics of moral crisis, and morality 
with several volumes and articles. These journals are, namely, İslam 
Mecmuası (Journal of Islam), Yeni Mecmua (New journal), and Sebilürreşad 
(Straight road). Throughout this chapter I use the original title of these jour-
nals instead of their English translation. Having seen that abundant refer-
ences to Muslim women and their place in society were central to morality 
discussions, I also conducted research on women’s journals of the time. By 
this means, I explore how women writers approached women-related moral-
ity discussions and how they pursued the problem of moral decline. However, 
because prominent feminist journals such as Kadınlar Dünyası (Women’s 
World) were not published during the war years,1 it was difficult to assess how 
women responded to the male-dominated discussion of morality in which 
they were often the center. Nevertheless, I outline the main points of moral-
ity debates in women’s journals at the beginning and end of the war, such as 
Bilgi Yurdu (The homeland of knowledge), Genç Kadın (Young woman), 
Kadınlar Dünyası (Women’s world), and Seyyale (Flowing). 
As mentioned above, the journals I have chosen to evaluate in this study 
represent the differing standpoints among late Ottoman intellectual circles. 
The Islamic reformists publishing İslam Mecmuası were mostly Turkish na-
tionalists including ones who had emigrated from Russia. They sought new 
interpretations of religion to create new possibilities for the revival of Muslim 
society. The chief editor of the journal was Halim Sabit, a Turkic émigré from 
Russia. He published İslam Mecmuası from February 1914 to October 1918, 
the very years of the First World War. Without the benefit of hindsight, one 
may find it odd publishing a theological journal during the war years. How-
ever, a closer look provides a better understanding of this choice. In a time 
when Turkish nationalist ideology consolidating power, this group sought to 
clarify nationalist perspectives on religion. This was also important for war 
propaganda, partly due to the declaration of jihad. Masami Arai, a prominent 
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author who studied nationalist journals of the Young Turks, argues that since 
nationalists believed their relation to Islam was not sufficiently set out in 
other journals such as Türk Yurdu (Turkish homeland), they founded İslam 
Mecmuası to voice their views on religion.2 Arai translated the catchphrase of 
the journal as “life with religion, religion with life,”3 but given that the jour-
nal sought to establish a new life in which religious order fit into contempo-
rary society, a more accurate translation is “a religious life, a lively religion.” 
The issue of “finding true Islam” was at the core of the themes with which 
authors in İslam Mecmuası had dealt with.4 The names appeared as authors in 
this journal will sound familiar to scholars of late Ottoman intellectual his-
tory: M. Şerefettin (Yaltkaya), Mansurizade Said, M. Şemseddin (Günaltay), 
Ziya Gökalp, Mahmud Esad, Musa Kazım, Ahmet Agayef (Ağaoğlu), Musa 
Carullah, Rızaeddin Fahreddin, Abdürreşid İbrahim, Bereketzade İsmail 
Hakkı, Ispartalı Hakkı, Besim (Atalay), Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, Köprülüzade 
Mehmed Fuad, Aka Gündüz, and Ömer Seyfeddin. As Arai puts it, the writ-
ers for İslam Mecmuası “had one characteristic in common: They obtained a 
modern school education alongside a traditional one; they could thereby see 
into Islam and its conditions in an informed way.”5 They searched for the 
reasons for the decline of the Muslim world and agreed that while Islam itself 
was not a barrier to progress, superstition was.6 Accordingly, Islam could be 
progressive if “foreign” elements falsely regarded as religious rules could be 
eliminated. Therefore, they pioneered the translation of Quran into Turkish. 
The fields with which the writers dealt varied from jurisprudence (fıkıh) to 
sociology (ictimâîyyat) and from history to literature. The final pages of the 
journal were reserved for news from the Muslim world and jihad. The journal 
sparked significant discussions on four topics: polygyny, nationalism in Is-
lam, the sociology of Islamic Jurisprudence (İctimâî Usûl-ü Fıkıh), and the 
delivery of sermons in Turkish (Türkçe hutbe). These topics became heated 
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discussions when writers for Sebilürreşad harshly criticized nationalist, and 
reformist interpretations of Islam. For instance, İsmail Hakkı wrote seven 
articles to refute Gökalp’s arguments on the vast place of mores (örf) in Is-
lamic Law and on the re-interpretation of jurisprudence under the heading of 
İctimai Usul-ü Fıkıh.7 Some of these debates, such as the one on the place of 
nationalism in religion, provoked such heated discussions that the govern-
ment intervened to silence both sides.8 Broadly speaking, the conflict be-
tween the Islamists in Sebilürreşad and the nationalists in İslam Mecmuası 
was exacerbated by the question of the source of law; the nationalists were 
attempting to open up space for reform in religious thought.9 By attaching 
importance to mores and national culture (hars) and claiming that there is a 
distinction between culture and civilization, the nationalists new interpreted 
religion and Islamic law anew. Through these interpretations, they touched 
upon realms such as family formation and dissolution, social conduct in eve-
ryday life, religious education, and religious practice. Previously, these were 
the strongholds of Islamists. 
On the issue of morality, İslam Mecmuası published a column titled 
“Ahlâk” (Morality) which accounted for fourteen of the total of 362 articles 
published over its four years.10 However, many other articles – for instance, 
ones in the columns “Jurisprudence” and “Sociology” – also dealt with the 
issue of morality. Besim Atalay (1882-1965), a teacher and director of several 
schools of education, was the primary commentator on morality.11 Atalay 
had acquired eleven years of madrasa education before enrolling in a secular 
school.12 After the First World War, as the director of culture (Hars Müdürü) 
                                                      
 7 Some of these articles were transcribed in Kara, Türkiye’de İslâmcılık Düşüncesi. 
 8 Güler, “İslam Mecmuası (1914-1918) ve İçeriği,” 14. 
 9 For a detailed assessment of these discussions, see Bakırcı, “II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Din 
Sosyolojisinin Önemli Bir Kaynağı: İslam Mecmuası (1914-1918),” 177–210. 
 10 See Arai’s table of “Classification of Articles in the İslam Mecmuası” in Turkish Nationalism 
in the Young Turk Era, 87.  
 11 He signed his articles with his titles School Director from Konya, Maraş and the İçel Teacher 
Training Schools (Dar’ül-muallims) respectively. 
 12 The only biographic information on Besim Atalay I can find is a monograph focusing on his 
studies on language. See Özel, Besim Atalay.  
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he conducted studies on the Turkish language and brought together a book 
on “pure” Turkish in 1920.13 Later, he promoted the simplification of the 
Turkish language as a member of the Turkish Linguistic Society during the 
1930s. His translation the Quran into Turkish in 1941 received the apprecia-
tion of İsmet İnönü, then President of the Republic of Turkey.14 Besim Ata-
lay is known for his studies on language rather than his early career as a 
writer in late Ottoman journals. To my knowledge, neither a monograph nor 
a study evaluating his early articles has been published. Even so, discussions 
on jurisprudence and polygyny overshadowed other articles in İslam 
Mecmuası, including Atalay’s works. It is also interesting to note that 
Sebilürreşad’s writers never addressed Besim Atalay’s articles on morality; 
they considered Ziya Gökalp and Mansurizade Said to be their addressees. 
Other writers who wrote on morality in İslam Mecmuası included Ziya 
Gökalp, Halim Sabit, and Kazım Nami (Duru). Much has been written on 
Gökalp and his social and political thought in the formation of Turkish na-
tionalism and secularism.15 While his views on religion, culture, nation, 
Turkism, and Turkish history are among the most studied topics in Otto-
man/Turkish historiography, his understanding of morality has remained un-
explored so far.16 Except for the insight of Zafer Toprak in his works on the 
emergence of sociological thought in late Ottoman Era, a detailed contextual 
analysis of Gökalp’s use of morality has never been conducted. Throughout 
this chapter, I focus on Gökalp’s attempt to create a “national morality” and 
contextualize what this prominent figure of the time meant by moral degen-
eration as well as how he responded to conservative arguments on morality. 
                                                      
 13 Ibid. 
 14 “Sevgili Atalay, Tanrı kitabının çevrilmesi için yaptığınız denemeleri zevkle ve sevinerek 
okudum. Başarınız büyüktür ve çok ümit vericidir. Gelecek eserlerinizi sabırsızlıkla bekliy-
orum.” Özel, Besim Atalay, 25–26. 
 15 A prominent work in English on Ziya Gökalp’s thinking is Heyd, Foundations of Turkish 
Nationalism. A recent study assessed Gökalp’s views on reform in Islam: Kurzman, Modernist 
Islam, 1840-1940. 
 16 A far-right nationalist publishing house published simplified version of a compilation of his 
articles on morality; however, many misinterpretations are evident in this version. Cengiz and 
Atgın, Türk Ahlâkı.  
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Generally his articles on morality were published in Yeni Mecmua; however, 
he wrote several articles that also touched on morality in İslam Mecmuası. 
Kazım Nami is famous for the volumes containing his memoirs which he 
published in the 1950s.17 He was a pedagogue and his articles were on up-
bringing and pedagogy rather than morality. In 1925, he published a book 
for teachers on moral education in schools.18 
With respect to morality discourses, the importance of İslam Mecmuası 
stems from its theological approach. Instead of looking for arguments com-
pletely opposed to Islamist thinking, my aim is to see whether a different ap-
proach to morality was possible within the theological framework, and if so, 
how? What was the nationalist approach to the issue of morality? The 
themes, questions, and views that were elaborated upon under the heading of 
morality in İslam Mecmuası had points in common. The idea of rejecting 
European morality was shared by İslam Mecmuası’s writers who emphasize 
the superiority of Islam over Christianity and Judaism with respect to moral 
thought. They shared the viewpoint of Islamists on the destructive effects of 
modernist reforms during the Tanzimat era and of Westernist thought on 
Ottoman Muslim society.19 They claimed that Tanzimat reforms brought 
about an obscure ideology of Europeanization and created a generation who 
sought the reasons for decline in Islam. Referring to the emergence of Islam 
and the times of the prophet Mohammed, the authors attempted to revive 
the moral purity of Islam and to apply it to contemporary Muslim society. 
For reformists, the problems of false traditions and superstitions resulted in 
the degeneration of religion and moral values in society. For them, the Ot-
tomans remained backward because of superstition. They argued that con-
trary to the emphasis on morality discernible in theological works, morality 
was never considered as important as other religious practices in Islam. Besim 
                                                      
 17 Duru, Arnavutluk ve Makedonya Hatıralarım; Duru, Cumhuriyet Devri Hatıralarım; Duru, 
İttihat ve Terakki Hatıralarım. He also wrote a monograph on Gökalp: Duru, Ziya Gökalp. 
 18 Duru, Mekteblerde Ahlakı Nasıl Telkin Etmeli? 
 19 On the Tanzimat and its application, see Yıldız, 150. yılında Tanzimat. Also see the articles in 
Alkan et al., Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası, 
Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi. 
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Atalay argued that morality, as it had heretofore been known, originated 
from Ancient Greek and Indian thought, and was thus “foreign” to Ottoman 
Muslim society. 
As a distinctive point, the authors in İslam Mecmuası attempted to com-
bine religious views on morality with nationalism in order to create a new 
understanding of morality based on the duty of individuals to their nation. 
In line with the catchphrase of the journal – “lively religion” – they tried to 
make Islam useful in society. In juxtaposition to the argument of individuals’ 
responsibility to God, they emphasized the social aspect of morality. In this 
framework, morality became a matter of national survival. The nationalists 
argued that the decline of the nation went hand in hand with the decline of 
morality. Accordingly, the fact that all the calamities were the result of moral 
degeneration confirmed that morality is collective. With respect to religious 
practice, the authors claimed that to be morally upright is better than to pray 
five times a day. 
The happiness emphasized in this journal was an ultimate life goal that 
was achieved only through upright morality. This new understanding of mo-
rality was based on the elimination of ascetic morality (zühdî ahlâk) that had 
so far been promoted by incorrect interpretations of Islam. New ethics of 
work, life, and family would benefit the whole nation. In order to open up 
space for the interpretation of morality from the viewpoint of religion, Be-
sim Atalay claimed that morality is not ahistorical; on the contrary, moral 
thought could change in time. Contrary to other articles on morality, which 
often referred to the Quran, hadith, or the life of the prophet, this argument 
was supported by references to philosophers such as Spinoza and Schopen-
hauer. Describing morality as a social construct, İslam Mecmuası emphasized 
the importance of education, milieu (muhit), and inheritance that were at the 
core of morality instead of religion itself. Other thinkers cited in İslam 
Mecmuası were Rousseau, Gustav Le Bon, and Durkheim. Interestingly, 
İslam Mecmuası had made few references to sexuality – particularly women’s 
sexuality – as part of moral degeneration. Instead, dishonesty, fraud, and in-
citing other people were evaluated as among the most significant moral 
problems. Thoughts resulting in “collective destruction” – such as denying 
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the past, disrespecting ancestors, and being pessimistic about the future – 
were counted among immoral behaviors. 
The journal Sebilürreşad had a longer publication history than İslam 
Mecmuası.20 Initially, the journal was titled Sırat-ı Müstakim and was pub-
lished right after the declaration of the constitutional regime in 1908. The 
chief editor was Serezli Hafız Eşref Edib, a graduate of the School of Law 
(Mekteb-i Hukuk). The journal is considered one of the “Islamist modernist” 
journals in the empire, as it published translations of famous Islamist reform-
ers such as Muhammed Abduh and Ferid Vecdi. As discussed by Somel, the 
writers for the journal had strong ties to the Committee of Union and Pro-
gress.21 
When Ebul’ula Mardin quit the editorship in 1912, the name of the jour-
nal was changed to Sebilürreşad, and the chief editors became Eşref Edib and 
Mehmed Akif. As Somel argues, while Sırat-ı Müstakim was more tolerant of 
non-Islamist voices, the political perspective of the writers for Sebilürreşad 
became more radical after events such as the Balkan Wars, the Tripoli War, 
and the First World War.22 Although the journal supported the War of Inde-
pendence, it became a stronghold of opposition to the secularist reforms of 
the Early Turkish Republic. Eventually, the infamous Law on the Mainte-
nance of Order (Takrir-i Sükûn), which was enacted to suppress the Sheikh 
Said Revolt of 1925, spelled the end of this journal because of its Islamic, op-
positional stance. 
Today, the journal has an important place in the ideological perspective 
of the political Islamists movement in Turkey. The new mosque of Diyanet 
İşleri was named for Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, a prominent writer in 
                                                      
 20 On Sırat-ı Müstakim and Sebilürreşad, see Debus, Sebilürreşâd; Somel, “Sırat-ı Müstakim”; 
Tunaya, İslamcılık Akımı; Toprak, “Türkiye’de Fikir Dergiciliğinin Yüz Yılı.” 
 21 Somel, “Sırat-ı Müstakim,” 4–5. With respect to the difference between İslam Mecmuası and 
Sebilürreşad, for now it is worth noting that the CUP was not a monolithic party in which 
many different views were coalesced under a single name. On the other hand, the Sebilürreşad 
writers criticized the nationalists because nationalists were benefiting from modernist inter-
pretations of Islam such as those of Afgani or Abduh to strengthen their own view. See Debus, 
Sebilürreşâd, 51. 
 22 Somel, “Sırat-ı Müstakim,” 5–6. 
M O R A L  C R I S I S  O N  T H E  O T T O M A N  H O M E F R O N T  
43 
Sebilürreşad, in 2013. Recently, the Bağcılar Municipality undertook a 25-
volume transcription of all of Sırat-ı Müstakim and Sebilürreşad’s issues into 
the Latin alphabet.23 The Ministry of Cultural Affairs announced 2011 as the 
“Year of Mehmed Akif,” with a full of events including symposiums, exhibi-
tions, and gatherings. Apart from these, there are convincing parallels be-
tween current political Islamists views and the ones defended in the journal. 
While conducting my research, I saw that most works by Sebilürreşad writ-
ers, including series of articles that were published in Sebilürreşad, were 
transliterated, simplified, and republished with the sponsorship of state insti-
tutions, particularly that of the Ministry of Culture, in the 1980s. The ideo-
logical atmosphere at the time was shaped by the 12 September 1980 coup-
d’état, and the military government promoted anti-communism as an ideo-
logical basis for neoliberal politics. The new ideology, the military elites were 
convinced, had to embrace and synthesize Turkish nationalism and Islamism, 
an ideology today known as the “Turkish-Islamist Synthesis.” The recircula-
tion of Sebilürreşad by the state institutions of that time demonstrates that 
the works of Sebilürreşad writers were useful for feeding the religious side of 
this ideology.24 
The legacy of Sebilürreşad in Turkish politics is evident. In addition, an 
interesting point in the recirculation of Sebilürreşad is that both the publish-
                                                      
 23 The Islamist writer M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ edits the series. Online access to the journal is 
available via the Bağcılar Municipality’s website, "Sırâtımüstakim." Bağcılar Belediyesi, 2017. 
http://www.bagcilar.bel.tr/kategori/1137/6/siratimustakim.aspx. 
 24 On the other hand, a course titled “Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi” (religious culture and moral 
knowledge) became compulsory in schools in 1982. The name and content of the course indi-
cate the unification and equalization of religiosity being moral superiority. Later, in the 1990s, 
right-wing publishing houses and newspapers such as Tercüman and Dergah Publishing pub-
lished these works. Today, in the 2010s, a controversial endowment, Ensar Vakfı, is re-
publishing some of these works through a foundation called the Değerler Eğitimi Merkezi 
(values education center) for instruction in new school courses introduced by the government 
called “morals/values education.” For compliations recently published by the aforementioned 
publication houses, see Kaya, Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Osmanlı’da Ahlâk Eğitimi; Bayrak-
tar, Son Dönem Osmanlı Ahlâk Terbiyecileri ve Ahlak Terbiyesi. Esther Debus wrote that the 
articles and arguments in Sebilürreşad are popular also among the Turkish Islamist movement 
in Europe. See Debus, Sebilürreşâd, 286. 
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ers and editors of these volumes treat the statements in Sebilürreşad as ahis-
torical – timeless guides to life, politics, society, and religion. No example is 
more striking than the 1991 catalog of Sebilürreşad prepared in 1989 and 
published by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), 
which revealed the ahistorical approach.25 One would expect a catalog of a 
journal published for decades to be chronological. Instead, the catalog is in 
alphabetical order because the statements of the Sebilürreşad writers are per-
ceived useful regardless of their contexts. A contribution of this dissertation 
is to contextualize at least the articles on morality.  
Given this long introduction to the journal, the importance of studying 
morality discourses in Sebilürreşad and how this sheds light on today’s Tur-
key should be clear. In this chapter, I only consider articles published during 
the First World War and some from the year 1919 (censorship was lifted 
from summer 1918 until February 1919, so it is useful to see an uncensored 
version of the journal.) Also, only those articles referring to wartime and its 
relation to the moral decline fall under the scope of the study. Pages of 
Sebilürreşad were generously given over to morality issues even before the 
war. This vast interest in morality, in my opinion, stemmed from the fact 
that Islamists approached morality, the protection of morality, and moral 
education as the last strongholds of their intellectual, social, and political su-
periority. 
The most important articles in Sebilürreşad to be contextualized in a his-
torical framework are commentaries written in response to other views in the 
Ottoman press. Sebilürreşad commented at great length on articles on mo-
rality that were published elsewhere. These commentaries constitute impor-
tant cases to be evaluated in the following pages. 
The authors who dealt with morality in Sebilürreşad included, variously, 
Mehmet Akif (Ersoy), Ahmed Naim (Babanzade), Prens Said Halim Paşa, 
and Ahmed Hamdi (Akseki). However, most commentaries and reviews writ-
ten in response to other journals and newspapers were penned by the edito-
rial staff. 
                                                      
 25 Ceyhan, Sırat-ı Müstakim ve Sebilürreşad Mecmuaları Fıhristi. 
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Before delving into morality debates in Sebilürreşad, a few introductory 
words need to be said about the figures mentioned above. Mehmet Akif (Er-
soy) (1873-1936), was the writer of the Turkish National Anthem, famously 
carries the title of “national poet” of Turkey. A strong supporter of the CUP 
(during the First World War he served in Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, the under-
ground paramilitary organization of the CUP) he supported the War of In-
dependence with famous sermons in the mosques. Later, he was disappointed 
by secular reforms of the Republic of Turkey and thus abandoned the country 
and settled in Egypt.26 Ahmed Naim (Baban/Babanzade) (1872-1934) re-
ceived degrees from Galatasaray High School (Galatasaray Mekteb-i Sultan-
isi) and the School of Civil Administration (Mekteb-i Mülkiye) and subse-
quently became a member of the Ottoman bureaucracy. During the war 
years, he worked in the Ministry of Education. In the early republican years, 
he became the rector of Istanbul University until the forced resign during a 
1933 purge that targeted academics.27 His work opposing ethnic nationalism, 
titled İslam’da Dava-yı Kavmiyet (Nationalism in Islam) became a manifesto 
by which Islamists defended the unity of the Muslim ummah under the ca-
liphate against Turkish nationalists.28 Said Halim Paşa (1865-1921) was the 
grandson of the founder of modern Egypt, Muhammed Ali. He worked in 
the Ottoman bureaucracy during the Hamidian regime but was eventually 
exiled following a denunciation report (jurnal). In 1913, he became grand 
vizier as a member of the CUP despite his criticism of the 1908 Constitution. 
He remained grand vizier until his resignation – or most accurately, his re-
moval from office by the CUP – in 1917, after the Arab Revolt of 1916. He 
was a known Islamist and supporter of Muslim unity, this revolt cost him his 
career.29 His works, most of which were published as series of articles in 
Sebilürreşad, were brought together as a book titled Buhranlarımız (Our cri-
ses) in 1919. Among the crises he mentioned, I examine the social and ideo-
                                                      
 26 Şeyhun, Islamist Thinkers in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic, 19–20. 
 27 Ibid., 59. 
 28 Ahmet Naim, İslâmda Dava-yı Kavmiyet. 
 29 Şeyhun, Islamist Thinkers in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic, 147–
152. 
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logical crisis with respect to which he harshly criticized Westernists and advo-
cates of European morality. Ahmed Hamdi (Akseki) (1887-1951), a graduate 
of a madrasa, worked in many medreses as lecturer (dersiam). He became the 
head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) in 
1947.30 He wrote many books on morality, some of which were composed of 
the articles he wrote in Sebilürreşad.31 
What were morality and immorality according to the Sebilürreşad writ-
ers? How did they perceive moral decline, and what was their solution to this 
problem? A close look at the journal’s index shows that morality was one of 
the topics most commented upon throughout the history of the journal. In 
most of these articles, the main interest of the writers was to show that relig-
ion is the only source of morality. They argued that no morals, values, or 
manners could exist without religion. For them, because the superior religion 
on earth was Islam, the superior morality was Islamic morality. In this jour-
nal, morality was utilized to criticize Westernists, nationalists, feminists, re-
formers, materialists, and Bolsheviks. Broadly speaking, the reason for moral 
decline according to Sebilürreşad writers was deviation from religion and 
Islamic law in both daily life as well as in politics. Most of the writers at-
tacked European-oriented Tanzimat reforms and also the degenerative im-
pact of the Constitutional Revolution of 1908. Debates on the emancipation 
of Muslim women constituted a distinct issue in the scope of Sebilürreşad’s 
polemics of moral decline. The writers placed the political and social emanci-
pation of women, opposition to the veil, the demands of women to join pub-
lic life (especially by working outside the home alongside men), and the 
rights of women vis-à-vis marriage at the center, and they argued that these 
were incompatible with an Islamic understanding of morality. Accordingly, 
sexuality remained the basic issue of immorality, and the subordination of 
women was at its core. With frequent references to increasing prostitution 
(including the frivolous behavior of women), the Sebilürreşad writers took 
gender roles and sexual limits as defined by Islam as the first condition to be 
morally upright. Interestingly, unlike many contemporary observers, 
                                                      
 30 Kara, Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi, 271–273.  
 31 Akseki, Ahlâk İlmi ve İslâm Ahlâkı; Akseki, İslâm Dini, İtikat, İbâdet ve Ahlâk. 
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Sebilürreşad articles claimed that the real reason for prostitution was not 
economic hardships but lack of adequate religious morality. 
Broadly speaking, Sebilürreşad writers argued that since the superiority of 
Muslims had always been derived from their morality – and their moral 
power was derived from the religion – deviation from Islam had brought 
about the end of this superiority. It was not knowledge or science but moral 
superiority that would make the Ottoman Empire great again. Science and 
knowledge could only be instruments to reach higher values. Since many 
Muslims in the Ottoman Empire disregarded Islamic law and orders in their 
lives, the country was cursed with unhappiness and defeat in every sphere, 
particularly at war. They strongly emphasized that the Ottoman Empire is the 
land of the caliphate and that the “whole Muslim world as well as the enemies 
of it” were watching it. Women, adolescents, and men had to act properly. 
Turning to the practices of the “age of happiness” (asr-ı saadet) and dispens-
ing with Western influences were ultimate goals in order to correct people’s 
morality. 
In some cases, the Sebilürreşad acted as an informant vis-à-vis dubious 
morality. The journal published the names of writers, journals, and articles –
including some excerpts from the works – to urge the government to act 
against immoral content. Articles on dancing, coeducational meetings, anti-
veil propaganda, cinema, theater, and love poems were among these “im-
moral” publications listed by Sebilürreşad. In addition, the editors also pub-
lished pieces from other papers that they appreciated from a moral point of 
view.  
To sum, the main characteristics of the morality discussion in 
Sebilürreşad that were distinctively different from those of the nationalists 
were the centrality of sexuality, opposition to feminism and the women’s 
movement, and the dilemma regarding the embrace of Western modernity. 
They harshly criticized the concept of “national morality” which they con-
sidered antagonistic to God’s orders. On the other hand, Islamists and Turk-
ish nationalists were united with respect to their disapproval of “Western mo-
rality.” 
The third journal I evaluate is Yeni Mecmua. The sixty-six issues of this 
weekly journal were published between July 1917 and October 1918, the end 
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of the First World War. It began publishing again upon the foundation of the 
Republic of Turkey for a short time. Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, who was among 
the writers of the journal, asserted that the chief editor, Ziya Gökalp, soft to 
publish a politically independent, financially self-sufficient journal; however, 
after just a few issues, he was faced with financial problems. A leading CUP 
member, Küçük Talat (Muşkara), offered help to finance the journal while 
guaranteeing the independence of its content. From then on, the journal was 
published with the sponsorship of the CUP.32 
The writers of the journal are among prominent figures in Turkish intel-
lectual history: Mehmed Fuat Köprülü, Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Ömer Seyfettin, 
Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, Halide Edip Adıvar, Avram Galanti, Refik Halid Karay, 
Tekin Alp, and Necmeddin Sadak. As discussed by Erol Köroğlu, this journal 
brought together many intellectuals including those with different views in 
order to increase the efficacy of the cultural output of war propaganda.33 To-
gether they contributed to the formation of a “national culture” by creating a 
new literary genre called National Literature (Millî Edebiyat) in the pages of 
Yeni Mecmua.34 Moreover, sociology articles columns mostly written by 
Gökalp constituted the principles of the Turkish nationalist movement. Some 
of Gökalp’s series of articles in Yeni Mecmua (including those on morality) 
would become part of his handbook on nationalism titled Turkification, Is-
lamization, Modernization.35 
Yeni Mecmua advertised itself as “weekly journal on scholarship, arts and 
morality” (ilim, sanat ve ahlâka dair haftalık mecmua). In accordance with 
this claim, articles on morality appeared in almost every issue. I chose this 
journal because it provides a better understanding of precisely what those 
prominent nationalists of the time who were writing in Yeni Mecmua 
                                                      
 32 Yahya Kemal, Siyasi ve Edebi Portreler, 17–18, quoted in Yamaç, “Basın Tarihinde Yeni 
Mecmua Muhteva Analizi ve Dizini,” x. For the publication history of Yeni Mecmua, also see 
Köroğlu, Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity, 93–94. 
 33 Köroğlu, Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity, 90. 
 34 Ibid., 100–115. 
 35 Gökalp, Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak; For selected articles of Ziya Gökalp in 
English, see Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization. 
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thought about moral crisis, how they correlated it to the war, and how their 
solutions differed from those of theological and religious approaches. Moral-
ity was a central topic throughout this journal, as a concept carefully ana-
lyzed by Necmettin Sadak and Ziya Gökalp in their attempts to formulate 
their thinking on the establishment of a “new life.”36 They envisaged a new 
understanding of morality that would constitute the backbone of Turkish po-
litical, economic, and socio cultural life. I discuss this further under the head-
ing “national morality.” 
The articles on morality were frequently in the sociology (“ictimâîyyat”) 
column and occasionally under the title the problem of upringing (Terbiye 
Meselesi). Necmettin Sadak and Ziya Gökalp were the chief commentators 
on morality, either Gökalp or Sadak wrote on morality on a weekly basis. 
Necmettin Sadak is known as the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1947 
and 1950. In the late Ottoman era, he was one of few graduates in sociology 
and taught sociology with Gökalp at Darülfünun (today Istanbul Univer-
sity). Sadak was a journalist, as well; he founded Akşam newspaper in 1918.37 
In this study, I primarily take the articles of Gökalp and Sadak in Yeni 
Mecmua into account with few exceptions. Gökalp and Sadak shared com-
mon views on morality; however, Sadak had more practical insights when 
contrasted with Gökalp’s historical, theoretical analysis. In his articles, 
Gökalp argued that only through sociological analysis could the Ottoman 
society overcome the crisis of morality. On the other hand, Sadak usually ex-
pressed his ideas on morality vis-à-vis the issue of upbringing (terbiye). 
Gökalp and Sadak shared a mission to correct the contemporaneous views on 
morality and establish a theory of secular national morality. Indeed, this 
formulation of a new morality was a translation the morale laïque of the 
French Third Republic. The term was particularly important for education 
policy which came into being in the late nineteenth century and sought to 
replace the monopoly of religion over education. It was important in creat-
                                                      
 36 “Yeni Hayat” was also the name of Gökalp’s book of poetry published by Yeni Mecmua in 
1918 which reflected his project of national life. Köroğlu, Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish 
Identity, 128. 
 37 Birinci, “Necmettin Sadık Sadak (1890-1953),” 493. 
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ing the “citizen” for the new republic. Emile Durkheim was the chief figure 
who had formulated morale laïque in line with his ideas on solidarity, har-
monious social life, and common consciousness.38 A cross reference of Durk-
heim’s work with those of Sadak, Gökalp, and Atalay reveals that the Otto-
man intelligentsia translated and adopted Durkheim’s theoretical framework 
in its entirety with the exception of his understanding of society. While for 
Durkheim the central concept was society, for Turkish nationalists it was the 
nation.39 
The aim of national morality according to these authors was to bring 
about a secular understanding of morality that was compatible with Turkish 
nationalism. This understanding of morality would shape the basic notion of 
solidarity in society. Although many scholars have evaluated the emphasis of 
solidarity for the formation of Turkish nationalism, the role of morality in 
this formulation remains vague. I believe that nationalists formulated solidar-
ity as a solution to the so-called “moral crisis.” In addition, a broad role is 
attributed to morality for solving social and individual problems that had in-
creased due to the war. The emergence of the discourse of a “crisis of moral-
ity” was a reaction to these problems – an attempt to coalesce all social and 
individual problems under one heading. Yeni Mecmua’s vast interest in mo-
rality in the very years of war stemmed from the fact that its prominent 
writers considered wartime as an opportunity to broaden the sphere of na-
tionalism and hasten the involvement of the state and government in un-
touched realms such as family. This formulation of social revolution, called 
ictimâî inkılab, not only staked claim to the moral realm and shook its relig-
ious foundations, but also institutionalized a new morality deemed inher-
ently superior to the religious one. Indeed, it challenged the existing social 
and political order. 
Yeni Mecmua coined a new concept to label the time through which the 
Ottoman Empire was passing: the stage of transition (intikâl devresi). The 
authors claimed that the crisis of morality was indeed a natural result of this 
period and had been observed previously in other developed countries. The 
                                                      
 38 Stock-Morton, Moral Education for a Secular Society, 125–139. 
 39 Zürcher, Turkey, 131. 
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transition entailed a transition to the age of social division of labor (ictimâî iş 
bölümü devresi). They argued that this process would soon be completed and 
finalized during the national period (millî devir). However, since the Otto-
man society had not established a social morality (ictimâî ahlâk), this period 
had become one of chaos. For Gökalp and Sadak, the old “ascetic morality” 
that was primarily concerned with the “self” and individual salvation was be-
ing shaken worldwide, soon a new collective morality would prevail in every 
developed country as a condition for a happy life. 
What was the new morality? For the polemicists in Yeni Mecmua, the 
sources of morality should be national. Instead of superstitions, useless tradi-
tions, and norms (that had been adopted from foreign cultures) and imita-
tion of Western culture, the new morality should rely on the mores of the 
“pure nation” and the collective conscience (ictimâî vicdan). The reasons for 
the moral crisis were conflicts that arose between education in Western-style 
schools and the realities of Ottoman Muslim society. Therefore, the two 
scholars emphasized the importance of milieu (muhit) in the moral develop-
ment of an individual. This did not mean that the moral values of contem-
poraneous Muslim society had to be accepted per se; on the contrary, by the 
end of the transition stage the milieu and new moral values would become 
compatible. The new morality was the key to coping with wartime problems, 
as well. For instance, the only remedy for war profiteering was to establish 
corporations with the principle of solidarity. The members of these corpora-
tions would have a collective understanding of morality and would never 
allow profiteering to happen. Due to the war, the Turkish people had come to 
understand the meaning of collectivity; therefore, wartime realities – despite 
their destructive effects on society – also open the gates for a new society.  
Women’s journals, on the other hand, were not involved in discussions of 
morality as much as the journals cited above. However, two approaches to 
“immorality of women” polemics can be observed. The first questions the 
unequal moral expectations that were set from men and women, and the 
second critiques the old values accompanying discourses on the need for so-
cial reform. In this respect, moral discourses on women were considered an 
obstacle to the emancipation of women. Moreover, the discourse of moral 
decline strengthened the idea of reform in the social realm. To an extent, it is 
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possible to observe anxieties about moral decline among women writers, as 
well. Instead of a comprehensive analysis of women’s articles, I underline the 
main trends with regard to discourses on moral decline. Therefore, I abbrevi-
ate discussions revolving around education, clothing, employment, and gen-
der relations in public and private spaces. 
As this study shows, the contest over morality was not only an intellec-
tual endeavor. Morality had become a political instrument between the rival 
ideologies. It was also important in the context of “saving the state” from 
decline. The First World War, on the other hand, constituted the setting for 
testing out the contesting ideologies over morality in society. 
§ 2.1  İslam Mecmuası: A Theological Perspective on the “New 
Morality” 
In this part of the chapter, we discuss how the authors of İslam Mecmuası de-
fined moral crisis and what kinds of solutions they offered from their “Isla-
mist Turkists” perspective. In line with the journal’s motto, “a lively relig-
ion,” the authors of the journal considered morality to be central point for 
the construction of a new understanding of good and bad to be pursued in 
the daily lives of Ottoman Muslims. For them, morality was a point of depar-
ture for discussing conflicts between the necessities of modern times and the 
old doctrines of tradition and religion. Questioning the limits of Islamic Law 
was ideological strength of the nationalists; morality was a great weapon to 
control this debate. It is my contention that the Turkish nationalist formula-
tion of the modernization of the Ottoman Empire –  “adopting the technol-
ogy of the West but not the Western morality” – served for purpose of 
avoiding being associated with “imitators of the West.” For the sake of analy-
sis, first I begin with what the old morality meant for the authors and how 
they criticized it. We should note that old morality mostly referred to doc-
trines of religion, but was not limited to them. The concept also referred to 
the principles of the Tanzimat era which nationalists resented its European-
oriented character. Second, I compare the concept of a new morality to the 
old, presenting their views on contemporary morality in order to assess their 
definition of the moral crisis. İslam Mecmuası was a theoretical journal that 
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set out the ideas of Turkish nationalists on Islam and makes theological in-
terpretations of Islam in line with the nationalist principles. Therefore, it 
would be misguided to expect many references to day-to-day events or prac-
tical issues. Instead, such references were abundant in Yeni Mecmua. 
Eventually, we demonstrate how the discourse of morality crisis was used 
and manipulated by nationalists for the purposes of advocating reform to the 
religious mentality. The nationalists embraced the concept of a moral crisis – 
which was frequently claimed by Islamists to emphasize the troubling conse-
quences of modernization – and took it in the opposite direction in critique 
of conservatives. It is possible to summarize this view as a theological ap-
proach that claimed the moral sphere but this time to use morality in the 
service of profane affairs. The First World War constituted the dramatic set-
ting in which reformers could call for urgent, radical change. 
2.1.1  The “Old Morality” versus the “New Morality” from the Per-
spective of Religion 
As mentioned earlier, Ahmed Besim Atalay was among the prominent fig-
ures writing on the relationship between religion and morality. Although his 
writings remained within the theological framework, he developed an alter-
native understanding of morality to the understanding that he called old 
morality.  
The old morality was originated from a mixture of several sources. Ah-
med Besim, in his article “Morality and Religion,” argued that up to then all 
the moralists in the Muslim world adopted the models in the ancient Greek 
and Indian philosophy.40 He said Muslim scholars adopted and reproduced 
this “archaic perspective” in their so-called Islamic and religious works.41 Ata-
                                                      
 40 Ahmet Besim, “Ahlak: Ahlak ve Din,” 27. “İslam âleminde şimdiye kadar ahlâka dair eser 
veren zevât eski Hind ve Yunan nazariyet-i ahlâkiyyesini esas ittihaz etmiştir. İslam 
ulemâsının ahlâk hakkındaki düşünceleri hemen hemen Hind ve Yunan nazarlarının bir isti-
talesinden ibarettir.”  
 41 Ibid. The works he referred to as “archaic” were the classics on morality in the Muslim and the 
Ottoman literary world, such as Kınalızâde Ali Efendi’s Ahlâk-ı Alâî or Nasirüddin Tûsî’s 
Ahlâk-ı Nâsirî. 
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lay divided Muslim society into three according to perspectives on morality: 
The philosophical perspective, the first group in Muslim society that adopted 
the ancient Greek and Indian morality. This group consisted of prominent 
figures in Islamic scholarship including İbn-i Rüşd, Farabi, İbn-i Sina or Nasi-
ruddin Tûsî. The second group consisted of sufis who appreciated spiritualism 
and discovered the virtues of high morality. However, they represented a 
small group and despite some original views that they derived from Islam, 
they too, were inspired by a foreign philosopher, Pythagoras. The third group 
was the common people (avam). Their understanding of morality did not 
rely on rational thought, experimentation, or self-improvement. Their un-
derstanding of morality relied only on certain false traditions (eğri doğru 
birtakım görenekler) and teachings (telkînat); hence, it is impossible to assess 
the morality of the masses and identify the sources feeding their moral 
judgments. 
He argued that the morality understandings of the first two groups were 
under “foreign influence,” primarily that of Greek and Indian philosophy.42 
Therefore, he claimed that Muslims never developed independent thought 
on morality; on the contrary, among the three principles of Islam (ahkâm-ı 
İslamiyye) Muslims neglected conscience and social principles (vicdâni and 
ictimâî) and corrupted jurisprudence and theology (fıkıh and kelâm) by sim-
ply turning Muslims into “praying machines” and spreading relativity and 
materialism among them.43 Consequently, Islamic scholars did not develop 
an authentic Islamic morality. According to him, by defining morality as 
“habitual” practices that need no further consideration (nefs-i nâtıkanın bir 
melekesi), Islamic scholars made the mistake of removing “reason” and 
“cogitation” behind human action.44 Because these scholars had wrong inter-
pretations on religious morality, most calamities in both the Orient and Oc-
                                                      
 42 Ibid.  
 43 Ibid. “fıkh İslamları bir ibadet makinesi haline getirdi, kelâm da onları itikad hususunda pek 
maddî ve pek nazariyatcı yapmıştır.” He claims this is the reason for the emergence of differ-
ent schools in Islam.  
 44 Ahmed Besim, “Din ve Ahlâk: Mânâ-yı Ahlâk,” 16.  
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cident stemmed from the conspiracies of immoral clerics.45 Ahmed Besim, 
quoting from Rousseau and Gustave Le Bon, wrote that such “scholarship” 
based on poor interpretations did not advance humanity.46 Ahmed Besim 
used Islamist claims – such as “being moral is superior than to making scien-
tific discoveries” or “without morality, knowledge is useless” – and turned 
their arguments upside down. His formulation was that “religious scholars or 
clergy (ulemâ) are useless without morality.” 
As a defender of “true Islam,” Besim argued that upright morals consti-
tute the foundations of Islam. For him, the hadith of prophet Mohammed, “I 
was only sent to perfect moral character,” summarizes the essence of religion. 
Islam gained power thanks to its emphasis on high moral standards that pri-
oritize virtues. He referred to the importance of the historical context when 
Islam was initially spread. The Roman Empire was on the verge of distruction 
due to the moral failure of the Romans. In contrast, Islam announced morals 
as fundamental to human life and thus gained popularity among who re-
sented the corruption in the Roman Empire. Islamic principles were based on 
the fact that morality is the only difference between a human and an ani-
mal.47 This emphasis on morality had given rise to the advancement of Islam. 
İslam Mecmuası had a mission to redefine ideals of morality according to 
the needs of modern times. First of all, the new morality had to serve collec-
tive (ictimâî) benefits, not individual ones. Ahmed Besim defined the rituals 
and practices in Islam (such as prayers and fasting) as part of a “habitual” un-
derstanding of morality. He condemned those “who feel sorrow if they wash 
their nose their left hand [by mistake] during ablution but feel nothing when 
destroying the lives of orphans’ or accepting bribes.”48 “Evil behavior harms 
                                                      
 45 “Şark ve Garbde vukua gelmiş olan fenalıkların kısm-ı azminin menşei ahlaksız ulemanın 
çevirdikleri fırıldaklarda buluruz; tarih buna pek güzel bir şahiddir.” Ahmed Besim, “Ahlak 
ve Din 2,” 7. 
 46 “Russo ilmden beşeriyete bir faide gelmeyeceğini ve belki zararlar iras edeceğini ve ahlakın 
ilme mercih bulunduğunu söylüyor; Gustav Le Bon da yakın ifadatda bulunuyor.” Ibid., 8.  
 47 Ahmed Besim, “Ahlak: Din ve Ahlak 3,” 11. 
 48 “Abdest alırken sağ eliyle burnunu temizlediği için muzdarib olan bir kimse rüşvet alırken; 
öksüzlerin ocağına su dökerken vicdanı hiç isyan etmemiştir.” Ahmed Besim, “Ahlak: Ahlak 
ve Din,” 27.  
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everyone… ” he claimed, “if we search for the sources of calamities that hu-
man beings – especially Turks – have experienced, we find that they were the 
moral corruption of some people who acted inconsiderately and did not even 
deem their acts to be petty sins.”49 Claiming that the basic reason for relig-
ious practice was to remind people of their moral duty, he frequently quoted 
the Quran and hadith (the advice of the prophet Mohammed) to support the 
idea.50 Ahmed Besim argued that adhering to high moral standards is more 
important (and useful) than religious practices such as praying: “God will 
forgive us if we do not perform physical practices of religion, and such sins 
do not harm social order (içtimâîyyat). However, if we do not fulfill our 
moral duties, we disregard both the rights of God and the rights of his vas-
sals.”51 He criticized the current understanding of “religious practice” which, 
according to him, was limited to “physical” activities. Instead, he claimed 
there is another, “spiritual” way of religious practice – namely, being moral.52 
As morality is spiritual religious practice, it serves both the purposes of 
being religiously upright and the welfare of society. In fact, the new morality 
focused on society and collectivity rather than individual and self. In İslam 
Mecmuası, “saving the nation” was central to the effort to formulate a new 
morality. Ahlak had to have a reason (gaye). Eventually, the “Muslim 
Turkists” sought to make use of the “spiritual” side of religion for their cause, 
as well. Ahmed Besim was convinced that “nations that had survived so far 
                                                      
 49 “Beşeriyetin – bilhassa biz Türklerin – başına gelen felaketlerin hakiki menşei araştırılacak 
olursa görülür ki bazı eşhasın – mühimsemeyerek ve hatta ufak günah bile addetmeyerek – 
yaptıkları ahlaki yolsuzluklardır.” Ahmed Besim, “Ahlak: Din ve Ahlak, Nazar-ı İslam’da 
Ahlak,” 7. 
 50 For instance, he quoted the hadith “Ne kadar namaz kılan kimseler vardır ki kazançları ancak 
yorgunluktur” which translates as “There are so many of those praying who gain nothing but 
tiredness.” Ahmed Besim, “Din ve Ahlak, 9:  İbadat-ı İslamiyye ve Ahlak,” 14.  
 51 “Bedenî ibadetleri yapmadığımız zaman Allah bizi affeder ve bu günahlar ictimâîyyatı 
etkilemez. Ama vazife-yi ahlakiyemizi ifâ etmediğimiz zaman hem hukûk-u Allahı hem de 
hukûk-u ibâdı ayaklar altına almış bulunuruz.” Ahmed Besim, “Ahlak: Din ve Ahlak, Nazar-ı 
İslam’da Ahlak,” 7.  
 52 Ahmed Besim, “Ahlak, Din ve Ahlak: İbadat-ı İslamiye ve Ahlak,” 14.  
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absolutely possessed a solid moral and spiritual foundation.”53 He considered 
morality to be a precondition for “progress” and “civilization,” because it was 
not law that prevented (or encouraged) people to behave correctly, but mo-
rality.54 He insisted that the decline of the nations, especially Muslim nations, 
was due to the adoption of the ancient morals of defeated nations.55 The rise 
of the Roman Empire, he argued, was a result of the Romans’ moral strength 
symbolized by resignation of the senate to return to farm.56 For him, an up-
right morality was similar to military training that encourages people to re-
sist bullets.57 All physical religious practices, in his opinion, should serve the 
needs of society. Fasting, for instance, produces empathy with the poor. 
Therefore, one should think the social benefits of religion while performing 
religious duties.58 Ahmed Besim and a few other writers commented on the 
question of whether morality changes over time. As making social values 
compatible with the modern age, space (mekân), and community was their 
ultimate goal, the reformists in İslam Mecmuası agreed that morality 
changes over time. Or to put it more precisely, they argued that morality had 
to change. Indeed, this was the genesis of social revolution (içtimâî inkılab). 
In the first issue of İslam Mecmuası, an author called Muallim Vahyi 
(Muallim refers to his profession, a teacher) wrote an article titled “Muslim 
Morality.”59 Instead of engaging in a theoretical discussion, he briefly sum-
marized how Muslims should behave in order to be morally upright. He pos-
ited four conditions for ideal Muslim morality: “strength [of the body], wis-
                                                      
 53 “Yaşayan milletler – mutlaka – sağlam bir ahlaka, sarsılmaz bir imana malikdirler.” Ahmed 
Besim, “Ahlak ve Din 2,” 9-10. 
 54 Ibid., 10.  
 55 “Mağlub milletlerin kokmuş ahlâklarını yamamağa başlayan İslamlar terakkileri kadar 
sur’atle tedenni etmekde gecikmediler.” Ibid., 9.  
 56 Ibid. He is probably referring to Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, the Roman dictator who 
voluntarily returned to farming after his service. “Vatanı yolunda kendini ateşe atanlar, 
çiftçiliği a’yan âzâlığına tercih edenler bulundukça Roma yükseldi.”  
 57 Ibid.  
 58 Ahmed Besim, “Din ve Ahlak 11: İbadat-ı İslamiye ve Ahlâk, Oruç, Hac ve Zekat,” 8.  
 59 Muallim Vahyi, “Ahlak: Müslüman,” 20.  
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dom, diligence, and fairness.”60 He emphasized how important it is for Mus-
lims to accumulate capital, become involved in trade, and increase their 
wealth as these were among the good deeds. He recommended Muslims to 
find practical solutions in every sphere of work, use machine power, make 
scientific discoveries, and be good at their jobs. He formulated new Muslim 
morality as such: “the heart of a Muslim beats with God while his hand works 
continuously.”61 One may find his advice generic; however, it is possible to 
read his statements as expressions reflecting the drawbacks to progress in 
Muslim society. He summarized these drawbacks in contemporaneous moral-
ity as: “seeing the world’s despair, being hopeless, [and] falling into idle-
ness.”62 I believe these were related to the war and psychological atmosphere 
of the wartime. Ahmed Besim also mentioned a pessimistic attitude among 
Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Ahmed Besim advised Muslims 
to turn their faces toward the future not the past.63  
An interesting point that deserves attention in the writings of “reform-
ists moralists” is their emphasis on happiness (saadet). In almost all the arti-
cles, references to happiness accompany the discourse of “progress;” it is the 
ultimate goal reached by means of ideal morality. Being happy was used as a 
contrast to pessimism and asceticism. Ahmed Besim argued that despite the 
firmness of Islamic morality, it is also capable of rendering happiness to hu-
manity.64 Being Muslim, accordingly, is to be happy through self-
purification.65 On this point, he combined his efforts to change moral rules 
and to achieve happiness: “We Turks were not able to generate a solid social 
life because initially we imitated the Persians and then the Europeans. Our 
morality should stem from our religion, law, customs, and contemporary mo-
                                                      
 60 “Sağlamlık, bilgicilik, çalışkanlık, adillik işte müslümanın sıfat-ı kaşifesi, bunlardır!” Ibid., 
22.  
 61 “Müslüman gönlü daima hakda, eli ise hiç boş durmayub iş yapmakdadır.” Ibid., 22.  
 62 Ibid. “Dünyayı zindan görmek, ümidsizliğe düşmek, işsizliği âdet edinmek.” 
 63 Ahmed Besim, “Nazar-ı İslam’da Ahlak 4,” 526. “Nazarların maziden ziyade atiye çevirilmesi 
gerekir.”  
 64 “Din-i İslâmın ta’limi ahlâkiyyesi kat’i ve surc olduğu gibi insanlığın her türlü sa’adetini 
te’min edecek bir sûret-i kâmilededir.” Ahmed Besim, “Ahlak: Din ve Ahlak 3,” 11. 
 65 Ibid. “[Müslümanlık] İnsanların tezkiye-yi nefs ederek mes’ud olmalarıdır.”  
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res so that it will appeal to our souls and minds and make us happy.”66 He 
formulated this ideal morality as a key to happiness as well as to progress: “In 
short, it is a morality that meets the necessities of [modern] times yet is 
grounded in national mores that will make human beings happy.”67 This led 
him to the topic of upbringing (terbiye) through which the new generation 
would gain a new understanding of morality. Once future generations re-
ceived a proper education on religious morality (in line with his interpreta-
tion), “finally, real happiness will be manifested in this destitute country.”68 
This brings us to the issue of terbiye through which an ideal morality bears 
fruit. However, before moving on this topic, a discussion is vital to under-
stand the philosophical ground on which a new education policy was built 
on. 
Moral change (tebdil-i ahlâk) was one of the most debated topics in 
İslam Mecmuası. In line with the idea of reform, “Islamist Turkists” reserved 
a space to put their understanding of the new morality into practice. Once 
the argument that “morality can change in time” was proven (from a histori-
cal point of view), then this space could be created and reserved for reform. 
Although Ahmed Besim supported his arguments with references to the 
Quran, hadith, and biographies of the prophet (siyer), on the issue of moral 
change he also cited philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Spinoza. In his 
article “Does Morality Change?” he argued that this is a philosophical discus-
sion yet there is a conventional – and wrong – assumption among the people 
concerning the unchanging nature of morality.69 He claimed this under-
                                                      
 66 “Biz Türkler bir vakitler Acemi bir vakitler Frengi taklid etmek istediğimizdendir ki koyu 
bir hayat-ı ictimaiyye vücuda getiremedik. Bizim ahlakımız, dinimiz, yasamız ve töremizden 
ve bugünün canlı örflerinden alınmalıdır ki ruhumuza ve istidadımıza muvafık gelsin ve bizi 
mes’ud edebilsin.” Ahmed Besim, “Ahlak: Din ve Ahlak 4, Hakikat-i Ahlak,” 11. 
 67 “Hülâsa ihtiyac-ı asra muvâfık millî örfler üzerine istinad eden ahlakdır ki beşeriyeti mes’ud 
kılar.” Ahmed Besim, “Din ve Ahlak 6,” 14. 
 68 “Nesl-i atiye iyi bir terbiye-yi diniyye verilir ve din muayyen İslamın düstur-u ahlakiyyesi 
ruhlara hissi bir suretde yerleştirilecek olursa o zaman şu garib yurtda saadet-i hakikiye te-
celli eder.” Ibid. 
 69 “Hükemâ arasında münâkaşa edilen bu mesele nasılsa – pek yanlış bir surette – halk arasına da 
atlamış; kök salmış ve bir kanaat şeklini almışdır. Hatta ‘can çıkmadan huy çıkmaz; huy canın 
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standing creates wrong views with respect to upbringing and discipline. To 
illustrate his point, he argued that God sent prophets to correct people’s mo-
rality. The understanding of morality was based on three things: milieu, he-
redity, and education.70 As these are subject to change, so too is morality. In 
this framework, he developed a theological view of morality reform. In an-
other article, he defended renewing the current morality by emphasizing its 
role in regenerating societies. Accordingly, morality serves the purposes of 
regenerating a nation and bringing it to the point of progress. Therefore, 
morality needs to be progressive. Without openly confronting, the Islamists’ 
ideal of “going back to the asr-ı saadet,” he argued that the proposal to adopt 
medieval morality in contemporary times was nonsensical.71 His illustration 
to show the drastic change in morality was – not surprisingly – the rise of 
nationalism and the adoption of nationalism and patriotism as great ideals of 
morality.72 The question was how to change the established understanding of 
morality and practice the ideals that Ahmed Besim theorized. On this topic, 
more so than to Besim himself, the articles of Gökalp, Halim Sabit and 
Kazım Nami need to be taken into account. 
2.1.2  Meşihat, Education and Regeneration of Morality 
The writers for İslam Mecmuası focused on the issue of terbiye as a way of 
dealing with moral decline in Ottoman Muslim society. The term terbiye 
played a key role in their understanding of the education of the masses. 
However, the term does not refer to scientific education – rather it translates 
                                                      
altındadır’ gibi yanlış telakkilere kadar yol açmıştır; halk bu kanaatin bu darb-ı mesellerin 
pek çok zararlarını görüyorlar.” Besim Atalay, “Ahlak Değişir mi?” 10-14.  
 70 “Peygamberlerin ba’s olunması, kitabların kelimesi, şeriatın kurulması hep bunun yani 
ahlakın kabil-i tebdil olması üzerine müessesdir. Ahlakımız neden değişmesin?” Ibid., 10. 
 71 “Ancak insanlara kabul ettirebileceğimiz ve kabulune çalışacağımız kavanin-i ahlakiyye 
zamanı, mekanı nazar-ı itibare alarak o cemiyeti yaşatabilecek kavaid ve vesayayı cami 
olanıdır. Yoksa kurûn-i vüsta ahlakını bugün tavsiye etmek hem beyhude ve hem faydasızdır. 
Her şey gibi ahlak ve nazariyet-i ahlakiyye de tebdillere, terkiblere uğramıştır.” Ahmet Be-
sim, “Ahlak: Din ve Ahlak 4 Hakikat-i Ahlak,” 12.  
 72 “Evvelleri vatanseverlik nedir bilinmezken sonraları en büyük mezaya-yı ahlâkiyye sırasına 
geçmişdir.” Ibid., 9. 
M O R A L  C R I S I S  O N  T H E  O T T O M A N  H O M E F R O N T  
61 
to upbringing, discipline or instruction. They formulated terbiye for the ado-
lescents of future generations as a key to progress: only through education 
could the Ottomans catch up to modern standards and carry the mores of a 
nation as well as the essence of Islam. On this topic, too, their starting point 
was a critique of old (and current) forms of terbiye. However, the critique 
targeted not only medieval understandings of education but also the policy 
of education initiated in the Tanzimat era. Accordingly, Gökalp wrote an ar-
ticle in the first issue of İslam Mecmuası titled “Islamic Terbiye: The Nature 
of Islamic Terbiye,” in which he claimed that the schools of the Tanzimat in-
culcated modern education (asrî terbiye) improperly while Islamic education 
was under the influence of Arabic nations.73 In his opinion, the crucial prob-
lem was a lack of a purpose (gayesizlik) that caused degeneration and moral 
decline in youth. He argued that the purpose of terbiye should be to make life 
meaningful and give it a purpose so that the future generations would rely 
on it. This education would eventually bless their souls with higher virtues 
and self-sacrifice in the name of the nation and religion. Modern education 
would provide people with the necessary tools for national progress.74 
Kazım Nami, in his article titled “Islamic Terbiye, Religious Terbiye,” 
made more radical critiques of the “so-called Islamic morality.”75 He targeted 
the Muslim idea of an “other world”: “Those who carry the idea ‘Every man 
for himself’ by calculating only their comfort in the after life are harmful 
burdens on social life.”76 The reformist but theological perspective of İslam 
Mecmuası on education is worth consideration, as well. Like with other top-
ics, the ultimate goal of the reformists was to penetrate religious discourse 
and conquer this realm from within. Education was crucial because it would 
eventually become the only way to instruct an “ideal morality” in society. 
What is interesting (and new) in the discussion of education that took place 
in İslam Mecmuası is not an emphasis on reforming school or university cur-
                                                      
 73 Ziya Gökalp, “İslam Terbiyesi: İslam Terbiyesinin Mahiyeti,” 14-17. 
 74 Ibid.  
 75 Kazım Nami, “İslam Terbiyesi: Dinî Terbiye,” 17.  
 76 “‘Her koyun kendi bacağından asılır’ diye yalnız ahirette nefsinin rahatını düşünenler, ictimâî 
hayat için muzır birer yüktür.” Ibid. 
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ricula, but introducing a new religious body responsible for developing a new 
understanding of education in Muslim society. To put it briefly, they sought 
to reform the institution of the Office of Şeyhülislam (Meşihat) and establish 
an office of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri) for these purposes. 
Halim Sabit wrote two groundbreaking articles on the issue in İslam 
Mecmuası.77 In line with the Durkheim’s “division of labor,” he suggested a 
reconsideration of the role of the Meşihat in the society. Accordingly, he pro-
posed two main bodies for the Meşihat, a religious advisory organ (dinî teşrî’ 
heyeti) and a religious education commission (dinî terbiye heyeti). He argued 
that the duties of the Meşihat should be limited to these two within a frame-
work of the division of labor in order to achieve a division between the relig-
ious and secular realms. By saying that the ulema is the sole authority in re-
ligious affairs, he courted and flattered them. But he narrowed the definition 
of “religious affairs” and questioned “unholy” things with which the ulema 
was dealing, such as legislation. He quoted following statement from the 
Quran, “obviously, God orders you to command [his] entrusted realms to 
competent [people or institutions]…”78 and continued, “henceforth, the re-
ligious realm will be clearly defined by relieving it of its burdens.”79 He based 
his arguments on the “orders of God” as well as on early practices in Islam, 
claiming that there was separation between religious and legislative (dinî ve 
kazaî) orders. By using religious references, he avoided formulating his views 
as anti-religious statements; on the contrary, he presented his ideas as the sav-
ior of the religious realm that would bring its holiness back by lifting off 
worldly burdens. Strikingly, he categorized the implementation of justice as 
among the burdens of the religious realm and claimed them for secular insti-
tutions: “henceforth, jurisprudence, with all its institutions, including family 
law, should be transferred to the Ministry of Justice, while legislative power 
                                                      
 77 Halim Sabit, “Dini Terbiye Heyeti,” 3-5; “Velayet-i Diniyye: Meşihat-i İslamiyye Teşkilatı,” 
5-8. 
 78 “Şüphesiz Allah emanetleri ehline tevdî etmenizi emrediyor.” Halim Sabit, “Velayet-i 
Diniyye: Meşihat-i İslamiyye Teşkilatı,” 5-8.  
 79 “İşte bunun için din, dine mezâhim olan şeylerden ayrılıp dinin şumûlu dairesini ta’yin etmek 
icab eder.” Ibid. 
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should be handed over to the sultan, the assemblies of the senate and the 
deputies.”80 Eventually, terbiye would be central to the duties of ulema. In 
accordance with the logic of the “division of labor,” a hierarchy among relig-
ious offices should emerge and work for reviving religiosity and increasing 
the moral standards of Muslim people. In this hierarchy, the caliph was first, 
followed by the Şeyhülislam, and then the Directorate of Religious Education 
(terbiye-yi diniyye müdüriyeti). In towns, muftis (müftüler) would be in 
charge of these duties, in districts preachers (va’izler), in nahiyes orators 
(hatipler), and in villages and neighborhoods, the imams.81 He asserted that 
his solution was an antidote to diminishing religiosity in society because “the 
mosques are silent, prayers are cold, and requests are selfish.”82 Therefore, he 
offered this education project to revive religion. 
Gökalp discussed the project of Diyanet İşleri in his writings to distin-
guish religious affairs from government ones, to limit the authority of ulema, 
and to claim their sphere for reform.83 However, as in the articles of Halim 
Sabit, reformists running for İslam Mecmuası used the Islamist discourse of 
morality crisis itself to remind the Islamists of “their real duties.” Instead of 
interfering in worldly affairs, they should withdraw from legislation and ju-
risprudence and increase the spiritual awareness of the Muslim people. 
§ 2.2  Sebilürreşad: In Defense of Religious Morality 
The Sebilürreşad writers published dozens of articles on morality and Islamic 
morality starting in the journal’s early volumes. In the scope of this disserta-
tion, I limit the discussion to those articles that dealt with the war and its re-
lationship to moral decline. Also, instead of evaluating articles in 
                                                      
 80 “İşte bunun için adaletin tevzii hususu aile hukuku da dahil olduğu halde bütün şubeleriyle 
beraber taksim ve vazifeler usûlüne göre adliye nezaretine, hukukî teşri’ husus da münhasıran 
zât-ı padişahî ile a’yan ve mebûsân heyetlerine teslim edilmelidir.” Ibid., 8. 
 81 Halim Sabit, “Dini Terbiye Heyeti,” 5. 
 82 “Camiler sönük, dualar hararetsiz, nidâlar ferdi…” Ibid. 
 83 On Gökalp's views on Diyanet, see Erşahin, “The Ottoman Foundation of the Turkish 
Republic’s Diyanet.” 
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Sebilürreşad that posited generic and ahistorical statements to emphasize the 
importance of morality in Islam, I focus on direct references to moral decline 
and its setting in order to assess the viewpoint of Sebilürreşad writers. 
Sebilürreşad editorial reviews of morality-related articles from other newspa-
pers are emphasized because through these reviews one can best see refer-
ences to wartime realities and contextualize the intellectual debates about 
morality. Obviously, these reviews also apprise us of other articles on moral 
decline in the Ottoman press. 
The main concern of Sebilürreşad’s writers was to underscore the fact 
that Islam is the only source of morality and that Islamic practices are the 
instruments to reach a higher moral standard. In this line of thought, moral 
decline was the result of divergence from Islam, because religion was the 
source of morality. Accordingly, all the empire’s calamities, including loss of 
land, dissolution, and social problems, stemmed from moral decline. For 
them, the strength of Muslims came from faith in the greatness of God and 
respect for the sharia law; once religion lost its power, defeat was inevitable.84 
In this part of the chapter, I first briefly present the points in common 
with respect to morality by Sebilürreşad writers and share insights on the 
importance of morality from an Islamist point of view. Second, I consider 
editorial reviews in Sebilürreşad of other articles in the Ottoman press. These 
reviews are important because they show the direction and policy of the 
journal. Most of the articles reviewed by the editorial board were excerpts 
from the Tasvir-i Efkâr or İkdam newspapers. Sebilürreşad generously re-
printed articles considered to be useful for the cause of showing the depth of 
the problem of moral decline. These articles contain many references to the 
war and contemporary developments. Third, I evaluate how morality became 
politicized both among rival ideologies and in the international context. 
Provoked by an article published in the Times concerning the increase in 
                                                      
 84 Another important point is that this line of thought – namely reviving Islam and Islamic life 
style through morality – constituted the main argument of modern Islamic revivalist move-
ments. These movements grounded their thinking on the notion that the source of crisis in the 
Islamic world was moral decline that originated in deviation from pure Islamic principles, see 
Şeyhun, Islamist Thinkers in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic, 1-2. 
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venereal disease and moral decline in the Ottoman Empire, the issue of 
moral crisis became a significant discussion of the legitimacy of the caliphate 
and of lifestyles that are incompatible with Islam. One of the main concerns 
of Sebilürreşad was that moral decline might harm the future of the caliphate 
and thus the future of political Islam. Emphasizing that other Muslim nations 
were following the news about the Ottoman Empire, the writers pointed out 
the importance of constituting a “good example” for the Muslim world for 
the success of jihad. At the end of the war, the issue became more concrete 
thanks to the establishment of the School of Islamic Philosophy (Dar’ül-
Hikmet’ül İslamiye) which had advised on press censorship in the name of 
“protecting Islamic morality.” Along with debates over the Times article, I 
present a conflict that emerged following a concert that took place in the 
Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocağı), over which the contest over morality between 
nationalists and the Islamists transpired. Fourth, I evaluate lists that of dis-
gusting publications (iğrenç neşriyat) published in Sebilürreşad. To inform 
readers and the authorities of the dangers of the spread of immorality in soci-
ety, Sebilürreşad published excerpts from contemporary journals and news-
papers demanding that action be taken against them. These excerpts provide 
us with the opportunity to see exactly which publications were “immoral” 
according to the editorial board of Sebilürreşad. Finally, I evaluate a recur-
rent theme in Sebilürreşad most referred to as the source of moral decline: 
sexual morality. This evaluation demonstrates how the issues of the place of 
women in the society, of family, of gender roles, of veils and women’s cloth-
ing, and of the feminist movement were discussed with respect to moral de-
cline. 
2.2.1  Religion and Morality from the Perspective of Sebilürreşad 
Among the many articles in Sebilürreşad on morality, I would like to begin 
with Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi’s introduction to morality literature (ahlâki-
yyat.)85 In this introduction to a series of articles on morality, he used two 
concepts to define which behaviors were moral and immoral: fezail and 
                                                      
 85 Ahmed Hamdi Aksekili, “Ahlâkiyyat Serisi Mukaddimesi,” 92.  
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rezail, which I translate as “virtues” and “vices.” He published dozens of arti-
cles on ilm-i ahlak – the science of morality. According to him, people would 
find the path to happiness and virtues, and distinguish good from evil thanks 
to this science. Not only Ahmed Hamdi but also other writers for 
Sebilürreşad referred to the concepts of rezail and fezail while defining mo-
rality and immorality. Accordingly, an individual is granted “salvation” and 
“happiness” in exchange for complying with Islamic practices and remaining 
within the borders of Islamic law. As Said Halim Paşa stated in his article on 
Islamization: “Islam is the most complete religion. Its morality is based on its 
creed, and its sociology derives from these moral principles…. The Islamic 
credo is the key to human happiness, as long as Muslims feel, think, and act 
according to the fundamental principles of this religion.”86 These two 
spheres, religion and morality, were therefore inseparable. Leaving one and 
embracing other, according to Sebilürreşad writers, was impossible. As 
Şeyhülislam Musa Kazım asserted, “it has been argued that old religions can 
be replaced by a new quasi-religion, ‘humanism.’ According to the advocates 
of this new ideology, religions belong to the past and are outdated. What is 
needed for the modern world is a new, non-religious, secular morality: hu-
manism. For me, such a thing is simply not possible.”87 
The biggest threat to religion that Sebilürreşad writers identified was ma-
terialism. Indeed, Mehmet Akif and Ahmed Hamdi translated a series of arti-
cles in Sebilürreşad by Mehmed Ferid Vecdi on the attack of the philosophy 
of materialism (felsefe-yi maddiyun) on the philosophy of spiritualism (fel-
sefe-yi ruhiyyun) in Sebilürreşad.88 The Bolshevik Revolution further in-
                                                      
 86 These passages were taken from Said Halim Pasha’s Islamization in manuscript form which 
were provided to Ahmet Şeyhun by the author’s family. Şeyhun, Islamist Thinkers in the Late 
Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic, 104.  
 87 Ibid., 32–33. 
 88 Muhammed Ferid Vecdi, “Felsefe: Maddiyun Meslek Felsefesinin Edyana Hücumu,” trans. 
Mehmed Akif, 209-211; Muhammed Ferid Vecdi, “Felsefe: Felsefe-yi Maddiyun ile Felsefe-yi 
Ruhiyyunun Çarpışması,” trans. Ahmed Hamdi, 250-252. Muhammed Ferid Vecdi (1878-
1954) was a contemporaneous Egyptian scholar known for being a follower of the Islamic 
modernism movement. His prominent works were translated by Mehmet Akif in 
Sebilürreşad. For more information on Muhammed Ferid Vecdi, see Yavuz, “Ferid Vecdi.”  
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creased concern over the future of religion.89 In this context, spiritualism and 
morality were the strongholds of political Islam. Identifying immorality and 
showing its cure were the tasks for the Islamists to undertake in order to 
maintain political power. To defend Islam in every sphere, they resorted to 
the moral decline argument their explainations of the backwardness or pro-
gress of nations.  
Many writers in the journal discussed the question of whether Islam was a 
barrier to progress. Dr. Ismail Hakkı Milaslı wrote a series of articles in which 
this question appeared in the title.90 In the last of the series, he argued that 
there were three conditions for the progress of nations: physical, mental, and 
moral strength. Since Muslims derived their moral principles from Islam, 
their source of moral strength was Islam. He contended that “religion and 
morality are the same” and that when Muslims lost faith, they lost their mo-
rality and thus their strength to progress.91 He agreed about the need for a 
new morality in contemporary Muslim society; however, the divine referents 
of morality had to remain unchanged. To achieve the task of “defending Is-
lam as the source of morality,” Sebilürreşad directly confronted other intel-
lectual circles particularly in the editorial reviews.92 
                                                      
 89 Sebilürreşad published several editorials criticizing the Bolsheviks. For instance, “Bolşevik 
Fikirleri: Erkân-ı Diniyyeye Karşı Hakarat ve Tecavüz,” 174. The editors often referred to 
Bolshevism in their critique of Turkish Republican secularism. “ Bolşevik Düsturları: Mekte-
plerde Laik Terbiyeden Maksat Ne İmiş?” 214-217.  
 90 İsmail Hakkı Milaslı, “Geri Kalmamızın Sebebi Dinimiz midir? Usülsüzlüğümüz müdür? 
Daha başka bir şey midir?” 106-107.  
 91 Ibid. “Zira Müslümanlar ahlakı dinlerinden alırlar cihetiyle ahlakca gerilik demek dince 
gerilik demektir. Ve hakikatte din ile ahlak birdir. Binaenaleyh bizim geriliğimiz ahlakımızın 
eksikliğindendir demekle dinimize tevsil etmediğimizden demek arasında fark yoktur. Ve 
nitekim birçoklarımız da geri kalmamız hep dini terk etmemizdendir derler ve böyle denirse 
bunun bir manası vardır.”  
 92 Although it is beyond the scope of this study, the reason why the Sebilürreşad’s editors set 
aside many pages in the journal for quoting another source deserves attention. It might be 
partly due to the theological background of the writers and their aim to develop certain ideas 
in defense of religion rather than to comment on recent political developments. 
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2.2.2  Reviews in Sebilürreşad 
On August 8, 1918, Sebilürreşad editorial congratulated the newly appointed 
Minister of Interior Affairs, Ismail Canbulat, for his interview in the newspa-
per Tasvir-i Efkâr. The interview was titled “The Necessity of Improving 
Public Morality” and in it the new minister expressed his interest in reform-
ing the organization of the municipal police to more effectively combat vio-
lations of public morality: 
Indeed, not only the Ministry of the Interior Affairs but the entire 
government establishment attributes great importance to this [moral-
ity] issue. Especially the grand vizier [Talat Pasha] is concerned about 
the gradual decline of morality. And he firmly agreed to take all nec-
essary precautions against this situation. Actually, in my opinion, 
government is always interested in morality issues. In every country, 
governments have moral, intellectual, and behavioral influence over 
society. The power of this impact is more than that of our [govern-
ment]. The government has to be the one showing the right path, 
protecting and restoring public morality by being an example. More 
than anywhere else, our people need guardianship and tutelage. They 
slavishly imitate all the behaviors and actions of the government.”93 
Strikingly, the minister likened the ideal role of government in Ottoman 
society to a father in the family – the chief exemplar of good manners and 
morals.94 One might interpret this expression as a critique of the previous rul-
ing elites. Moving on from the role of government to correct public moral-
ity, he continued: “Henceforth, during my term of office, I will deal particu-
larly with public morality. I will endeavor with great attention and care to 
make sure that the municipal police execute their duty with respect to the 
                                                      
 93 “Matbuat: Ahlak-ı Umumiyenin Islahı Lüzumu ve Hükümetin Vazifesi,” 265-266. See 
Appendix A, Quotation 1 for the source text.  
 94 Ibid.  
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protection of morality.”95 Eventually he indicated the new gambling houses 
and the gradual increase in prostitution were initial problems to be addressed. 
He emphasized his resentment about permissions to open new brothels. Cit-
ing examples of European countries that had abolished brothels (such as Swit-
zerland and Prussia), he concluded that government has to put obstacles in 
the way of immorality: “We will try to reduce the causes that produce or pave 
the way for moral degeneration. We expect success because in our society, 
the public’s affinity for moral sentiment is more than other societies’ disposi-
tion and nature.”96 These statements of the minister brought joy and pleasure 
to Sebilürreşad’s editorial board, and they emphasized that the new minister 
is famous for his views about applying the law equally for everyone; thus, fi-
nally, an “honest and ambitious person had arrived to serve the Muslim na-
tion and prevent its disgrace.”97 It appears that Sebilürreşad shared the 
thoughts of the minister on the causes of moral decline – the selective appli-
cation of law in cases of the violation of public morality. The date of this in-
terview coincided with the last months of the war, and it can be interpreted 
as a critique of corruption among CUP circles. Indeed, this critique is clear in 
one Sebilürreşad editorial review focused on the article of the famous Turkish 
nationalist, Necmeddin Sadak, an author for Yeni Mecmua and a follower of 
Ziya Gökalp. 
Through the end of the war, Sebilürreşad increased its emphasis on mo-
rality. In some cases, half the pages of an issue were reserved for Ahlâkiyyat. 
In December 1918, immediately after the war, Sebilürreşad cited the article 
of Necmeddin Sadak titled “The Considerations on Morality” written in his 
                                                      
 95 Ibid. “Binâenaleyh nezarette bulunduğum müddetçe bilhassa ahlâk-ı umûmiyye ile 
uğraşacağım. Zabıtanın muhafaza-i ahlâk nokta-i nazarından uhdesinde mütertib vazifeyi son 
derecede dikkat ve itinâ ile ifâ etmesine sa’y olacağım.” 
 96 Ibid. “Ahlâkımızı bozan, yahud ahlâk bozulmasına tesehhil eden her dürlü esbabı azaltmağa 
çalışacağız, bizde amme-i nassın fıtrat ve mizacından hiss-i ahlâka meyil daha ziyade olduğu 
cihetle mesaimizde muvaffak olmamız da me’muldur.”  
 97 Ibid. “İslam memleketlerinde tesis olunan umumhaneleri kapatarak, icra-yı fuhuş için tevziğ 
olunan vesikaları toplatarak bu son zamanlarda meydan alan rezaletlerin önüne geçmek gibi 
büyük ve tarihi bir hizmeti, millet-i İslamiye ancak İsmail Canbolat gibi mert ve azimkâr 
nâzırlardan bekler,” 266.  
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own newspaper, Akşam.98 At the end of the war, thanks to the lifting of cen-
sorship, the time had come to target Turkists “for their role in moral decline.” 
Before giving details of the editorial review in Sebilürreşad, I briefly present 
the main points Necmeddin Sadak explored in the aforementioned article. 
His article is also the statement of a “new life” advocate on moral decline as 
the outcome of war: 
Obviously, over the last four years we saw that things had changed. 
Among these, morality is the most remarkable. Many of us have 
changed our consideration of morality [and] what to take from it; the 
borders of the concept of morality have widened. We have seen this 
transformation in every kind of morality. The morality of profession 
and duty, women and sexual morality, civil morality, etc. all gradually 
failed. I don’t know if there is any other country in which morality 
had declined so quickly.”99  
Necmeddin Sadak accused this new consideration of morality of corrupting 
the morality and honor of the Turkish family and Turkish women because its 
eclectic perspectives on the concepts of progress, civilization, and moderni-
zation were incomplete. He continued: “Today we have reached the end. It is 
difficult to assess the damage that the homeland has witnessed just because of 
moral corruption. What is done is done; that whirlpool is left behind.”100 Fi-
nally, he explained what he meant by the “damage” caused by moral corrup-
tion:  
Here are the biggest and most catastrophic ones among these dam-
ages that need our attention…. On the one hand, there is the pros-
perous lifestyle that can be observed among the war profiteers and 
among those who currently live in comfort, apparently as a result of 
easily earned wealth at the expense of the country. On the other 
                                                      
 98 Sebilürreşad, “Matbuat: Ahlak Telakkisi.”  
 99 Ibid., 231. See Appendix A, Quotation 2. 
100  Ibid., 232. “Bugün işte nihayete vardık. Yalnız ahlak bozgunluğundan memleketin gördüğü 
zararları şimdi ta’yin güçdür. Olan oldu, o levtiyet geride kaldı.”  
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hand, there appeared a new form of womanhood, completely eman-
cipated from sexual and familial morality, that is a so-called represen-
tation of the life of the European woman with its manners and liberal 
and extreme desires.101  
Sadak put war profiteering and the emergence of a new womanhood at 
the core of moral corruption. According to him, because these two “dam-
ages” remained unpunished, the upbringing (terbiye) of young girls and boys 
was extremely affected. He complained that the new generation is following 
the example of this comfortable, easily earned life and tends to be ignorant 
and lazy. He urged families, schools, and the press to take action. 
If considerations of a new and moral life do not appear soon – in 
other words, if the terbiye of the family and school do not decry this 
and the press does not take control of this morality, there will be a 
more significant and final decline. Let’s work to keep moral consid-
erations in their natural, reasonable boundaries. Only then can we 
save the future of homeland.”102  
The Sebilürreşad editorial review appreciated these lines and accepted these 
statements as an apology. 
No doubt, it is a success to see an author of Yeni Mecmua – the jour-
nal that desired to overthrow our entire religious, national, social, and 
moral basis and replace it with fake institutions; the journal that ex-
pressed joy by chanting “a space is opening for the new life” after the 
gradual fall of our old religious notions of chastity – on the right 
path, making confessions under the heading ‘Considerations on Mo-
rality.103  
                                                      
101 Ibid. See Appendix A, Quotation 3.   
102 Ibid. See Appendix A, Quotation 4.  
103 Ibid. See Appendix A, Quotation 5.  
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Sebilürreşad concluded the review by expressing the wish that those intellec-
tuals unite against present calamities (felâkât-ı hâzıre) and work for the cor-
rection of morality. 
Actually, competition over morality had increased between the Islamists 
and Turkish nationalists at the end of the war. As mentioned earlier, the abo-
lition of censorship played a role in direct confrontations, but also the loss of 
the war and increasing political tensions given the occupation of the empire 
created an atmosphere in which morality became a tool of the opposition. 
Sebilürreşad deliberately followed the activities of nationalists and used the 
argument of immorality whenever possible. An example was a concert that 
took place in the Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocağı). On December 18, 1919, 
Sebilürreşad quoted an article by the owner and chief editor of İkdam news-
paper, Ahmed Cevdet Bey, titled “Orient and Occident,” in which he focused 
on the “undesirable” consequences of Westernization on women of the Ori-
ent (including Greek women.)104 The aim of the editorial review was ex-
pressed as embarrassing the other writers in İkdam who appreciated the con-
cert that took place in the Turkish Hearth.105 The editors harshly criticized the 
event because women and men were mixed, because women took the stage 
and sang songs, and above all because of the contrasting image of the misery 
of the people under occupation and the pleasure of “modernists” in concert 
halls: “While hundreds of our Muslim brothers, orphans, desperate women, 
sick, old people are groaning and suffering in the mountains of Izmir, the 
Turkist clubbers, who give moral lectures to others, are giving concerts with 
women and men mixed, chanting and singing in the name of the ‘celebra-
tion of Turkism.’” 106 The Sebilürreşad continued on to criticize Turkish na-
tionalists in a sarcastic way: “Obviously, the club will try to reveal why it was 
                                                      
104 Ahmed Cevdet, “Şark ve Garb,” 118-119.  
105 Ibid. “Fakat İkdam gibi ağır başlı diye telakki edilen bir gazetenin de bu erkek kadın karışık 
zevk-i ahenkleri ishihsan etmesi hiç de yaraşır bir hareket değildir.”  
106 Ibid. “İzmir dağlarında yüz binlerce Müslüman kardeşlerimiz, kimsesiz çocuklar, biçare 
kadınlar, alîl ihtiyarlar sefil ve sergerdan inliyorken burada Türkçülük bayramı altına sığınıp 
öte beride hamiyet dersi veren Türk ocakçıları erkek, kadın karışık hevanendeler, sazendelerle 
ocaklarında icra-yı ahenk ediyorlar.”  
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established and attract audiences by continuing the activities of pleasure and 
concerts.”107 Debates over “concerts” in the Turkish Hearth would continue. 
Accompanied by a sarcastic tone, the Sebilürreşad editorial board’s com-
ments and reviews had a political agenda, as well. 
2.2.3  Morality from the Perspective of Political Islam: Thoughts on 
the Future of the Caliphate and Jihad in Sebilürreşad 
The role of ideology in moral decline was debated in all intellectual circles 
both during and after the war. Each side blamed the other for the “intellec-
tual basis” for defeats in battle and the backwardness of Ottoman society. 
However, the end of the war brought another political dimension to this de-
bate: the future of the caliphate. As the Ottoman Empire was defeated on the 
battlefield, the ideology surrounding the caliphate, jihad, was questioned, as 
well. This counter-propaganda was particularly evident in the British press 
which openly argued that the Ottoman Empire did not qualify for “holiness” 
due to immorality observed among the common Ottoman Muslims. This 
increased the anxiety of Islamists over moral decline and added a dimension 
that can be formulated as “the whole Muslim world is watching us.” Here, I 
cite an important event that shows how moral decline became politicized. 
On September 11, 1919, the Times published an article titled “Decadent 
Turkey: Muslim Virtues Fast Disappearing” claiming an “alarming increase 
of venereal disease in Turkey, and especially in the capital during the last few 
years.”108 The Times correspondent declared that although “long established” 
in Anatolia, venereal diseases were now becoming a big problem in the capi-
tal, Constantinople, with some 40,000 women and girls undergoing medical 
treatment “in a population of about 1.100.000 inhabitants of both sexes.” 
The correspondent based this information on a “well-informed Turkish 
source.” As discussed by Seçil Yılmaz, it appears his source was Abdullah 
Cevdet, the director of the General Health Administration and the chief edi-
                                                      
107  Ibid. “Ocak maksad-ı tesisini göstermek istediği cihetle zevk-ü sefâsında, âhenk icrasında 
devâm etmekle müdâvim celbine çalışacağı tabiidir.” 
108 Seçil Yılmaz shared the digital version of this article with me. “Decadent Turkey,” Times, 9. 
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tor of Ictihad, who was a prominent “Westernist” figure.109 Before detailing 
the “fight” that took place between Sebilürreşad and Abdullah Cevdet, we 
should focus on the rest of the newspaper article to see the process of the 
politicization of public morality and why it became so important in that his-
torical context. 
Moving on from the increasing number of venereal diseases among Mus-
lims, the correspondent of the Times depicted the situation of public moral-
ity in the Ottoman Empire. 
The Government has ceased to recognize Moslem prostitution and to 
enjoin the medical inspection of Moslem prostitutes, which was some 
slight check on the dissemination of disease, but takes no steps to 
close Turkish houses of ill-fame or to punish the food profiteering 
which is one of the chief causes of the evil. It is also handicapped by 
the inefficiency and venality of too many Turkish doctors, the lack of 
drugs and hospitals, the increase of alcoholism, and many other diffi-
culties. It has not been able to check the growth raki drinking among 
the Turkish working class or the increase in the number of private 
gambling clubs run by effendis to any appreciable extent, and its 
chances of tackling the redoubtable problem of the social evil seem 
small.110 
After summarizing the circumstances of “decadence,” the correspondent 
eventually proceeded to the political ramifications of these circumstances 
and addressed the petition by prominent Indians that had been sent to the 
Prime Minister of Britain. The petition was written in solidarity with the Ot-
tomans and expressed concerns over the future of Constantinople, a city that 
was considered “the center of Islamic civilization and morality.” The corre-
spondent found it “a pity” that “highly distinguished Indians, such as the 
Aga Khan” joined the solidarity with the Ottomans. Quoting from the peti-
tion in which the Indian Muslims expressed concerns after the occupation of 
                                                      
109 Yılmaz, “Love in the Time of Syphilis: Medicine and Sex in the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1922,” 
273. 
110 “Decadent Turkey,” Times, 9. 
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Istanbul about the replacement of Islamic civilization “by alien civilizations 
with all their concomitants, casinos, gambling dens, liquor shops, and other 
undesirable adjuncts,” he stated that either the writers of this petition were 
ignorant or infected by “early Victorian cant in its most odious and hypo-
critical form.” Based on the immorality argument, the correspondent argued, 
“there are good reasons enough for the maintenance of some form of Turkish 
sovereignty at Constantinople, but it is ridiculous to urge that its present 
civilization is Islamic, or indeed anything but Levantine.” He concluded his 
article with the advice to the “Indian friends of Turkey” to offer medical help 
to Turks suffering from syphilis and consumption (as well as a loss of man-
power due to war) because, quoting a British doctor, “in a few years the Turk-
ish problem will be medical rather than political.” 
This article had a great impact on the Ottoman press. Especially 
Sebilürreşad took up arms against Abdullah Cevdet, who had proposed li-
censing Muslim prostitutes in order to combat venereal disease.111 The debate 
led to his dismissal as director of the General Health Administration a year 
later.112 “Those West-lovers (Garpperest) who lead our women to an evil path 
shall read this,” wrote the editors of Sebilürreşad when reprinting a two-page 
article by Cevdet, the chief editor of Ikdam, in which he evaluated the article 
in the Times. Here, I briefly present Ahmed Cevdet’s view on the causes of 
moral decline because his article on the topic was written in a surprisingly 
explicit fashion and Sebilürreşad quoted it in its entirety, despite its length. 
According to Ahmed Cevdet, the path leading to the Times newspaper arti-
cle resulted from several mistakes that took place in the Ottoman Empire. 
First off, any civilization project in the Orient had to take religion into ac-
count because it was nothing if not religion from which the people of the 
Orient derived their moral principles. Accordingly, it was a mistake to disre-
gard Islam. A good religious education had to be in place in school curricula. 
                                                      
111 “Ahvâl-i Sıhhiye Hakkında,” 106-107.  
112 This debate started with a dispute over the number of venereal disease cases indicated by 
Abdullah Cevdet. The Ottoman Physicians Society (Cemiyet-i Ettiba-yi Osmaniye) claimed 
that these numbers were exaggerated and incorrect, Yılmaz, “Love in the Time of Syphilis: 
Medicine and Sex in the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1922,” 274–276.  
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Second mistake was government legislation in various fields. Economic poli-
cies needed to prevent poverty because people sacrifice their chastity due to 
poverty. Another legal action that the government needed to consider was 
military service. Recruiting men and separating them from their wives for 
years, leaving them away from their families in a country that lacked ade-
quate means of transportation, had become a problem from the perspective 
of morality because in the end the situation corrupted the morality of both 
men and women. In addition to this, another legal issue that impacted mo-
rality was divorce law which gave husbands a monopoly over divorce. Men 
exploited this right, Ahmed Cevdet argued, and used it extensively to re-
marry. He also contended that women should obey Islamic clothing rules if 
they expected to be respected in society. However, since times had changed, 
they should also have access to the university education and earn their own 
livelihood. “In our society the number of women is more than that of men,” 
he said; therefore, it was no longer possible for women to “sit at home and 
make a living.”113 Furthermore, Ahmed Cevdet pointed out the role of con-
temporary literature on moral decline. He claimed novels, stories, and Euro-
pean literature had poisoned people’s sense of spirituality; they not only 
caused moral decline but also spread a misunderstanding of real European 
civilization. He asserted that none of the authors in these genres had visited 
Anatolia, and none had an idea about the essence of Turks. All these works 
were materialistic – based solely on profane ambitions. He added a critique of 
CUP rulers who had not paid enough attention to this issue. 
According to Ahmed Cevdet, there was an obvious problem of moral de-
cline in Ottoman Muslim society for the aforementioned reasons. Therefore, 
the article in the Times, despite its exaggerations and political agenda, had a 
point. He referred to a “morally degenerate class” in Istanbul that had 
emerged in a time of social dissolution along with the declaration of the con-
stitution (Meşrutiyet). According to him, such phenomena were natural in 
times of turmoil; however, this class needed to be replaced by a new ruling 
elite, which had not yet happened in the Ottoman case. Therefore, he con-
                                                      
113 “Matbuat: Ahlâk Mes’elesi,” 17. “Bahusus ki bizde kadının adedi erkekden fazladır. 
Binaenaleyh kadın eskisi gibi yalnız evde oturup geçinemez.”  
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cluded, “we [Ottomans] are in fetret devri, time of troubles.”114 But he argued 
that the Times correspondent had not analyzed the situation as closely as he 
had, and he urged the office of the Şeyhülislam (Bab-ı Meşihat) to take ac-
tion, particularly against publications that violates public morality. 
The declaration of jihad during the First World War made the lifestyles in 
the Ottoman Empire, which were “incompatible” with Islam, more vulner-
able to critiques. In this framework, morality was of broad and intense inter-
est in discussions of the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate. The sensitive-
ness of the political situation had increased by the end of the war when the 
Ottomans were defeated. Therefore, the fight over morality became more 
explicit among intellectuals, particularly between Turkish nationalists and 
political Islamists. 
We can also consider the famous dispute over the concert that took place 
in the Turkish Hearth in this context. The Islamists in Sebilürreşad had po-
litical motives when they informed authorities of immoral activities that were 
taking place in the country. In this case, they had a special office to with 
which to collaborate: the moral censorship commission in the Dar’ül-
Hikmet’il İslamiyye (the School of Islamic Philosophy), which was established 
under the authority of the Şeyhülislam on March 5, 1918. The council was 
founded “to promulgate and circulate the high virtues of Islam, to protect 
religious institutions in the best possible way, and to work towards the ac-
complishment of a variety of goals, such as reforming the medreses (ma-
drasas) and providing religious advice to the general public.”115 Three com-
missions operated under the office: the first one was called catechism (akâid), 
charged with the task “to protect Islam against philosophical attacks and su-
perstitions;” the second one was jurisprudence (fıkıh) commission, which 
“examined the legal opinions of the Muslim jurists;” the third, and most im-
portant for our topic, was the morality (ahlâk) commission, “charged with 
promulgating Islamic morals.”116 This commission would become the main 
censorship mechanism during the armistice period. The commission, after 
                                                      
114 Ibid. “Biz şimdi bir fetret devresinde bulunuyoruz.” 
115 Hanioğlu, “Darü’l-Hikmeti’l İslamiye.” 
116 Ibid. Notably, Mehmet Akif Ersoy was the chief scribe in this office.  
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discussion among board members,117 would issue declarations urging the 
Ministry of the Interior Affairs to take action against immoral publications. 
Sebilürreşad resorted to the morality commission to complain about 
immoral activities and publications. The concert in the Turkish Hearth club 
was one such activity; thus, from this moral mindset, publications that 
praised the event needed to be censored. Eventually the School of Islamic 
Philosophy published a declaration titled “On the Inappropriateness at the 
Turkish Hearth,” which was also reprinted by Sebilürreşad in appreciation of 
the commission’s statement. An interesting aspect of this declaration was the 
emphasis on “the house of the caliphate, the place where the whole Muslim 
world is watching,”118 where the immoral events would “incite the feelings of 
Muslims and surprise their enemies.”119 Finally, the commission called upon 
the ministry to take necessary measures against the organizers of the event as 
well as against the publications promoting it. The School of Islamic Philoso-
phy mainly operated after the war; however, I believe that intellectual discus-
sions that took place during the war together with political circumstances of 
the time were the actual catalysts for the establishment of this institute. Dur-
ing and after the war Sebilürreşad reported “immoral” publications to 
authorities, urging the latter to take action against what the journal labeled 
“disgusting publications” (iğrenç neşriyat) and “propagandas of immorality” 
(ahlaksızlık propagandaları). 
2.2.4  Listing Immoral Publications – the “İğrenç Neşriyat” – in 
Sebilürreşad 
As mentioned earlier, through the end of the war the ideological contest be-
tween Turkish nationalists and Islamists increased. Sebilürreşad considered it 
a “duty” to inform authorities of publications violating public morality and 
spreading immorality. The editorial board published excerpts from articles as 
                                                      
117 “Twenty-six religious scholars served on the board between 1918 and 1922. The board 
members convened 171 times to discuss 273 different matters.” Ibid. 
118 “Bütün bilâd-ı İslâmiyenin tevciye-yi nazar eylemiş olduğu dâr’ül-hilafet’ül milliyede…” 
Sebilürreşad, “Türk Ocağındaki Münasebetsizlikler Hakkında,” 119.  
119 “yârı müte’essir, ağyârı mütehayyir” Ibid. 
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well as literary works in its pages under the headings of “immoral publica-
tions” or “immorality propaganda.” The editors also commented on them, 
warning both readers of Sebilürreşad and authorities how harmful these pub-
lications were. Unsurprisingly, others would label this activity on 
Sebilürreşad’s part as denunciation (jurnalcilik), recalling the oppressive 
years of censorship under the Hamidian regime (1876-1909). However, 
Sebilürreşad would claim that its readers were demanding it “to do some-
thing” to stop such immoral publications. For instance, on August 8, 1918, 
Sebilürreşad published a letter to the editors from Konya penned by “a 
member of the ulema.”120 The letter complained that a newspaper in Konya, 
Türk Sözü, had published an article that “invited youth to fight against Mus-
lim veils and marriage practices and encouraged women and men to have a 
lengthy relationship before getting married.”121 The author asked 
Sebilürreşad to respond this article. Sebilürreşad stated that it had taken no-
tice of the mentioned article; however, responding to it “would be superflu-
ous,” though the editors wished the article’s author had read the series in 
Sebilürreşad titled “Diseases in the Islamic World and Their Cures.”122 Other 
reasons Sebilürreşad presented for the “denunciation” of immorality were to 
protect the religion and Muslim women by revealing the “real face” of its 
political opponents. 
For our analysis, it is important to understand what was labeled “immor-
ality” or “things causing immorality” from the perspective of Sebilürreşad. 
In December 1918, Sebilürreşad published a two-page list of excerpts from 
other, mostly nationalist, journals.123 As it is clear from the sarcastic title, 
Sebilürreşad was attempting draw attention to the “contrast” between cir-
cumstances in the country and the topics with which the press was dealing. 
                                                      
120 Sebilürreşad, “Konya’da Münteşir Türk Sözü’nün Adâb ve Ahlâka Mugâyir Neşriyatı ve 
Ahlâka Mugâyir Neşriyat,” 265-266. 
121 Ibid. “Türk Sözü gazetesinde müslümanların emr-i tesettür ve izdivaçlarına karşı gençliği 
ilan-ı isyana davet eden, kadınlarla erkekleri kabl’el-izdivaç uzun bir münasebet ve muvane-
sette bulunmaya teşvik eyleyen bir makaleye karşı cevab verilmesi temenni olunur.”  
122 Ibid. “Âlem-i İslam’ın Hastalıkları ve Çareleri.” 
123 “Memleket Ne Hâlde, Matbuat Ne İle Meşgul,” 149-150.  
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As an incipit, the Sebilürreşad editorial complained about the lack of regula-
tion of such publications and asserted that “one would be ashamed of hu-
manity after seeing this situation. Even enemies would be saddened by this 
much degeneration and decline.”124 Sebilürreşad continued with an apology 
to readers because it was necessary to publish excerpts of this iğrenç neşriyat 
in order to show the degree of the “calamity.”125 The first journal targeted was 
Fağfur, which was published between August and November 1918. 
Sebilürreşad considered two love poems in the journal – Faruk Nafiz’s “Baş 
Başa” (In private) and Selami İzzet’s “Beyoğlu’nun Hanımlarına” (To the la-
dies of Beyoğlu) – to be among the disgusting publications. Second example 
was the article “Büyükada Hayatı” (Life in Büyükada) in Serbest Fikir 
Mecmuası, from which these lines were quoted in the editorial: “This luxuri-
ous life is the only thing that keeps people alive. I laugh at those who don’t 
think in this way: To those people who want to see life as misery, sorrow, and 
poverty brought on by the war, I pity them.”126 Another article from Serbest 
Fikir was quoted to show how the authors of such works pursue or wish to 
pursue the world. For instance, instead of looking for sorrow and misery, one 
author emphasized the beauty of women’s attire in an article titled “Kadın 
Tuvaletleri ve Hayat” (Women’s attire and life): 
I was looking for the joyful and entertaining sides of life this week. It 
seems it is easier to find than an abundance of misery! Today we are 
living a luxurious life. Especially our women; we cannot find any-
thing more interesting and exciting than their carefully chosen ele-
gant dresses, colors, socks, and attitudes.127  
                                                      
124 Ibid. “İnsan bu halleri görüyor da bayağı insanlıktan nefret edeceği geliyor. Bu kadar tereddi 
ve inhitattan düşmanlar bile müteessir olur.” 
125 Ibid., 149.  
126 Ibid., 150. “Bu şuh hayat insanları yaşatmak için yegane kuvvettir. Ben böyle düşünmeyenlere 
gülerim: O insanlar ki hayatı elem içinde, ıstırab içinde, bugünkü fecii harbin sefaleti içinde 
görmek isterler, onlara acırım.” 
127 Ibid. “Bu hafta da hayatın zevkli, eğlenceli safhalarını arıyordum. Her halde bu ıstırabi 
bolluktan daha kolay bir şey! Bugün büyük lüks içinde yaşıyoruz. Bilhassa kadınlarımız, bun-
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Lastly, Sebilürreşad targeted a love poem published in Yeni Mecmua by Enis 
Behic, who was also an adherent of the Syllabist Movement (Beş Hececiler). 
Sebilürreşad introduced the poem sarcastically: “And here is Yeni Mecmua, 
the journal that gives social and moral lessons to the Turkish community on 
the ‘New Life.’”128 The title of the poem was “Bir Çift İskarpin” (A couple of 
shoes) telling of the harmony of a man and woman’s footsteps on the side-
walks.129 Considering that Sebilürreşad found advocating “getting to know 
each other before marriage” to be immoral for Muslim couples, the “har-
mony” of which the poet wrote might have led its editors to label this poem 
immoral. Note, however, some among the authors of the “calamities” to 
which Sebilürreşad referred – such as Faruk Nafiz Çamlıbel – are in the con-
temporary Turkish literary canon and famous for creating the national liter-
ary genre. While establishing a fresh, nationalist genre in Turkish literature 
during and after the war, these poets attracted the critique of the conserva-
tives of Sebilürreşad.130 
This contest over morality revealed other facts regarding wartime censor-
ship. Sebilürreşad published a list of articles that, according to it, were 
“against the sacredness of Islam.”131 In this list, there were articles from Ser-
best Fikir, Hürriyet-i Fikriye, and Sıyanet that questioned the practice of 
veiling women in Islam. These journals claimed that Sebilürreşad was acting 
as an informant (jurnalci) and violating freedom of speech in the country. 
According to Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, who wrote in answer to these critiques, 
it was the “duty of Sebilürreşad to protect Islam” against false statements 
about the practice of veiling. Therefore, Sebilürreşad’s editors drew such arti-
                                                      
ların pek mütena bir zevkle intihab ettikleri elbiseleri, renkleri, çorabları, tavırları kadar ru-
humuzu bir mesti ile helecanlandıran başka bir şey göremiyoruz.” 
128 Ibid. “Türk unsuruna ‘yeni hayat’ için ictimâî, ahlâkî dersler veren ‘Yeni Mecmua’dan.” 
129 Ibid. “Mini mini iskarpinler/ Ne sevimli güvercinler/ Parkelenmiş sokaklarda/ Mini mini 
ayaklarda/ Ne gecelerin sesi gelir/ Vurunca da neşelidir.” 
130 See Erol Köroğlu’s work on the national literature movement and its development during the 
war,  Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity. It is possible that Sebilürreşad’s editors used 
this opportunity to criticize nationalist attempts to create a literary genre and used morality 
arguments for this purpose.  
131 Sebilürreşad, “İslam’ın Mukaddesâtı Aleyhinde Neşriyat,” 227-228. 
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cles to the attention of the military administration (askerî hükûmet). Ahmed 
Hamdi also noted that the military government had intervened in the dis-
pute and asked that the topic be closed.132 As this case illustrates, the wartime 
government asked newspapers to end discussions on some “sensitive topics.” 
It is possible to argue that due to intervention by the wartime government, 
disputes over morality remained relatively few compared to the post-war pe-
riod. Therefore, we should keep in mind that intellectual debates during the 
war had certain limitations. 
2.2.5  Reflections on the War, Women, and Morality in Sebilürreşad 
As mentioned, the problem of “immorality” for Islamists was of equal impor-
tance with irreligiosity. Their statements on morality served to link morality 
and religion and keep it within the limits of Sharia law. According to 
Sebilürreşad writers, among the many versions of immorality, prostitution, 
or sexual immorality in general, was the worst. The argument that “God 
sends calamities to those who are immoral” was frequently espoused; how-
ever, I dig beneath the arguments to provide the peculiar context of the war 
and the ensuing years of armistice marked by the Allied occupation and the 
national resistance against it. 
On December 16, 1919, the Sebilürreşad editorial board published an ar-
ticle titled “The Problem of Morality in Our Homeland” in which the editors 
reviewed wartime developments together with intellectual debates that – ac-
cording to them – had paved the way for immorality and particularly for 
prostitution.133 The article appreciated that the Ottoman press, after “ten 
years of destruction,” had finally recognized how evil immorality was and 
                                                      
132 “[askerî hükümet] tesettür meselesi hakkında gazetelerde münakaşaların devamını arzu 
etmediğinden Sebilürreşad bu konuda uzun uzadıya bir reddiye makalesi neşrederek mese-
lenin esasına girişmeyi şimdilik uygun bulmamış, yalnız tesettür hakkında din alimlerine, 
halis muhlis İslam olan Türk kadınına iftira ihtiva eden o makaleyi askeri hükümetin nazar-ı 
dikkatine arz etmekle yetinmişti.” Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, “Tesettür ve Kadın Hakları 
Konusunda Bilinmesi Elzem Hakikatler,” quoted in Kara, Türkiye’de İslâmcılık Düşüncesi, 
283. 
133 Sebilürreşad, “Memleketimizde Ahlak Meselesi,” 404-406. 
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had realized that “immorality or prostitution and adultery were social 
wounds” to be healed.134 Most of the complaints by the press proposed no 
real solutions to the immorality problem and there were common miscon-
ceptions on the issue. Sebilürreşad was proud of its own perspective on mo-
rality, which had never changed from the beginning despite accusations of its 
“bigotry.”135 While others recognized the importance of morality only after 
the war, Sebilürreşad had known the sources of the problem from the begin-
ning: “Now, we shall say it again. The reason for the rapid spread and dis-
semination of all this immorality and especially prostitution and adultery was 
the death of religious grace – more precisely, humans forcing the distruction 
of spiritualism with their many words and speeches.”136 Moving on, the arti-
cle presented an overview of the sources and definitions of immorality from 
a historical point of view. Accordingly, the problem first started with the mis-
understanding of the “freedom” that was announced with the proclamation 
of the constitution in 1908; “some people thought freedom means being free 
from religious duties and doing whatever they like.”137 The initial phase of 
this misunderstanding was revealed with respect to the issue of veiling, the 
most rooted religious practice among Muslims with a history of thirteen and 
a half centuries. The article went on to refer to “they” without detailing to 
whom “they” refers. “As they anticipated that once the obstacle [of veil] is 
removed, the remaining religious duties would collapse more easily; they dis-
covered that they could achieve their plans by destroying the woman’s 
çarşaf138 and pulling down the wooden curtain between haremlik and se-
                                                      
134 Ibid. “Allah’a şükür ki ahlâksızlığın fenâ olduğu artık teslim ediliyor. Sûi ahlâk veya husûs-u 
fuhuş ve zinaya ictimâî bir yara deniliyor.” 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. “Şimdi yine söyleyelim. Bu ahlaksızlıkların ve bahusus fuhşun, zinanın bu kadar sur’atle 
tevsiğ ve intişarına sebeb avâtıf-ı dinîyyenin ölmesi, daha doğrusu nassın maneviyatı helâka 
doğru zorla sürükleyen birçok lisânlarla, birçok kelâmlarla öldürülmesidir.” 
137 Ibid. “Birçoklarımız hürriyeti her şeyden evvel kuyyud-u dinden azâde olarak başıboş 
yaşamak ve nefs-i emârenin her istediğini yapmak mânâsına aldılar.”  
138 An outer garment that covers the entire body of women. For details, see Koçu, Türk Giyim, 
Kuşam ve Süsleme Sözlüğü, 65–68. 
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lamlık.”139 Thus, changes in clothing and gender segregation acted as triggers 
in the development of moral decline. The article continued listing the 
“sources of evil”: the opening of cinemas, theatres to women and organizing 
events where women and men were mixed. Keeping in mind the critique 
that Sebilürreşad made of nationalists regarding concerts in the Turkish 
Hearths, it is possible to assume that “they” referred to nationalists. The ar-
gument continued that the source of “immorality” was the modern under-
standing of life (asrîlik) and the project of creating the modern human 
(muasır insan etmek), to which we are familiar from the works of the promi-
nent figure of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Gökalp. The second issue was 
women’s participation in economic activities. Although the article did explic-
itly argue against the idea of women working, it emphasized that “they” in-
dicated that Islam was an obstacle to women’s participation in economic ac-
tivities since it was only concerned with protecting the honor of Muslim 
women. Eventually, as argued in the article, young women and men “lost 
the control of their minds”140 after such provocations. “Women took the 
çarşaf off saying it was too heavy and jumped into the streets wearing dresses 
that are reserved for sleeping”141 and men started to engage in acts disap-
proved of by God (münkerat). The article harshly criticized the notion that 
“foolish women” who were obedient to their husbands were therefore under 
their yoke.   
Unlike other accounts that considered poverty to be the main reason for 
prostitution, the article asserted that while “poverty might be one reason for 
prostitution” it was not “as significant as bringing women and men together 
under the same roof.”142 They blamed “so-called vanguards” in society who 
helped unite women and men in Darülfünun (imperial university) confer-
ences and organized concerts in halls with women and men together. These 
                                                      
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. “Bunca telkinât-ı fasıde ile iğfal edilen genç erkeklerle kadınların akılları zıvanasından 
çıktı.” 
141 Ibid. “Kadınlar çarşaf ağır geliyor diye soyunup gecelikle sokaklara fırladılar.” 
142  Ibid. “Vakıa fakr-u sefâlet de fuhşun esbâb-ı şuyuundan biri olabilir. Fakat insaf edelim. 
Cinsiyetten iki gencin bir araya getirilmesini teshil etmek kadar müessir midir?” 
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“so-called vanguards” sent “young, uneducated” girls alone to European uni-
versities. They encouraged the government to employ women and eventu-
ally “filled the chambers of the state with unqualified, useless women” and 
wasted public money.143 All these constituted “the first stage of prostitution.” 
Sebilürreşad was proud of its view which, according to the article, had never 
wavered since the beginning. The article asserted that Muslims had a pure 
morality bound to religion “despite shortcomings in public morality that 
prevented our progress.” Apparently, it was not modernization that Islamists 
considered harmful to morality, but the “path” that nationalist elites had fol-
lowed to achieve modernization. For the sake of modernization, “they” made 
people forget God and destroyed the “holy source” of morality. The editorial 
board of Sebilürreşad concluded with these lines:  
One should know well that this nation is Muslim. Its source of moral-
ity is Islam. It received all its graces from there. And the disgraces 
have been instilled in its soul and body by foreign hands. And the 
cure for the immorality microbe from which it suffers is to vaccinate 
religion at the heart of it.144  
Another writer for Sebilürreşad, Mustafa Sabri, summarizes this line of 
thought more precisely:  
The idea of our religious reformers is, “Since we are not able to build 
our world, we must at least destroy our afterworld.” I can only say I 
am not one of those who deny the material and moral decline of the 
Muslims, and I neither want to prevent their awakening nor the 
methods of reform that could improve the situation of the Muslim 
world. But if the progress and advancement of the Muslim world is to 
be obtained at the expense of their religion, by destroying Islam as a 
                                                      
143 Ibid. “Hükûmeti teşvik ede ede nihayet devâir-i devleti vukufsuz işe yaramaz kadınlarla 
doldurup hazineyi beyhûde ezrâr ettiler.” 
144 Ibid. See Appendix A, Quotation 6.  
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religion, I would rather Muslims stay in that miserable and wretched 
condition than to benefit from material advancement.145 
The article above was indeed a summary of what Islamists thought about mo-
rality and immorality. As is clear, the problems of women’s employment dur-
ing the war, their participation in social life, their veiling and clothing, and 
their new rights to education were at the core of “immorality” arguments. In 
general, the “issue of women” stood at the center of the “immorality mi-
crobe.” Aggressive and exaggerated statements such as “jumping into the 
streets in night dresses” and claims that modernist nationalist elite projects 
were the reason for prostitution, constituted the ways that Islamists at-
tempted to reclaim moral authority. In fact, Sebilürreşad depicted these elites 
as “inexperienced doctors” with no idea about the “immorality microbe.” 
Therefore, they could do everyone a favor by “leaving the patient in bed” 
and stepping aside.146 
The issue of women and its relation to immorality was a prominent topic 
in Sebilürreşad. A Muslim woman’s duty was to protect her morality. 
Women also had power over men to correct their husbands’ behaviors. An-
other article in Sebilürreşad titled “The Conditions and Duties of Women” 
explicitly stated that “the reason of prostitution is not economical, but spiri-
tual.”147 Even at the end of the war, Sebilürreşad continued accusing Turkish 
women of immorality and evilness. Unlike nationalist statements depicting 
Turkish women as the “heroines” of the war, Sebilürreşad recalled the wide-
spread “prostitution and immorality” during the First World War. On Octo-
ber 16, 1919, Sebilürreşad reviewed an article published by the nationalist 
newspaper İstiklal. The latter article had praised the sacrifices of Turkish 
women during the war and celebrated their steps on the path to emancipa-
tion.148 Sebilürreşad wrote a sarcastic commentary manifestly accusing Turk-
                                                      
145 Quoted in Şeyhun, Islamist Thinkers in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish 
Republic, 46–47. 
146 “Memleketimizde Ahlak Meselesi,” 404-406. 
147 Sebilürreşad, “Kadınların Vaziyeti ve Vezaifleri,” 105. “İktisadî sıkıntıdan değil ihtirasî 
sıkıntıdan kötü yola düşülüyor.”  
148 Sebilürreşad, “Kadınlarımız Hakkında,” 19. 
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ish women of having been corrupted. The review stated, in a sarcastic tone, 
that “we know what the path of emancipation has been for Turkish women 
in the last four or five years, especially during the Great War.”149 Sebilürreşad 
used the passive voice to depict the situation of women instead of blaming 
them directly. The journal held an unstated subject responsible the situation 
of women, thus disregarding their own agency: 
In recent years, as nobody can deny, prostitution has increased 
among our women and it has been observed that Muslim women are 
secretly engaged in prostitution. These women, abandoning and ne-
glecting family life and their duties, were sent to the streets. Men’s 
duties were saddled on the shoulders of these women in exchange for 
salaries that were unquestionably insufficient to make a living.150 
Strongly arguing against the idea of women’s struggle for emancipation, 
Sebilürreşad asserted that there was no such struggle between men and 
women in Muslim society.151 It advised İstiklal newspaper to “think first” 
before publishing such articles. 
§ 2.3  Yeni Mecmua: The “New Morality” as a Cure for Moral 
Decline 
Yeni Mecmua set aside many pages to elaborate on the issue of morality and 
offered new insights for solving the problem of moral decline. Its writers ap-
proached the issue of morality from a sociological point of view. Most articles 
on morality were published in the sociology (ictimaiyyat) section to empha-
size that moral values had to be discussed from a “scientific” perspective. This 
stemmed from the influence of Durkheim on the development of the disci-
                                                      
149 Ibid. “Türk kadını[nın] dört beş seneden beri, yani Harb-i Umûmî hengâmesinde sâlik olduğu 
olduğu târik-i istihlasın neden ibâret olduğu elbet malûmumuzdur.” 
150 Ibid. See Appendix A, Quotation 7.  
151 Ibid.  
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pline sociology among Ottoman intellectuals.152 In line with this, the authors 
of Yeni Mecmua institutionalized moral decline debate within the confines 
of sociological approaches. For them, once the reasons for decline were re-
vealed scientifically, it would be easier to solve the problem. For the sake of 
analysis, I highlight those articles that point to the context of war as impor-
tant to the shortcomings of current moral values. The authors coined the 
concept of a transition period (intikal devresi) that define the war as a mo-
ment of transition into the age of the modern division of labor. In this 
framework, they developed a new understanding of morality based on a 
“new life” (yeni hayat), which social life based on solidarity (tesanüd). Ziya 
Gökalp called this new understanding of morality national morality (millî 
ahlâk).153 In the context of war, moral decline, according to the commenta-
tors, was revealed especially with respect to the issue of war profiteers because 
a new morality based on social solidarity had not yet been established in so-
ciety. To establish such virtues in society and thereby overcome the problem 
of moral decline, the task of upbringing (terbiye meselesi) had to be under-
taken in a modern way. Only through education, Sadak and Gökalp empha-
sized, could moral decline be eliminated. 
2.3.1  The Morale Laïque and the Sociological Analysis of Morality 
and Moral Decline 
For the authors in Yeni Mecmua, morality was something to be dealt with by 
the discipline of sociology. Moral decline, in this sense was a sociological 
problem with scientific explainations if approached using the methods of so-
ciology. Therefore, the issue fell in the realm of ictimâîyyat, a term that 
Gökalp coined as a translation of sociology. 
                                                      
152 Many studies on the impact of Durkheim on Ottoman-Turkish intellectuals have been 
published. For more information, see Toprak, Türkiye’de Popülizm; Toprak, “Türkiye’de 
Durkheim Sosyolojisinin Doğuşu”; Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp.  
153 Zafer Toprak discusses this in the context of “social revolution” in Gökalp’s thought. Social 
revolution was the second step in the advancement of reform in Ottoman society following the 
political revolution of 1908. Toprak, “Osmanlı’da Toplumbilimin Doğuşu.” 
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Before detailing the statements on moral decline in Yeni Mecmua, an 
overview of the term morale laïque and how Durkheim’s works formulated it 
is essential to grasp a better understanding of intellectual context. Thus, I 
draw parallels between contemporary European thought and the works of the 
Ottoman intelligentsia. Durkheim was convinced that the moral crisis in 
French society was derived from changes in social structure that had de-
stroyed the common consciousness by removing the basis for ethics.154 Some 
French intellectuals of the Third Republic, including Durkheim, undertook 
the task of creating an official secular morality as a fundamental precondi-
tion for social integration.155 Education was central to the project of nursing 
children on the new Republican values. As Morton indicates, “morality in 
education gradually came to mean a civic religion, with regular readings of 
the Declaration of Rights, civic chants and patriotic fervor as its main com-
ponents.”156 Moral renewal was only possible by setting up great collective 
goals that united individuals around common ideals.157 
In Durkheim’s works, morality was treated as a “social fact” explicable 
only from the standpoint of sociology.158 A significant part of his studies was 
dedicated to developing a morale laïque in the service of society that he en-
visaged would be organized according to the principle of the “division of la-
bor.”159 He introduced the science des moeurs (sciences of mores) to sociol-
ogy to observe the customs of a society in order to study morality.160 Gökalp 
adopted this formulation and developed it in his studies of mores (örf) in 
Turkish society.  
On August 23, 1917, Ziya Gökalp published an article titled “Moral Cri-
sis” in Yeni Mecmua.161 He began by defining different moralities. From his 
point of view, there were two different moralities: ascetic morality (zühdî 
                                                      
154 Stock-Morton, Moral Education for a Secular Society, 128. 
155 Ibid., 5. 
156 Ibid., 26. 
157 Ibid., 134–135. 
158 Royce, Classical Social Theory and Modern Society, 57–58. 
159 Stock-Morton, Moral Education for a Secular Society, 127. 
160 Ibid., 129. 
161 Ziya Gökalp, “Ahlak Buhranı,” 122. 
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ahlâk) and social morality (ictimâî ahlâk). Ascetic morality was the moral 
system of primitive societies (ibtidai cemiyetler) established on the concept 
of mystic “holiness” and the categories of the taboo (haram) and the obliga-
tory (vacib). Apart from these two, there were licit (caiz), permitted 
(mübah), and permissible (helal) acts. In monotheistic religions, these cate-
gories solidified even more because they had consequences in the afterworld. 
In this perspective of morality, people who commit sin feel guilty whereas 
those who fulfill the obligatory rules feel righteous. Therefore, ascetic moral-
ity brought high moral values to individuals and established rules in society, 
up to a point. However, in Gökalp’s opinion, as society advanced, ascetism 
was transferred from the public to the private sphere, which was an inevitable 
consequence of the social division of labor.162 In times of social progress, he 
asserted, only a few can fulfill the obligations of ascetic morality; social divi-
sion of labor conflicts with public ascetics and diminishes the number of as-
cetic people, thus causing a decline in decency and moral quality.163 At this 
point, he refers to the context in which the transformation occurred:  
Eventually, in addition to the social division of labor, on one hand, 
and the excessive admiration that we show towards European civiliza-
tion, on the other, the spiritual earthquakes that the war caused shook 
ascetic morality completely, and as a result, souls and consciences 
tended to be freed from all moral concerns.164  
For him, once emancipated from the influence of ascetic morality it was 
natural and necessary that individual desires would become rampant. And, 
Gökalp argued, 
that is what we call individualism (ferdcilik); after denouncing prin-
ciples of old morality, people left moral concerns aside and only ran 
after personal pleasures, joys, and interests. Today, the immorality 
                                                      
162 Ibid.  
163 Ibid.  
164 Ibid. See Appendix A, Quotation 8.  
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movement that harms innocent souls with tragic fate is nothing but a 
wretched consequence of the disease of individualism.165  
As is clear from these lines, he defined “religious morality” as an ascetic mo-
rality that – as times changed – would inevitably diminish in society due to 
three developments: war, the emergence of the division of labor, and admira-
tion for European civilization. “Religious morality” can no longer be 
adopted, since it belongs to another age: “Both religion and law may estab-
lish special codes in society, however; both derive their strength from moral-
ity.”166 This idea was the exact opposite of that of the religious morality de-
fenders in Sebilürreşad. Gökalp indicated that morality was the source of law 
and religion, while Sebilürreşad’s authors emphasized that religion was the 
source of both morality and the law. Gökalp took his point further and ar-
gued that the conservatives who defended the revival of old morality to 
overcome crisis of morality were contributing to the current moral decline: 
their insistence on the old morality made the resistance of individualism to 
the “domination and tyranny of a diminishing morality” stronger.167 How-
ever, more so than these “old morality defenders,” the people most responsi-
ble for moral decline were intellectuals who had not worked on codifying 
and developing a new morality.168 
Gökalp simplified the definition of “new morality” to a “social morality” 
that had to be established on sociological methods.169 He made it explicit that 
“nobody would respect” principles not based on scientific evaluation “in the 
                                                      
165 Ibid. “İşte ferdçilik dediğimiz şey, insanların eski bir ahlâka karşı isyan ettikten sonra ahlâk 
endişelerinden büsbütün vazgeçerek, ferdî ihtiraslarının, ferdî eğlence ve menfaatlerinin ar-
kasından koşması demektir. Bugün, birçok müessif tecellileriyle henüz bozulmamış ruhları 
dağdar eden ‘ahlâksızlık hareketi’ işte, bu maraz-ı ferdciliğin menfur bir neticesinden ibaret-
tir.” 
166 Ibid. “Din ile hukuk da kendilerine mahsus birer inzibat tesis edebilirler, fakat ikisi de 
kuvvetlerini ahlâktan alırlar.” 
167 Ibid. “Zaten, ahlâksızlık ceryanı bazen kendisini haklı ve nazariye itibariyle kuvvetli 
gösterebiliyorsa, hiç şübhe yoktur ki, bu kuvveti solmuş bir ahlâkın tahakküm ve istibdâdı 
sayesinde ihrâz edebiliyor.” 
168 Ibid.  
169 Ibid.  
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age of reason.”170 In order to follow the principles of morality, people had to 
know how those were established in the course of social advancement and 
then to define their purposes and benefits from the perspective of the posi-
tive sciences, not scholasticism or literary knowledge. He offered two socio-
logical fields to cope with moral and religious decline: moral and religious 
sociology (ahlakî ictimaiyyat and dini ictimaiyyat). Only these two fields of 
sociology could save adolescents from the apparent conflict between the 
positive sciences and religious and moral emotions. This conflict was what 
created the gap from which individualism was benefiting from. Strikingly, he 
not only criticized the moral understandings of materialism, biological de-
terminism, and spiritualism – none of which were able to establish a positive 
moral scholarship – but also the moral perspectives of Kant, Comte, and 
Spencer for being agnostic (gayr-ı münfehim). He concluded that “sociology 
is the only positive science that can help maintain the current religious and 
moral sentiments that constitute the backbone of real duties for social or-
der…. Therefore, we expect the cure for today’s moral depression only 
through the true path that sociology illuminates.”171 
On the topic of individualism and the impacts of modern thought on 
morality, İsmail Hakkı published an article in Yeni Mecmua titled “Ahlak 
Mücahedeleri” (Moral conflicts).172 After acknowledging the existence of a 
moral crisis in society, he analyzed the influence of certain philosophical 
trends on the decline of morality. According to him, because society was in a 
period of social dissolution, such trends could easily affect the people, par-
ticularly the youth. Among these trends, he considered moral nihilism (lâ-
ahlâkîlik), biological determinism (tabiatcılık), idealism (fikircilik), particu-
larism (infiradcılık), collectivism (ictimâîcilik), conservatism (mu-
                                                      
170 Ibid. “Şübhesiz bugün makul olmayan yahud makuliyeti ilmî tedkikler neticesinde ortaya 
konulmayan kaidelere kimse itibar göstermez. Bu asır, ilm asrı, terassud ve tecrübeye 
müstenid akıl asrıdır.”  
171 Ibid. “Binaenaleyh, ictimâiyyat ilmi cemiyetlerde el’an yaşamakda olan ve ictimâî inzibâta aid 
vazifelerin en canlı uzuvlarını teşkil eden dinî, ahlakî duyguların müsbet ilimlere karşı 
sarsılmamasını te’min edebilecek yegâne müsbet ilimdir.” 
172 İsmail Hakkı, “Ahlâk Mücahadeleri,” 187-188. 
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hâfazacılık), and false idealism (sûnî mefkûrecilik). He strictly opposed 
moral ideas derived from nihilism and Darwinism. Emphasizing the nature 
of moral codes as social principles, he agreed that “moral Darwinism” was a 
misinterpretation of Darwin’s “survival of the fittest,” and he claimed that 
applying such principles to morality was wrong because it leads to a total re-
jection of moral judgments. Like Gökalp, he proposed the idea of solidarity 
to cope with the crisis of morality vis-à-vis philosophical trends stirring up 
conflict in society. 
Returning to Gökalp’s sociological analysis of moral decline, we should 
note that he divided morality into several forms and wrote about each sepa-
rately. This was in line with his idea of sociological classification to observe 
“social facts” using a scientific approach. These five moralities were: individ-
ual morals, professional morals, sexual morals, family morals (he wrote 
twelve series of articles on family alone), and finally, general morals (şahsî 
ahlâk, meslekî ahlâk, cinsî ahlâk, aile ahlâkı, umûmî ahlâk, respectively). 
Accordingly, during war, “crime against property increases because the na-
tion becomes a single family and thus it stirs the spirit of collectivity, while 
on the other hand economic poverty accelerates.”173 Consequently, he re-
ferred to war profiteering as easily-earned wealth shook the economic and 
moral foundations in society. He contended that if “professional morals and 
individual morals have been established in the country before the war, profi-
teering would not have become such a big problem and it would not have 
been possible to spend that illicit money in an immoral way.”174 
Gökalp considered sexual morality to be the most important part of şahsî 
ahlâk. He asserted that sexual morality deserves particular attention because 
the sense of crisis in terms of sexuality reached an utmost degree.175 After 
                                                      
173 Ziya Gökalp, “İctimaiyyat: Şahsî Ahlâk,” 141. “Harb zamanında bir taraftan millet bir tek aile 
mahiyetini aldığı için, iştirakçilik ruhunun hakim olmasından, diğer taraftan iktisadî sefâletin 
tevsiğ etmesinden, mülkiyete tecavüz hadiseleri de artıyor.” 
174 Ibid. “Harbden makdem memleketimizde meslekî ahlâk ile şahsî ahlâk kuvvetle tesis etmiş 
olsaydı, ne ihtikarcılık bu kadar marazi bir şekil alacaktı, ne de gayr-ı meşru bir surette ka-
zanılan paraların gayri ahlaki bir surette sarfına imkan bulunacaktı.” 
175 Ziya Gökalp, “İctimâiyyat: Cinsî Ahlâk,” 168.  
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giving a long historical, anthropological background of gender segregation, 
his main idea in overcoming crisis of sexual morality was the necessity of 
establishing the mutual respect of both sexes as the essence between men and 
women relationships. Once personality was defined as sacred and the “free 
will” of both woman and man was recognized, this kind of moral crisis 
would be eliminated. The first stage in the recognition of this free will was to 
legally recognize the equality of the sexes. Repeating his claim that this was 
the age of the division of labor, he strongly argued that old moral codes con-
cerning veils and gender segregation created obstacles to women’s participa-
tion in the division of labor and had to be eliminated. Conservatives had to 
accept an understanding of “mental veiling” instead of physical veiling.176 
These lines might have sounded radical at the time; however, the motives of 
these intellectuals were about saving the state. Perhaps, the legitimacy of this 
aim allowed them to be radical. 
Gökalp continued dealing with “the issue of women” in a series of arti-
cles titled “Family Morality.” One of these articles, titled “The Love for 
Chevalier and Feminism” had interesting insights on morality, or in Gökalp’s 
terms – “sick morality.”177 After arguing that feminism was misinterpreted in 
current intellectual circles and was confused with medieval understandings 
of aristocratic women chevaliers, who were accepted as superior to men, he 
defended feminism as a democratic movement that demanded the equality 
of men and women. He attacked the Tanzimat literature, especially the 
Servet-i Fünun genre (except for Tevfik Fikret) that adopted aesthetic judg-
ments of women from French literature, for its role in “sick morality.” In this 
aesthetic view, the beauty of women was reduced to their psychical appear-
ance, whereas in other literary genres such as those of British literature, the 
beauty of women stems from not only appearance but also high morals. For 
him, “the material beauty of woman and her high morals are indivisible from 
each other,”178 and “the way to unite love with morality is only possible 
                                                      
176 Ibid. “Maddî tesettür yerine manevî tesettür kâim olunmalı. Fakat öte yandan muhafazakârlar 
da bu tedricî tekâmülün zarûrî olduğunu artık kabul etmelidir.” 
177 Ziya Gökalp, “Aile Ahlakı: Şövalye Aşkı ve Feminizm,” 364.  
178 Ibid. “Kadının güzelliği ve ahlâkîliği bir bütündür.” 
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through marriage.”179 Adopting feminism in the social and political spheres 
also meant educating women in national and professional morality since 
they heretofore lacked these qualities. On the other hand, women’s sexual 
morality was higher than that of men, according to him, man should take the 
strength of woman as an example from this point of view. We should note 
that these arguments opposed those of Sebilürreşad’s authors who empha-
sized the weakness of women on the issue of sexual morality. Gökalp, on the 
other hand, recognized the “will” of women in this sense and accepted 
women’ sexuality within this framework. His views on morality imply the 
fact that he was convinced that morality was socially constructed – in line 
with the sociological view. 
2.3.2  The Concept of “İntikal Devresi,” Solidarism, and the Under-
standing of “National Morality” in Yeni Mecmua 
The authors of Yeni Mecmua agreed that the Ottoman Empire was undergo-
ing a stage of transition (intikal devresi). Accordingly, a sense of moral crisis 
was a natural outcome of this stage. Used in many different contexts, the 
stage of transition meant a transformation from ummah to nation, from 
backwardness to advancement, from feudalism to modernity, and from the 
extended to the nuclear family. This transition had been marked by social 
crisis or social dissolution in those countries that had experienced it. Fur-
thermore, the agonies accompanying the transition were evident in every 
sphere of life; all institutions – including morality, family, marriage, labor, 
business, bureaucracy, and the military – suffered from turmoils of transition. 
For instance, Ahmed Midhat (Metya)’s article titled “Professional Groups 
and Moral Life” claimed that even though it had been one and half centuries 
since the social turmoil of the Industrial and French Revolutions had started, 
the world was still struggling with moral and legal tensions.180 As discussed, 
Gökalp claimed that there had been a transition from ascetic morality to so-
cial morality. Women’s participation in the labor force was also a sign of the 
                                                      
179 Ibid. “Aşkın ahlâkla birleşmesi ise ancak izdivac dahilinde kalmasıyla meşrutdur.” 
180 Ahmed Mithad, “Mesleki Zümreler ve Ahlaki Hayat,” 258-259.  
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transition to the modern division of labor that would eventually necessitate 
legal changes to recognize women’s rights in the public sphere.181 Another 
author, Sadak agreed with him and claimed that it was also “a transition pe-
riod in the spiritual mindset of the public.”182 He wrote in 1917 that three 
years of war had brought moral decline in society and argued that the old 
morality should be replaced with a new one. This new morality, as developed 
by several authors in the journal, was based on the foundation of social soli-
darity inspired by Emile Durkheim. 
In this line of thought, all civilizations went through a similar social crisis 
in the transition stage; however, for Gökalp, the problem was deeper and re-
mained unsolved in the Ottoman Empire due to the lack of “great intellectu-
als.” Recognizing solely Tevfik Fikret as a “great intellectual,” he argued that 
there were no other intellectuals in the spheres of morality, law, and philoso-
phy with Fikret’s intellectual caliber. These intellectuals in other countries 
had guided society from ascetic to moral religiosity and from ascetic to social 
morality.183 
Apart from the disadvantage of not having great intellectuals during the 
stage of transition, the cures for overcoming the shortcomings of this period 
were to reform existing institutions and establish new ones as necessary ac-
cording to the principles of the social division of labor. Moral problems dis-
cussed with respect to the social division of labor were war profiteering, 
women’s participation in social, economic, and political life, and the educa-
tion of adolescents. I discuss the first two here and reserve another heading 
for the education issue because while the first two were “immediate” projects, 
education was a long-term solution for moral decline, yet with a similar per-
spective based on solidarity. 
The authors of articles dealing with war profiteering approached the issue 
as a moral problem. For them, getting rich off the war was the result of an 
individualist, self-seeking morality. War profiteers only pursued their own 
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interests, not only economically but also socially. Refik Halid (Karay) wrote 
an article titled “The War Rich” in Yeni Mecmua and expressed that there 
were two major calamities in the country: louse-borne typhus and war profi-
teers.184 According to him, the newly rich thought that being wealthy meant 
wandering around like a turkey with a full stomach and running after fe-
males in the streets. Such rich people, for Karay, did no good for their home-
land or fatherland. They ate, drank, had fun, and showed off. Their money, 
Karay said, did no good for the country; these newly rich never donated to 
charity. On the contrary, their way of spending money harmed the public 
good. At the end of his article, he emphasized that these newly rich had 
emerged within Ottoman society; they were “domestic products.”185 Such a 
description of the war profiteering problem indeed had long-lasting echoes, 
particularly in literary works. Strikingly, the problem was not deemed a con-
sequence of the economic policies of the ruling party. Instead of discussing 
the failure of the economic policies of the government, intellectuals concen-
trated on the immorality of businessmen.186 Therefore, the solution to the 
war profiteering problem was to establish corporations and unions – or, as 
described by Sadak in French, groupements professionals. These corporations 
would be established on the basis of professions as units that would check the 
work ethics of their members. Even without any “legal” punishment, these 
corporations would apply “social” punishments such as exclusion from pro-
fessional circles for “not comply[ing] with the national consciousness.”187 
These corporations would be the tools by which individual interests would be 
attached to the national interest, and each corporation would share “social” 
                                                      
184 Refik Halit “Harb Zengini,” 301. 
185 Ibid. “Balta ormana ‘sapım sizden!’ demiş; bu ictimaî bıçkının da maalesef sapı içimizden çıktı; 
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duties according to the principles of the social division of labor. In other 
words, the logic was formulated as: “corporations would find harmony be-
tween individual and national interests and instill a national morality in the 
members of the professional groups.”188 For instance, Sadak said, “If we had 
had a proper trade [society] before the war, we would never have ended up 
with profiteering in such an ugly and improper way.”189 For him, people en-
gaged in profiteering because of the lack of “national morality,” – that is to 
say a moral understanding shaped by solidarity and the institutions that were 
established on the basis of solidarity.190 National morality, on the other hand, 
was the idea of considering the public interest to be superior to individual 
interests; this was the foundation of the “new life” and the source of all kinds 
of moral activity.191 
2.3.3  National Education as a Solution to Moral Decline 
As Berkes stated in his groundbreaking work, the “fulcrum” of reformers to 
liberate individuals from “the yoke of tradition” was education.192 Yeni 
Mecmua had a separate column on the issue of education and upbringing 
titled “The Problem of Upbringing.” Instead of restating the importance of 
education for modernization projects, this study limits the matter to the 
“healing” effects of education for moral decline. Necmeddin Sadak was the 
leading figure writing about ideal education in Yeni Mecmua. He underlined 
that some problems in education system had resulted in a crisis of morality. 
According to him, the initial problem was the conflict between the modern 
school curriculum and milieu (muhit). Sadak asserted in his article titled “The 
Education of Our Young Girls” that the factor most contributing to “moral 
decline in the world of women” was the education that young girls re-
                                                      
188  Ibid. 
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ceived.193 He contended that the conflict that arose between modern educa-
tion – particularly the curricula of foreign schools – and the social conditions 
of society was the actual reason for moral decline. This education had no real 
basis in the society and created expectations that could never be realized. 
These girls found salvation by migrating to other countries or places and, in 
the worse scenario, by committing suicide. In order to cope with this prob-
lem, the conflict had to be eliminated; family, the social environment, and 
schooling had to work in harmony to educate adolescents. Girls had to be 
educated not only to be wives or mothers but also skilled employees. Moral-
ity had to be instilled through this education to convey the “great ideals” of 
both family and the workplace. In another of his article, he criticized exces-
sive materialism. The article titled “The Danger of Sports” argued that moral 
progress is superior to bodily progress.194 The importance of education and 
the reform of education had become possible thanks to the war. Eventually, 
national education would be victorious over clerical education.195 The moral-
ity crisis could be eliminated by a “national education” that would give to the 
young generation “noble causes” and “great ideals.”196 These ideals would at-
tach the youth to their families, society, and the nation with patriotic feel-
ings. 
§ 2.4  Women’s Journals on Moral Decline 
Moral decline discourses often revolved around the topics related to women 
such as veiling, clothing, gender roles in the family and in society, polygyny, 
the formation and dissolution of marriages, women’s behavior, and gender 
segregation in the public sphere. Especially veiling practices were a central 
issue for maintaining gender distinctions and women’s morality in public 
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space. Starting in the sixteenth century, sultanic edicts were published to pre-
serve traditional veiling by referring to, as Nora Şeni asserts, “what has al-
ways been” as a pretext justifying the promulgation of such edicts.197 On the 
other hand, Ahmed Refik wrote in Yeni Mecmua, Ottoman women “just like 
the Janissaries” had “never obeyed” these sultanic codes.198 As discussed ear-
lier in this study, sumptuary laws on clothing had many rationales apart from 
the obvious – that is, protection of the Islamic principles. For instance, Tu-
naya considered the veiling issue to be a tool of political Islam to intervene 
in social life.199 Accordingly, the issue became attached to the discussion on 
the limitations of freedom and secular law vis-à-vis sharia law. In the context 
of the war, the veiling issue took on yet another dimension: the reason for 
the country’s calamities was suggested to have been women’s resistance to 
the veil. Mehmet Tahir, for instance, published a booklet on the topic arguing 
against the general assumption in society that the Balkan Wars had been lost 
because women had uncovered themselves.200 Fashion, indeed, had ramifica-
tions encompassing concerns over morality, identity, and autonomy. Nicole 
Van Os explains how women’s outfits came to be perceived as a threat in the 
late Ottoman context. 
First, the changes in the outdoor dress of women evoked opposition 
from those who thought certain types of clothes were not in accor-
dance with religious rules and national morals. Second, expenses in-
curring while following fashion, defined as a constantly changing of 
clothes without an actual necessity, were a reason for the rejection of 
fashion. Third, and often connected with the other reasons, there was 
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a growing resistance amongst a part of the population to the increas-
ing economic, political and cultural influence of “the Europeans,” 
and the perceived subsequent loss of Ottoman independency and 
identity.201 
Developing a “simple and plain national dress” was an aim of the feminists, 
as it sounded morally and politically correct in the atmosphere of the war.202 
The debate about polygyny had a similar, central question: can secular 
law prohibit what was mandated by sharia law? Islamists defended polygyny 
as one of the most important aspects of Muslim societies for protecting mo-
rality and preventing prostitution.203 Not only from the perspective of sharia 
law but also from a Malthusian perspective, Scott Rank posits, advocates of 
polygyny argued that polygyny was a “natural” condition to “reproduce” in 
the case of women’s infertility and that it balanced the unequal ratio be-
tween men and women.204 In times of war, especially, conservatives em-
braced the latter argument that the relative number of women was greater 
than men due to the war and that this gender imbalance would result in in-
creases in extramarital affairs and prostitution.205 
During my research on intellectual responses to moral decline, I was cu-
rious whether women had reacted to these discussions of morality, particu-
larly to the ones revolving around gender inequality. Interestingly, women’s 
journals did not deal with the morality issue as much as other journals that I 
examined. For the sake of analysis and to maintain the wartime context, I 
scanned journals starting in the years 1912 and 1913, the time of Balkan 
Wars, as well as some journals published right after the war. 
The First World War constituted the context for a new wave of feminism 
in the Ottoman Empire. The concept of “Muslim Women,” coined by Fatma 
Aliye, was later transformed into “Turkish Women” by Nezihe Muhiddin in 
the war years. For Nezihe Muhiddin “a national identity including a national 
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morality” had to be the basis for the rational, secular, modern sense of wom-
anhood.206 On the discourse of moral decline, it is possible to observe two 
dominant views that prevailed among women writers of the time. One was 
the need for social reform that would trigger a questioning of the existing 
social values in society. Such values in Muslim society were considered an 
important obstacle to the guarantee of gender equality. Accordingly, these 
“corrupt” values had to change to emancipate women from the yoke of tradi-
tion as well as to bring an end to moral decline. The second view exposed the 
notion of equality in order to object to the central place of women in dis-
courses of moral decline. According to this view, morality was considered 
narrowly as protecting the honor of women, while the rule did not apply to 
men. On the other hand, some women writers sided with discourses of moral 
decline arguing that Muslim women had to respect national and religious 
identity. 
Kadınlar Dünyası has a distinctive place among Ottoman women’s jour-
nals.207 The editors and writers of the journal were comprised of women who 
explicitly engaged in feminism as a social movement. The owner was Ulviye 
Mevlan, who was also the founder of the Osmanlı Hanımları Müdâfaa-i Hu-
kuk-ı Nisvan Cemiyeti (Ottoman society for the defense of women’s rights). 
Many prominent figures of Ottoman feminism were among the authors of 
the journal including Aziz Haydar, Emine Seher Ali, Mükerrem Belkıs, Yaşar 
Nezihe, Belkıs Şevket, Mesudet Bedirhan, Bedia Kamran, and Meliha Zek-
eriya. The journal led an effective opposition to the exclusion of Muslim 
women from higher education, employment, and entering public space. 
During the Balkan Wars, the authors defended the territorial unity of the Ot-
toman Empire and joined the nationalist cause in condemning the war. Dur-
ing the First World War, the editors decided to go on hiatus due to wartime 
conditions and their desire to join humanitarian aid and war efforts on the 
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homefront. Through the end of the war, Kadınlar Dünyası announced its 
return.208 
In Kadınlar Dünyası, the discourses on moral corruption were accompa-
nied by an emphasis on the need for social reform as an antidote to degen-
eration. For instance, Mükerrem Belkıs wrote an article titled “Harmful Tra-
ditions” in Kadınlar Dünyası complaining that the government was always 
busy with political reforms and underestimated important social reforms that 
would also strengthen the political ones.209 “Establishing happy and solid 
families,” in her formulation, had to be regarded as the backbone of reform 
programs including military reforms: a nation ultimately relied on the fam-
ily.210 For her, the first issue was arranged marriages (görücülük) as an obsta-
cle to forming such families.211 She called for the annihilation of old, harmful 
values in society lest they destroy “all our existence.”212 
Another article in Kadınlar Dünyası argued that the discourse on moral-
ity constituted an obstacle for women to participate in economic, social, and 
political life. After listing virtues that fall under the heading of upright mo-
rality, such as being hardworking, obedient, patriotic, charitable, just, and 
fair, the article, which was authored by the editorial board, contended that 
morality in Ottoman society had been reduced to its sexual connotations.213 
“Morality is not only about chastity,” the article argued. “The homeland will 
not be saved merely by chastity.”214 Here again, it is possible to see that 
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women developed a discourse of national interests that through attention to 
unequal expectations from men and women. The editorial board put the is-
sue of gender inequality forward based on the fact that such righteousness 
was only expected from women: “Is it logical to expect chastity only from 
women and leave men free in the matter of prostitution?”215 The editors con-
sidered women’s equality a necessary condition for the progress of the nation 
and commented that arguments about immorality were irrelevant to this 
aim. The article went on to say that the morality argument served the pur-
poses of preventing women from working outside the home or receiving 
higher education. A similar argument is found in another article in the same 
journal. Feride İzzet Selim wrote that many people in Ottoman society be-
lieve that if girls learn to write, they will write love letters. Due to the im-
morality argument, many families hesitate to send their daughters to 
school.216 Aziz Haydar put the question of unequal expectations from differ-
ent sexes in the title of her article: “Why Is It Only Women Who Need To 
Be Corrected?”217 After listing common views of how a woman “must be,” 
including the condition of being “morally upright,” she asked whether “these 
conditions are not necessary for men” and whether “men are – as they as-
sume themselves – perfect.”218 Indeed, the double standard of morality con-
stituted a major point in morality discussions among women writers. 
Nezihe Hamdi, an author in Kadınlar Dünyası, wrote an article in Sep-
tember 1914 titled “Moral Anxieties” in which she questioned the double 
standard in morality discourses.219 In her article, she underlined how the mo-
rality argument was instrumentalized to create an obstacle to women’s par-
ticipation in social life. She defined this argument as a weapon (silah) of 
those men who argued that women’s participation in social life would harm 
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their position in the family and led them to search for pleasures other than 
domestic family life which result in the dissolution of the family. According 
to her, this rationale was wrong. She argued that there were three reasons for 
the separation of the spouses: instinctive reasons (garizî sebebler), spiritual 
and aesthetic reasons (ruhî ve bediî sebebler), and financial reasons (iktisadî 
sebebler).220 She asserted that the real moral anxiety should be concerned 
about these problems to prevent the institution of family from being dis-
solved. To establish a balance among the spouses within the family, moral 
anxieties should not be an obstacle to couples getting to know each other 
before marriage in a natural environment – that is to say in public space. She 
not only opposed segregation before marriage but was also against arranged 
meetings before marriage. Once women began participating in social life, 
matrimonial candidates would find each other in the natural course of daily 
life.221 Moral anxieties, for her, were derived from traditional marriage forma-
tion practices, and the solution to this problem was to enable women to par-
ticipate in social life. Defining these moral standards as male morality and a 
male mentality (erkek ahlâk ve zihniyeti), she strikingly concluded her arti-
cle with a sarcastic comment on the inequality inherent in the morality ar-
gument: 
We would like to invite those who defend the exclusion of women 
from social life in the name of moral anxieties to a test that will quell 
their worries. For centuries, women have lived a secret, enslaved life 
for the sake of this fictitious anxiety. Nevertheless, people today 
know through many examples that this segregation has been useless. 
Therefore, is it not possible to apply the same practices to men, as 
well? Please, can we ask them to not participate in social life and to 
leave social institutions to the administration of women for a few 
centuries? Is it not necessary to enforce women’s morality [on men] 
and turn the sharp side of the knife towards the men?222 
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In another journal, Seyyale (of which only one issue published, on June 4, 
1914), an article signed with the author’s initials appeared discussing the “un-
reasonable” aspects of “immorality” arguments. The author opposed the 
widespread idea of what she formulated as: “We [Ottomans] can never get 
used to the European lifestyle because we have something called manners 
(âdâb) about which Europeans have no idea.”223 She questioned the hypocrisy 
of “immorality” arguments. Initially, she began with explaining the under-
standing of entertainment that is generally labeled as “sin” by conservatives. 
For instance, she asserted that even though they claim theatergoing is a sin, 
members of the ulema, wearing their clerical clothes, unhesitatingly visit “the 
ugly imitation” of “European” theaters.224 She asked why members of the 
ulema visit these ugly places while opposing the idea of civilized entertain-
ment. Second, mixed entertainment vanues in Europe were regarded as im-
moral by the Ottoman public; however, the same public did not regard it as 
immoral when observed among Ottoman non-Muslims and even between a 
Muslim man and a non-Muslim woman! Therefore, the immorality argu-
ment was only valid for Muslim women. She concluded that “it is pointless 
to distinguish between Muslim morals and universal morals and to separate 
Muslims from other nations as such.”225  
As a matter of fact, feminism came to be associated with immorality by 
some conservative writers, as discussed in this study. They often considered 
feminism to be a threat to the extant social order that envisaged the control 
of women in the family. Women’s acquisition of equal legal rights, according 
to this line of thought, would further contribute to moral decline in society. 
Feride Nihal wrote an article in Kadınlar Dünyası to answer these claims. She 
questioned the rationale of this argument: “I wonder what kind of immoral-
ity might emerge by granting women rights? My God! In order to agree 
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with this argument, one would need to be shorn of one’s reason and 
sense.”226  
Happiness was a key word for women writers and their projects for an 
ideal life. Accordingly, equality brought happiness to the family, and happi-
ness was only possible with a spiritual understanding that emphasized the 
nonmaterial sides of life and morality in particular. Mükerrem Belkıs also 
complained that feminism was misunderstood from the perspective of moral-
ity. She argued that feminism had no intent to destroy morality or the fam-
ily. “On the contrary,” she wrote, “feminism is a way to realize a better hap-
piness by observing the principles of morality.”227 For her, feminism has the 
same purpose as the principles of morality: to guarantee happiness for the 
people. Both feminism and morality advise people to do good and avoid the 
bad. 
In her article on the understanding of feminism among the Ottoman-
Turkish women writers, Elif Mahir Metinsoy argues that despite their de-
mands regarding women’s civil and social rights, some of these women writ-
ers were reproducing patriarchal lines of thought, particularly after the war.228 
She asserted that “Turkish Muslim women’s ostensible emphasis on national-
ist and moral values overshadowed their agency in the women’s movement 
and their active participation in social life.”229 Parallel to this argument, 
moral decadence anxiety was present among men writers of women journals, 
as well. For instance, Macit Şevket wrote an article in Bilgi Yurdu titled 
“Women and Morality” in which he used a metaphor to describe the need for 
happiness – that is to say, morality – in addition to knowledge: “Human in-
telligence is a source of light; it illuminates like the sun, but the sun has an-
other duty, which is to heat. Human beings are in need of heat as much as 
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228 Mahir Metinsoy, “The Limits of Feminism in Muslim-Turkish Women Writers of the 
Armistice Period (1918-1923),” 86. 
229 Ibid., 104. 
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light.”230 Therefore, he argued that scientific education and morality had to 
be combined to work together just like the sun. Halide Nusret Kazimi, a 
woman author in Genç Kadın who also published a few articles in 
Sebilürreşad, was a defender of Islamic values and practices, particularly ones 
concerning women’s clothing. In one of her articles titled “On Morality: The 
Problem of Veiling,” she described a moment of “shame” in Inas Sultanisi 
(Girls High School) concerning veiling. Halide Nusret wrote that some for-
eigner visitors wanted to see the students. Among the six hundred students at 
least half were adolescents, but “only three were veiled,” she complained. She 
continued, “when I told them it is a mistake to neglect national identity to 
this degree, they shrugged their shoulders and laughed at me.”231 It should be 
noted that she wrote this article in 1919 during the time of the occupation 
when anxiety over national identity, or Muslim identity, was heightening. A 
similar moral anxiety regarding the behaviors of students and graduates of 
the Girls Schools was expressed by Mükerrem Belkıs who wrote in Kadınlar 
Dünyası in June 1918 that she was disappointed by the “moral laxity” that 
she observed among educated girls. She complained that Girls’ Schools, the 
only places that could correct the “sick morality of these girls, which they had 
adopted from their families and previous environments,”232 lacked moral 
education. Having witnessed the calamities (felaketler) that these girls had 
experienced, she expressed her resentment of their lack of purpose in life – 
that they had no idea why they were educated and what was expected of 
                                                      
230 Macit Şevket, “Ahlak ve Kadın,” 53-57. “Zekâ-yı beşer bir menba-yı ziyadır, güneş gibi 
etrafını aydınlatır; ama güneşin bir de hararet vermek hassası var. İnsan, yalnız aydınlanmak 
değil, hem de ısınma ihtiyacındadır.” 
231 Halide Nusret, “Ahlak: Tesettür Mes’elesi,” Genç Kadın, No. 8, 1919, in İlengiz, Kadın 
Eserleri Kütüphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi Vakfı 20. Yıl Özel Yayını Genç Kadın 1919 Ocak-
Mayıs (Yeni Harflerle), 110. “Ben ‘milliyeti bu kadar unutmak doğru değil’ dedikçe onlar 
gülerek omuz silkiyorlardı.”  
232 Mükerrem Belkıs, “Kız Mekteplerinde Ahlak ve Ahlak-ı Terbiye,” 2-4. “Biz mekteblerden 
ailenin verdiği sakim âdât ve efkârı, bozulmuş seciyyeyi, muhitin telkin ettiği gayr-i ahlâkî 
temayülatı düzelterek yeni ve temiz hisler, kanaatler aşılayarak, ve ruhlar üzerinde sanatkar 
gibi işleyerek heyet-i ictimaiyyeye birer ruh doktoru, hayat doktoru, ahlâk doktoru 
yetiştirmesini istiyoruz.” 
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them. They were extremely individualistic; and had neither interest in femi-
nism nor in any other ideal as such. At the end of her article she contended 
that “the homeland is in a state of social depression.”233  
The “moral attitudes” of girls who were studying at the Girls’ Schools 
were among prominent topics in the popular media. Another article in Türk 
Kadını argued that “many people are talking about the freedom, irreligious-
ness, thoughtlessness, and immorality of school girls.”234 Despite such warn-
ings, these schoolgirls continued dressing up as if they were going somewhere 
else and at the end of the day heading out to the parks. While defending the 
women’s right to access education was a prominent subject among Ottoman 
feminists, they also emphasized the importance of being morally upright.235 
Needless to say, I have abbreviated this discussion on women and moral-
ity. I presented only patterns of thought that can be observed in the writings 
of prominent women writers who dealt with morality. How the image of 
immoral women was transformed into one of morally pure Turkish women 
in the context of nationalist writings needs further study. Perhaps an in-
stance might give us a clue about this shift in discourses. The harsh critiques 
targeting women discussed earlier, particularly those in Sebilürreşad attracted 
the attention of “male feminists,” as well. Suphi Nuri wrote in 1919 in his 
newspaper İleri that “we [men] are upsetting our women with our critiques 
of their morality,”236 and he called on others to respect women and stop mo-
rality polemics that target women. It is possible to say that his extortion sig-
nified a general trend marking the end of immorality accusations targeting 
women. 
                                                      
233 Ibid. “Memleket, heyet-i ictimaiyye buhran içindedir.” 
234 “Genç Kızlarımıza Dair,” Türk Kadını, No. 13, 1918, 203-204, quoted in Türe, “Images of 
Istanbul Women in the 1920s,” 120. “Herkes, kızların serbestliğinden, dinsizliğinden, 
düşüncesizliğinden, ahlâksızlığından bahsediyorlar.”  
235 Mahir Metinsoy, “The Limits of Feminism in Muslim-Turkish Women Writers of the 
Armistice Period (1918-1923),” 96. 
236 Suphi Nuri, “Kadınlarımıza Hürmet,” 4.  
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§ 2.5  Concluding Remarks 
This chapter evaluated several views on morality and moral decline as ex-
pressed in wartime journals and juxtaposed them with each other. İslam 
Mecmuası, in line with its aim to further incorporate religious principles into 
daily life, discussed important aspects of morality from a theological perspec-
tive and referred to an emerging understanding of a new morality. The 
authors of the journal articulated their views on the basis of questioning the 
authenticity of contemporary Islamic morality. For them, an ideal new mo-
rality would not exclude Islam. However, a collectivistic interpretation of re-
ligious responsibilities and duties must be combined with the needs of the 
time. 
The second part of the chapter evaluated the moral decline paradigm 
from the perspective of Islamists through a representative journal, 
Sebilürreşad. One would obviously expect to see the defense of Islam as a 
main reference for morality in the Islamist literature. However, the complex 
stories and historical context surrounding discourses of moral decline present 
a fertile ground to develop a better understanding of the contest over moral-
ity. By keeping morality in the realm of religion, Sebilürreşad’s writers at-
tempted to build a stronghold against nationalist reform advocates. Using 
the flexibility of the term morality, Islamists rendered a critique of the “new 
life,” a concept coined by nationalists. Discourses on moral decline helped 
Islamists to regenerate their ideology by claiming that they had been on the 
right path all along. In a time in which spiritual ideologies were under attack 
by materialism, the Sebilürreşad writers used a moral decline paradigm to 
reestablish a religious hegemony over lifestyles and public space. 
What followed was a section on Yeni Mecmua’s stance on moral decline 
in Ottoman society. The journal reserved many pages for the matter because 
the authors regarded morality as key for solving many social problems in-
cluding war profiteering, the participation of women in social life, and the 
absence of a national education and upbringing policy. Employing the prin-
ciples of Durkheimian sociology, Gökalp, Sadak, and other authors empha-
sized that individualistic values and a lack of solidarism were the core prob-
lems with respect to morality. Considering moral decline as an outcome of 
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stage of transition, they emphasized the need for change in values and moral 
codes to adopt this new stage of progress. The new morality had to encom-
pass social harmony and define the duties of individuals to society. As op-
posed to the defenders of religious morality, Yeni Mecmua openly argued 
that the source of morality could not be religion because religious morality 
was individualistic. Modern times necessitated the creation of a “new per-
son,” and this person had to be equipped with contemporary values. 
The last part dealt with the stance of women’s journals on moral decline. 
The responses of women’s journals on the relationship between war and 
moral decline were relatively limited. The war also played a role in these lim-
ited responses. Nevertheless, it is important to see how women questioned 
the unequal nature of immorality arguments that held women accountable 
for immorality while leaving men aside. On the other hand, women also 
used decline polemics to open up space for reform. Nevertheless, some arti-
cles by women writers clearly expressed concern about moral decline, par-
ticularly among schoolgirls. 
Morality polemics had wide ramifications and were not mere philosophi-
cal activity. The debate not only encompassed the law and legal rights, it also 
constituted a major issue in the Ottoman political and ideological spectra. 
What united these ideological discourses was an insistence on an authentic 
morality and their critique of the Tanzimat era. Later on, a critique of materi-
alism added to these points in common. Apart from these two points, their 
analyses of moral decline differed. While Sebilürreşad argued for eternal, un-
changing religion as the sole source of morality, Yeni Mecmua argued that 
society (or in their case, the nation) was the source of morality. On the other 
hand, İslam Mecmuası argued for basing morality on a redefined religion 
freed its historical legacy. From the perspective of intellectuals involved in 
morality polemics, discourses on moral decline served to set out ideological 
differences. While nationalists defended the need for a social reform involv-
ing the improvement of the condition of women in the family, Islamists used 
a moral decline paradigm to reestablish Islamic moral hegemony over public 
space. In this respect, a focus on morality was key to wartime political and 
intellectual discussions when most writers saw an opportunity to shape future 
society. While some Ottoman Muslim writers further developed this argu-
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ment within the scope of feminism and advanced the need for social reform 
to eliminate traditional values that constituted a clear obstacle to women’s 






The Public Morals, Prostitution, and Daily Realities 
For a long time, the story goes, we supported a 
Victorian regime, and we continue to be domi-
nated by it even today. Thus the image of the im-
perial prude is emblazoned on our restrained, 
mute, and hypocritical sexuality. 
–Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 
his chapter presents an overview of regulatory measures and their limits 
regarding the protection of public morality on the Ottoman home-
front. As shown in the following pages, military and bureaucratic attempts to 
protect public morality were mainly concentrated on two interrelated per-
spectives. First, in the course of the war, offenses violating public morality 
became part of growing national security concerns; and second, wartime ri-
valries among combatant countries manifested itself in the solidification of 
so-called cultural oppositions in which moral contestation played a signifi-
cant role. While the former dimension entailed more practical and adminis-
trative concerns, the latter had cultural implications. Keeping these points in 
mind, this chapter will deal with a range of questions: How did Ottoman 
authorities define acts against public morality and how did they deal with 
these offenses? Was there a consensus among military and bureaucratic elites 
T 
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on definitions of immorality? To what extent did religion play a role in 
measures pertaining to public morality? How were discourses on moral de-
cline reflected in politics and legislation? Given that morality occupied an 
important place in public opinion, how did the Ottoman government re-
spond to moral concerns? What were the limits of state power in this sense? 
Indeed, state documents from the Turkish Prime Ministry Ottoman Ar-
chives, particularly those from the catalogues of the Ministry of the Interior 
Affairs and the police department shed light on these questions. Moreover, 
the minutes of the Ottoman Parliament include debates regarding the moral-
ity concerns of ruling circles, while documents from the Archives of the 
Turkish General Staff (ATASE) reveal efforts of the military that were crucial 
for mobilization. Some articles published in Ottoman newspapers also ad-
dress the “moral battle” of the government. Moving on from the questions 
above, I address the Ottoman notion of public morality and definitions of 
offenses against public morality, wartime concerns about national security 
and its intersection with moral crisis, prostitution and its containment, and 
daily realities touching on the issue of morality. 
3.1.1 Efforts to Protect Public Morality in Combatant Countries 
Before getting into the details of the Ottoman case, it should be noted that 
public attention to moral behavior was also observed in other combatant 
countries. Emphasizing that wartime brought back the “fears of degeneracy” 
of the late nineteenth century, Grayzel argues that “the behavior of the entire 
population of belligerent nations was scrutinized during the war, because it 
became part of the war effort to preserve an idealized society that was worth 
dying for and to maintain the virility and success of the competing armies.”1 
Indeed, during the war, there were many examples illustrating concerns 
about morality in Britain, Germany, and France, particularly with respect to 
the moral standards of women and adolescents. For instance, in Britain, it 
became common belief that young girls “lost their minds” when they en-
countered men in uniform. The term “khaki fever” was used to describe this 
                                                      
 1 Grayzel, Women and the First World War, 62. 
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“epidemic disease” indicating that young women were behaving immodestly 
and acting “in dangerous ways” when confronted with the military men.2 
Although, “khaki fever” was observed mostly among young British women 
between the ages of thirteen to sixteen (the age of consent was sixteen) from 
poor working class families, it was believed that the “disease” threatened the 
middle class, as well, marking “the First World War as a climactic time of 
concern about young women's social and sexual behavior.”3 This discourse, 
indeed, paved the way for the establishment of the Women Patrols Commit-
tee and Women Police Service by middle class women to control these 
young girls in cinemas, dancing halls, and bars and prevent them from hav-
ing “dangerous” interactions with soldiers.4 In France, a solidarity campaign 
that invited French women to become godmothers (marraines) of soldiers 
sparked debates on moral laxity when soldiers started to seek women through 
such advertisements: “I have no need for socks, but would be very happy to 
correspond with a young, pretty, affectionate marraine.”5 In Germany, Ute 
Daniel underscores, state policies were especially focused on male adoles-
cents. According to her, this stemmed from the fact that this group was both 
a resource for the army and a source of labor during the war.6 Every kind of 
behavior among adolescents was under police surveillance. “Youth decrees” 
(Jugenderlasse) were issued by municipalities announcing that adolescents 
were forbidden to smoke in public places, to frequent bars after 9 p.m., and 
to go to the movies, in addition to an evening curfew.7 However, the most 
remarkable measure to control the youth was compulsary saving enforce-
ment which was announced on March 18, 1916, allowing all male and fe-
male juveniles, to spend only eighteen marks from their weekly wages and a 
third of their remaining earnings until they reach the age of eighteen. Em-
ployers deposited the rest in bank accounts to which adolescents and their 
                                                      
 2 Woollacott, “‘Khaki Fever’ and Its Control,” 325. 
 3 Ibid., 325.  
 4 Ibid., 327-335.  
 5 Grayzel, “Mothers, Marraines, and Prostitutes,” 72. 
 6 Daniel, The War from within, 160. 
 7 Ibid., 166. 
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families had access only if they obtained consent from the aldermen of their 
place of residence.8 It was partly true that there was a rise in crime (especially 
against property) among young workers, but the main concern was how 
young workers spent their wartime earnings.9 In other words, morality was 
instrumentalized to cut the wages of young workers. 
We should take “war babies” scandals – that is to say the illegitimate off-
spring of soldiers which became a social problem during the war – into ac-
count as part of morality debates. Grayzel argues that while such instances 
contributed to concerns over moral decay, some governments recognized the 
status of these children in an attempt to decrease the number of illegitimate 
births and encourage population growth. In Britain, for example, if a woman 
could prove that a soldier had made a home for her and her children, she 
could get an allowance from the government. As Grayzel puts it: “War ba-
bies, therefore, received their protected status through their paternity and 
their problematic nature through their maternity.”10 In France, the govern-
ment allowed soldiers to marry by proxy and legitimized their children, even 
after their deaths. Eventually, the ratio of illegitimate children fell from 15.9 
percent in 1914 to 9.9 percent in 1915 and 1917.11 
Public attention to the behavior of working women constituted another 
central issue. The First World War was unique in the history of women’s em-
ployment and presence in public space. The question of whether war work 
contributed to the emancipation of women remained a heated topic in the 
war historiography for decades.12 However, recent studies on gender relations 
and war work show that gender roles were maintained in society despite 
women’s participation in war work. Nicole van Os comments on the con-
temporary war and gender literature: “During the First World War the objec-
                                                      
 8 Ibid.  
 9 Ibid., 162-163. 
 10 Grayzel, Women and the First World War, 66.  
 11 Ibid.  
 12 Early accounts emphasized that working during the war played an “emancipatory” role for 
women without questioning the concept of “emancipation” itself. For instance, see Yalman, 
Turkey in the World War, 231–239.  
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tive position of women in society indeed changed, but their relative (subjec-
tive) position did not.”13 Women workers were under strict moral control in 
their work places through gender segregation. Their ways of spending 
money, their interaction with males, and their attire in public space consti-
tuted focuses of interest. For instance, in Britain a perceived change in 
women attitudes was the fashion of shorter mid-calf skirts and trousers, and 
going out without the company of chaperons.14 In some cases, as Laura Lee 
Downs shows in her work on gender division in metalworking industries 
during the war, women workers’ behavior – including their political demands 
and engagements – were attributed to their moral weakness, and policemen 
assumed that “among women, labor militancy (or any aggressively asserted 
political stance) sprang from unchecked sexuality.”15 Surveillance of women 
workers became institutionalized in some cases. In Britain, National Union 
of Women Workers established the League of Decency and Honor in order 
to watch women worker’s moral behavior.16 
Fighting against prostitution and venereal disease constituted the major 
interest of belligerent governments in the realm of morality. Unregistered 
prostitution was an obstacle to the incorporation and mobilization of the 
homefront. First of all, it eroded the so-called reason for the war as a defense 
of honor. Secondly, it risked public health as such diseases were spreading 
both on the homefront and in the army. The new type of clandestine prosti-
tutes was called “amateur girls” in Britain and “secret” or “wild” prostitutes in 
Germany.17 As for the Ottoman Empire, Ahmet Rasim called this new kind 
of prostitution simply “new prostitution” (fuhş-i cedid).18 Belligerent gov-
ernments cracked down on unregistered and clandestine prostitution. The 
British government issued many orders to prevent unregulated prostitution, 
even allowing military authorities to expel prostitutes from specific areas via 
                                                      
 13 Van Os, Feminism, Philanthropy and Patriotism, 285. 
 14 Beckett, Home Front, 1914-1918, 98. 
 15 Downs, Manufacturing Inequality, 140–141. 
 16 Thom, Nice Girls and Rude Girls, 20. 
 17 Grayzel, Women and the First World War, 70–72.  
 18 Ahmed Rasim, Eski Fuhuş Hayatı: Fuhş-i Âtik, 209–210. 
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a regulation called “Defense of the Realm Act.” To eliminate the spread of 
venereal disease among soldiers, prostitutes were kept under surveillance and 
arbitrarily arrested. The women’s supposed ignorance of disease was not an 
acceptable excuse.19 In Germany, measures against uncontrolled prostitution 
– mainly to protect against venereal disease – were strict. Members of the 
army who were caught carrying a disease had to identify the women who 
might have transmitted it, and those women were imprisoned. Women who 
had sex with several men in the span of a month were labeled prostitutes af-
ter two warnings, regardless of whether they were paid. The bars in Berlin, 
where women hostesses were working, were closed. The military doctors were 
responsible for examining prostitutes for venereal disease.20 
On the other hand, army-controlled prostitution was tolerated in the ar-
eas behind the fronts provided that prostitutes had regular, mandatory medi-
cal examinations. French and German military authorities opened and regu-
lated brothels segregated according to military rank along the Western Front. 
While soldiers among the lower ranks visited cheap houses, officers had access 
to expensive brothels. The Habsburg military also opened brothels for sol-
diers. On the other hand, Great Britain, and its dominions, and former colo-
nies forbade such controlled prostitution near the front. While the United 
States army officially barred soldiers from visiting brothels, officers were tol-
erant of those who did yet required medical examinations.21 
Immorality or morality would also become part of war propaganda dur-
ing the First World War. Combatant countries accused enemies of being 
immoral, thus justifying their own causes based on an argument of moral 
superiority and inferiority. For instance, in 1916, rumors that Germany and 
France promoted bigamy or polygamy because of huge losses on the battle-
field created “a horrified reaction” among the public.22 German soldiers who 
occupied Belgium were depicted in the British press as horrible and barbaric: 
“To remember Belgium is to remember the alleged immorality of the Ger-
                                                      
 19 Grayzel, Women and the First World War, 71. 
 20 Ibid., 72. 
 21 Journey, “Prostitution | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1).” 
 22 Grayzel, Women and the First World War, 67. 
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man armies and to take up arms against them.”23 In German propaganda 
depictions of the enemy were in line with a gendered aspect of morality. 
While military newspapers depicted Russian soldiers in East Prussia as rapists, 
the women of enemy nations were portrayed as unfaithful and of immoral 
character.24 “Black shame” propaganda in Germany served to create a nega-
tive image of French colonial soldiers by portraying black soldiers raping 
white women.25 Moreover, the “immorality” of enemy nations served the 
purpose of waging a “legitimate” war. For instance, the Habsburg invasion of 
Serbia during the war was justified with a discourse of the “moral inferiority” 
of the Serbs.26 In order to demoralize enemy soldiers, war propaganda also 
addressed the honor and morality of civilians on the homefront. As discussed 
in chapter 4, soldiers’ families were at the center of such propaganda. 
                                                      
 23 Albrinck, “Humanitarians and He-Men,” 317. 
 24 Nelson, “German Comrades-Slavic Whores: Images in the German Soldier Newspapers of the 
First World War.” 
 25 Koller, “Enemy Images: Race and Gender Stereotypes in the Discussion on Colonial Troops. A 
Franco-German Comparison, 1914-1923,” 142–143. 
 26 Knezevic, “Prostitutes as a Threat to National Honor in Habsburg-Occupied Serbia during the 
Great War,” 315. 
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Figure 3.1 Canadian recruitment poster from the First World War. (Archives 
of Ontario, Online War Poster Collection, Reference Code: C 233-2-4-0-
263) 
Wartime regulations on the protection of public morality in belligerent 
countries were mainly focused on uncontrolled prostitution, venereal disease, 
working women, and the behaviors or habits of adolescents (who were poten-
tial future soldiers) and mothers – especially their entertainment habits and 
educational goals. It is possible to observe an emphasis on national security 
in the responses to “immoral” acts. On the other hand, morality became part 
of propaganda rhetoric justifying war aims and underscoring “differences” 
among rival countries. There were both similar and different dynamics re-
garding the protection of public morality in the Ottoman case. 
3.1.2 The Ottoman Terminology of Immorality and Peculiarities of the 
Ottoman Case 
The state documents in the Ottoman Archives employed several expressions 
to define or condemn immorality: Acts against morality (ahlâka mugâyir 
hareketler), immorality (ahlâksızlık), immorality or bad morality (sûî ahlâk), 
and violation of public morality (ahlâk-ı umûmîyeye hıyanet). In some cases, 
the concept of “violating public morality” was used interchangeably with 
“violating public order” in state documents. In this regard, I argue that Ot-
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toman authorities approached the protection of public morality within the 
wider framework of maintaining public order and security. This was partly 
because of the fear that public reaction, such as gatherings or protests against 
violations of morality, might cause the deterioration of public order. Also, as 
detailed in the following pages, it was believed that moral corruption brought 
about a chain reaction of criminality causing further increases in the number 
of incidents disrupting discipline and order. Together with public order con-
cerns, the cultural atmosphere of war in which morality became part of in-
ternational rivalry needs to be taken into account. Given that the Ottoman 
Empire was the only Muslim-majority country in the war, it is possible that 
further emphasis on authentic Muslim morality was employed to further 
mark the differences. Therefore, immorality emerged as a social illness con-
stituting a threat not only to public order but also to the prestige of the Ot-
toman Empire. Other expressions of immorality in state documents illustrate 
the latter in a more striking fashion: acts against Islamic manners (âdâb-ı 
İslâmiyeye mugâyir), acts against Islamic principles (hilâf-ı İslâmiyeye 
mugâyir), acts against the principles of Islam and national manners of the 
Ottomans (şe’arir-i İslâmiye ve âdâb-ı millîye-yi Osmaniyeye mugâyir 
olarak), and acts against the dignity of Islam (haysiyet-i İslâmiyeye 
mugâyir). This emphasis on Islam rather than ethnicity was peculiar to the 
Ottoman Empire not only because it was the only Muslim-majority country 
in the war but also because the Ottoman war effort relied on Islam given the 
declaration of jihad. Thus, immorality was associated with acting against Is-
lamic principles – principles that were crucial to efforts to wage “holy war 
against the infidels.” Eventually, the quest for authentic Muslim identity in a 
country where official political agenda had yet “to catch up with the West” 
constituted a great tension for morality. Hence, the points that marked the 
so-called differences between East and West became main issues in morality 
discussions. 
As shown in this chapter, some political and economic developments in 
wartime in the Ottoman Empire that contributed, on one hand, to the ef-
forts of the government to take more effective steps to eliminate immorality 
while at the same time limited those efforts due to the country’s financial 
needs, on the other. For instance, the abolishment of capitulations in 1914 
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constituted a remarkable moment in the combat of prostitution. Previously, 
brothels owned by foreigners were subject to the same commercial laws and 
privileged position as any other foreign enterprise in the empire. This re-
sulted in relative flexibility with respect to the operation of the sex industry 
within the borders of the empire. At the outbreak of the war, the Ottoman 
government unilaterally abolished capitulations and thus took control over 
such houses. The hunt for traffickers of women became part of the Ottoman 
effort to save the prestige of the empire. Prostitutes and procurers who were 
foreign passport holders found themselves “enemy aliens” on the Ottoman 
homefront despite years spent in the empire. Furthermore, their requests for 
Ottoman citizenship would be denied on the basis of their famed “immoral-
ity.” The proclamation of martial law and suspension of constitutional rights 
in those areas where martial law was declared were other dynamics contribut-
ing to the protection of morality. Expelling prostitutes or “immoral people” 
from these areas became a widespread practice in the Ottoman Empire dur-
ing the war. These operations were conducted in the name of national secu-
rity and public order. 
On the other hand, turning to daily realities, the measures against im-
morality, immoral acts, and things causing moral decay were limited. Par-
ticularly with respect to the control of entertainment venues and regulation 
of alcohol consumption, there was a tension between the country’s financial 
needs – that is, its need to excise taxes – and maintaining high moral stan-
dards. To a degree, frequenting European-style entertainment venues such as 
theaters and cinemas and habits such as alcohol consumption were associated 
with moral laxity and regarded as a submission to European culture among 
conservative circles. The Ottoman government, far from being so radical, 
approached these vices in a pragmatic way by exacting taxes on pleasure to 
increase funds for war relief. At the same, state authorities maintained the 
agenda of protecting public order and eliminating crisis of morality critique 
for the sake of war propaganda. Public attention to morality, however, was 
revealed in the moral critiques of war profiteering and conspicuous consump-
tion which established a sharp contrast with the poverty of the masses and 
the purity of the soldiers on the battlefield. 
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§ 3.1  Morality and Public Order Under Martial Law 
During the First World War, martial law became a tool to protect homefront 
morality within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. People accused of “im-
morality” were expelled from martial law territories as they constituted in-
ternal threats to public order (asayiş) and discipline in the homeland (inzibat-
ı memleket) and were thus to be kept under control for the sake of national 
security.27 Although spatial isolation of prostitution had a long history in the 
Empire, the emphasis during wartime was different than earlier practices. 
During the war, I argue that the use of national security discourses to fight 
prostitution constituted the main distinctive point. 
Martial law became part of routine administration in the last decades of 
the Ottoman Empire. Starting in the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878), 
martial law proclamations continued during the crises of the constitutional 
era. Resorting to martial law meant suspending constitutional rights if they 
conflicted with military measures. Initially to suppress and prevent separatist 
revolts, especially in the Balkans, martial law became institutionalized as part 
of mobilization efforts during the First World War.28 
The Article 113 of the constitution of 1876 defined the conditions for 
the establishment of military law. Accordingly, in times of upheaval, martial 
law could be proclaimed in a specific place and articles of the constitution 
that conflicted with martial law could be suspended. Those who violated the 
security of the state would be deported or exiled by imperial decree.29 Accord-
ing to Osman Köksal, the concept of idare-i örfiyye originated from the fact 
that soldiers had been in administrative positions in Ottoman provinces 
since the classical period. These rulers with a military background were called 
ehl-i örf meaning “men of customary law,” in contrast to the “men of relig-
                                                      
 27 For a detailed assessment of security practices and concepts from the eighteenth to the 
twentieth centuries in the Ottoman Empire, see the articles in the edited work of Lévy, Özbek, 
and Toumarkine, Osmanlı’da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza. 
 28 On the application of martial law in the Balkans, see Zeren, “The Formation of Constitutional 
Rule: The Politics of Ottomanism between de Jure and de Facto (1908-1913).” 
 29 Köksal, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Sıkıyönetim ile İlgili Mevzuat Üzerine bir Deneme,” 157.   
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ious law” such as kadıs.30 Eventually, military administration became associ-
ated with the term örfî and became a single term idare-i örfiyye. Moreover, 
the term divân-ı harb was coined in the Military Penal Code of 1870 and 
referred to courts that dealt with cases concerning soldiers.31 However, with 
the first proclamation of martial administration, these courts came to be 
known as divân-ı harbi örfî and were distinguished from their predecessor 
because it had the authority to try civilians. The martial courts could operate 
only in those places where martial law had been proclaimed.32 While, under 
usual circumstances, the constitution precluded the trials in different courts 
apart from secular (Nizâmî) and religious (Şer’î) courts, Article 113 became 
the legal basis for trying civilians in martial courts.33 As Noemi Levy-Aksu 
discusses, the proclamation of martial law was an Ottoman version of the 
“state of siege” and must be considered in light of encounters between the 
Islamic legal tradition and contemporaneous European legal developments 
occurring within the political and social context of the late Ottoman Em-
pire.34 
For the first time in the Ottoman history, parliament proclaimed martial 
law in Istanbul on May 24, 1877, amidst the increasing tensions following 
the Russian occupation of Ardahan during the Russo-Ottoman War.35 While 
this event started a tradition of martial law declarations in late Ottoman his-
tory, the first institutional framework for military rule followed a few 
months later, on October 2, 1877, with a decree that constituted the basis for 
all subsequent martial law declarations. This decree consisted of thirteen arti-
cles that ultimately transferred the powers of civil-bureaucratic administra-
tion to the administration by the military (hükûmet-i askeriyye).36 The text 
was called the İdâre-i Örfiyye Kararnâmesi which means Martial Administra-
                                                      
 30 Köksal, “Tarihsel Süreci İçerisinde Bir Özel Yargı Organı Olarak Dîvân-ı Harb-i 
Örfîler,(1877–1922),” 16. 
 31 Ibid. 
 32 Ibid., 10.  
 33 Ibid., 36-37.  
 34 Lévy-Aksu, “An Ottoman Variation on the State of Siege,” 20.  
 35 Köksal, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Sıkıyönetim ile İlgili Mevzuat Üzerine Bir Deneme,” 169. 
 36 “İdare-i Örfiye Kararnamesi,” Düstur, Vol. I. No. 4., 71–72. 
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tion Decree. Accordingly, the execution of the decree was under the jurisdic-
tion of divân-ı harb, the martial courts. The Article 2 of the decree suspended 
any articles of the constitution that were not compatible with military law. 
Terms such as “discipline” and “order” constituted major concerns of the 
text. The decree proclaimed the following types of cases would be tried: a) 
those who were perpetrators or collaborators of crimes and murders that vio-
lated state’s internal and external security; b) those who carried out assassina-
tions of government officials on duty; c) those who committed crimes men-
tioned in item (a) before the declaration of martial law but had not yet been 
sentenced; d) those who committed ordinary crimes and murders related to 
crimes and murders under the jurisdiction of martial courts; e) all associa-
tions, even if established before the declaration of martial law; and f ) those 
who involved in events that caused the declaration of martial law, even if 
they reside outside the territory of martial administration.37 
For our purposes, the most important part is Article 6 of the decree which 
constituted the legal basis for exiling and deportation. 
 The military government shall have power to; first, search residences 
when necessary, day or night; second, deport and exile those who are 
convicts or suspects and those who are not officially registered resi-
dents from martial law areas to some other place; third, confiscate 
weapons and munitions of the people; fourth, ban newspapers that 
publish objectionable content and similarly ban such organizations.38 
It seems that this article became the measure most applied to the civilian 
population. The right to search residences openly violated the principle of the 
constitution safeguarding private property, yet it allowed the Ottoman police 
                                                      
 37 Ibid. 
 38 Ibid. “Hükûmet-i askeriye evvela lüzum görünen eşhâsın leyl-ü nihare ikametgâhlarını 
taharriye; saniyen şübheli ve sabıkalı güruhundan olub taraf-ı hükümetten ahz-ü girift ol-
unanları idare-i örfiye altına alınan mahalde ikametgahları olmayan eşhas mahal-i ahire tard 
ve teb’ide; salisen ahalinin esliha ve cephanesini toplamağa; rabian tahdiş-i ezhanı muceb 
neşriyatta bulunan gazeteleri derhal tatil etmeğe ve her türlü bu cemiyetleri men etmeğe me-
zundur.” 
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to operate raids. Also, it is important to note that even if the crimes described 
above have been committed before the proclamation of martial law, the case 
could be transferred to the martial courts. 
On August 2, 1914, the day full mobilization was declared in the empire, 
an imperial decree proclaimed martial law throughout the country.39 Indeed, 
martial law was in effect in Istanbul from 1909 to 24 July 1912 when Gazi 
Ahmet Muhtar Pasha, the grand vizier, abolished martial law. When his gov-
ernment shut down parliament amidst strong disagreement with Unionist 
deputies, tensions in Istanbul increased. Consequently, martial law was pro-
claimed again on 17 September.40 As Stanford Shaw discusses, a proclaima-
tion of martial law in the beginning of the war could not be carried out 
throughout the country as a whole at once; therefore it was imposed gradu-
ally in different provinces.41 I should also add that throughout the war, both 
the spatial and legal boundaries of martial courts were matters of negotiation 
and discussion between civilian and military authorities. However, some 
parts of the country were considered more vulnerable given the circum-
stances of the mobilization and remained continuously under military ad-
ministration. Unregistered prostitutes, procurers, and traffickers of women 
were often sent away from martial law territories to central Anatolia where 
railway connections were limited and the place was far enough from the bat-
tle fronts. Their acts were considered an obstacle to mobilization and na-
tional security as official correspondence reveals: “prostitutes are violating 
local morality and consequently leading the violation of security and degen-
eration of the country.”42 Strikingly, these people were not tried in the 
courts, yet based on information that local police or authorities provided to 
the military, they were exiled under the scope of administrative decisions. 
This situation calls for a careful analysis of understanding of public order in 
                                                      
 39 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, 172–173. 
 40 Köksal, “Tarihsel Süreci İçerisinde Bir Özel Yargı Organı Olarak Divan-ı Harb-i Örfiler 
(1877–1922),” 21. 
 41 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, 172–173. 
 42 BOA. DH. EUM. ADL. 33/23, 1335 Ş 25. “fahişeler ahlâk-ı mahalliyeyi ifsad ve bi’l-netice 
asayiş-i memleketi ihlal ve teğiyyide sebeb oldukları…”  
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the late Ottoman era, particularly the period in question. As discussed by 
Deniz Dölek Sever, ensuring public order on the Ottoman homefront went 
beyond concerns about preventing crime: 
Since at that time there was a perception of high “internal threat” 
from the state’s point of view, a series of extraordinary measures were 
put into practice. Groups of people who were not regarded as poten-
tially dangerous during peacetime came to be seen as principal targets 
for state’s control. In this respect, the state made use of harsher pun-
ishment, oppression and control mechanisms in the name of the well-
being of society. Thus, the state attempted at legitimizing its violence 
through the maintenance of public order for the sake of “public 
good.”43 
Therefore, we should consider operations against immorality from the per-
spective of protecting public order. As shown through some example cases, 
the use of martial law to fight immorality demonstrates the prevalence of 
national security concerns. 
                                                      
 43 Dölek Sever, “War and Imperial Capital: Public Order, Crime and Punishment in Istanbul, 
1914-1918,” 29.  
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Figure 3.2 Martial law was abolished in districts marked in blue in 1917 (ex-
cept for Istanbul) (BOA, İ.DUİT. 101/101.) 
§ 3.2  Fighting Against Prostitution and Exiling “Immoral” People 
from Martial Law Territories 
As mentioned earlier, fighting against prostitution was a major task to pro-
tect public morality on the homefront. In the Ottoman Empire, neither pros-
titution nor its regulation were peculiar to the war.44 The novelty of wartime 
was unregistered prostitution, which came to be conceived as part of daily 
life.45 According to Ahmed Rasim, social circumstances during the First 
                                                      
 44 On the history of regulation of prostitution in the Ottoman Empire, see Toprak, “Istanbul’da 
Fuhuş ve Salgın Hastalıklar”; Özbek, “The Regulation of Prostitution in Beyoğlu (1875–
1915)”; Wyers, "Wicked" Istanbul: The Regulation of Prostitution in the Early Turkish Re-
public. Toprak later published a more detailed version of the aforementioned article in his 
book; Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935), 113–153. 
 45 On the regulation of prostitution during the First World War on the Ottoman homefront, see 
Oğuz, "Prostitution (Ottoman Empire)," International Encyclopedia of the First World War 
(WW1).” 
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World War paved the way for debauchery in Ottoman society, and prostitu-
tion took on new forms to spread among Muslim people.46 Ahmed Emin 
asserts that this new form of prostitution was more common among Muslim 
women in the Ottoman Empire than among non-Muslims.47 Fears about the 
spread of this new prostitution were closely related to violations of public 
morality. Such clandestine prostitution constituted the major reason for the 
spread of venereal disease among civilians and soldiers. 
One remarkable measure of the Ottoman wartime government was the 
declaration of a new regulation to combat venereal disease. While this regula-
tion showed the extent of the problem, it provided official recognition of the 
brothels at the same time. In 1915, the government issued a detailed regula-
tion on prostitution called the Regulation on Preventing of the Spread of Ve-
nereal Disease.48 Whereas the previous regulation concerning brothels from 
1884 was limited to certain areas of Istanbul such as Beyoğlu, the new regula-
tion embraced all of the provinces and defined a legal framework along with 
detailed directions.49 As is clear from the title, the purpose was to keep the 
spread of venereal disease under control. To achieve this task, the regulation 
subjected brothels to state control, registered prostitutes, and kept them un-
der medical surveillance. A variety of fines and punishments were meted out 
to those who violated the regulatory measures. However, as Toprak notes, this 
regulation was liberal and mainly targeting controlled prostitution rather 
than prohibiting it entirely.50 A considerable number of articles in the regula-
tion concerned only the elimination of venereal disease and sanitary meas-
ures. The morality aspect of prostitution was not explicitly mentioned. Yet 
the regulation established a classification of prostitution that needs further 
                                                      
 46 Ahmed Rasim, Eski Fuhuş Hayatı: Fuhş-i Âtik, 209–210. 
 47 Yalman, Turkey in the World War, 244. 
 48 Emraz-ı Zühreviyenin Men’i Sirayetine Dair Neşr Olunan Nizamnameye Mütealik 
Talimatname. A shortened Turkish translation of the regulation is available in Alyot, Türki-
ye'de Zabıta, 570–586.  
 49 Wyers, "Wicked" Istanbul: The Regulation of Prostitution in the Early Turkish Republic, 67. 
 50 Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935), 117. 
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elaboration because the state defined the limits of prostitution through this 
regulation.  
The 1915 regulation begins by defining a prostitute: “In return for an in-
terest or as habit, those who work to gratify the pleasure of others by having 
intercourse with more than one man are called prostitutes.” The places where 
two or more women visited or resided for the purpose of prostitution were 
euphemistically called public or common houses. The regulation contends 
that pensions or hotels used for the same purposes, be called public houses, as 
well. Properties that are rented or owned for the purposes of prostitution or 
procuration are called meeting points – like French rendezvous houses. Fur-
thermore, other relationships out of wedlock with a similar nature to prostitu-
tion were considered by the regulation. For instance, sluts were considered 
prostitutes, as well, and were described as those women who wander around 
for the purposes of engaging in prostitution. They had to reside in brothels 
and were also to be registered. Mistresses, described in the regulation as those 
who had intercourse with only one man, would be registered. If they contin-
ued with it as an occupation, they would be subject to the same regulation as 
prostitutes. 
I propose rethinking the regulation of venereal disease from the afore-
mentioned perspective of national security. As mentioned earlier, the war 
increased anxieties about morality in many combatant countries and trig-
gered a submission to the collective good regarding so-called dangers or 
threats to social order. Prostitution in general and venereal disease in particu-
lar were among such dangers that had the potential to destroy the collective 
good – that is to say, the public health of a nation.  
On war and regulation of prostitution, Judith Smart provides valuable in-
sights in her work on venereal disease regulations in Australia during the First 
World War. In her study, she presents a multi-layered approach towards the 
regulation of prostitution and venereal disease that shows how such regula-
tions of sexuality came to fall in the scope of national defense measures. 
If defence needs and duties of citizenship made the conscription of 
young men’s bodies possible, the same requirements of total war for 
involvement by the whole society made the control of young 
women’s bodies seem equally necessary because their unconstrained 
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sexuality was represented as being dangerous to the fighting strength 
of the armed forces and to the reproducibility of the nation.51  
She also takes into account the patrolling of public space with regard to such 
regulations that concerned women’s sexuality. Certain categories of prostitu-
tion were introduced in these regulations to clarify the “public woman” from 
the “private” one, distinguishing the “good” from the “bad.” In this sense, 
there are similarities between the Ottoman regulation concerning venereal 
disease and the Australian one given their common concern with classifying 
the woman and thereby containing prostitution. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that – whether in great or small 
number – the very existence of venereal disease among soldiers and civilians 
indeed contributed to the solidification of anxieties about morality. After all, 
such diseases had a fame of immorality and were regarded as consequences of 
immorality. Venereal disease stood between moral and medical discourses.52 
In the context of war, as Chapter 2 discusses, the spread of venereal disease 
became a tool for propaganda opposing Ottoman claims to represent Muslim 
civilization. Particularly in this political context, as Seçil Yılmaz argues 
“syphilis and prostitution became grounds for the political contestation of 
public morality” for the “national and religious prestige” of the empire.53 
Apart from these, morality discourses were regarded as part of a “mental 
struggle” against venereal disease due to the lack of adequate medical con-
trols.54 
On another level, the aims of employment campaigns for women can be 
evaluated within the broader framework of protecting homefront morality. 
As discourses on the “promiscuity” of working women began to be voiced 
aloud, government and semi-governmental organizations explicitly propa-
gandized employment campaigns to protect the honor and morality of Mus-
lim women. For instance, the Society for the Employment of Ottoman Mus-
                                                      
 51 Smart, “Sex, the State and the ‘Scarlet Scourge’,” 25. 
 52 Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935), 114–115. 
 53 Yılmaz, “Love in the Time of Syphilis: Medicine and Sex in the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1922,” 
280–281. 
 54 Ibid, 260.  
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lim Women explicitly indicated this fact in its mission. “The aim of this soci-
ety is to find jobs for women and to safeguard them while customizing them 
to honorable ways of earning money.”55 This organization not only provided 
jobs but also made marriage by the age of twenty compulsory for women 
workers. The organization actively took part in arranging marriages, pro-
vided a trousseau for prospective brides, and investigated potential grooms 
with the help of the police department.56 Moreover, similar institutions en-
couraged women to become seamstresses or undertake similar activities be-
cause these jobs had the advantage of maintaining gender segregation. For 
instance, in 1914, a garment house called Biçki Yurdu was established to 
teach poor Muslim women to sew, and Behire Hakkı Hanım, who published 
sewing books on behalf of this institute, achieved a medal for her efforts.57 
There was consensus among some women intellectuals as well as govern-
ment and semi-government organizations that dressmaking was the best job 
to prevent Muslim women from interacting with foreign men.58 
Instead of focusing on prostitution itself as a wartime phenomenon, dis-
cussing how wartime dynamics played a role in the prevention of “immoral-
ity” for the sake of the war efforts is significant to grasp a better understand-
ing of the sense of moral crisis and its relation to national security. With 
reference to correspondences between military and civil authorities and peti-
                                                      
 55 Kadınları Çalıştırma Cemiyeti İslamiyesi Nizamnamesi. A copy of the regulation can be 
found in BOA. DH.İ.UM.EK. 37/6 (9). 
 56 If a potential groom was unable to provide a living for the new family, the organization took 
on the responsibility of finding him a job. The salaries of women who did not agree to the ar-
ranged marriages were decreased by 15 percent and women were fired from the organization if 
there was any further disagreement. Those who married received a 20 percent increase in their 
daily wages plus an additional 20 percent increase for every child she bore. In order to match 
couples, the names and backgrounds of candidates were published in newspapers. Spectacular 
public weddings were promoted to encourage single people to marry. Yalman, Turkey in the 
World War, 236. See also Toprak, “The Family, Feminism, and the State During the Young 
Turk Period, 1908-1918”; Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935); 
Karakışla, Women, War and Work in the Ottoman Empire; Oktar, Osmanlı Toplumunda 
Kadının Çalışma Yaşamı. 
 57 Oktar, Osmanlı Toplumunda Kadının Çalışma Yaşamı, 88. 
 58 Ibid., 80. 
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tions by convicts, I shed light on specific measures against the violation of 
public morality in martial law areas. Prevention of “immorality” by military 
measures was a significant phenomenon during the war, contextualizing mo-
rality as a national security concern.  
During the war, “undesirables” who were considered harmful to the war 
effort and mobilization were dismissed from martial law territories and relo-
cated to other parts of the empire.59 The documents indicate that the pun-
ishment for morality offenses was usually banishment from martial law terri-
tories due to the acts against public morals (âdâb-ı ahlâk-ı umûmiye mugâyir 
if’alden dolayı idâre-i örfiye mıntıkası hâricine te’bid). In the Prime Minis-
try Ottoman Archives, much correspondence is about banished prostitutes 
and procurers sent to Anatolian cities such as Kayseri, Konya, and Kütahya. 
Some of these people were initially sent to Ankara before a final decision 
about them was made. Many were free to settle wherever they chose except 
for places close to railways or battle zones. 
In most cases, the governor in the martial law territory was responsible 
for identifying people who violated public morality. These governors in-
formed the Ministry of the Interior about people engaged in prostitution or 
procuring, or that harbored such activities. For instance, the governor of 
Bursa, Ali Osman, sent a list of such women via encrypted telegram and re-
quested the ministry to obtain martial court orders to banish them to a 
“proper” place.60 Therefore, the process began with local civil authorities, was 
then passed to the Ministry of the Interior, and lastly approved by the courts 
martial. 
Since finding a means of livelihood for people who had been banished 
was a prominent problem, archival documents on such cases are abundant. 
                                                      
 59 As discussed by Deniz Dölek Sever, during the war, the Ottoman government issued measures 
to control civilian travel on the home front. Travel permits were re-introduced and new secu-
rity units were established to control people’s movement. “Undesirables” such as vagabonds, 
beggars, and idlers – most of which were poor people – were sent away from Istanbul as they 
were regarded as the “usual suspects.” See Dölek Sever, “War and Imperial Capital: Public 
Order, Crime and Punishment in Istanbul, 1914-1918,” 152–206.  
 60 BOA. DH.ŞFR. 477/72 1331 H 14 (27 Haziran 1915). 
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Petitions written by banished people who seeking a livelihood enable us to 
follow their stories. Through these stories, it is also possible to see whether the 
“ostracism” of immorality went beyond the limits of the military measures 
and became a social phenomenon. How did these people make a living in 
exile? How did local authorities approach them? 
In most cases exiled people had many difficulties in the places where they 
were sent. They were living like fugitives, traveling from one place to an-
other, had neither jobs nor the skills to get a job, and carried a history of past 
“immorality.” Keeping up bad old habits was not a wise choice, but in many 
instances that was the case. For example, Zeyneb bint-i Ibrahim was a 
woman residing in Istanbul. Together with her companion, Süreyya, she was 
banned from the martial law territory upon a decision of the military gov-
ernment (hükümet-i askeriyye) for the offense of operating brothel without 
a license. The court martial decided to imprison them for twenty-five days 
for this offense.61 However, after they released from prison, they kept on 
“breaking the peace” according to the documents. Eventually, the military 
government banished them from Istanbul to Ankara on February 22, 1916. 
A document dated May 17, 1916, indicates that the two women were in 
Bilecik (a city on the border of Hüdâvendigar province). Local authorities 
kept them there since they had neither money nor any allowance to con-
tinue to Ankara.62 On March 29, 1917, the local governor of Kütahya sent a 
letter to the Ministry of the Interior, indicating that Zeyneb was sent to An-
kara upon a martial court order, but she ran away from Ankara and went to 
Kütahya.63 The governor told the ministry that Zeyneb had no relatives, nei-
ther money nor someone to send her stipends, and she had a tendency for 
“inappropriate behavior.” He asked if it was possible for the ministry to pay 
her a daily stipend. However, the Ministry of the Interior refused the request 
and informed the governor that people deported by the martial courts were 
allowed to travel to other districts (apart from military law territories) to 
make a living. Therefore, Zeyneb was free to stay in Kütahya. Paying sti-
                                                      
 61 DH.EUM.ADL. 21/35 1334 N 08 (9 July 1916). 
 62 Ibid. 
 63 DH. EUM. 6. ŞB. 54/59 1335 C 16 (10 March 1917). 
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pends for such people was not possible; the ministry advised that in order to 
provide her with a living, the district should employ her in a proper job. 
In some cases, local governors took the initiative to provide the daily sus-
tenance (a bread) for banished prostitutes. On December 26, 1915, the gov-
ernor of Konya informed the Ministry of the Interior that some sixteen 
women were “encouraging prostitution among youngsters by engaging in 
illicit relationships and thus violating the order and discipline in the home-
land.”64 The court martial in Konya decided to banish them as a punishment 
to encourage self-rehabilitation (ıslah-ı nefs). Execution of the decision took 
three months, and these sixteen women were exiled to different parts of the 
city. Later on, documents in the same folder indicate that six of these women 
were banished to the town of Bozkır without even sufficient money to buy 
bread. The local governor of Bozkır said that the municipality had spent 600 
kuruş to buy daily bread for these women over fifty days. Eventually, the 
Ministry of the Interior Affairs agreed to reimburse this amount from its dis-
cretionary fund (tahsisât-ı mestûre). 
Many prostitutes and procurers were banished from Istanbul to Kayseri 
by court martial orders. As the battle zones broadened in the course of the 
war, the scope of the martial law widened accordingly. On March 7, 1917, 
the local governor of Niğde sent a letter to the Ministry of the Interior Af-
fairs expressing his opinions on fighting prostitution and protecting morality 
which is worth quoting here.  
From Kayseri province and from others, as well, certain prostitutes 
were banished to Niğde on the basis that they were violating public 
morality and thus upsetting public order. This practice of banishment 
will not have a positive effect on the improvement of morality. It is 
certain that eight-tenths of these women engage in prostitution due 
to hunger. Therefore, instead of banishing them, they should be pro-
vided with employment in workshops for a while until it is obvious 
                                                      
 64 “Münâsebet-i gayr-i meşrâda bulunarak birtakım gençleri fuhşiyata tahrik ve bu sebeple 
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that they will avoid such misbehavior. However, without such meas-
ures in place, it is enough to notify a policeman to exile these women 
from one place to another. Who will assure that these women won’t 
break the peace wherever they go? It is obviously more efficient for 
local authorities to attempt to discipline these women. Especially 
those with property or any ties to a place should be encouraged to 
stay there. Another option, if it is not possible to employ women in 
jobs offered by the municipality or the local administration, is to keep 
them under the protection of their parents or wardens. Therefore, it is 
requested that this situation come to an end through the orders of the 
ministry.65 
As a matter of fact, officials in the Ministry were astonished to hear that a 
provincial governor had been issuing banishments without the approval of 
the military. A note by Aziz Bey of the ministry was attached to this letter 
questioning why civilian authorities undertook such measures without court 
martial decisions.66  
The Ministry of the Interior contacted the Kayseri governor about this is-
sue. The governor replied that two women who were had been exiled to Kay-
seri settled near Sivas (which was part of Kayseri province), but the place they 
settled was in close proximity to the battlefront. The Third Army decided to 
relocate prostitutes further to Niğde. Another woman who continued living 
off prostitution was exiled to Niğde upon the approval of the head of the Re-
cruiting Office of Fifteenth Division (On Beşinci Fırka Ahz-ı Asker Kalemi 
Reisi).67 
Providing a livelihood was even more difficult for foreigners who had no 
economic means other than procuring or prostitution. According to the 
General Directorate of Police (Emniyet-i Umûmiye Müdüriyeti), two Rus-
sian citizens, Fişel [sic] and his wife Anna, were banished from Istanbul since 
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they were “wandering in Istanbul” without property or wealth and were en-
gaging in procuring (muhabbet dellallığı). On December 21, 1914, the gov-
ernor of Ankara wrote to the ministry that these two Russian citizens had 
been temporarily sent to Ankara to be resettled in a place “far from railways 
and without administrative difficulties.”68 They had no wealth or skills to 
find a job. They spoke Russian, German and a bit of Arabic. The governor 
said there was neither a position in which to employ them nor a place to 
which to send them where they could earn a living. Eventually, he asked for a 
way to provide a livelihood for this couple.69 Both the directorate and the 
ministry agreed in their correspondence that the local municipality had to 
deal with the subsistence of such people. The governor of Ankara replied, in-
dicating with reference to the local municipal assembly reports that the mu-
nicipality had used up its entire budget allocated for such cases and therefore 
needed additional funds. Upon this answer, the General Directorate of Police 
asked the grand vizierate for special permission to provide a stipend for these 
cases from the war subsidy.70 
In order to make a living, some deported people asked the police for 
permission to travel to other districts. Some documents demonstrate that 
initially local police departments and governors did not allow them to travel 
to other cities and kept them under strict control. Therefore, a general order 
was declared indicating that these people were free to travel except in mili-
tary zones.71 On March 4, 1916, the General Directorate of Police declared 
this order, to be applied in all the provinces. In the order, it was indicated that 
traffickers of women, vagrants, and suspects (maznu-î sûi) were banished 
from Istanbul (a martial law administration area) to other cities. The direc-
torate pointed out that due to constant complaints from these people, it was 
clear that local authorities were not even allowing them to travel to other 
parts of the empire where the military law had not been established. The di-
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rectorate stated that these people were free to travel anywhere to make a liv-
ing except for martial law areas and especially not Istanbul.72 
Both deported people and their relatives constantly petitioned for par-
dons from the Ministry of the Interior Affairs. These petitions reveal details 
about public morality offenses. The case of Marika de Lamiçe [sic] is one of 
these cases. She was accused of procuring Muslim women. The details of her 
offense were described in the document as “inviting honorable Muslim 
women over to her house, making them wear hats, and introducing them to 
foreigners for the purposes of prostitution.”73 Eventually, Marika was ban-
ished from Istanbul to Konya on April 16, 1917. After a year, Marika’s rela-
tives wrote a petition to the Ministry of the Interior asking for her pardon. 
They indicated that Marika had written many petitions claiming that she was 
innocent. Even though she was guilty, they wrote, a year of exile was enough 
for the mother of two fatherless children, a sixteen-year-old daughter and a 
twelve-year-old son.74 Nevertheless, there is no indication in the archives that 
she received a pardon. 
A case from Eskişehir shows that not only courts martial but also local ac-
tors took initiatives to combat prostitution in their own cities. The governor, 
together with other local authorities, arranged marriages for such women and 
sent some of them to villages to work for the harvest. This story was revealed 
on account of Ziynet and Aişe, two women from Eskişehir who sent tele-
grams to the Ministry of the Interior Affairs complaining that they have 
been banished on false accusations of prostitution in July 1917.75 The Gen-
eral Directorate of Police asked for an investigation report from the local 
Eskişehir governor to determine whether the banishment was in accordance 
with the law. The governor corresponded with a long letter revealing how he 
                                                      
 72 DH.EUM.ADL. 28/38 1335 Ra 20 (4 March 1916). 
 73 “Marika de Lamiçe’nin muhadderât-ı İslamiye’yi hanesine kabul ve şapka iksa ettirip 
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dealt with the issue of “public morality” in his district. Based on the fact that 
prostitution was spreading among honorable families due to poverty, he ad-
mitted that they were attempting several preventative measures. First, local 
authorities investigated whether these women had relatives or properties in 
Eskişehir. Then they took them for medical examination to see if they had 
venereal disease. The ones who did not have diseases but had relatives in sur-
rounding villages were sent to those villages where the Council of Elders 
(Köy Heyet-i İhtiyarisi) arranged their marriages to village men. If marriage 
was not an option, prostitutes were banished to other villages of their rela-
tives or parents where they were made to work for the harvest. According to 
the governor, because men were absent due to the war agriculture relied al-
most exclusively on the labor of women, and prostitutes could make a con-
tribution. Some prostitutes were even unable to find such employment, and 
thus, eventually returned to Eskişehir. When soldiers’ relatives engaged in 
prostitution, the governor reported their names to the Military Recruitment 
Office. The soldiers’ families remained in Eskişehir and were neither “pun-
ished” by serving in agriculture nor forced to submit to arranged marriages. 
Eventually, he denied the allegations of Aişe and Ziynet and wrote that the 
two women were still in Eskişehir contrary to their claim that they had been 
banished.76 
Strikingly, even under conditions of war, Ottoman authorities did not 
stigmatize these people to the extent of leaving them on their own to starve. 
The scope of banishment measures was limited to keeping these people out of 
martial law territories. Rather than evaluating this as a sign of tolerance, I 
believe it stemmed from fear of further moral decline and further deteriora-
tion of public order which could accelerate due to poverty. 
As mentioned earlier, although the spatial isolation of prostitution and 
the banning of immoral people from living in specific places was not a new 
measure, its implementation during the war was different from previous im-
plementations. It is important to see the new way of dealing with the viola-
tion of public morality and unregistered prostitution within the scope of 
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military measures undertaken for the sake of national security. To focus more 
on the national security and its relation to morality, the issue of foreigners 
and immorality, which was at the intersection of cultural and political devel-
opments regarding public morality and the discourses of moral decline, pro-
vides a fruitful ground for inquiry. 
§ 3.3  “The Immoral Foreigner”: The Role of Political and Cultural 
References in Moral Perceptions 
In February 1915, the New York Times published an article titled “Curb 
White Slavery in Constantinople: Ambassador Morgenthau’s Efforts Effec-
tively Seconded by Sultan’s Police.”77 The correspondent reported that due to 
the capitulations “the suppression of the white slave traffic was practically 
impossible” in the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, traffickers held passports 
from several countries in order to maintain their commercial privileges. In 
some cases, some also held Ottoman citizenship in case it became necessary. 
The Ottoman government abolished capitulations at the outbreak of the war, 
so “the time for the authorities to attack white slavery in the capital had 
therefore come.” Indeed, while the Ottoman police could take measures 
against the trafficking of Muslim women, the trafficking of foreign women 
remained “ambiguous,” as Wyers noted.78 The abolishment of capitulations 
added another dimension to the public morality debate by giving the Otto-
man government the opportunity to increase control over the sex trade. 
However, the situation was not as simple as keeping prostitution under con-
trol. Prostitution and trafficking of women had different implications with 
regard to cultural and political contests for moral superiority, particularly dur-
ing the war. In the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslims and foreign passport 
holders were considered to be the ones who had dominated the sex trade due 
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to commercial privileges granted to foreign citizens and the relatively lesser 
surveillance of non-Muslim communities. Indeed, this situation was reflected 
in the cultural and political realm as “foreigners promote moral degenera-
tion.”79 As mentioned in chapter 2, many polemicists indicated that the 
adoption of European values was the source of moral decline in the Ottoman 
Empire. Indeed, this was not a new perception. Syphilis was called frengi in 
the Ottoman Empire, implying the disease had originated in the West. (The 
Ottomans used to call Europeans “Frenk”.) On the other hand, in France the 
disease was called the “disease of Naples,” while Italians called it the “French 
disease.”80 During the First World War, the increasingly nationalist tone of 
propaganda contributed to the rise of anti-foreigner sentiments in morality 
discourses. In Turkish literary works, it is possible to observe that moral de-
generation was attributed to foreigners or non-Muslims, especially during the 
war and the occupation that followed it. Yakup Kadri’s Sodom ve Gomore is 
a great example of a work in which Istanbul under occupation is presented as 
a city “drowned in moral and spiritual corruption” in contrast to “pure and 
moral” Anatolia and the Anatolian Turks.81 
                                                      
 79 It is possible to observe this discourse in various sources including journal articles and 
literary works. For instance, an article titled “The Issue of Morality” in Sebilürreşad argued 
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Irvin Cemil Schick argues that despite the existence of brothels in 
Kadıköy and Üsküdar owned by the Muslims and the fact that a wide spec-
trum of ethno-religious groups were involved in the sex trade, proponents of 
Turkish nationalism accused non-Muslim elements of the Ottoman society 
of being the owners of the sex business.82 He states that public health was not 
the real agenda behind attacks on prostitution; rather, it was political and 
aimed at discrediting cosmopolitanism.83 Arus Yumul poses a similar argu-
ment through the story of the marginalization of the Pera quarter where a 
real cosmopolitan public sphere had emerged in the late Ottoman era. Ac-
cording to him, the cosmopolitan nature of Pera challenged the nationalist 
ideology of the Early Turkish Republic from a spatial perspective: It was nei-
ther “in” nor “out.”84 In her article “Limits of the Imaginable in the Early 
Turkish Novel: Non-Muslim Prostitutes and Their Ottoman Muslim Clients,” 
Hülya Yıldız evaluates the reasons why particularly non-Muslim women were 
depicted in Turkish novels as prostitutes. According to her, this representation 
served as an aesthetic symbol of the “encounter between Ottoman society 
and the ‘Other’ that is both inside and outside its boundaries.”85 
Rifat Bali’s work sheds light on the assumed role of foreign Jews in prosti-
tution and trafficking of women in The Jews and Prostitution in Constan-
tinople: 1854-1922.86 Given the geographic position of Istanbul, the city was 
a major transit for the trafficking of women between the East and West.87 
Some foreign Jews who fled persecution or military service in Russia, Ruma-
nia, and Hungary arrived in Istanbul and established a trafficking network. 
These traffickers even had their own synagogue, Or Hadash, since people 
engaged in this business were not allowed to enter the main Ashkenazi syna-
gogue. Bertha Pappenheim, a leading feminist figure who combatted the 
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trafficking of women and founded Jewish Association for the Protection of 
Girls and Women, came to the Ottoman Empire to observe the participation 
of Jews in prostitutions network and established a foundation to prevent it. 
She was shocked by the very existence of traffickers’ synagogue, and stated 
her opinions in a letter sent to a friend during her 1911 tour of the Ottoman 
Jewish enclaves.  
Here among the Jews [is] a complete lack of ability to understand that 
this trade in humans as something dishonorable, a moral defect that 
in any case derives from living together with the Turks, or – what ap-
pears to me more probable – a hereditary mindset among the oriental 
Jews. The “sexuality” here has not given rise to any moral outrage.88 
The attitude towards the Orient and the association of the Orient with moral 
laxity was the other side of the coin. In Edward Said’s formulation of Orien-
talism, sexuality constituted a major departing point. He drew attention to 
the persistent association of sexuality with the Orient by European novelists 
such as Flaubert.89 Therefore, for both sides, immoral was the “other.” For in-
stance, Allied propaganda presented the Orient as the greedy consumer of 
European females – that is to say, “white women” – and contrasted the Ori-
ent with the superior morality of the West.90 Not surprisingly, this became a 
propaganda tool against the Ottomans during the First World War.91 Malte 
Fuhrmann discusses this point in anti-prostitution campaigns in his article 
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“‘Western Perversions’ at the Threshold of Felicity: The European Prostitutes 
of Galata-Pera (1870–1915)” and emphasized how gender, imperialism, and 
nationalism played a role in the fight against or tolerance of the trafficking 
of women. He argues that the issue of controlling sexuality became part of a 
broader political debate “in the context of colonial and semi-colonial strug-
gles for hegemony.”92 Prostitutes and their nationalities had symbolic mean-
ings that implied the moral and thus political inferiority of the country from 
which came. “The subjugation of women’s sexuality metaphorically repre-
sented the subjugation of their country,” writes Fuhrmann on how national 
profiles of prostitutes and traffickers led generalizations about the immorality 
of certain nations and jeopardized the political and social interests of those 
nations.93 Indeed, Ottoman authorities were “willing to turn a blind eye or 
even be protective of traffickers’ and pimps’ networks in their capital because 
of their corrosive effects on European supremacy.”94  
To a degree, Ottoman authorities did approach non-Muslim immorality 
differently than Muslim immorality. Samuel Cohen, for example, illustrated 
this point in an enquiry made for the Jewish Association for the Protection 
of Girls and Women in June 1914. 
The Turks do not shrink from making use of the public brothels, al-
though they are very strict about their own women folk not leading 
immoral lives. The answer generally given by them when asked why 
the present state of affairs is permitted, is that the matter does not 
concern them so long as the inmates of the brothels do not belong to 
the Mohammedan faith. With regard to the prostitutes of other faiths, 
they do not see why they should interfere. Their argument is that if 
other nations and other religions permit women to act as prostitutes 
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in their own country, why should they be prohibited from doing so in 
Turkey.95 
Assuming that a certain society lacked moral values was part of a political 
contest that created the “other” and put a distance between a certain identity 
and the authentic one. This became particularly important in the context of 
First World War when national rivalries among combatant countries intensi-
fied. 
Apart from ideological and cultural background that played a role in 
shaping perspectives on morality and prostitution, it is also true that before 
the abolition of capitulations, Ottoman authorities could not take control 
over the brothels and prostitutes for practical reasons. For instance, in 1876 
the Ottoman Ministry of Justice loaded two ships with foreign prostitutes for 
deportation; however, European consuls intervened and forced the Ottoman 
government to abandon the operation.96 In several previous confrontations 
prior to the war, the Great Powers defended the rights of their citizens in or-
der not to risk their commercial privileges for some prostitutes.97 In March 
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1914, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent requests to the French, 
Russian, Italian, and Austro-Hungarian embassies requesting special permis-
sion to conduct sanitary inspections of brothels run by citizens of their coun-
tries. The embassies responded positively on the conditions that they are in-
formed of the addresses of these houses and that doctors alone be in charge of 
the inspections.98 It was a diplomatic matter to visit non-Ottoman commer-
cial offices or residences. In the same dossier, a document written by the Le-
gal Counselor of the Sublime Porte (Bâb-ı Âlî Hukuk Müşaviri) stated that 
because “most clandestine prostitutes were foreigners who resided in their 
own residences instead of in brothels,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
needed to ask for the cooperation of foreign embassies to regulate and in-
spect clandestine prostitution.99 Legal concessions to non-Muslims made 
them more resistant to the Ottoman law regarding control over the sex in-
dustry.100 
The setting for harsher measures vis-à-vis immorality was multi-layered. 
While the abolishment of capitulations lifted legal restrictions on “sex busi-
ness,” the proclamation of martial law suspended constitutional rights, pre-
cisely those regarding the protection of private property. Before martial law, 
local authorities from provinces and Istanbul constantly complained that 
constitutional rights prevented them from undertaking stricter measures to 
stop prostitution. As the governor of Hüdavendigâr province put it in 1910, 
“despite government decrees to prevent prostitution, constitutional rights 
that prohibit the violation of private property discourages further investiga-
tions.”101  
A discourse on human rights accompanied the diplomatic and political 
rivalries among combatant countries and various actors with respect to 
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eliminating the problem of the trafficking of women. Morality-related ar-
guments, most of which concerned prostitution and the international net-
work that fed it, were of great importance from the standpoint of the na-
tional and international prestige of the states concerned. For instance, the 
American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau (1856-
1946) actively and proudly took part in preventing the trafficking of women 
in Istanbul during his service. In his memoirs, he indicated that he had ad-
vised Bedri Bey, the Ottoman Chief of Police, to eliminate the white women 
trade in Istanbul when Bedri Bey had asked “whether he could not do some-
thing that would justify me portraying him in a more favourable light” when 
he heard that Morgenthau was planning to write a book.102 Accordingly, he 
used this opportunity as head of a committee established to fight against traf-
ficking of women. In order to save his reputation by becoming the person to 
save the city from this “disgrace,” Bedri Bey, thus conducted an effective op-
eration: “In a few days every white-slave trader in Constantinople was scur-
rying for safety; most were arrested, a few made their escape; such as were 
foreigners, after serving terms in jail, were expelled from the country.”103 
Morgenthau subsequently made the New York Times to report on the event 
to honor Bedri Bey for his achievement, and after this he established a good 
friendship with him. 
Archival documents shed light on the banishment and deportation of al-
leged traffickers of women. A six-page notebook in the archives shows some 
details about the banishment and deportation of traffickers and prostitutes.104 
The notebook contains a list of 167 people of which 151 were deported, and 
eleven were exiled to Sivas, and five were sent to Kayseri. This notebook was 
prepared by the Istanbul Police Directorate for the Ministry of the Interior 
Affairs. It provides names, father’s names, citizenships, places of residence, 
short indications of crimes (all of which were trafficking of white women), 
and dates of deportation. Among these people were Russian, French, Aus-
trian, Romanian, and Ottoman citizens who mostly resided in Galata. For 
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some, no date of banishment was indicated; instead, it was reported that they 
were “banished with the first group.” In other cases, the dates were January 
31, and February 1, 1915. Following these deportations, on February 3, 
1915, the Ministry of the Interior Affairs introduced a general decree regard-
ing public morality offenses and measures to be taken. Unfortunately, this 
decree was not among the archival documents even though widely referred 
widely to in the correspondences. 
Owing to petitions written by the alleged traffickers of women, we can 
follow their time in exile. Madam Yaş Şodaç [sic] and Ernestiya [sic] were 
sent to Kayseri on February 1, 1915, along with many people who were ac-
cused of the same crime. Their names were among those on the six-pages list 
of the first round of deportation. These two women claimed they were vic-
tims of a slander. Indicating that there was no rabbi in Kayseri with whom 
they could perform their religious duties, they asked to go back Istanbul or at 
least to be resettled in Konya. They added that they were suffering extreme 
misery and poverty – sefalet ve perişaninin son noktasındayız. However, ac-
cording to the General Directorate of Police, these women violated security 
and were constantly acting suspiciously – ahvâl ve harekâtının selb-i emniyet 
ve dâimi şübhe bulunmağla – and since they had engaged in an interna-
tional crime, that is to say, trafficking of women, they could not be par-
doned.105 
Among archival documents regarding banishments, Dina Kalazar’s case 
is the most detailed.106 Her case is revealed through the correspondence be-
tween the General Directorate of Police and the Ministry of the Interior Af-
fairs in addition to petitions. She was known as “Sarı Madam,” and was fa-
mous for owning five brothels in Galata. Apparently, she was a central figure 
in international trafficking of women. She was banished from Istanbul to 
Kayseri on January 31, 1915, for the offense of trafficking of white women. 
Her offense was indicated in the documents as “ahlâk-ı umûmiyeye hıyânet” 
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in the trafficking of women. She might be the same Dina I mention in this case. See Bali, The 
Jews and Prostitution in Constantinople, 1854-1922, 56. 
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which means violation of public morality. The police department indicated 
that she had been involved in trafficking for many years together with her 
husband, Marko. Eventually, Marko was banished to Sivas and Dina was sent 
to Kayseri. Dina wrote many petitions some of which were collectively 
signed by other female companions in Kayseri. They began sending petitions 
to the Kayseri governor and the ministry as soon as they were settled there. 
They tried many ways to be relocated elsewhere. First Dina signed a petition 
complaining her lack of livelihood. Later she signed a collective one claiming 
that there was no rabbi in Kayseri with whom they could perform their relig-
ious duties. And she kept on writing in the end claiming that the climate of 
Kayseri did not agree with her. Eventually, she received permission to travel 
to Eskişehir and settle there. 
Dina’s case also reveals facts related to the banishment process and life in 
exile. For instance, the local governor of Kayseri indicated in one correspon-
dence that these women made their livings for a while by selling their be-
longings. Dina, Agtiana Gala Naka [sic], Sultana, and Viktorya wrote a peti-
tion on May 25, 1915. 
Your servants it’s been a while since [we] opened brothels. We are Ot-
toman citizens and we belong to the Jewish community. When mar-
tial law was proclaimed, they deported us from Istanbul and banished 
us to Kayseri. We are not men; we have no profession to make a liv-
ing. We cannot meet even our basic needs in Kayseri. It is known 
that we never had problems in brothels that we ran. We cannot adapt 
to the climate in Kayseri, our children are in Dersaadet, and our hus-
bands are in Sivas – all of us are in misery. It has been five months 
now; only God and we know how we have suffered. If we are not – 
and never will be – allowed to work in this profession, we are ready to 
sign documents guaranteeing that we will never run brothels.107 
Another petition in the same folder was signed by Sultana, Viktorya and 
Mari İzdaç [sic]. They claimed that one of them had a son and he was a sol-
                                                      
107 BOA. DH.EUM.ADL 12/31 1334 M 24 (2 December 1915). For the original text, see 
Appendix B, Quotation 2.  
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dier in the Ottoman army. They wrote that they served important house-
holds in Istanbul, and they had been punished while the real owners of the 
brothels were still in Istanbul. Also, Dina’s sister Fiska Yenirman [sic] wrote a 
petition on March 21, 1916, to the General Directorate of Police. After 
briefly summarizing the events, Fiska asserted that her sister possessed 
wealth; she would live an honorable life in Dersaadet if she were allowed to 
return. However, the answer was unfavorable; the directorate emphasized that 
trafficking of women could not be pardoned.108 
After two years of banishment, on January 1, 1917, Dina wrote another 
petition in which she indicated that upon her own request she had moved to 
Ankara (Eskişehir) from Kayseri with special permission. Her husband (ap-
parently back to Istanbul) had typhoid fever, and she asked for special per-
mission from the province of Eskişehir to return in order to take care of her 
husband in Istanbul. As soon as she arrived in Istanbul, police took her into 
custody and sent her back to Kayseri, the place where she was first banished. 
She asked the ministry to travel back to Eskişehir saying that she could not 
make a living in Kayseri. “Two years ago, I was banished to Kayseri due to a 
trafficking of women offense. However, I could not adapt to the weather 
there. I asked permission to go to Ankara, and they allowed me to do so. As 
soon as I heard that my husband had typhoid fever, I went to Dersaadet wit 
special permission. They said I came without notifying the authorities. They 
sent me back to Kayseri with my six-year-old child.”109 Eventually, she re-
ceived permission to go back to Eskişehir.110 
It is interesting to note that the General Directorate of Police indicated 
that Dina’s punishment was not based on a decision of the court martial. The 
directorate commented that it was unnecessary to get a court decision for 
these cases since trafficking of women was an international crime; moreover, 
the government had announced a preventive measure that such people be 
banished even without a conviction.111 This shows that Dina was banished by 
                                                      
108 BOA. DH.EUM.5.Şb. 22/47 1334 Ca 28 (2 May 1916). 
109 BOA. DH.EUM.ADL. 49/26 1335 Ra 6 (19 January 1917). 
110 BOA. DH.EUM.ADL. 48/13 1335 Ca 30 (24 March 1917). 
111 BOA. DH.EUM.ADL. 49/20 1334 Z 25 (23 September 1916). 
M O R A L  C R I S I S  O N  T H E  O T T O M A N  H O M E F R O N T  
151 
the directorate. However, she wrote in one petition that she had been ban-
ished due to the proclamation of martial law.112 The most reasonable explana-
tion is that the Ministry of the Interior had established preventive measures 
at the outbreak of the war and applied them without even referring to the 
martial order. 
Non-Ottoman citizens who were deported or banished due to immorality 
offenses applied for Ottoman citizenship with the hope of receiving a pardon 
or guaranteeing their ability to stay within the borders of the empire. How-
ever, such applications were declined immediately after reports indicating 
their “immorality” were sent by the General Directorate of Police to the 
Ministry of the Interior. Even though a person had not been convicted of a 
“morality” crime, she or he had no chance of receiving Ottoman citizenship 
due to “immorality fame.” Now, I elaborate on cases of refusals to grant Ot-
toman citizenship due to “immorality” reports. 
3.3.1  Morality as a Requirement for the Acquisition of Ottoman 
Citizenship 
During the First World War, the citizenship status of foreign passport holders 
in the Ottoman Empire became a matter of interest for several reasons. Es-
pecially civilians who held the citizenship of one of the Entente Powers were 
faced with harsh measures as part of the battle itself. These people had a long 
history in the empire not only as visitors, businessmen, or workers but also as 
permanent residents. Evaluating citizenship applications by foreign passport 
holders who allegedly violated public morality and were subsequently ban-
ished or deported demonstrates how morality became a significant impetus at 
the intersection of multiple dynamics. In addition to wartime measures, the 
abolishment of capitulations at the outbreak of the war meant that being a 
non-Ottoman citizen within the borders of the Empire was no longer a privi-
leged position. The abolition curbed interest in sex trade, and military sur-
veillance of morality resulted in great unrest for non-Ottomans. As will be 
                                                      
112 Ibid. “Dersaadet’ten idare-i örfiye ilan olunduğu esnada cariyelerini ? İstanbul’dan kaldırarak 
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shown with archival documents, the dates of citizenship applications suggest 
this argument. Almost all applications I studied in the scope of this project 
were submitted in the beginning of 1915, some months after the declaration 
of mobilization and right after the government’s announcement of measures 
concerning both the situation of non-Ottoman citizens and the protection 
of morality in martial law areas. These cases, show that morality was an im-
portant requirement to be granted Ottoman citizenship. Many of the cases 
considered here are related to prostitution, trafficking of women, or procur-
ing. The fact that none of the applicants managed to receive citizenship 
shows how moral judgments worked together with national security concerns 
and how wartime measures enabled the “undesirable” elements in society to 
be eliminated. 
The catalogues of the Ministry of the Interior are full of such demands, 
petitions, and applications of alleged “prostitutes and procurers” to become 
citizens. However, their applications were declined immediately whenever the 
police department’s investigation reports were sent to the Ministry of the 
Interior. Even applicants who had not been convicted or banished due to mo-
rality crimes were rejected when their police report indicated that they were 
immoral – ahlaksız. No further investigations were carried for that individual 
and their application would be declined immediately. Furthermore, thanks to 
the investigation, he or she would get charged as well. 
It should be noted that after the abolishment of capitulations, on March 
15, 1915, a preliminary law was issued regarding residence and travel regula-
tions for foreign citizens in the empire.113 According to this preliminary law, 
provincial and local governors, after informing the Ministry of the Interior 
Affairs, had the right to banish or deport foreigners who violated peace and 
order within the borders of their towns or cities. Those who were deported 
could not return to the empire without formal permission. Breaking this law 
would entail imprisonment of up to six months and/or a fine of up to fifty 
gold Ottoman coins.114 Mişel Salomovic was among traffickers of women 
                                                      
113 "Ecnebilerin Memalik-i Osmaniye'de Seyahat ve İkametleri Hakkında Kanun-u Muvakkat," 
Düstur, Vol. 2, No. 7, 484–485.   
114 Ibid. 
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deported from the Empire on January 29, 1916.115 His wife, Madam Bertah-
lamovic, petitioned the Imperial Secretary (Mabeyn-i Hümayun Başkitabet 
Dairesi) and asked for a pardon emphasizing Mişel’s old age and that there 
had been others who had returned to the country whose cases were similar to 
Mişel’s. Upon her petition, several departments held an investigation. Fi-
nally, the directorate of police answered the Ministry of the Interior as fol-
lows: 
Due to trafficking of white women offenses, foreign passport holders 
were deported from the country while Ottoman citizens were exiled 
to other Ottoman cities. Mişel Salomoviç, a Russian citizen, con-
victed of women trafficking was deported from the country along 
with others on January 29, 1916. Since his return would violate the 
seventh article of the foreigner’s law, the request has been rejected.116 
While the abolition of capitulations clearly broke the previous contract be-
tween foreign passport holders and Ottoman authorities, the preliminary law 
on foreigners of 1915 brought about new measures to keep foreign citizens 
under control and punish them in cases of violations of order. Combined 
with the mobilization efforts – that is to say, martial law wartime was charac-
terized by the increasing power of civil and military offices over civilians. 
There were many shortcomings of being a citizen of an Entente Power in 
the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. For example, reprisals 
against civilians became integral to fighting the enemy during the war. Civil-
ians were punished with deportation or banishment in retaliation for bomb-
ings targeting Ottoman citizens. For instance, as payback for Entente bomb-
ings in Köyceğiz, a person named Ferguson was to be exiled to Kastamonu. 
However, since he had left the country, the Ottoman police tried to find his 
father. Unable to find none of them, the police found another foreigner, 
                                                      
115 A certain Michael Moses Salamovitz, alias Michel Pasha, was indicated as the person who ran 
the synagogue to which traffickers attend in Morgenthau’s reports that were cited in Rifat 
Bali’s work. It is possible he was the same person. Bali, The Jews and Prostitution in Constan-
tinople, 1854-1922, 55. 
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Robert McGill to banish in retaliation.117 Apart from retaliations, non-
Ottoman citizens, including Muslim ones, were under the surveillance of 
Ottoman security forces. They were subject to a special curfew that restricted 
their movements at night.118 A general circular by the Ministry of the Inte-
rior Affairs to the provinces prescribed the banishment of “harmful” (muzır) 
citizens from Allied countries to “non-prohibited zones” – that is, provinces 
under civil administration.119 But in Syria, which was under the command of 
the Fourth Army, all citizens of Allied powers, regardless of whether they 
were “harmful or not,” were banished to Urfa. As a precaution against spy-
ing, the harboring of spies, or the conducting anti-government or anti-war 
propaganda, many were banished to central Anatolia to less-connected re-
gions such as Kastamonu, Sivas, Çorum, Konya and Kayseri as well as to cit-
ies far from military deployment routes. The Black Sea, Aegean, and Mar-
mara coasts were considered especially vulnerable to naval attacks and were 
considered the places where spies were potentially being harbored.120 
The act of banishment served not only as punishment for political of-
fenses as mentioned above, was also a mechanism for the preservation of 
public order. Such public order cases varied from drunkenness to pickpocket-
ing and from prostitution to loose morals. While banishment was generally 
the result of a court martial decision, some were idareten sürgün meaning an 
administrative order for banishment.121 
                                                      
117 BOA. DH. EUM. 5., ŞB., 80/57 (4 June 1914). 
118 ATASE, 277/1136 001 12.  
119 Ibid.  
120 Ibid.  
121 On administrative decisions regarding banishment, see Ata, “I. Dünya Savaşı İçinde Bozkır’a 
Yapılan Sürgünler.” Whether foreigners were subject to courts martial orders deserves further 
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State of Siege.” See also Zeren’s study in which he discussed extraterritoriality in law in the 
framework of the establishment of constitutional rule in the Ottoman Balkans. Zeren, “The 
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The “morality requirement” is explicitly observed in official documents 
regarding citizenship applications. On January 10, 1915, Terzi Povayir [sic], 
Vitali, and Tesab Arş [sic] applied for Ottoman citizenship through the Citi-
zenship Directorate of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hariciye Nezareti Tâbii-
yyet Müdüriyeti). The ministry sent the cases to the Ministry of the Interior 
Affairs to be investigated by the police department. According to police re-
ports, all there men were residents of Şeftali Street in Galata, and had been 
previously banished for making a living by encouraging prostitution; thus, 
their cases did not deserve further investigation and their applications were 
denied immediately.122 
In another case, the denied request of a Russian citizen, Eşmil Aron 
veled-i Birkof Gerson [sic], who was a barber in Şeftali Street Galata, was 
based on the fact he was involved in trafficking of women. The document 
reported that his application was denied because “such people do not deserve 
the honor of receiving Ottoman citizenship,” and moreover, he should be 
charged for this offense.123 Here, it should be noted that Eşmil Aron had nei-
ther been convicted nor banished previously for trafficking of women. He 
applied to citizenship from his place of residence.  
Although the documents did not give further information about how the 
police had investigated the case and how they reached such conclusions, the 
records of some cases suggest that personal accounts during the investigation 
mattered, as well. For example, the case of Rafyan reveals that police relied 
on personal accounts during the background investigation to evaluate his 
citizenship application. Rafyan applied for Ottoman citizenship on Decem-
ber 3, 1914. He was a Jew, a citizen of Russia, lived in Karaoğlan Street, Ga-
lata, and worked as a street vendor. Six years earlier he had deserted from 
military service in Russia and settled in Istanbul. Apparently, as he was a fu-
gitive in Istanbul, he had never submitted a document to the Russian Consu-
late. According to the police report, he had a relationship with a prostitute in 
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one of the Galata brothels, and he made his living from this relationship. The 
report went on to say that he was known as “immoral Rafyan” among the 
people.124 Eventually, his application was denied. A similar case was that of 
Rolmeş veled-i Volef Karonfelk’s [sic] who applied for citizenship on Decem-
ber 21, 1914. He was a street vendor and resident of Karaoğlan Street, Ga-
lata. His application was denied on the basis that he earned his living from his 
relationship with a prostitute.125 
Not only men but also women foreign nationals applied for Ottoman 
citizenship in order to secure their living and situation in the country during 
the war. For example, Liza bint-i Mendel, a Russian citizen and resident ten-
year resident in Karaoğlan Street, Galata applied for citizenship on December 
31, 1914. Since she was operating a brothel, the document reports, “she does 
not deserve to be registered and accepted as an Ottoman citizen.”126 Another 
case was Elis from Adana’s Taşçıkan neighborhood who applied for Ottoman 
citizenship in February 1915 claiming that she was American. However, she 
could not provide any documentation of her citizenship other than her 
command of English. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined her applica-
tion foremost because she could not prove her country of origin and second 
because her immorality was “well known.”127 
There are cases of religious conversions not being accepted, as well, due to 
immorality accusations. An Armenian woman, Mari, a resident of Kumkapı, 
and the daughter of Giragos the gardener, applied to the Ministry of Justice 
and Religious Denominations (Adliye ve Mezâhib Nezâreti) to convert Islam 
on July 6, 1917. After an investigation by the Istanbul Police Department, 
the Ministry of the Interior Affairs concluded that she was earning her living 
from prostitution. Her application was denied, and she was not allowed to 
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convert to Islam.128 In another case, local authorities in Istanbul approached 
the conversion of an English man differently. This case is also interesting 
since it involved an interreligious relationship between a Muslim woman and 
a non-Muslim man. Arthur Talin [sic], an English citizen, was banished from 
Istanbul to the town of Bozkır in 1915 when police discovered his affair with 
a Muslim woman. After three months in exile he converted to Islam, 
changed his name to Ahmed Arif, and asked the Ministry of Justice and Re-
ligious Denominations to approve his conversion. Having received his appli-
cation, the Ministry found it suspicious and asked for more information 
about his motives for religious conversion. The Ministry of the Interior Af-
fairs reported that Arthur had converted to Islam to marry a Muslim woman. 
Emphasizing that he had obtained permission to marry from the father of 
that Muslim woman, his application was accepted, and he was allowed to re-
turn to Istanbul.129 
As these cases demonstrate, the Ottoman government conducted special 
investigations regarding the moral qualities of citizenship applicants. Given 
the circumstances that foreigners in the empire experienced as citizens of en-
emy countries, many applied for Ottoman citizenship in order to secure their 
residence in the empire. However, Ottoman authorities imposed strict back-
ground checks and denied the applications of foreigners in cases of suspected 
of immorality. 
§ 3.4  Morality Between Discourse and Daily Realities 
Although the most powerful discourse on morality manifested itself in the 
polemics on prostitution and sexual behavior, other topics in the domain of 
morality were more central to everyday life. Prostitution, indeed, was part of 
a broader discussion on public morality in which vices, conspicuous con-
sumption, and European cultural penetration into the Muslim community 
became rallying points. Neither ill-reputed behaviors nor critique of them 
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were peculiar to wartime; however; the obvious context of war contributed to 
a rise of moral considerations and added new dynamics. Nevertheless, this 
did not mean that Ottoman authorities, whether bureaucratic or military, 
achieved absolute authority over public morality. 
The recurrent themes in morality polemics revolved around the broad 
categories of entertainment and leisure as vices causing further moral deca-
dence. Entertainment and leisure activities had become the subject of heated 
debates due to their role in the penetration of European cultural influence 
into Muslim societies. As discussed in chapter 2, advocates of Islamic moral-
ity pointed to this influence as the primary reason for moral degeneration in 
the Ottoman Empire. From the conservative point of view, compliance with 
or resistance to this influence constituted the grounds for moral standards. 
Like prostitution, habits such as alcohol consumption and gambling – and to 
a certain degree frequenting modern entertainment places where European 
“vices” were on display, such as theaters, cinemas, and taverns – were associ-
ated with immorality. Increased hostility toward enemy countries during the 
First World War strengthened discourses on “imported immorality.”130 Apart 
from religious conservatives and authentic morality advocates, other intellec-
tual elites were also among those targeting such entertainment and leisure 
activities due to their degenerative impact on society. Some popular percep-
tions regarding morality, or more precisely immorality, were accompanied by 
fears inspired from biblical stories of calamity. Jihad – the holy war – added a 
religious dimension to discourses on morality. On the other hand, in the eyes 
of the state authorities public morality was part of a broader framework of 
public order. As long as public order was not concerned, there are few refer-
ences regarding individual’s “private” lives in official documents. What did 
alarm state authorities was possible social upheaval (halkın galeyana gelmesi) 
that could be stirred up by the violation of public morality. For instance, con-
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spicuous consumption and excessive entertainment on the homefront could 
attract public reaction and spark protests. Moreover, discourses of moral de-
cline might affect the motivation of soldiers on the battlefield who were 
fighting for nothing else but their honor. Despite these concerns, the Otto-
man state approached the issue pragmatically and used spending on enter-
tainment to increase its own revenues. Given the context of the war, such 
revenues obviously became indispensable for the state budget. While semi-
government war relief organizations invested in entertainment to collect this 
revenue, the moral instruction and nationalist propaganda achieved limited 
success due to the conflict between financial interests and the expectations 
of spectators. Therefore, in this study, I suggest that entertainment and the 
vices associated with immorality were part of a moral contest among various 
actors with various agendas. Also, turning our attention to the daily aspects 
of morality provides a more complete, complex picture of the vast reach of 
morality discourses. 
The link between public order and public morality can be observed in a 
regulation issued prior to the First World War, on March 12, 1912. This was a 
supplementary law added to the Article 99 of the Penal Code stipulating new 
measures for maintaining discipline and order in the country and preventing 
the violation of public manners, morality, principles of health.131 The decree 
consisted of six articles that prevented ex-convicts from carrying weapons, 
asked full cooperation of travelers with police requesting they show their 
documents; made it compulsory for landlords and hotel owners to inform 
the police departments of the identities of their tenants and guests within 
twenty-four hours; prohibited theater plays that might insult or humiliate re-
ligions and madhabs recognized by the Ottoman state as well as the ones that 
                                                      
131 "Kanun-i Cezanın Doksan Dokuzuncu Maddesinin Altıncı Cumadelahire 1329 Tarihli 
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violated public manners, morality or public order; prohibited the opening of 
brothels in forbidden areas; and lastly, banned any kinds of attempts explic-
itly stirring up public turmoil and violating manners and the practice of re-
ligion in Ottoman lands. Indeed, these points constituted the backbone of 
the main issues of public order and public morality in the eyes of Ottoman 
authorities. 
Keeping these points in mind, first, I first discuss popular perceptions re-
garding war and immorality. Second, I focus on conspicuous consumption 
and war profiteering to show how morality discourses were central to the cri-
tique of social inequalities during the war. Third, I evaluate official attempts 
to regulate entertainment venues with an emphasis on the government’s di-
lemma concerning financial profit and moral control. The same dilemma is 
observed in the last part which focuses on gambling and alcohol. Through 
these points that shed light on the complexity of public morality discourses, I 
also aim at addressing early versions of current debates on “lifestyle” and its 
relationship to morality. 
3.4.1  Popular Perceptions of Moral Decline and the Violation of 
Public Morality  
Is it possible to list the things deemed a threat to public morality in the 
course of everyday life? Was there a common discourse, or a popular percep-
tion on the signs of immorality? If so, how did this discourse intersect with 
the context of war? Although less documented, it is possible to find some 
clues about a mentality that assumed a relationship between immorality and 
calamities throughout Ottoman history. Prohibition on alcohol consumption, 
for instance, constituted a result of the assumed link between immorality 
and calamity. Prohibitive discourses served to reproduce the authority of tra-
ditional elites by establishing their moral authority over society. For example, 
after pestilence and a fire disaster in Istanbul in the seventeenth century, the 
Ottoman ulema started a campaign that blamed practices that deviated from 
Islam. They achieved their aim to prohibit the sale of wine in the city.132 Ac-
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cording to Kırlı, in the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the 
seventeenth centuries, sumptuary laws and the moralizing discourses of rul-
ing elites intensified in the Ottoman Empire as a consequence of challenges 
by new social forces against the existing order.133 The moral decline polemi-
cists in the early modern Ottoman Empire thus attempted to preserve their 
hegemony and extent social hierarchies through sumptuary regulations that 
emphasize the degeneration of moral order. Kırlı stated that this hegemony 
not only maintained the political position of the ruling classes, it was also an 
ideological hegemony that explains the prevalence of moral discourses 
among those of the same opinion about declining moral values even though 
they were not part of the ruling class.134 The moral discourses that emerged in 
the early modern era targeted “urban public spaces” such as coffeehouses, 
places that “represented the breakdown of social hierarchy and thus served as 
a metaphor for urban disorder.”135 Sultan Mahmud II’s regime, which coin-
cided with social upheaval and radical reform, strongly emphasized ortho-
doxy and morality during the abolishment of the Janissary corps. The het-
erodox Bektashi order (infamous for drinking) was closed, and their 
properties were handed over to the orthodox Nakshibendi order. 
Public spaces such as coffeehouses were also mistrusted because they con-
stituted the locations from which gossip and rumors spread, including politi-
cal commentaries.136 In the nineteenth century public attention intensified 
on “heterogeneous” public spaces such as theaters, cinemas, parks, pubs, and 
cafés where “unrelated men and women could mingle.”137 Throughout the 
nineteenth century, the spatio-temporal organization of urban life attracted 
the attention of the ruling classes both from the standpoint of modernity 
                                                      
133 The period in question was marked by “social fluidity and the gradual disintegration of 
existing hierarchies” owing to domestic migration that was a consequence of population 
growth and the dissolution of the tımar land system. Kırlı, “The Struggle over Space,” 42. 
134 Ibid., 42-43.  
135 Kırlı, “The Struggle over Space,” 49. 
136 For more information, see Kırlı, Sultan ve Kamuoyu. 
137 Yıldız, “Limits of the Imaginable in the Early Turkish Novel,” 555. Regarding initial 
introduction of cinema and cinema-going in the Ottoman Empire, see Çeliktemel-Thomen, 
“The Curtain of Dreams: Early Cinema in Istanbul (1896-1923).” 
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and public order. In the previous system, urban order and moral control had 
been provided within defined spatial units among which the mahalle consti-
tuted the basic unit. In this system, personal surety (kefalet) played an im-
portant role in stipulating collective responsibility for maintaining public 
order and morality.138 Nighttime, however, offered opportunities to those 
bent on evading society’s existent norms.139 When the streets began to be 
illuminated in the nineteenth century, the night became subject to the grow-
ing control of state authorities. However, as Nurçin İleri argues, there was a 
paradox between a more efficient system of surveilling and controlling the 
night and the “cultivation of nocturnal sociability.”  
The Ottoman authorities and elites tried to tolerate nocturnal con-
viviality because they knew that some urban vitality was crucial as 
sign of progress. Yet at the same time, they tried to monitor night life 
by surveilling public gathering places, entertainment venues, taverns, 
and activities like drinking, gambling, and prostitution that were 
primarily associated with nighttime transgression.140  
The illumination of the night created new spaces for leisure activities that 
came to be associated with disorder and immorality – and at the same time 
with modern life and economic progress.141 The “moral order” defenders, 
thus, targeted not only the entertainment places but also established parallels 
                                                      
138 Zarinebaf gives a detailed account of how the kefalet system worked, see Zarinebaf, Crime and 
Punishment in Istanbul, 132–133. 
139 Wishnitzer describes how “different” nighttime could be for different groups of people: “The 
powerful norms of public morality and the constant gaze of the neighborhood community 
shaped nocturnal life in different ways for different people there were those who did not ven-
ture beyond the accepted, or further from the neighborhood coffee-house. Others tried to use 
darkness to evade the sensitive threads of the community network at night while leading a 
respectable life during the day. Still others, who were socially marginal and fell below the 
standards of public morality anyway, engaged more openly in social drinking and other stig-
matized behaviors. Finally, there were those who were powerful enough to disregard the social 
norms of the mahalle. For all of these groups, darkness carried benefits that daytime could not 
offer.” Wishnitzer, “Into The Dark,” 518. 
140 İleri, “A Nocturnal History of Fin de Siécle Istanbul,” 24. 
141 Ibid., 204–205.  
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between moral decline and European cultural influence based on the fact 
that such entertainment places were the products of Western civilization. 
The initial phase of the late Ottoman version of what I call “the immoral-
ity chain,” began with the instillation of degenerate values through theater 
and cinema. This type of entertainment brought to men and women to-
gether at the same stage, thus disregarding gender segregation and holding 
up the “private” lives of other people and their corrupt values as examples to 
the youth. Furthermore, alcohol, which is explicitly forbidden in Islam, low-
ered inhibition and prepared an environment in which illicit sex and prosti-
tution might occur. Since prostitution requires money, men would resort to 
gambling and risk the income of their families. Eventually, such people were 
cursed with the stigma of venereal disease. To some extent this line of 
thought can be observed not only in conservative circles but also among na-
tionalists with respect to their critiques of immorality. While religious moral-
ists preferred to cite stories of divine punishment, such as the famous story of 
Sodom and Gomorrah, nationalist narratives focused on social and national 
destruction as consequences of immorality.142 In the upheaval of the war and 
also during the armistice period, the latter narrative of collective destruction 
gained momentum. 
During the First World War, some members of the Ottoman ulema used 
the proclamation of Jihad as an opportunity to revive the narrative of im-
morality and divine punishment. A madrasa teacher from the Temple Mount 
(Harem-i Şerif) wrote a letter to the Ministry of the Interior Affairs at the 
beginning of the war claiming that if the government hoped to succeed in 
Jihad, it had to watch people’s morality, in particular that of women’s, be-
cause “the first rebellion [against God] happened in this world because of 
women.”143 He proposed steps be taken for the sake of jihad including: 
The prohibition of all acts that were incompatible with Islam; the clos-
ing taverns and coffeehouses; the prohibition of alcohol and gam-
                                                      
142 Karaosmanoğlu, Sodom ve Gomore (first edition in 1924).  
143 BOA. DH.EUM. 7. Şb. 1333 Ra 3 (3/1) (19 January 1915). “dünyada hasıl olan ilk ma’siyet 
kadınlar sebebinden neş’et etti.”  
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bling for Muslims; the prohibition of those things causing or encour-
aging adultery; the obligation of women to behave with perfect 
manners (kemâl-i edeb) in bazaars, theaters, and parks; and the ban 
of those kinds of women’s clothing that were incompatible with Is-
lamic principles.144 
For him, the theaters in which women were dancing with “uncovered chests” 
and provoking illicit love affairs were the places where immorality was spread 
among Muslims and Muslim youth. He asserted that to tolerate such in-
stances would harm the holy cause and have a negative impact on other Mus-
lim countries. Another medrese teacher, Abdullah Fevzi Efendi, joined the 
army during the First World War and wrote in his memoirs that “the fire 
from howitzers and planes are just as it was told in Quran: calamities arriving 
from the sky to the earth” that were God’s punishment for sins that Otto-
man soldiers had committed.145 
Ordinary people also shared similar opinions about immorality. “To serve 
humanity,” they sent letters to the Ministry of the Interior Affairs asking 
measures be taken against immorality. These letters presented lists of houses 
where illicit sex allegedly occurred.146 A notable man from Kayseri requesting 
the prohibition of brothels in the city asserted in a letter that calamities such 
as earthquakes, fires, disasters, shortage of rain, lack of profits and insuffi-
cient harvests were the consequences of a curse brought by immorality.147 The 
                                                      
144 Ibid. “Nusret ve muvaffakiyet husûlü için beyne’l-ahali vaki olan maasi ve muharremat meni 
ve izalesi. Bilcümle meyhane ve kahvehaneler Müslümanlar içki ve müskirat içmemesi ve 
kumar oynamaması ve zinayı muceb olan esbab ve teşvikatın men edilmesi, hanımlar çarşı ve 
tiyatro ve bağçelerde kemâl-i edeble hareket ettirilmesi ve âdâb-ı İslâmiyeye muhalif çarşaf ve 
elbise-i gayr-i layıka hanımlarca isti’mal edilmesinin men olunması.”  
145 Koçkuzu, Çanakkale Cephesinde Bir Müderris, 112.  
146 A certain Abdi Hulusi wrote a letter to the ministry listing the houses being used for 
prostitution. He stated his aim in writing this letter as “to serve humanity” “hidmet-i insaniye 
namına,” see BOA. DH. EUM. 3. Şb. 8/74 1333 Za 11 (20 September 1915). 
147 “Ahlakı bozulan yerler felaket ve mesaibden hiçbir an halli kalamaz. Bugün binlerce insanları 
pençe-i kahrında inil inil inleten zelzeleler, harikler, gaileler, imtar-ı matar, noksan-ı hasılat, 
fikdan-ı semerât gibi dürlü dürlü felaketler ancak ahlaksızlığın tevellid ettiği…” BOA. DH. 
EUM. 6. Şb. 42/52 (3) 17 Ağustos 1334 (17 August 1918). 
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author of this letter used the same “chain of immorality” to illustrate the 
links between moral and social disorder.148 
Despite the bitter tone against violations of public morality, the main 
motive of authorities was to take measures to protect public order. The ap-
proach was relatively flexible, official discourse notwithstanding. Even Ab-
dullah Fevzi Efendi, who cursed Ottoman soldiers for their immorality, wrote 
in his memoirs that “those who accomplish their duties” need joy and enter-
tainment, and it can be tolerated so long as it was “once in a while” and 
without public display. These “rules,” indeed, constituted public approbation 
or toleration of immorality. As long as immoral acts remained “secret” and 
occurred only “once in a while,” both the public and state authorities would 
tolerate them. In the case of open violations, punishment could be severe. 
Carousal (işret) and paying women to dance (kadın oynatmak) were among 
the most documented violations of public morality.149 It seems that this type 
of entertainment was especially common among the bureaucratic and mili-
tary elites in the provincial areas. It came to be documented in archival corre-
spondence when conflicts arose when security forces intervened or local 
people complained to the police. Again, these events were documented for 
breaking the peace and public order because they created an uproar among 
the local community.150 The military or bureaucratic officers caught drinking 
and watching women dance were tried in courts martial.151 
                                                      
148 This letter, indeed, seems to have been inspired by the new Minister of the Interior Affairs, 
İsmail Canbulat, who promised to take strict measures against prostitution while in office. See 
chapter 2. 
149 In 1911, a new article was issued as a supplemant to Article 202 of the Ottoman Penal Code 
stipulating imprisonment for a period from one month to one year for the act of women danc-
ing. See İleri, “A Nocturnal History of Fin de Siécle Istanbul,” 266.  
150 A case demonstrates the power of “public enthusiasm” vis-à-vis the violation of public 
morality. In Isparta, the local gendarme commander (jandarma bölük kumandanı), Kazım 
Efendi, along with the retired lieutenant (mülâzım) Hacı Bey and the telegraph bureau officer 
Mehmed Şevket Efendi, were arrested after public protest of women dancing in Kazım Efendi’s 
house, BOA. DH. H. 48/5 1331 Ca 04 (24 April 1913). 
151 Archival correspondence gives a sample case on the topic. In the town of Mecidözü, a member 
of the local administrative council (meclis-i idare âzâsı), Pirzade İbrahim, the Director of the 
Subsistance Office (mal müdürü), Hakkı, and the commander for tracking down the deserters 
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Perhaps, it is worth considering the public impact and imagery of occa-
sions when soldiers and high ranking military men were involved. İhsan Tur-
jman, a soldier based in Jerusalem, vividly described such representative sto-
ries of social as well as military life in 1915 and 1916 in his diary.152 He often 
contrasted the misery of ordinary people and low ranking soldiers with the 
indulgence of those of high rank. He was disgusted by the “whoring and 
drinking” parties of higher ranking men taking place at a time when the Ot-
toman army was fighting in Çanakkale and where thousands of soldiers lost 
their lives. 
Ahmad Cemal Pasha issued an order today, in celebration of the an-
niversary of Sultan Mehmet Rashad V’s ascension to the throne, to 
distribute mutton and sweets to members of the armed forces… A big 
party was being prepared at the Commissariat, to be presided over by 
the two Cemals [Cemal Pasha and Küçük Cemal] and Ruşen Bey 
[Commander and Residence Inspector]153 and other senior admirals 
and officers… A number of Jerusalem prostitutes were also invited to 
entertain the officers. I was told that at least 50 well-known whores 
were among the invitees… While this was happening, our brothers 
were fighting in the Dardanelles… I suddenly became despondent 
and very sad for our condition.154 
Obviously, Cemal Paşa was among the three most significant figures of the 
CUP and had privileges over low ranks. He was notorious among the local 
population of Greater Syria as he had ordered the deportation and execution 
of many leading figures on the basis of accusations of spying while the locals 
were struggling with famine as well as locust attacks. His reputation of im-
                                                      
(firarî takip müfrezesi kumandanı) Captain İbrahim were caught watching women dancing, 
and their case was transferred to the courts martial. See BOA. DH. EUM. KLU. 12/30. 1335 R 
05 (29 January 1917). 
152 Tamari, Year of the Locust. 
153 The title “Residence Inspector” refers to an Ottoman military rank Menzil Müfettişi which 
should be translated “Station Inspector.”  
154 Tamari, Year of the Locust, 111–112. 
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morality added yet another dimension to this story of a type that attracted 
vast interest among the locals. Abigail Jacobson’s discussion about Turjman’s 
testimony details how such occasions sparked an “identity crisis” that shook 
the Ottoman collectivity and estranged Arab soldiers from Ottoman iden-
tity.155  
In another context, reputation for immorality played an important role 
in expressing ethnic discontent. A French Lazarist Priest in Syria wrote in 
1917 about the Cemal Paşa case. “Apostasies are the order of the day in the 
cities. How many have given themselves to Muslims, or have given up their 
honor for a morsel of bread…All of the Turkish officers, Jemal Pasha at their 
head, can’t have enough Christian girls to sacrifice to their perversions.”156 
During the Arab Revolt of 1916, the Sharifian propaganda against the Otto-
man rule was based on the idea that Sharif Hussein was doing his duty 
against those who violated the Sharia by introducing secular laws and life-
styles. The Sharif of Mecca targeted Cemal Paşa’s perversions in his anti-
Ottoman propaganda including his role in employing women in state offices 
which for the Sharif it signified the fact that Ottomans were not qualified to 
rule the Muslims.157 Reputation for immorality played a role in constructing 
the “other” at the international level and contributed to the contest of prac-
ticing “true Islam” and legitimate Islamic governance. 
3.4.2  Moral Decline and Conspicuous Consumption, Debauchery, 
and Wartime Profiteering 
A moral discourse often accompanied critiques of war profiteering which al-
most obscured the political failure of the “national economy program” from 
which the profiteers benefited. Especially after the Balkan Wars, when the 
CUP seized full control of the Ottoman government, a new economic pol-
icy called the National Economy (Millî iktisat) was pursued in order to em-
power Muslim businessmen. The new economic policy had a simple formula 
                                                      
155 Jacobson, “Negotiating Ottomanism in Times of War.” 
156 Cited in: Thompson, Colonial Citizens, 27. 
157 Teitelbaum, “The Man Who Would Be Caliph: Sharifian Propaganda in World War I,” 290–91. 
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to save the Ottoman Empire: to create an alternative Muslim bourgeoisie.158 
Accordingly, the traditional Ottoman bourgeoisie, comprised mainly of non-
Muslims, was eliminated from commercial networks due to perceived sympa-
thy for foreign powers. The accumulation of wealth was to be left in the 
hands of the Muslim bourgeoisie. In fact, the war provided many opportuni-
ties to actualize this project. The First World War became a huge opportunity 
for profiteers to bypass previous rules of commerce through political en-
gagement with the CUP. The national economy policy facilitated war profi-
teering by providing transportation rights, credits, and privileges to Muslim 
entrepreneurs. Not only large enterprises but even small merchants profi-
teered, especially on urgently needed goods such as oil, gas, sugar, and flour. 
Meanwhile large landowners benefited from the ambitious agricultural poli-
cies of the government. New companies were established under state protec-
tion and benefited from privileges designed to keep commerce in the hands 
of Muslim entrepreneurs.159 Black-marketing of goods in demand made it 
possible for many to make huge profits during the war. 
Istanbul was significantly affected by privation, due to its reliance on im-
ported goods. At the beginning of the war, the city met its consumption 
needs through existing stocks, but as the war went on, local merchants specu-
lated and stored the resources. This food crisis provided the basis for a transfer 
of wealth from non-Muslim merchants to the Muslim bourgeoisie. Some or-
ganizations, such as the National Defense Society and the Artisans’ Society, 
played significant roles in this transfer.160 
On May 24, 1917, under the pressure of public opinion, the Ottoman 
government issued a provisional law to prevent speculation. The courts mar-
tial were in charge of executing the penalties from then on. An Anti-
                                                      
158 Toprak, Türkiye’de Milli İktisat, 1908-1918, 174 (first edition in 1982). Zürcher discusses 
whether “millî” refers to Turkish nationalism, Ottomanism, or Islamism in Young Turk social 
and economic policies and concludes that the unionists’ policies were primarily motivated by 
the idea of promoting an “Ottoman Muslim” state, Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Na-
tion Building, 230–231. 
159 Ibid., 45-48. 
160 Ahmad, İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme, 44–45. 
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profiteering Commission (Men-i İhtikâr Heyeti) was established to enforce 
the law. Although the efforts of the government to end the black market 
were initially successful, the political agenda of creating a national economy 
conflicted with these efforts in the chaotic atmosphere of the war.161 Those 
who were able to stock goods thanks to transportation rights, credits, and 
state protection accumulated immense wealth.162 
Consequently, a new class of war profiteers (harb zengini) emerged. War 
profiteers, a specific group of merchants, became the most resented in Otto-
man public opinion. Their way of living, which was often affiliated with de-
bauchery and corruption, was a major theme in Turkish literature of the 
postwar period.163 In most of these narratives, the main character is a for-
merly pious Muslim man who easily acquired wealth owing to the circum-
stances cited above. As soon as he becomes rich, he frequents nightlife ven-
ues popular among business circles – such as Hotel Tokatlıyan – to meet new 
acquaintances and display his wealth. To increase his reputation and make his 
name more presentable in high society, he makes up a family name with the 
suffix “-zade” meaning “descendant of.” Leaving his old traditional konak 
house behind, he moves into an apartment flat and furnishes it in a Euro-
pean bourgeoisie fashion. His moral laxity that allows him to benefit from 
privation is evident in his new habits such as hiring a mistress, consuming 
alcohol, gambling, and partaking of saloon entertainment.164 In the end, he 
is a vulgar imitation of the modern bourgeoisie – a parasite of society who 
made a fortune through political connections in a time of crisis. Therefore, 
these wealthy men did not hesitate to cooperate with the new political pow-
ers that be, the Allies, who occupied Istanbul in 1920 in the aftermath of the 
                                                      
161 Toprak, Türkiye’de Milli İktisat, 1908-1918, 538. 
162 Vehbi Koç (1901-1996), patriarch of one of the wealthiest families in contemporary Turkey, 
displays in his memoirs how transportating goods from Ankara to Istanbul brought him a 
good profit during the war years. Koç, Hayat Hikâyem, 20–21. 
163 For a companion of these literary works, see Deren Van Het Hof, “Erken Dönem Cumhuriyet 
Romanında Zenginler ve Zenginlik,” 81-106.  
164 For a representative story, see Alus, Harp Zengininin Gelini. 
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war.165 The critique targeting the lifestyle of this wealthy class was different 
than the early criticisms in the Tanzimat era, however. A new narrative of 
treason and social destruction replaced stories of individual destruction as a 
result of over-Westernization.166 According to Akın, war profiteers and their 
ways of acquiring wealth created a tension that would eventually result in the 
“loss of legitimacy” of state authority; indeed, public criticism targeting “in-
justice” curbed the war effort.167 
Strikingly, as discussed in chapter 2, most contemporary writers ap-
proached the problem of war profiteering as a problem of morality, thus mak-
ing it part of a discussion of moral decline instead of considering the role of 
politics in the rise of profiteering. This is further evidence that political and 
social discontent was translated and melted into the discourse of morality. In 
fact, a similar tendency was evident in other belligerent countries, as well. 
For example, Jean-Louis Robert discusses the association of immorality with 
profiteering in his study of wartime caricatures. He argues that wartime cari-
cature “redefined the internal social order” through contrasting, moralized 
images. 
In different ways and at different times they arrayed home versus the 
front; city versus countryside; men versus women; consumers versus 
merchants; munitions makers versus the rest; the nouveau riche ver-
sus the ordinary man; as well as the time honoured opposition of 
capital and labour. Most of these images focus on the question of 
consumption, and the shortages of basic commodities which affected 
different groups in different ways. This is not surprising, since it is 
precisely what the readership experienced. But if this evidence rein-
forces our sense of material grievance, it also provides good grounds 
                                                      
165 Leyla and her family in Yakup Kadri’s Sodom ve Gomore is a perfect example of this 
typology. See Karaosmanoğlu, Sodom ve Gomore. 
166 Deren Van Het Hof, “Erken Dönem Cumhuriyet Romanında Zenginler ve Zenginlik,” 96. 
167 Akın, “War Profiteers.”  
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for concluding that the Great War crystallized a set of moral codes, 
which can be seen in the popular press.168 
The immoral imagery of Ottoman war profiteers can be evaluated within this 
framework. During the war, a moralizing rhetoric was often employed as a 
way to express social inequalities. Novels and popular works displaying such a 
moral dichotomy dominated Turkish literature for decades after the war dem-
onstrating that the collective memory of the war was shaped by this moral-
ized imagery of wartime inequalities. The profiteers were represented in the 
collective memory as being morally lax and having degenerate values. 
                                                      
168 Robert, “The Image of the Profiteer,” 132. 
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Figure 3.3 “The World of the Nouveau Riche” as depicted in Sedad Simavi’s 
cartoon album. (Yeni Zenginler/Les Néo-Riches, Istanbul, 1918 (rep. Adam 
Yayıncılık, ed. Turgut Çeviker, 1993)). 
3.4.3  Entertainment and Leisure: Between Moral Control and Finan-
cial Profit 
A closer look at the regulation of entertainment venues (lubiyyat mahalleri) 
during the First World War presents a complex story in which several factors 
played a role. Besides religiously-motivated objections, entertainment venues 
were subject to concerns over urban control and social order as these venues 
posed a potential threat to the political and cultural order.169 On the other 
                                                      
169 Jens Hanssen discusses this argument focusing on Beirut, see Hanssen, "Public Morality and 
Marginality in Fin de siècle Beirut," 201. Nurçin İleri also discusses this point in her study: 
“Entertainment venues and other public places such as Turkish baths or printing houses were 
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hand, the approach of the Ottoman state regarding these venues was prag-
matic, as they constituted a significant source of revenue for the treasury. 
The war added new dynamics to this ambivalent approach towards enter-
tainment venues.170 
While war profiteers were enjoying their time in the Pera Palace Hotel or 
in the Hotel Tokatlıyan, cinemas and theaters constituted the main locations 
of mass entertainment for the lower classes during the war. As discussed in 
this study, the means of entertainment in these venues attracted criticism 
with respect to their role in moral decline. During the war, a new critique 
emerged from nationalist sensibilities that such places distracted people’s at-
tention from the war and contributed to a lack of interest in the future of the 
nation. Therefore, a formulation combining moral and financial interests 
emerged during the war by which private entrepreneurs were levied with 
heavy taxes and semi-government war relief organizations were encouraged 
to collect revenues through nationalist shows. Also, owing to the abolition of 
capitulations, venues formerly belonging to foreign companies became sub-
ject to Ottoman law, and thus taxes could be imposed on them.171 However, 
as shown in the following pages, regulated content and nationalist shows did 
not bring in the anticipated income due to lack of public interest. The ideal 
of creating “respectable popular leisure activities”172 thus conflicted with fi-
nancial interests. 
The war relief semi-government war relief organizations, namely, the So-
ciety for National Defense (Müdâfaa-i Millîye Cemiyeti), the Naval Society 
(Donanma Cemiyeti), and the Red Crescent (Hilâl-i Ahmer), considered en-
tertainment as a source of income in addition to being a tool to make war 
propaganda. As Özbek argues, these aid organizations constituted a “political 
                                                      
considered as ‘habitats of crime’ because the rebels and criminals could blend in public in these 
venues.” İleri, “A Nocturnal History of Fin de Siécle Istanbul,” 207.  
170 For a brief assessment of the topic in Turkish, see Oğuz, “Millî Mesele ve Maddî Gereksinim 
Arasında: Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Eğlence Yerlerini Düzenleme Çabaları.” 
171 BOA. DH.MTV. 35/7 1333 S 04 (22 December 1914). 
172 I borrowed this term from Jens Hanssen. Hanssen, "Public Morality and Marginality in Fin de 
Siècle Beirut," 198.  
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public sphere” that emerged from an attempt of the CUP government “to 
direct civic activity and public enthusiasm towards the nationalist and milita-
rist policy concerns of the party.”173 The first pamphlet of the Naval Society 
advertising coming theater shows clearly indicated this political agenda un-
derlying the entertainment: “We found a new way for people who want to 
help the Naval Society… Thanks to this initiative [of establishing a theater], 
the Society will not only receive financial support. This initiative will also 
contribute our people in social and national aspects [and] – with due respect 
– perhaps teach them great lessons.”174 While these institutions were exempt 
from special taxes, other entertainment companies were subject to a 10 per-
cent tax transferred to the budget for the Poorhouse (Darülaceze).175 During 
the war, in order to guarantee this important source of revenue, the police 
were charged with monitoring tickets sales and issuing bans if the venues re-
fuse to pay the taxes for the Poorhouse.176 In addition to the Poorhouse tax, 
all the tickets were subject to a stamp duty for Hedjaz Railways (Hicaz 
Demiryolları) with a value of twenty para.177 Through the end of the war, 
new taxes were introduced for the tickets of cinemas, theaters, concerts, 
proms, horse races, and similar activities as the state expenses increased due 
to the war.178 As indicated in an archival document, the Ottoman govern-
ment undertook similar financial measures as other belligerent countries and 
collected taxes on pleasure and joy (zevk-ü keyf) rather than vital needs 
                                                      
173 Özbek, “Defining the Public Sphere during the Late Ottoman Empire,” 801–807. 
174 Sevengil, Türk Tiyatrosu Tarihi: Meşrutiyet Tiyatrosu, 227. 
175 BOA. DH. UMVM. 116/40 1335 Ca 20 (13 April 1917). During Ramadan, when nighttime 
became particularly active, inspectors of the Poorhouse visited the theaters themselves and 
collected this revenue on a daily basis, see Yıldırım, İstanbul Darülaceze Müessesesi Tarihi, 
124.  
176 BOA. BEO 4482/336127 1335 Za 11 (28 September 1917). 
177 Apart from these taxes there were also license tax, stamp tax, and a tax issued by the Ottoman 
Public Debt Administration (Düyun-u Umumiye). An actor, Burhaneddin Bey submitted a 
petition to the Ministry of the Interior Affairs regarding the excessive taxation of theaters, and 
he wrote that these taxes were the main obstacle to the development of local theater initiatives 
because they were only imposed on local companies. Yıldırım, Istanbul Darülaceze Müesse-
sesi Tarihi, 124.  
178 BOA. A.) DVN. MKL. 64/27 06.04.1918. 
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(ihtiyacât-ı hakikiyye). While small enterprises were hit by heavy taxation, 
war relief institutions enjoyed the opportunity to offer “legitimate” enter-
tainment.179 
Entertainment venues became subject to morality debates in two re-
spects: first, moral instruction and war propaganda through entertainment, 
and second, the elimination of content that violated public morality and 
sparked public protest. War relief entertainment, however, did not appeal to 
public taste. The masses did not frequent the highly intellectual moral in-
struction shows. Initially, these organizations sought to save the entertain-
ment industry from vulgar shows by replacing them with moral and educa-
tional shows; however, they soon realized that they had to win popular 
approval to make profit. To increase revenues, it became apparent that the 
shows had to appeal to a broad audience which meant compromising enlight-
ening ideals and moral instruction through entertainment. 
When the Ottoman Fine Arts School (Dârülbedâyi) was established in 
1914, there was enthusiasm among intellectuals who hoped to educate masses 
through entertainment. Abdullah Cevdet celebrated the arrival of André An-
toine, who came to Istanbul to establish Dârülbedâyi’s theater organization 
saying: “Our friends told us that this country needs many things before thea-
ters. We can’t prohibit entertainment in society, but we can save our people 
from dirty, ugly, and vulgar entertainment venues and take them to the foot 
of the theater stage which teaches high ideals.”180 The first play staged in 
Dârülbedâyi was Emile Fabre’s La Maison d’Argile (Çürük Temel), a family 
drama allegorically referring to the dissolving Empire. All the revenues of the 
shows were transferred to the Women’s Society for Soldiers’ Families (Asker 
Ailelerine Yardımcı Hanımlar Cemiyeti). However, after being staged a few 
times, the hall remained empty because spectators were not interested. In-
stead, improvisational plays (tulûat kumpanyası), and comedies were attract-
                                                      
179 It is possible to find letters from theater directors from distant provinces such as Basra 
complaining that they are unable to run their companies anymore because of the heavy taxes, 
BOA. DH. H. 1332.4.27 17/40 (25 March 1914).  
180 Quoted in: Sevengil, Türk Tiyatrosu Tarihi: Meşrutiyet Tiyatrosu, 182. 
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ing spectators.181 Therefore, organizers of war relief entertainment found a 
middle road by performing comedies immediately after national and histori-
cal dramas.182 
The quality of shows staged in these institutions attracted intellectual 
criticism due to their lack of moral instruction. Muhsin Ertuğrul, who was 
among the leading theater and cinema figures in the late Ottoman and early 
Republican era, had to leave his job in Dârülbedâyi as a consequence of the 
conflict between profitable and educational plays. In 1918, he wrote in 
Temaşa journal – a journal that was published by intellectuals who opposed 
the vulgar war relief entertainment – and asserted that moral and social plays 
are not popular in society; therefore, these plays are not profitable.183 He 
commented that theaters should help increase morality and educate society, 
and he complained that in order to a make profit, plays served only the pur-
pose of attracting popular attention, thus decreasing the quality of the art. 
In addition to intellectual reflections on the impact of entertainment on 
morality, there were also bureaucratic and military perspectives that focused 
on regulation from the viewpoint of protecting public morality. The fore-
most issue that deserves attention is censorship. At the beginning of the war, 
the Ottoman High Command (Başkumandanlık Vekâleti) published Instruc-
tion on Censorship (Sansür Tâlimâtnâmesi) consisting of sixty-one articles 
that brought about heavy censorship of the press and personal mail, as well as 
theater plays and cinema films.184 Accordingly, censorship centers were estab-
lished in all important cities and these places would be responsible for the 
elimination of “harmful” content, particularly that curbing war efforts and 
affecting the morale of the Ottoman people.185 However, censorship of thea-
                                                      
181 Ibid. 
182 Ozansoy, Darülbedayi Devrinin Eski Günlerinde, 55. 
183 Ertuğrul Muhsin, “Garpta Tiyatroculuk, Bizde Tiyatroculuk,” 5.  
184 Turgut, “I. Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı Posta Sansürü.” 
185 Ibid. Gizem Tongo Overfield Shaw directed my attention to this transcribed, simplified 
version of “Instruction of Censorship” which can be found online: Türk Filatelli Akademisi, 
1330 (1914) Senesinde Selimiye Askerî Matbaada Basılan ‘Sansür Talimatnamesi,’ last modi-
fied October 22, 2016, http://turkfilateliakademisi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/sansur.pdf. 
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ter plays was the subject of several debates. On February 23, 1915, the Otto-
man High Command sent a general decree to all provinces announcing that 
the police would be in charge of censoring theater plays instead of the mili-
tary.186 This decision was taken upon an incident that were considered as a 
“negligent” act of the Beyoğlu Military Censorship Commission (Beyoğlu 
Askerî Sansür Heyeti) who approved a play titled Great Vartan in Armenian 
in which the battles of ancient Armenia were staged. The decree announced 
that due to the heavy workload of military censorship offices, and given the 
extraordinary circumstances of war, for the sake of public morals, security, 
and the safety of the state, theater plays (especially non-Turkish ones) were to 
be investigated by the police.187 
After charging the police with censorship, the Chief Police Department 
started preparations to regulate entertainment venues. In 1916, the Ministry 
of the Interior Affairs issued a detailed “Regulation of Theatres, Cinemas, 
Café Chantants and Outdoor Performances.”188 Among the sixty articles of 
regulation, there were also the ones dealing with the issue of public morality. 
The regulation stipulated the ban of theater plays that could offend the relig-
ions or ethnicities of the Ottoman people for that could harm national values 
and public morality. In the third part – on Café Chantants, musical coffee 
houses, and concert cafés – it was stated that women singers and actresses 
were not allowed to show up or dance in the presence of customers. Adoles-
cents younger than eighteen and students in uniform were not allowed to 
enter these places. Other types of entertainment, such as horse and tightrope 
acrobatic shows, circuses, storytelling shows, and puppet theaters, were re-
quired to obtain a license from the police. Street performances and tent thea-
ters were only allowed if the venues were sufficiently close to a fire station 
and police department. However, to my knowledge, this regulation did not 
get implemented during the war, at least not officially. Corroborating this 
assumption, the last document I came across, dated March 24, 1918, was cor-
respondence by the Ministry of the Interior to the Council of State asserting 
                                                      
186 BOA. DH. EUM. 5. Şb. 9/51 1333 R 07 (22 February 1915). 
187 Ibid.  
188 BOA. DH.EUM. 6. Şb. 38/12 1336 Ş 18 (29 May 1918). 
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the urgency of the approval of the regulation “for the sake of discipline and 
order.”189 
The regulation prepared by the Ministry of the Interior Affairs was the re-
sult of a long process during which local police quarters were interviewed and 
measures that were being implemented in other European countries were re-
viewed.190 In contrast to this meticulous preparation, orders directly issued by 
Enver Paşa, the Minister of War, attempted to bring harsh and more imme-
diate measures. On February 5, 1918, Enver Paşa sent an order to the Minis-
try of the Interior Affairs regarding excessive advertisement of entertain-
ment in the Ottoman press and on street posters. 
In order not to break our soldiers’ endurance to withstand the diffi-
culties of war, from now on the Ottoman press is neither allowed to 
publish any advertisement in newspapers or for distribution on the 
streets that promotes pleasure, extravagancy, and luxury; nor any ad-
vertisement for entertainment, theaters, cinemas, concerts, songs or 
feasts except for ones sponsored by war institutions and for war relief. 
These kinds of advertisements can only be displayed inside the enter-
tainment venues. Secondly, those who do not comply with this order 
shall be prosecuted by the military courts.191 
The General Police Department replied and asserted that to prosecute these 
people, the Council of Ministers had to approve the decision; moreover, it 
was impossible to ban all advertisements for luxury. Enver Paşa answered this 
                                                      
189 Ibid. “nizamnâme lâyihalarının bir çok seneden beri tedkikatı şûra-yı müşarûnileyhce icra 
edilememesine ve esâsen inzibatî birer mâhiyeti haiz olan mezkur nizamnâmelerin bir an 
evvel mevki-i tatbike adem-i vazî memleketin inzibatına sûî te’sir icra eylemekte 
bulunmasına binâen...” 
190 The ministry asked the opinions of local police regarding the feasibility of regulations, see 
BOA. DH.EUM.MEM 72/29 1334 S 24 (1 January 1916). The Ministry of Interior Affairs 
asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send examples of regulations being implemented in 
other countries such as Bulgaria, Sweden, and Austria, see BOA. DH.EUM.VRK 29/8 1336 Za 
14 (21 August 1918); DH.EUM.VRK 29/7 1336 Za 13 (20 August 1918); and DH.EUM.VRK 
29/3 1336 L 25 (3 August 1918). 
191 BOA. DH.EUM.6.Şb. 31/29 1336 Ca 05 (18 Mart 1918). See Appendix B, Quotation 3. 
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with another letter agreeing about the procedure yet urging the police to real-
ize the measure: “Therefore, I ask the Police Department to investigate these 
cases [to be transferred to the Council]. Advertisements of items that are not 
among vital and natural needs, such as those published by costume houses 
and beauty rooms (tuvalet ve zarâfethâneler) to attract customers, can be 
counted among luxuries.”192 Eventually, on March 4, 1918, the military or-
dered that all cinemas and photography shops in and near Istanbul to obtain 
a license from the intelligence division of Military Headquarters in Istanbul 
(Karargâh-ı Umûmî İstihbârat Şûbesi).193 This case demonstrates that leading 
figures of the Ottoman military were aware that during a war, violations of 
public morality in the sense of excessive entertainment and consumption, 
shattered the spirit of collectivity. 
As shown, regulating entertainment venues during the First World War 
had several purposes besides protecting public morality, such as making 
propaganda and collecting revenue. A remarkable point at the intersection of 
these aims was bureaucratic and military approaches to content that violated 
public morality were closely associated with concerns for public order and 
national unity. While the government was able to take more effective meas-
ures to regulate entertainment venues owing to the abolition of capitulations 
and by resorting to military measures, other factors – mainly the generation 
of income through entertainment – conflicted with the project of refine-
ment the content of mass entertainment. 
3.4.4  Gambling and Drinking: The Mother of All Vices and Taxes 
The dilemma between regulatory measures and financial interests was re-
vealed in debates over alcohol and gambling, as well. Starting in the seven-
teenth century and continuing throughout Ottoman history, there were 
                                                      
192 “Herhalde bu memnu’iyet ahkâmının Istanbul polis müdüriyeti umûmîsince tâ’kib ve ? 
te’minini istirham ederim. Zarûrî ve tabii ihtiyaçlar sırasında olmayan ilânlar ezcümle tuvalet 
ve zerâfethânelerin müşteri celbine müteâlik reklamları müzeyyinattan mâdûd olabilir.” Ibid. 
This, I believe, also shows a tension between the military and bureaucratic authorities on the 
legislation procedures.  
193 BOA. DH. EUM. VRK 28/51 1336 C 4 (17 March 1918). 
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many attempts to ban alcohol or limit its sale. Such measures specifically tar-
geted Muslim drinkers, because as Georgeon states “a drinking Muslim,” af-
ter all, would find himself in places where non-Muslim communities social-
ized thus constituted a threat to Ottoman order founded on the separation of 
ethno-religious communities.194 According to Kırlı, “taverns were entrapped 
by a vicious circle,” “…. While they were closed down on the basis of ‘dete-
riorating public morality,’ they were reopened since state finances could not 
bear the burden of being deprived of the tax revenue generated from alco-
holic beverages.”195 
A brief history of attempts to regulate alcohol consumption in the nine-
teenth century confirms the argument regarding the association of public 
order with public morality. For instance, the 1858 Ottoman Penal Code and 
the 1858 Streets Regulations stipulated that drinking was to be punished only 
when it caused serious disturbances to public peace, morality, and security.196 
In several other regulations, similar anxieties associating public morality and 
public order are evident. In 1862, a new regulation was issued titled “Regula-
tions on Alcoholic Beverages” (Müskirât Nizamnâmesi) and concentrated on 
the spatial organization of alcohol-selling businesses.197 In 1878, new taxes 
were introduced on coffeehouses, casinos, and alcohol selling places. In his 
attempt to emphasize Islam and Islamic principles, Abdülhamid II limited the 
amount that shops or places serving alcohol could sell.198 In 1912, a new 
regulation was issued regarding the opening hours of places selling alcohol.199 
Taxes from such establishments greatly contributed to municipal budgets, as 
well. As Hanssen states, over a quarter of the annual income for the munici-
                                                      
194 Georgeon, "Ottomans and Drinkers," 14. 
195 Kırlı, “The Struggle over Space,” 58. 
196 İleri, “A Nocturnal History of Fin de Siécle Istanbul,” 232. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Hanssen, "Public Morality and Marginality in Fin-de-siècle Beirut," 200. 
199 Ibid., 203. Closing hours were particularly important with regard to regulations on alcohol 
consumption and the reorganization of entertainment venues. Nurçin İleri asserts that attempts 
of authorities to close the venues on time stemmed from their assumption that a strict closing 
hour regulation would preserve the balance between morality and modernity. İleri, “A Noc-
turnal History of Fin de Siécle Istanbul,” 208. 
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pal budget of Beirut in 1913 came from taxes on petrol, alcohol, and gam-
bling.200 
A closer look at prohibitive measures shows that they were far from effec-
tive. Along with financial interests, the factor of “resistance of drinkers” con-
tributed to the failure of prohibitive projects.201 Although alcohol was strictly 
prohibited by Islam and labeled the “mother of all vices,” the Ottoman Mus-
lims enjoyed alcoholic spirits quite in a liberal fashion. As Matthee indicates, 
alcohol consumption paradoxically “always played a surprisingly important 
role in male elite circles in the Middle East.”202 Until the nineteenth century, 
this habit was “hidden” from the public. Starting in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, alcohol consumption was embraced by the Ottoman 
Muslim elite as “an indicator of the modern lifestyle.”203 This allowed relig-
ious critics to label alcohol consumption the result of “over-westernization” 
and to identify it with the decline of Muslim morality. This moralistic dis-
course was later reinforced by the rise of a medical discourse against alco-
hol.204 
Starting in the nineteenth century, both prohibitive and liberal discourses 
regarding alcohol had political and cultural implications. Embracing such 
habits or rejecting them constituted the basis for discussions about percep-
tions of European civilization. In religiously-motivated circles, prohibitive 
discourses on alcohol served the purpose of establishing moral authority.205 In 
                                                      
200 Hanssen, "Public Morality and Marginality in Fin-de-siècle Beirut," 201. 
201 Georgeon, "Ottomans and Drinkers," 10. 
202 Matthee, “Alcohol in the Islamic Middle East,” 112. 
203 Georgeon, “Ottomans and Drinkers,” 16-17.  
204 Ibid. 
205 The topic still sparks widespread political and ideological debate in contemporary Turkey. 
Growing interference of the government into private lives motivated by regenerating the 
population as well as reviving an Islamic discourse have served to strengthen what I call the 
“moral polarization” between the two different sides. On the topic, see Karaömerlioğlu, 
“Nüfus Mühendisliğinden Gezi Parkı Direnişine.” 
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this respect, the morality discourse went hand in hand with the contest over 
the public space.206 
Critiques of alcohol consumption in the early modern Ottoman Empire 
used the “calamity” argument to ban alcohol in the Empire. During the Tan-
zimat era, consuming alcohol became affiliated with being civilized and cul-
turally open to progress, though by the end of the nineteenth century, a 
strong medical argument accompanied the religious objections. Following 
the war, when Istanbul was occupied in 1920, Allied military authorities used 
“chaotic and unruly nature of Istanbul at night” and the “protection of pub-
lic morality” to justify their interventions in the city.207 The Ankara govern-
ment prohibited alcohol in 1920 as a consequence of “an unanticipated un-
ion of traditional populists (and Islamists) from the İkinci Grup (who 
advocated prohibition on religious and moral grounds) and medical and pub-
lic health officials (equipped with medical and social science).”208 Later on, in 
Kemalist Turkey, alcohol consumption reemerged “as an even more promi-
nent marker of Turkey’s status as a Western and modern nation-state.”209 
On the issue of the war and alcohol, Ahmed Emin held up the gradual in-
crease in rakı production – which doubled from 1914 to 1917 – as an indica-
tor of moral decline.210 On the other hand, the government also benefited (or 
attempted to benefit) from the consumption of alcohol, particularly during 
the war. On July 8, 1915, the Ottoman government introduced a tax tariff to 
be imposed on mail and telegrams as well as on tobacco and alcohol in order 
to fund the establishment of scientific and industrial institutions for the edu-
                                                      
206 For instance, during the Gezi Events in 2013, raising a glass became a form of protest against 
prohibitive measures. For discussion on how alcohol consumption became politicized in this 
context, see Evered and Evered, “From Rakı to Ayran.” 
207 MacArthur-Seal, “Intoxication and Imperialism,” 300. 
208 Evered and Evered, “From Rakı to Ayran,” 43. In addition, this measure also curbed the 
interests of non-Muslim alcohol sellers. As the law eliminated most private enterprises, it also 
served the purpose of establishing a state monopoly (tekel) on alcohol. See Karahanoğulları, 
Birinci Meclisin İçki Yasağı (Men-i Müskirat Kanunu). 
209 Ibid., 44.  
210 Yalman, Turkey in the World War, 242–243. 
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cation of children of martyrs (evlâd-ı şühedâ).211 Whether a dispute over the 
moral dilemma of using alcohol taxes to support the children of martrys’ 
would have broken out in the parliament is unclear because it was not con-
vening when the government passed this law. 
In the Ottoman parliament, the imposing of taxes on playing cards, for 
instance, had led to a discussion on whether the priority of the government 
should be to protect public morality or to collect regular but small tax 
amounts on such items to benefit the budget. On December 17, 1917, draft 
legislation on the taxation of playing cards was discussed among Ottoman 
parliamentarians.212 The proposed draft stipulated a five kuruş tax on each 
pack of cards. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, the deputy from Karahisarı Sahib, argued that 
the state should not rely on such revenues, otherwise “public morality would 
be under a serious threat.”213 He proposed that the government should adopt 
a “prohibitive” approach regarding gambling and increase the tax to 50 kuruş 
in order to fight against what, according to him had become an “epidemic 
disease” in the country. 214 After him, Şeyh Saffet Efendi, the deputy from 
Urfa, took the floor and proposed to increase the tax to 100 kuruş because, 
“according to the Ottoman Constitution, the religion of the state is Islam.” 
Thus above this constitution there was a “holy constitution” – that is, the 
Quran – which explicitly prohibits Muslims from gambling. As his title indi-
cates, he was a cleric. For him the Ottoman Empire was the land of “the 
Great Caliphate of Islam,” so the government had to respect divine orders 
and take steps to correct public morality. He argued that the draft was not 
intended to discourage gambling; instead, it benefit from it through taxes. 
                                                      
211 “Madde 4: 5 Ağustos 1328 tarihli kanunun altıncı maddesi mucibince rakılardan alınmakta 
olan harb vergisinin bir misli (evvelce resm-i mirisi verilmiş olduğu halde mevcud bulunan 
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Düstur, "Evlâd-ı Şühedânın Ta'lim ve Terbiyesiçün Vücuda Getirilecek Mü'essesat Mesarifine 
Muktezî Vâridat Hakkında Kanun-u Muvakkat," Vol. 1, No. 7, 642–643. 
212 MMZC, Term 3 Vol. 4 Year: 1, 19.  
213 Ibid. “Devlet makinesinin çevrilmesi için bir memba gibi telakki edilirse, o vakit ahlâk-ı 
umûmîyye gayet vahim bir tehlikeye maruz kalır ve elbette ki memleket ve devlet, esas iti-
bariyle böyle bir vergiyi kabul etmez.” 
214 Ibid. “Sari bir hastalık”  
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Following these words, other deputies took the floor and delivered excited 
speeches regarding the protection of public morality while other deputies 
showed sympathy and chanted “Bravo!.” In this enthusiastic atmosphere, 
some deputies proposed increasing the amount of the tax to 500 kuruş per 
pack of cards. On the other hand, some deputies called on the others “to 
leave the discussion of permissible and impermissible (haram-helal),” noting 
that “taxes are also imposed on pork and wine,” and he also received support 
from some deputies.215 Finally, the Minister of Finance, Mehmet Cavit Bey, 
took the floor and gave a speech on the dilemma of the government be-
tween the sake of morality (menfâ’at-i ahlâkiyye) and the sake of economy 
(menfâ’at-i mâliye), particularly with respect to topics related to pleasures 
(mükeyyifat). He argued that prohibitive approaches would pave the way for a 
black market, thus eventually violating yet another ethical rule. After his 
speech, the deputies agreed on the amount of five kuruş for the tax.216 In-
deed, his words explicitly illustrated the moral dilemma of the Ottoman gov-
ernment. 
Ahmed Emin asserts that during the First World War, the Ottoman gov-
ernment passed an anti-gambling law but only enforced it rigidly for a few 
days.217 However, as indicated in the newspaper Tanin, the Ministry of the 
Interior Affairs did not issue a new anti-gambling law. Instead, the office 
merely recirculated what was already stipulated in the Ottoman Penal Code 
regarding gambling and ordered that these cases be taken to the courts.218 
Strikingly, despite some public expectations regarding prohibitive measures 
on gambling, the Ottoman government relied on the discretion of the courts 
to punish gambling. 
                                                      
215 Ibid. Hacı Şefik Bey, Deputy of Istanbul: “Helal, haram bahsine gelince: Domuzdan alınan 
resim de haramdır, şaraptan alınan resim de haramdır. Onlar geçmiş, babam geçmiş!” 
216 Gambling was subject to punishment of up to six months imprisonment and a fine according 
to the 242nd Article of the 1858 Ottoman Penal Code, see İleri, “A Nocturnal History of Fin 
de Siécle Istanbul,” 244. 
217 Yalman, Turkey in the World War, 243. 
218 Tanin, “Kumar Oynayanlar Hakkında,” 31 August 1918. 
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§ 3.5  Concluding Remarks 
This chapter discussed the protection of public morality from political and 
social perspective in the context of the First World War. As shown, anxiety 
over public morality had ramifications beyond a simple rhetoric of prevent-
ing prostitution and controlling sexuality. Particularly on the topic of for-
eigners and immorality, I propose to take the setting of the war and rivalry 
between combatant countries seriously because immorality discourses served 
political and cultural claims. Moreover, some developments such as the aboli-
tion of capitulations and military measures, including the search of private 
houses, banishment, and deportation from martial law territories, constituted 
an opportunity for Ottoman authorities to “clean up” the homefront, espe-
cially in martial law areas. As some cases illustrate, morality was a concrete 
requirement – a condition of eligibility to obtain Ottoman citizenship or 
convert to Islam. 
Years later, the Republic of Turkey would take further measures to keep 
prostitution out of the country. In 1930, the government enacted an aboli-
tionist law on prostitution mandating the deportation of all foreign prosti-
tutes. Nationalist motives were accompanied by critiques that Istanbul was 
the global center for the trafficking of women.219 It is possible to argue that 
the wartime measures mentioned in this study were the early stages of this 
“clean-up campaign” of the 1920s and 1930s designed to increase the pres-
tige and reputation of the country. On the issue of alcohol, again, it was the 
Ankara Government in 1920 prohibiting alcohol. My contention is that the 
First World War was also a transitory period from moral to medical discourse. 
A close look at the topics that fell under the domain of public morality in 
the daily life shows the fault lines in contemporaneous discussions on the 
link between lifestyle and morality. Although these moral encounters 
emerged in the vast context of the nineteenth century, the war constituted a 
peak and intermingling of the national and cultural anxieties. Moreover, 
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177–179. The League of Nations 1927 report on the trafficking of women severely criticized 
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such moral encounters in daily life became the markers of the differences be-
tween rich and poor and combatant and noncombatant. However, attempts 
to protect public morality remained limited due to the financial interests of 
the government vis-à-vis expenditures on pleasure. 
At the end of the war, polemics of moral decline carried yet another po-
litical implication. The dichotomy was not Muslim morality versus European 
morality, but Anatolian versus Istanbulite. For instance, the wartime image 
of immoral Muslim women disappeared and made way for the image of he-
roic Turkish women. The category of “immoral women” was reduced to just 
those women of the Istanbul elite who collaborated with Allied forces. This 
sharp image that established itself through morality deserves further atten-






Family at the Center of Moral Decline: Legislation Tar-
geting the Regeneration and Protection of Ottoman 
Muslim Families 
Bu ahlaksızlığın esbâbını böyle derince 
araştırırsanız ine ine aile içine girersiniz. Ve 
buradaki meşhudâtınıza ağlarsınız. 
–Tüccarzade İbrahim Hilmi, 
Avrupalılaşmak Felâketlerimizin Esbâbı 
uring a visit to my hometown, Sivas, a man whom I met coinciden-
tally, asked what I was studying. I told him the First World War and 
added: “specifically the homefront.” He immediately replied excitedly and 
said, “I know a lot about that!” He continued, “when the war broke out and 
the people heard about the mobilization, men said ‘shoot [kill] all the crip-
pled and one-handed men’.” Not following at first, I asked the reason, and 
he said, “because, only crippled men would remain in the town and the fel-
lows did not want to leave the women to them!” 
D 
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 “Hunger and love are what moves the world.”1 As mass mobilization 
started in the Empire, a population of mainly women, children, and elders 
remained on the homefront. They suffered not only from the absence of 
their breadwinners, but also from the lack of a sense of patriarchal protection. 
The family as an institution was heavily affected by wartime conditions. The 
formidable problem of manpower was accompanied by heavy taxation on 
agricultural products in towns and villages. Amid economic deprivations, the 
Ottoman countryside witnessed a chaotic situation regarding the protection 
of soldiers’ families from sexually exploitation. The absence of the male 
members of the household brought about concern about the involvement of 
soldiers’ female relatives in extramarital sexual activities. As discussed in the 
following pages, this “uncontrolled” environment was referred to as “the 
form of moral decline in rural areas” in the writings of Ottoman intellectuals 
and state elites. The scope of this moral decline surpassed the capacity of ci-
vilian authorities to cope, and the Ottoman government (and military 
authorities) found new ways to deal with the problem. 
I begin my analysis with an overview of the impact of the war on the 
family, contextualizing how family life was affected by wartime circum-
stances but also presenting the background for changing perceptions of the 
family. I then turn to the forms of state intervention in family affairs in 
terms of taking control over sexual relationships that potentially threatened 
the family as an institution. I demonstrate how the wartime legislation that 
targeted the family was driven by moral concerns. Examining gender-related 
aspects of war contributes to the understanding of political developments, 
particularly those related to “civic order.”2 I contend that the turmoil of the 
                                                      
 1 Sigmund Freud quoted these lines of the famous eighteenth-century poet-philosopher Schiller 
as a starting point for his ego-instinct and object-instinct drive theory: “In what was at first 
my utter perplexity, I took as my starting-point a saying of the poet-philosopher, Schiller, that 
‘hunger and love are what moves the world’. Hunger could be taken to represent the instincts 
which aim at preserving the individual; while love strives after objects, and its chief function, 
favoured in every way by nature, is the preservation of the species.” Freud, Civilization and Its 
Discontents, 34.  
 2 I owe this formulation to the work of Elizabeth Thompson in which she casts light on the 
political and social reflections of the gender crisis in terms of authority and identity. In her 
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wartime tested and revealed the vulnerability of once solid, traditional norms 
and values. As the foundations of the old order were shaken, several legisla-
tive attempts were made paving the way for a new understanding of the fam-
ily in which state intervention is legitimate. As a distinctive feature of this 
study, I consider morality discourses and moral concerns as the common 
point behind several legislative attempts. These legislation attempts, which so 
far in the historiography have been elaborated separately, are thus evaluated 
together in a wider framework. First, I focus on the forms of sexual assault 
targeting the female members of soldiers’ families. Given that such cases ex-
plicitly contradicted official war propaganda based on the protection of 
honor and family, the state enacted a provisional law authorizing courts mar-
tial to handle sexual assaults on soldiers’ families. Indeed, this legislation 
marked the beginning of state intervention in the family. However, instead 
of evaluating this intervention as the natural outcome of increasing sexual 
assault cases, I point out the role of individuals – both men and women – in 
shaping the reciprocal relationship between citizens and the state. By holding 
the state accountable for a lack of protection from sexual violence, victims of 
and witnesses to these crimes explicitly asked for further state involvement 
so that the perpetrators be punished in a more effective way. 
The second part of this chapter examines a heretofore unexplored legisla-
tive attempt, the Adultery Bill of 1916, and the debates surrounding it. The 
Adultery Bill was proposed by the Ministry of War to authorize the military 
to police the sexual conduct of “unfaithful” wives. Although this draft was 
not put into force, the endeavor shows the extent of moral considerations 
and the approach of military authorities to the problem of moral decline. I 
examine how the draft law instigated debates on the understanding of moral-
ity crimes, the nature of law, and limits of public and private law. By contex-
tualizing the punishment of such crimes in the Ottoman Empire in Islamic 
                                                      
work, she used the term “civic order” to evaluate a broader context of state-society interaction: 
“The civic order embodies norms and institutions that govern relations among citizens and 
between citizens and the state. It is within the civic order that the terms of citizenship and state 
power are both expressed and continually renegotiated among agents of the formal state appa-
ratus, its unofficial agents, and their clients.” Thompson, Colonial Citizens, 1.  
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Law as well as Sultanic Codes (kanunnames), I show the significance – and 
uniqueness – of such interventions in the history of the empire. 
Finally, I evaluate the Ottoman Family Rights Decree of 1917 as part of 
the growing intervention of the state in the family. Here, my aim is not to 
rewrite the narratives on the widely discussed Family Decree, but establish 
links between references to norms, values, and morality and the justification 
for the law. I argue that discourses on morality and national regeneration 
played an important role in shaping the body of the law. In a way, discourses 
on the need for social reform went hand in hand with arguments about how 
outdated and degenerate were the values that encompassed the family. This 
was a pretext for lifting taboos regarding the privacy of the family and paved 
the way for the introduction of family reform. 
§ 4.1  War and the Family 
Specialized studies have enhanced our understanding on the impacts of the 
First World War on the family as an institution. The First World War trig-
gered long-lasting change as in the perceptions of family, women, and chil-
dren in many combatant countries. Among them, I believe we should also 
consider moral values surrounding family formation and dissolution as well 
as factors that are a menace to family order. In the Ottoman case, the First 
World War served to attach new meanings to the family in terms of defining 
its function within society. The impact of total war also manifested itself in 
patriarchal norms and traditional gender roles in a manner that redefined the 
relationship between individuals and the state. 
The families of soldiers received attention from military and bureaucratic 
authorities in combatant countries. More than anything else, this attention 
derived from the fact that war propaganda during the First World War high-
lighted the protection of women and children more than any other reasons 
were waging war against the enemy. Paradoxically, the absence of their men 
in pursuit of the very same cause left women and children defenseless against 
several forms of violence on the homefront. The gendered aspect of war 
propaganda added to these concerns. As Susan Grayzel put it, “in part be-
cause the war was justified as a defense of women and children, and thus im-
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plicitly of traditional gender roles, there was a good deal of concern about 
how wartime circumstances might alter these.”3 
The initial policies regarding the family were driven by the motive of 
compensation in the absence of breadwinners. In many combatant coun-
tries, special “family aid” measures were introduced in order to support fami-
lies.4 Obviously, the issue of leaving money to the discretion of the women 
went hand in hand with a form of moral control over consumption, putting 
women and adolescents under the microscope of social and political control.5 
During the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman government introduced a provi-
sional law providing family allowance (muinsiz aile maaşı) for the families 
whose sole breadwinners had been conscripted into the army. Aid became 
central to the new Provisional Law on Military Service issued in May 1914 
and affected more families due to the large-scale mobilization.6 By means of 
this aid program, the government financially compensated families for the 
absence of breadwinners, thus establishing a tacit contract with soldiers per-
taining to their sacrifice. Mehmet Beşikçi explains this tacit contract between 
conscripted men and the state as follows:  
1) His and his family’s basic needs were provided by the state in re-
turn for his service; 2) his collaboration with the state increased his 
social status; 3) he was to be assured that the war effort was worth sac-
rificing himself for; 4) the duration and conditions of his military 
                                                      
 3 Grayzel, Women and the First World War, 64. 
 4 On Family Aid in several countries, see Daniel, The War from within; Grayzel, Women’s 
Identities at War; Pedersen, Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State.  
 5 Women and adolescents of conscripted soldiers’ families were constantly under public 
surveillance with regard to their sexuality, their socialization, and their communication with 
the soldiers in the battlefield. Their way of spending Family Aid were subject to a debate 
among the press, police, and several bureaucratic offices. In Germany, some municipalities 
announced that women who spend money for cinema-going would not be eligible to receive 
Family Aid anymore. In Britain, restrictions were put on alcohol consumption, which was 
allegedly spreading among women in reaction to the uncertainties and hardships of wartime. 
See Daniel, The War from within, 143–147; Grayzel, Women and the First World War, 67. 
 6 Van Os, “Taking Care of Soldiers’ Families: The Ottoman State and the Muinsiz Aile Maaşı,” 
96–97; Akın, “The Ottoman Home Front during World War I,” 141–143. 
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service remained unchanged from his initial mobilization. Failure to 
maintain this tacit contract could produce various forms of resistance 
to the mobilization effort.7 
In practice, the allowance was ineffective due to the irregularity of payments, 
as well as bad or unfair treatment of women by provisioning officers (iaşe 
memurları), including the abuses of corrupt officers who took advantage of 
their position to engage in sexual relationships with women in need.8 Both in 
the countryside and in cities there was a sense of increasing prostitution as 
such. When such news arrived to soldiers at the battlefront, desertion became 
an inevitable consequence. In 1917, during the war, the Ministry of War 
mandated the death penalty for officers who caused such incidents for facili-
tating desertion.9 Ahmed Emin describes the situation as follows: “As the 
waves of debauchery behind the front caused heads of families to grow ap-
prehensive for the safety of their homes and to desert the front line, special 
courts-martial were set up to handle the task of safeguarding public morals.”10 
The families of soldiers became more important as the war dragged on. 
The need for their collaboration with the state to continue waging the war 
had significant effects especially with respect to morale on the front. As 
many scholars agree, this era was marked by a new concept of a relationship 
                                                      
 7 See Beşikçi, The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War, 8.  
 8 In villages, the situation worsened as well due to the lack of manpower and the high taxes on 
products, Van Os, “Taking Care of Soldiers’ Families: The Ottoman State and the Muinsiz Aile 
Maaşı,” 102. Akın cites similar stories from first hand accounts of the situation. For instance, 
the local head of the CUP in Giresun wrote that officers were abusing their positions for such 
purposes: “Honor was trampled to satisfy their sensual appetite.” Quoted in: Akın, “The Ot-
toman Home Front during World War I,” 166–168. In his memoirs, İrfan Orga tells how they 
treated families in the revenue office in Istanbul. His mother, after being insulted by the offi-
cers, did not go there to collect the aid and instead sent Orga to receive it. When he went to the 
office, a man who helped him talk to the officer physically abused him. After the incident, none 
among the family members visited the office again. He says the allowance they received was 
anyway not enough to live on due to increasing prices. Orga, Bir Türk Ailesinin Öyküsü, 149–
150. 
 9 Akın, “The Ottoman Home Front during World War I,” 160. 
 10 Yalman, Turkey in the World War, 246. 
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between women and the state. This relationship was more direct than before, 
without husbands or male relatives as intermediaries. According to Grayzel, 
“what made this war such a compelling moment in women history is that it 
provides an opportunity for many women to forge a new relationship with 
their nation-states.”11 In the Ottoman case, Akın argues, attempts of the 
government to relieve the financial burden of families and to protect them 
from various forms of violence resulted in the “transformation of women’s 
identities vis-à-vis the state,” and pave the way for a new direct relationship 
between the state and women in the absence of men.12 Toprak addresses this 
changing relationship vis-à-vis the formation of the nation-state. According 
to Toprak, the war radically changed the perception of women’s role in the 
society due to the need for a female workforce, and this contributed to the 
promotion of the nuclear family as the main component of a national state. 
During the war years, Ottoman society witnessed radical transformation par-
ticularly in the urban context triggered both by the intellectual environment 
of the Young Turk family ideology and Ottoman feminism, as well as by 
wartime social and demographic changes.13 Yet, it is hard to say that the war 
emancipated Muslim women. Traditional gender roles persisted, holding 
women back from achieving equality.14 
The interest in the family in many belligerent countries derived from the 
idea that the family as an institution was on the verge of losing its main 
functions. These functions, according to Daniel, can be defined under two 
headings: a) Physical, psychological, and societal reproduction of people in-
cluding the raising and socialization of children and the reproduction of 
adults in terms of their psychological and physical components, material 
support, psychological stabilization, and sexuality; and b) production and 
                                                      
 11 Grayzel, Women and the First World War, 117. 
 12 Akın, “The Ottoman Home Front during World War I,” 135–136. 
 13 Toprak, “The Family, Feminism, and the State During the Young Turk Period, 1908-1918,” 
441–452. 
 14 For a discussion on the emancipation of women both in early Turkish Republican and 
contemporary contexts, see Kandiyoti, “Emancipated but Unliberated?”; Arat, “From Emanci-
pation To Liberation: The Changing Role of Women in Turkey’s Public Realm.” 
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consumption of food.15 Accordingly, during the war, the reproductive func-
tion of the family decreased, but the consumption and production of goods 
increased. When the balance between reproduction and production was bro-
ken by wartime circumstances, the sole function of the family remained an 
economic one. 
It is my contention that it was exactly this decline in the reproductive 
functions of the family caused by the war, in other words the separa-
tion of many families, the decline in the birth and marriage rates and 
the increase in the number of women who no longer lived either with 
a husband or other family members outlined above, that moved those 
aspects of human coexistence previously situated in the context of 
the family into the arena of the public interest, where they were then 
defined as symptoms of a crisis affecting the entire society.16 
These assumptions are indeed in line with the crisis of paternity cited at the 
beginning of this study. However, in the Ottoman Empire interest in the 
family had wider implications transcending discussions on the basic func-
tions of the family. Owing to strict moral codes along with religious approba-
tion, all forms of man-woman encounters in both the private and public 
sphere were scrutinized within a larger perspective of the family institution. 
In the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, family be-
came a major point of interest in the Ottoman press.17 Debates on family 
included references to a so-called family crisis (aile buhranı) which encom-
passed morality discourses. Cem Behar and Alan Duben considers the family 
crisis spoken of by Ottoman intellectuals as a “cultural crisis” following the 
emergence of the nuclear family.18 According to them, even though domestic 
gender roles were not radically changed, traditional elites in society and their 
distinctive way of living (konak life) were undermined by the formation of a 
                                                      
 15 Daniel, The War from within, 127. 
 16 Ibid., 138.  
 17 Toprak, Türkiye’de Popülizm, 264. 
 18 Duben and Behar, Istanbul Households. 
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new wealthy class – that is war profiteers.19 Başak Tuğ argues that the point of 
departure for the family crisis debate among Ottoman intellectuals was not 
the transformation from large to nuclear families, but instead was the indi-
vidualistic, loose family ties in Ottoman society.20 Toprak’s studies show that 
the main agenda of reformist intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp was to pro-
mote the nuclear family model among Ottoman Muslim families. They at-
tributed a great role to morality in their vision of the national family (millî 
aile) model.21  
In a way, the concerns over family in the context of the war had wider 
implications for the maintainenance of the collective effort dedicated to mo-
bilization. These implications extended to a broader framework of sexuality 
transcending the borders of the family as an institution per se. To illuminate 
this point further, I should note that the concept of “soldiers’ family” refers 
not to family as an institution, but to family members, particularly to the 
women of the family.22 Therefore, the central issue was their sexuality and 
sexual encounters on the homefront. 
4.1.1  Contextualizing State Intervention in Sexual Violence, Rape, 
and Assaults in the Ottoman Empire 
According to Islamic Law, relationships out of wedlock are considered acts of 
adultery (zina, or in Ottoman word fi’il-i şen’i). Adultery aside, the punish-
ment for rape and similar acts is not defined clearly among the hadd.23 Ac-
                                                      
 19 Ibid., 200–201. 
 20 Tuğ, “The Claims on Modernity and Tradition,” 99. 
 21 Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935), 14–16; Toprak, Türkiye’de 
Popülizm, 263–264. 
 22 Nicole van Os reminded me that such uses of the term family usually refer to women. I should 
also add that while in contemporary Turkish the word tecavüz means rape, in the Ottoman 
context it meant “crossing the lines” and violating the rights of someone else. For the diction-
ary meaning of the word, see Sami, Kâmûs-î Türkî, 481. 
 23 See Oxford Islamic Studies Online for the definition hadd in Islam: “Limit or prohibition; pl. 
hudud. A punishment fixed in the Quran and hadith for crimes considered to be against the 
rights of God. The six crimes for which punishments are fixed are theft (amputation of the 
hand), illicit sexual relations (death by stoning or one hundred lashes), making unproven accu-
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cordingly, rape (ırza geçme or hetk-i ırz) was considered under the heading of 
adultery, yet courts had discretionary power (ta’zir) to determine the pun-
ishment.24 There were three types of punishment for adultery: one hundred 
lashes, banishment, and stoning to death.25 In the Ottoman Empire, the 
kanunnames (Sultanic Codes) of Sultans Mehmed II, Beyazıd II, Süleyman I, 
and Selim I supplemented Islamic Law with respect to rape crimes, and issued 
different punishments of the act.26 For instance, a case study from the town 
of Balıkesir in the seventeenth century shows that adultery was generally 
punished with banishment.27 Only in the 1858 Ottoman Penal Code, which 
was the first penal code in the modern sense, were crimes of adultery subject 
to standardized punishments.28 This code differed from the kanunnames 
since the law applied to everyone, while the previous codes defined punish-
ments based on whether the crime was committed by Muslims or Non-
Muslims, slaves or free people.29 Articles 197-200 of the 1858 Penal Code was 
reserved for the gender violence cases, rape, and crimes against morality.30 
The punishment of the crime of rape was hard labor. If the victim was a vir-
gin, the perpetrator had to pay recompense in addition to doing hard labor 
                                                      
sations of illicit sex (eighty lashes), drinking intoxicants (eighty lashes), apostasy (death or 
banishment), and highway robbery (death). Strict requirements for evidence (including eye-
witnesses) have severely limited the application of hudud penalties. Punishment for all other 
crimes is left to the discretion of the court; these punishments are called ta’zir.” “Hadd - Ox-
ford Islamic Studies Online.” On the discussion of hadd and zina, see Sonbol, “Rape and Law 
in Ottoman and Modern Egypt,” 214–232. 
 24 Dönmezer, Ceza Hukuku, 31–32. For prophetic and sectarian traditions of punishment in zina 
cases, see Sonbol, “Rape and Law in Ottoman and Modern Egypt,” 215–219. 
 25 Konan, “Osmanlı Hukukunda Tecavüz Suçu,” 152–155. 
 26 Ibid., 157–162. Semerdjian, “Gender Violence in Kanunnames and Fetvas of the Sixteenth 
Century,” 180–197. 
 27 Yağcı, “Osmanlı Taşrasında Kadına Yönelik Cinsel Suçlarda Adalet Arama Geleneği,” 51–81. 
 28 Konan, “Osmanlı Hukukunda Tecavüz Suçu,” 162–163; Dönmezer, Umumı Adab ve Aile 
Nizamı Aleyhinde Cürümler, 27–28.  
 29 Konan, “Osmanlı Hukukunda Tecavüz Suçu,” 168. This aspect of law was also discussed in the 
case of Egypt, see Sonbol, “Rape and Law in Ottoman and Modern Egypt,” 225.  
 30 For a transliterated version of the articles, see Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı 
Hukuku Külliyatı, 864–866.  
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sentence. The severity of the punishment increased if the victim was a minor 
or if the perpetrator was among family members who were supposedly 
guardians of the victim. If the perpetrator was a state officer, he was fired 
from his position immediately. If the crime of rape was committed together 
with other crimes such as homicide, banditry, or theft, the punishment be-
came more severe: a life-long sentence of hard labor or the death penalty.31 
In the course of the nineteenth century, several supplementary articles were 
appended to this part of the Penal Code. 
The Ottoman Penal Code of 1858 was inspired by the French Code of 1810. 
An historian of comparative law, Sulhi Dönmezer, points out that as a gen-
eral principle of lawmaking throughout the nineteenth century, state inter-
vention in private affairs and family relationships was considered “unneces-
sary” because it was perceived that such interventions would further 
deteriorate family order and peace.32 For him this principle explains the rea-
son for the limited number of articles devoted to sexual violence, violating 
morality, and family-related crimes in the penal code. Accordingly, from the 
second half of the eighteenth century to the First World War, philosophy 
prevailed and a strong reaction against the intervention of law in the sphere 
of individual morality developed. As a consequence, the list of morality 
crimes remained limited in the penal codes of the time since most were con-
sidered crimes without victims or harmless to the state. Even though strict 
legislation stipulated punishments for immorality in Britain and its colonies, 
the individualist mentality was particularly evident in the French Penal Code 
of 1810. Only acts violating the freedom of another individual or those 
openly inciting public morality were punished. However, the First World War 
was a watershed event that marked the beginning of a new understanding 
for the punishment of morality crimes and crimes against family.33 Especially 
crimes against the family constituted an essential part of several penal codes 
after the war. While some, such as the Italian Penal Code of 1931, greatly 
                                                      
 31 Konan, “Osmanlı Hukukunda Tecavüz Suçu,” 162–166; Dönmezer, Umumi Adab ve Aile 
Nizamı Aleyhinde Cürümler, 27–28. 
 32 Dönmezer, Ceza Hukuku, 19–21.  
 33 Dönmezer, Umumi Adab ve Aile Nizamı Aleyhinde Cürümler, 20–28.  
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stressed such acts, more liberal codes such as that of the Swiss kept the list of 
morality crimes limited. The redefinition of crimes against morality and 
family derived from the wartime developments because of which the previ-
ous approaches toward the limits of private sphere were transformed. Also, 
new offenses were added to the penal code such as abandonment of the fam-
ily. According to Dönmezer, this was due to intense migration in the after-
math of the First World War that resulted in the separation of many spouses. 
He added that the war opened a path to the return of patriarchy leading to 
further state intervention to the family.34 “Saving the family” by establishing 
severe penalties became a matter for the state (especially for Fascist govern-
ments) as a result of the war. 
What transpired during the First World War was that both the code and 
its application vis-à-vis gender violence were insufficient in a time of tur-
moil. The war shook the foundation of what had been considered private up 
to then. Not only in the Ottoman Empire and republican Turkey, but also in 
many other countries, the First World War opened a new page on the pun-
ishment of acts against public morality and crimes against family. Specifi-
cally, crimes against family constituted an essential part of several penal 
codes after the war due to the concern about population decline.35 I suggest 
reconsidering the Ottoman state’s and military’s intervention in this private 
sphere during the First World War from this perspective. For the first time in 
the history of the Ottoman Empire, crimes against morality and family dur-
ing the First World War were tried in military courts. This intervention cre-
ated a discussion of the limits of the public and private spheres. There was a 
specific moment that this situation triggered an important discussion among 
bureaucrats: the Ministry of War’s proposal of the Adultery Bill in 1916, 
which is discussed at length in the following pages. 
                                                      
 34 Ibid., 24. 
 35 Emphasis on population growth was particularly evident in the penal codes of fascist 
countries, see Quine, Population Politics in Twentieth-Century Europe. 
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4.1.2  Sexual Assaults Targeting Soldiers’ Families Before the First 
World War 
Archival documents suggest that sexual assault cases against members of sol-
diers’ families were common even prior to the First World War. An overview 
of similar cases during the Balkan Wars reveals that female members of sol-
diers’ families were faced with several forms of sexual assault. However, dur-
ing those years the judicial process worked differently; charges brought up 
and trials for such cases were under the authority of the civilian bureaucracy, 
unlike during the First World War. In many cases, soldiers themselves peti-
tioned the Ministry of War regarding their families’ situation. The Ministry 
of War brought cases to the attention of civilian authorities such as the Min-
istry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior Affairs. Sometimes in a bitter 
tone in the correspondence, the Ministry of War urged civilian authorities 
that the government’s initial duty was to protect soldiers’ female relatives. 
For instance, Mehmed Ali bin Mehmed Ali, a soldier stationed at Anadolu 
Kavağı (a district along the Bosporus), wrote a petition on May 3, 1913, to 
the Ministry of War claiming that his wife had been abducted and raped by 
some of his fellow townsmen from Kastamonu. The Ministry of War passed 
the complaint on to the Ministry of the Interior Affairs and added, “needless 
to say, the first responsibility of the government is to protect the women in 
soldiers’ families from attack or assault.”36 As this case illustrates, the process 
was initiated by the Ministry of War, and the Ministry of the Interior Affairs 
then started an investigation through the provincial governor. In addition to 
petitions written by soldiers, wives who were attacked or assaulted also sent 
complaints to the Ministry of War. For example, Fatma from Adana peti-
tioned the ministry complaining that she had been assaulted and robbed by 
fifteen men on her way to the city. During her journey to Adana for the 
purposes of work, the perpetrators stopped her, stole her money and earrings, 
and assaulted her sexually. She sent a telegram to the Ministry of War and 
                                                      
 36 BOA. DH.H. 43/66 4 Nisan 1329 (17 April 1913). “Beyandan âzâde olduğu üzere efrâd-ı 
askeriye muhareminin her dürlü taarruzat ve tecavüzatdan masûn bulundurulmaları 
hükümetin de akdem-i vezâifinden olmağla…” 
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signed it “a soldier’s wife, Fatma.” The Ministry of War passed her petition 
along to both the Ministry of the Interior Affairs and the Ministry of Justice 
on October 4, 1913.37 The Ministry of the Interior Affairs forwarded the 
complaint to the provincial governor of Adana requesting an investigation. 
Another case shows that complaints by soldiers regarding the protection of 
their families were more effective than those by civilian members of the fam-
ily. For instance, Arif bin Emin, a soldier, petitioned the Ministry of War 
complaining that local authorities in his hometown of Ürgüb had not heeded 
his sister Fatma’s case.38 Fatma had been attacked and raped by a certain Çir 
[sic] Ali and his companions. They cut Fatma’s husband’s fingers while he 
defended Fatma against the attackers. Fatma’s four-month-old child died dur-
ing the incident. The family had applied to local authorities, but no investi-
gation had been initiated. Arif bin Emin, as a member of the military, sub-
mitted the case to the Ministry of War demanding justice for his sister. The 
Ministry of War passed the case on to the Ministries of Justice and Interior 
Affairs on October 30, 1913, asserting that such incidents have a negative 
impact on the morale of both the soldier whose family was involved and the 
battalion of which that soldier was a member.39 Before the First World War, 
the Ministry of War passed these cases along to civilian authorities urging 
them to conduct investigations. Due to the bureaucratic exchanges involved 
in the process, investigations could last a long time. As the number of con-
scripted men increased during the First World War, leaving many women on 
the homefront without protection, the Ministry of War initiated more 
straightforward solutions to bypass such bureaucracy. 
                                                      
 37 BOA. DH.H. 46/01 (04) 21 Eylül 1329 (21 September 1913). 
 38 BOA. DH.H. 48/06 (026) 17 Te 1328 (30 October 1912). 
 39 Ibid. “efrâd ailelerinin bu misüllü tecavüzat ve ta’adiyata düçâr olmaları hem kendü 
üzerlerinde ve hem de mensub oldukları kıta’at-ı askeriyece ne derecelerde sûi tesir hâsıl 
eyleyeceği…” 
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§ 4.2  In Search of State Protection: Who Will Protect the Honor of 
the Soldiers? 
As discussed in chapter 3, the war brought about the expansion of military 
power throughout the country owing to the declaration of the martial law. At 
the beginning of the war, on January 3, 1915, the Ministry of the Interior 
Affairs issued a general order to all provinces which read: “We are informed 
that in some places, the families of those soldiers – our soldiers who are ready 
to die to protect the faith, honor, and homeland – are being attacked and as-
saulted in their hometowns. As it is not desirable to hear of such cases, the 
protection of soldiers’ families is of great importance. Thus, such attacks 
should be prevented and those who dare to act to the contrary shall be ar-
rested and summoned before the courts martial and condemned to severe 
penalties.”40 This general circular was issued even before the proclamation of 
the provisional law authorizing courts martial to handle sexual assault cases 
involving soldiers’ families. This means the courts martial operated under an 
administrative measure (idârî karar) until the proclamation of the provi-
sional law. On September 8, 1915, the Council of Ministers approved the of-
ficial provisional law mandating that sexual assaults of members of soldiers’ 
families be taken to courts martial. The text in the Ottoman Code Book 
(Düstur) provides a brief description of the provisional law. The law stipu-
lated that in times of mobilization – during the proclamation and continua-
tion of martial law – rapes and assaults against wives, children, or any female 
relatives of soldiers be tried by martial courts and punished according to Ar-
ticle 206 of the Penal Code.41 The bill was not in accordance with usual pro-
cedure for such cases. Under usual circumstances, the punishment of civilians 
                                                      
 40 BOA.DH.EUM.MTK 79/34 1333 S 16 (3 January 1915). 
 41 “Seferberlikte idâre-i örfiyyenin ilân ve devamı müddetince berrü ve bahri erkân ve ümerâ ve 
zâbitan ve zabıt vekilleri ve zabıt namzetleri ve küçük zâbitan ve onbaşı ve neferât ve men-
sûbin-i askeriyenin zevce ve evlâdlarına ve ailelerinde bulunan mahremine karşı kânûn-i 
umûmî-i cezânın ikinci bâbının üçüncü faslıyla kânûn-u mezkurun iki yüz altıncı maddesinde 
münderic ef’alden birini irtikab edenlerin tâ’kib ve muhâkemesi divân-ı harblere aiddir.” 
Düstur, Vol.2, No.7, 716. 
Ç İ ĞD E M  OĞU Z  
202 
who assaulted soldiers’ families was not under the jurisdiction of military 
authorities. Correspondence written by the Ministry of the Interior Affairs 
reads: “As a matter of fact, rape cases involving soldiers’ wives or family 
members are not among military offenses. Nevertheless, it became necessary 
in the course of the war to investigate and punish those crimes in the mili-
tary courts.”42 Military as well as civilian authorities might have thought that 
trials in courts martial would be more effective given that there was no su-
preme court above the military courts to reinvestigate the case. Their deci-
sions were immediately applied. Thus, Ottoman authorities (especially the 
Ministry of War) attempted to prevent rape and violence targeting soldiers’ 
families by authorizing the courts martial and executing sentences more ef-
fectively. At this point, it is important to underline the role of individuals 
calling on the state to take measures against such cases and to point out the 
bilateral relationship behind the state’s measures. The social background of 
wartime legislation and policies, in which moral considerations played an 
important role, transformed perspectives on the limits of the private and 
public spheres with regard to family. 
Let me now examine the exchanges between soldiers’ families and state 
authorities with respect to sexual assault. First, I present the voices of women 
through the petitions they submitted to legal authorities. Second, I discuss 
the petitions of soldiers’ addressed to the Ministry of War or to the Ottoman 
Parliament regarding sexual assaults that their families had suffered. Third, I 
consider complaints filed by locals, muhtars, and village elders. Finally, I 
mention reports written by local military officers such as those of Recruiting 
Office Chiefs (Ahz-ı Asker Riyaseti) and Gendarmerie Commanders (Jan-
darma Alay Kumandanlığı). 
 
                                                      
 42 BOA. DH. EUM. ADL 23/31, 26 Temmuz 1332 (8 August 1916). “asker aileleri ve 
muharemine tecavüz esasen askeri bir cürm olmayub ancak hal-i harbin tevellid ettiği bir za-
ruret üzerine tecavüzat-ı vakıanın takib ve muhakemesi dîvân-ı harblere tevdi’ olunmuş…” 
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Throughout the war, many women communicated with the government 
by submitting individual or collective petitions.43 These petitions have been 
evaluated by several researchers from different perspectives.44 In this study, I 
consider these petitions as sources through which the extent of sexual vio-
lence as part of the homefront dynamic can be ascertained. Women as well 
as soldiers used petitioning as an instrument to remind the state of its duty 
to protect honor (namus) and dignity (şeref). They explicitly held the state 
accountable for rapes, abductions, assaults, and threats, thus inviting the gov-
ernment to take severe measures against the perpetrators of such offenses. As 
a result, the state gradually began intervening in the realm of the family. In 
part, this intervention was invited. However, it would be misleading to ig-
nore the agency of military authorities to take strict measures as such affairs 
curbed the war effort. 
The most common phrase in women’s complaints regarding sexual as-
sault is, in Ottoman Turkish, “ırzımızı paymal ettiler,” meaning “they tram-
pled our honor.” Two women, Emine and her sister Havva from Akkilise, a 
village near the city of Konya, sent a telegram on November 24, 1915, di-
rectly to Talat Pasha, the Minister of the Interior Affairs.45 They accused Cap-
tain Osman Ağa and his companions as rapists and aggressors who had tram-
pled their honor. Emine and Havva said, “our husbands are fighting for the 
faith and the state, but here, Captain Osman Ağa’s gangsters are raping us. 
                                                      
 43 In the scope of this study I include only the petitions of Muslim women in Anatolia. For a 
study on the petitions of Armenian women, see Kutluata, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Ermeni 
Kadınların Yazdıkları Arzuhaller.” For a study evaluating sexual assaults and rape crimes of 
Armenian women, see Bjornlund, “‘A Fate Worse Than Dying’: Sexual Violence during the 
Armenian Genocide.” 
 44 Petitions are useful sources through which one can get an idea on people’s demands from the 
government during the wartime. Many women submitted petitions to complain about priva-
tions, hunger, and other problems on the homefront. See Van Os, “Taking Care of Soldiers’ 
Families: The Ottoman State and the Muinsiz Aile Maaşı,” 103–104; Akın, “War, Women, and 
the State,” 25–28; Akın, “The Ottoman Home Front during World War I,” 122–178; Mahir 
Metinsoy, “Osmanlı Kadınlarının Gıda ve Erzak Savaşı,” 56–61.  
 45 BOA. DH. EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1, (003) 11 Teşrinisani 1331 (24 November 1915). The letter begins 
with “we, the three of us, are soldiers’ wives;” however, it was signed by only two women.  
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We are sisters. They beat us and abducted us from our village.”46 The state-
ment “fighting for the faith and the state” is a phrase commonly found in 
these petitions. Emine and Havva added something interesting at the end of 
their telegram: “For God’s sake, please save us from these Muscovites.”47 By 
this, they equated an Ottoman military captain to those of the enemy na-
tion.48 
Another case exemplifies solidarity between families of soldiers with re-
spect to a sexual assault that involved a war widow. Three women from 
İnegöl, Bursa, wrote a petition on December 25, 1914 to the president of 
Ottoman parliament addressing him as “father of our nation.”49 They in-
formed him that a municipal council member from Bursa, Hacı Ahmed, had 
abducted a war widow, Ayşe, and taken her to his farm. These three women 
emphasized crucial points in their attempt to attract the attention of parlia-
ment. They employed key concepts of war propaganda such as protection of 
the faith, the nation, justice, and honor in their letter. Moreover, they wisely 
articulated the wartime circumstances with which soldiers’ families were faced 
on the homefront. The letter begins: “We are at war with the enemies of Is-
lam and faith. Our sons are being martyred. Their women are the honor of 
faith and fatherland.”50 These expressions equated their own situation with 
the honor of religion and the state and were among common phrases that 
can be found in such letters. They continued as follows:  
                                                      
 46 Ibid. “Üçümüz de asker karısıyız. Kocalarımız orada elyevm din devlet için muharebe ediyor 
fakat burada Yüzbaşı Osman ağanın çeteleri zorla bizim ırzımıza geçiyorlar. Biz iki kız 
kardeşiz. Köyümüzden döğerek tekmeliyerek başka köye götürdüler.” 
 47 Ibid. “Allah aşkına bizi bu Moskoflardan kurtarınız.” 
 48 Ibid. The second item of correspondence in this file was from the governor of Konya. The 
governor said that an investigation had been conducted about this case. He claimed that Cap-
tain Osman had been appointed to track bandits and that these petitions were meant to prevent 
him from doing so. Eventually, the martial court found him not guilty.  
 49 BOA.DH.EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1, (102) 12 Kanunuevvel 1330 (25 December 1914). “Millet[in] 
babası efendimiz.” 
 50 Ibid. “Cümle İslam din düşmanları ile muharebe ediyoruz. Evladlarımız muhârebede şehid 
oluyor. Haremleri din ve devlet namusudur.” 
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They took the widow of a martyr from İnegöl to Bursa promising to 
pay her a salary [family allowance]. They kept her at municipal coun-
cil member Hacı Ahmed’s farm. They raped her. They made her a 
whore. Hacı Ahmed has syphilis. Now this soldier’s desperate widow 
has syphilis, too. She is still at Hacı Ahmed’s place as a concubine.51  
It is interesting that they used notions of honor, faith, and nation to de-
fend Ayşe against a municipal official. The mention of venereal disease could 
also be a conscious means of stigmatizing Hacı Ahmed. In the next part of 
their letter, the women reminded the government of its promises at the be-
ginning of the mobilization, and they finished their letter with a demand for 
justice. 
The honor of a soldier, honor of the faith and state have been de-
stroyed. How can this happen? How does your dignity accept this? 
Will the homeland embrace the syphilitic man who took a Muslim 
woman as his concubine? For the love of God, please, avenge the 
honor of a Muslim martyr. We beg your mercy. In the newspapers we 
see the promises that our national assembly has made. God forgive 
you. Investigate the cruelty of infidels who destroy honor. We want 
justice, dear sir.52  
They signed the letter with reference to their own belonging to soldiers’ 
families: wife of soldier, Ayşe; a soldier’s mother-in-law, Fatma, and the 
widow of a martyr Medri [sic]. It is possible to interpret this solidarity as a 
signifier of the demand for justice for all soldiers’ families which stemmed 
from fear that in the absence of their men, others in the town - officials, 
wealthy townsmen, or local military commanders – would be encouraged to 
attack soldiers’ families if their vulnerability was exposed as such. By estab-
lishing relations between different connotations and notions, such as the rea-
sons for the war as propagandized by the government itself – “protecting the 
state and faith” – and the state’s promises to soldiers and their families, they 
                                                      
 51 Ibid. See Appendix C, Quotation 1.   
 52 Ibid. See Appendix C, Quotation 2.  
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sought justice for a widow, emphasizing her Muslim identity. Upon receiving 
this letter, the Ministry of the Interior Affairs sent it to the province of 
Hüdavendigar (Bursa) and asked for an investigation. The governor wrote a 
detailed answer which is worth quoting here. 
It was notified to our office that Ayşe bint-i Meryem was abducted 
and taken to the farm of a member of the municipal council, Hacı 
Ahmed, as a concubine. The aforementioned woman’s husband did 
not return from the Balkan Wars and she was not welcomed into her 
mother-in-law’s place. Therefore, she was drifted around, and at one 
point she went to Ankara and then to İnegöl, where she was accused 
of immorality together with another woman called Meryem. Thus, 
she was taken to Bursa again and was suspected of having a criminal 
[prostitution] background according to police and gendarmerie re-
ports. Eventually, she began working for Hacı Ahmed Efendi as a ser-
vant where she is taken care of just like an adopted child. Since Hacı 
Ahmed Efendi discouraged her from prostitution, in our opinion it is 
better for her to stay there instead of wandering around vagrantly. 
Thus, our police department decided there is no need to take Hacı 
Ahmed’s case to court.53 
Obviously, we cannot know which story is true, but it is unlikely that these 
three women who wrote to parliament had anything to gain by giving false 
or misleading information. Most probably they knew Ayşe from their town. 
The women considered each other’s situations to be alike in the sense that 
they were all soldiers’ families. They might have thought that once rumors 
emerged that widows, mothers, or any other relatives of soldiers were not un-
der the protection of the government – and even worse, that the govern-
ment turned a blind eye to abductions, rapes, and assaults – nothing would 
stop other men from taking advantage of this. In Ayşe’s case, the govern-
ment apparently turned a blind eye by leaving Ayşe at Hacı Ahmed’s place 
instead of paying her an allowance. 
                                                      
 53 BOA.DH.EUM.2. Şb. 35/ 1, (104) 9 Şubat 1330 (22 February 1915). See Appendix C, 
Quotation 3.  
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Among the archival documents there are similar complaints filed by sol-
diers themselves. Apparently, their families informed them about such in-
stances in letters asking for help. The soldiers deliberately reported these cases 
to the Ministry of War or to the Ottoman parliament. One interesting case 
involved a soldier’s sister. Mustafa from the village of Kemer near the town 
of Salihli in Aydın province was a member of Second Army stationed in 
Edirne. Mustafa wrote a petition on January 9, 1915 to the Ministry of Jus-
tice to be conveyed to the president of the Ottoman parliament. In his letter 
he said that fifteen days earlier, townsmen raided his sister’s house and at-
tacked her. The perpetrators threatened her continuously after the event. He 
wrote that he had informed local authorities in Edirne and asked the office to 
inform the Ministry of Justice of the case. After a few days, he received an-
other telegram from his sister saying that she was again attacked in the mid-
dle of the night and that other women in the neighborhood had rescued her. 
Mustafa wrote to the Edirne prosecutor once again and was told that because 
of the lack of gendarmerie forces in that village, the attackers had not been 
arrested. After detailing the negligence of local authorities, he continued his 
letter, reminding the Ottoman government and parliament of its promises at 
the beginning of the war regarding the protection of soldiers’ families. 
Your honor, the declarations of the Deputies and the Notables Cham-
ber addressing the military were read to our units on December 24, 
1914. Here, I would like to write down those words as far as I remem-
ber. “The day of revenge that the whole nation, from elders to the 
young and from martyrs to the living, has been awaiting has come at 
last. You, together with our allies, are fighting against the Muscovites 
again, the biggest enemy of the Ottomans and the Muslims. Take re-
venge for those houses they burned, the wounds they opened, and 
the martyrs they stepped on. Do not ever think about the families 
you left behind. They are entrusted to us by God.” Your honor! I ex-
pect only the protection of my sister’s rights and the punishment for 
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the perpetrators by our constitutional government of the Ottoman 
State.54  
Mustafa almost quoted the declaration by the government that had been 
read in military units with special emphasis on the protection of families.55 
This implied the contract between the government and the soldier in which 
they were united on the idea of “protecting honor.” Finally, Mustafa asked 
not only for the perpetrators to be punished but also the police officers in his 
town for their negligence. He continued, “[I ask you to punish them] be-
cause I am soldier. I cannot leave here and go there to follow up on this case. 
I can only entrust my family to the great conscience and justice of our gov-
ernment of the Constitutional Ottoman State with my best thoughts for the 
victory of our nation, army, and navy.”56 These lines indicate the basic con-
tract between soldiers and the state regarding the protection of their families. 
Also, the way that he signed his letter in which he emphasized his Turkish 
identity is related to the same concern: “From the Second Army unit, yours, 
ready to renounce his life for the nation, son of Turk, soldier of the Turks.”57 
In contrast to his bitter tone throughout, he added a desperate postscript to 
his letter: “As telegrams arrive [from my sister], I crave to commit suicide. I 
can’t talk about this to any of my companions and will never do so…. My 
sister filed a complaint, as well, yet it seems that the police prosecutors did 
not pay attention to it. I present this case to your conscience and kiss your 
hands your honor, sir.”58 Finally, the Ministry of the Interior Affairs sent a 
                                                      
 54 BOA.DH.EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1, (92). 27 Kanunuevvel 1330 (4 January 1915). See Appendix C, 
Quotation 4. 
 55 For the original statement see MMZC, Term 3, Vol. 1, Year. 1, 21 December 1914, 26. 
 56 BOA.DH.EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1 (92), 27 Kanunuevvel 1330 (4 January 1915). “Çünkü bendeniz 
askerim. Tâkib-i dâ’va için oralara kadar gidip intikam alamayacağımdan hükümet-i meşrûtî-
yi Osmaniyemizin adaletine havale ederek milletimizin ordumuzun donanmamızın muzaffer 
olmasını niyâz ederek pek âlî olan vicdânınıza ailemi terk ederim.” 
  57  Ibid. “ikinci ordu efradından milleti için hayatını vakf eylemiş olan Türk oğlu Türk askeri”  
 58 Ibid. “Telgraf geldikçe intihar edeceğim geliyor. Hiçbir asker arkadaşıma meseleyi 
açamıyorum ve açmayacağım.... Hemşirem da’va ettiği halde kaza-yı mezkur müddeî umûmi 
komiser bey nazar-ı ehemmiyete almadığı anlaşılıyor. Vicdan-ı selimiye yine havale ederek 
birader-i ‘alilerinin ellerinden öperim efendim hazretleri.  
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notice to the province of Aydın asking them it to investigate the events. The 
province replied that the perpetrators were arrested but not taken to the court 
martial since the event occurred before the general order authorizating mar-
tial courts to protect soldiers’ families.59 
In some cases, Recruitment Offices (ahz-ı asker şubeleri) attempted to 
initiate investigations regarding assaults of soldiers’ families with no official 
complaint from women or soldiers. For instance, on January 18, 1917, the 
Third Army Command (Üçüncü Ordu Kumandanlığı) reported that the of-
fice had carried out an investigation following gossip in the city that a cer-
tain Salih Beyzade Mehmed, a notable of from Tokat, had been seducing 
desperate women with the help of his own wife.60 The commander stated that 
Salih “a man of dubious morals” sat behind curtains and doors and secretly 
watched the women who visited his wife at home. With the help of his wife 
and, the commander wrote, owing to the “women’s weakness and factors of 
necessity” (zaifiyet-i nisvan ve saike-yi zaruret), he seduced those whom he 
fancied. Recently, the letter read, gossip had arrived to the commander that 
Salih had seduced the daughters of Osman Bey (who was a deceased colonel 
of the gendarmerie) in the same way. The commander sent his report to the 
Ministry of War urging it to take action against those insulting the morality 
and honor of soldiers’ families. He added that soldiers should be spared any 
worries regarding the honor of their families in order to stay focused on their 
military duties in battle. The commander requested the banishment of Salih 
as an administrative measure because current law did not apply to his case. 
However, gossip was not reason enough to enforce the law in Salih’s case. 
The office of the governor of Sivas (the province of which Tokat was an ad-
ministrative district) indicated this fact in correspondence addressed to En-
ver Pasha. The office concluded that despite the gossip regarding Salih’s rela-
tionship with the daughters of Osman Bey, authorities were unable to prove it 
and no official complaints had been filed by the women.61 Eventually, trial or 
administrative measure was taken against him. However, cases like this 
                                                      
 59 BOA. DH. EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1 (106) 12 Şubat 1330 (25 February 1915) .  
 60 BOA. DH. EUM. ADL. 32/28 (011) 1335 B 16 (8 May 1917). 
 61 Ibid.  
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prompted discussions among civil and military officials about how to react to 
illicit relationships if no complaints of sexual assault were filed or if the rela-
tionship was established on a voluntary basis. Could or should military or ci-
vilian authorities intervene in such cases? This topic will be discussed under 
the heading of Adultery Bill in the following section.  
Another source through which sexual assaults are revealed the weekly re-
ports by local military authorities, especially gendarmerie forces, to the gov-
ernors of their districts. For instance, the commander of gendarmerie regi-
ment (jandarma alay kumandanı) in Hüdavendigar province reported four 
criminal cases in the districts (livas) of Söğüt and Ertuğrul on December 30, 
1915.62 Two of the four were sexual assaults and the other two were cases of 
theft. One concerned an attack of five women, among whom was a soldier’s 
wife, while they were on their way to Eskişehir together with the local head-
man (muhtar) of their village, Hasan Ağa, to go shopping. Some other 
armed villagers stopped them along the way, stabbed the muhtar, and raped 
the women. The attackers were arrested and summoned before the courts 
martial. Another case concerned Captain Süleyman, the Head of the Subsis-
tence Office (İaşe Memurluğu), who was caught raping Ali Osman. (It was 
not indicated whether Ali Osman was a minor.) The document says Ali Os-
man was rescued; moreover, the captain had been previously caught having 
an affair with a woman. The subsistence offices were the main points from 
which food was distributed during the First World War. Apparently, Captain 
Süleyman used his position to abuse men (or boys) and women who were in 
need. There is plenty of evidence in the archives similar to the case of Cap-
tain Süleyman in which military officers themselves were accused of sexual 
assault.63 
                                                      
 62 BOA. DH. EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1 (028) 17 Kanunuevvel 1331 (30 December 1915). 
 63 For instance, in a telegram eleven men from Malatya complained to the Ministry of the 
Interior Affairs that their “honor was trampled by a few gendarmeries in the region” see 
BOA.DH.EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1 (071) 18 Ağustos 1331 (31 Ağustos 1915). The ministry received 
not only cases of sexual assault, but also cases of property violation and homicide cases for 
which the members of the military were accused. For a homicide case in which two soldiers 
attacked and murdered two women, see BOA. BEO. 4495/337074 11 Kanunuevvel 1333 (11 
December 1917); for a case of the violation of private property by gendarme and its investiga-
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It is arguable that the Ottoman Anatolian countryside was in complete 
disorder due to the high number of rapes, abductions, and assaults against 
women in soldiers’ families. The old codes of moral principles – the “collec-
tive guardianship” of morality – were shaken by the wartime circumstances, 
and apart from severe punishment no mechanism remained to protect sol-
diers’ families from sexual exploitation.64 This situation contributed to the 
perception of moral degeneration and social crisis (ictimai buhran) during 
and after the war. On the other hand, victims of such crimes called for action 
and held the state accountable for their vulnerability. Eventually, this con-
tributed to the widening of the scope of state intervention in the sphere of 
family issues. 
4.2.1  Punishing Sexual Assaults: The Legal Process in Martial Courts 
It is easier to find the final decisions of sexual assault trials than the initial 
complaints or petitions that would more fully complete the story. As dis-
cussed earlier, starting in early 1915, the courts martial began trying sexual 
assault cases involving members of soldiers’ families. Some exemplars in the 
archives demonstrate a pattern in the punishments of such offenses as well as 
the procedures of the military tribunals. The military courts tried rape and 
sex crimes according to the Ottoman Penal Code and forwarded their deci-
sions to the Ministry of War. In most cases, Articles 206 and 198 were ap-
plied. While the former stipulated the punishment for rapes involving vic-
tims of fifteen years old or younger, the latter applied to rape cases that 
included abduction. The Minister of War, Enver Pasha approved the decisions 
to be issued as an imperial order (irade-i seniyye), generally on his own ini-
tiative. Once the decision was approved by imperial order, the Ministry of 
                                                      
tion which was instigated upon the receipt of a telegram from five women (soldiers’ wives) 
from Bursa, see BOA. DH. EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1 (034). Eventually, the Directorate of Police issued 
a circular to all provinces on May 27, 1915, ordering that attacks on soldiers’ properties be 
prevented. See BOA. DH. EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1 (142) 14 Mayıs 1331 (27 May 1915).  
 64 Ahmed Emin described traditional forms of moral surveillance of women in a neighborhood 
as “collective guardianship,” see Yalman, Turkey in the World War, 232. See also chapter three 
on the issue of collective responsibility for protecting morality.  
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War executed it. The punishment for a rape crime involving a soldiers’ fe-
male relative (usually his daughter or wife) was three years of hard labor. The 
offender faced harsher penalties if he had resorted to violence, caused damage 
(either physical and mental), or committed the rape together with another 
offense such as theft or breaking into private property. In such cases the pun-
ishment could increase to up to seven years of hard labor accompanied by the 
loss of one’s civil rights (hukûk-u medeniyyeden ıskat) in addition to paying 
all the expenses of the witnesses and the court. As a general rule, court mar-
tial decisions included the public disclosure of the offender (teşhir) as part of 
the punishment. In some cases, soldiers themselves were the perpetrators of 
such crimes and were punished according to the Ottoman Penal Code as well 
as the Military Penal Code. The cases below illustrate the decisions in such 
tribunals. 
The case of Menevişe [sic], a soldiers’ wife from the village of Çakıl near 
the town of Harput, was brought before the martial court in Elaziz. A certain 
Hacı Ibrahim was accused of breaking into her house and raping her. The 
court sentenced him to three years of hard labor based on Artile 198 of the 
penal code. The decision was approved by an imperial order on May 20, 
1916. The Ministry of War was the executor of the order.65 In another case, 
the Konya court martial tried a certain Hacı Hüseyin for the abduction and 
defloration of Feride, the sister of the soldier Mehmed. Hacı Hüseyin was 
sentenced in absentia to death – moreover, the confiscation of his property 
was ordered – according to the Article 206 of the penal code. The court deci-
sion arrived at the grand vizierate signed by Enver Pasha. The vizierate ap-
proved the court decision but decided to retry Hacı Hüseyin upon his arrest.66 
In another case, Dimitri was sentenced to three years of hard labor after he 
was accused of raping a fourteen-year-old daughter of a soldier.67 In another 
case, a Circassian refugee named Hasan broke into a soldier’s wives house in 
the night and raped her. The court martial of Izmir sentenced him to seven 
years of hard labor based on the Article 198 of the Penal Code, relieved him 
                                                      
 65 BOA. İ. DUİT 171/12 7 Mayıs 1332 (20 Mayıs 1916). 
 66 BOA. İ. DUİT. 174/20 2 Haziran 1333 (2 Haziran 1917). 
 67 BOA. İ. DUİT. 173/59 21 Teşrinievvel 1332 (3 November 1916). 
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of his civil rights, and charged him court expenses together with the expenses 
of witnesses (amounting to 249 piasters).68 In another case, a certain İbrahim 
abducted a soldier’s wife and raped her.69 He was sentenced to the same pun-
ishment as Hasan. In a case of abduction and rape, the court martial of An-
kara sentenced a perpetrator to five years of hard labor.70 The court martial of 
Ankara sentenced two townsmen accused of raping Azime, a soldier’s wife, 
to three years of hard labor.71 However, if rape was not accompanied by ab-
duction or breaking and entering, the standard punishment was three years 
of hard labor. 
In a case before the Izmir martial court, the perpetrator was a soldier 
while the victim was the wife of another soldier. A labor battalion sergeant 
named İsmail had raped Cemile, the wife of the soldier Veli, and the court 
sentenced him to five years of hard labor according to Article 198 of the pe-
nal code, demoted his military rank, and relieved him of his civil rights.72 
There are many cases in which soldiers were the perpetrators of rapes ranging 
from statutory rape to forced intercourse with fellow townswomen. They 
were sentenced to heavy penalties such as the confiscation of their property, 
dismissal from duty (in the case of homosexuality), and the standard penalty 
of hard labor.73 
For an example of an adultery case – intercourse with the consent of both 
parties – Hatice’s trial in the Ankara martial court can be examined. A sol-
dier’s wife, Hatice, was involved in consensual intercourse with Osman, a 
fellow townsman from her village of Kuruçay. She became pregnant, and in 
order not that it not be revealed, she committed feticide. The martial court in 
Ankara sentenced Hatice to fifteen years of hard labor on June 22, 1917, 
based on Article 174 of the penal code.74 
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These cases are abundant in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives. The 
main duty of the martial courts was to ensure that the current Ottoman Pe-
nal Code was thoroughly applied; it was not to introduce new law on the 
punishment of sexual assault. The involvement of the Ministry of War in-
deed served this purpose as it was actively involved in the trial processes. 
§ 4.3  Punishing “Unfaithful” Wives: The Adultery Bill of 1916 
Cases of infidelity involving soldiers’ wives was a major concern in combat-
ant countries. Although these cases were treated as crimes, infidelity and 
adultery are mutually established relationships, and thus there is no victim. 
As Lisa M. Todd stated in her article on German women and sexual infidel-
ity, this kind of relationship troubled German authorities:  
As we have seen again and again, whether in reports of a teenager 
flirting with soldiers in Düsseldorf or a married woman sneaking 
around with a Russian in Regensburg, it was not so much the sexual 
activity that disturbed Germans, it was the fact that many of these 
women were entering affairs of their own free will - engaging in in-
timate activities because they wanted to, not out of marital or finan-
cial obligation.75  
The imagery of wives who were “enjoying their lives” openly contradicted 
the service that was expected from them. 
During the First World War, a remarkable measure by combatant coun-
tries to protect morality was to segregate women on the homefront from 
prisoners of war (POWs) and from soldiers that arrived from the colonies. In 
Germany, radical measures were taken to prevent the interaction of women 
with POWs working in industry or agriculture, such as declaring the names 
of “immoral” women in newspapers and taking legal measures beyond pub-
lic sanctions.76 Based on the Prussian Siege Law of 1851, German authorities 
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introduced measures to prevent contact between POWs and civilians. Todd 
stated that thousands of German women were arrested as a result of relation-
ships with POWs.77 Furthermore, on the local level, the names of these 
“promiscuous” women were posted on the church doors as public humilia-
tion. German authorities identified these cases of “moral decline” in German 
society with “national decline.” 
One reason for this tendency to conflate female licentiousness and 
national decline was the pervasive, albeit contested, bourgeois code of 
sexual behavior and separate spheres, both of which were predicated 
on the innate purity and sobriety of women. For many Germans, 
‘Deutsche Frau - Deutsche Treue’ was more than a truism. The im-
moral behavior of war wives seemed to challenge that image. War-
time reports increasingly complained that “the scandalous behavior of 
German women is starting to tarnish our reputation abroad.” One of 
the roles of the wartime German woman was to express the gravity of 
the situation at the front by the seriousness of their activities on the 
homefront. Women's chief tasks therefore included preserving the 
moral bedrock of society on which to build a successful postwar na-
tion.78 
In another context, the war was characterized by fear of the “mixture of 
races” due to the mobilization of men in the colonies. Black troops in the 
United States and the French colonial army were considered threats to the 
preservation of morality on the homefront. Nonwhite troops were isolated 
from white ones even in their place of work. Especially in France, Senegalese 
troops were both praised for their skill as warriors, but at the same time these 
“savage qualities made them a potential sexual and moral threat to the 
French civilians.”79 A similar attitude was present in the British army vis-à-vis 
Indian troops. It was feared that the war would eliminate established inequali-
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ties between white women and Indian men.80 Not only men but also the 
women of colonized regions were a danger. An Australian government min-
ister declared that “Cairo will do infinitely more harm to Australia than all 
the Turks will do in Gallipoli.”81 Race and nation appeared as further stan-
dards for moral control. 
In the Ottoman Empire, the connotations of adultery were similar to 
those in other major combatant countries with respect to moral decline. 
However, the concerns did not result from interaction among foreign na-
tionals or POWs with Ottoman women. Mostly it was due to the consensual 
relationships of soldiers’ wives. In this regard, I evaluate a legislative attempt 
by the Ottoman Ministry of War that indicates the growing concern for pre-
venting adultery among the female relatives of soldiers, particularly their 
wives. I believe that this attempt has remained unexplored because the bill 
was not enacted. However, this detail does not change the fact that such an 
attempt by itself importantly reveals the extent of the “problem” and the 
willingness of the military to intervene in sexuality in the name of protect-
ing family. 
Almost a year after the martial courts were authorized to try sexual as-
sault cases involving soldiers’ families, a new debate started concerning the 
authorization of Military Chiefs of the Recruitment Offices (ahz-ı asker 
şube-yi reisi) and high-ranking commanders to litigate in adultery (fi’il-i 
şen’i) cases – that is to say, whether military men should be able to file com-
plaints and initiate a legal process on behalf of soldiers against their unfaith-
ful wives. On April 26, 1916, the Ministry of War presented a draft of a new 
provisional law that supplements the earlier one regarding the protection of 
soldiers’ families. The draft read,  
according to Article 201 of the Penal Code, adultery charges can be 
brought only by the husband, or by parents (legal guardians) in the 
husband’s absence. If no complaints are filed by these parties, the 
martial courts cannot undertake an investigation. The fact that sol-
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diers fighting on the battlefront or taken as prisoners of war have no 
means to file complaints raises the issue of the morale of soldiers. And 
because allowing soldiers’ female relatives who commit adultery to go 
unpunished would provoke protests in the public opinion, a bill ap-
pears to be vital that would substitute the complaints of husbands or 
parents with those of the highest ranking military commanders and 
the Chiefs of Recruitment Offices in order to protect the honor of 
soldiers.82  
Although the bill was not enacted, debate over the bill strikingly relates to 
the morality concerns. On one hand, initiatives taken by the Ministry of 
War enlarged the purview of public realm, bringing private cases under the 
jurisdiction of martial courts. On the other, once this distinction between 
public and private was blurred, the notion within Ottoman law on family 
affairs – which strictly defined the boundaries of private and public matters – 
was invalidated. From this point of view, morality, honor, and family cases 
stood in the center between public and private law. 
Again, the context of war is crucial for making sense of military inter-
vention in such a delicate issue. The possible grounds for this intervention 
can be summarized as follows: First, many women who seeking financial 
help or a means of protection engaged in extramarital relationships, or else 
they were encouraged to have such relationships as a fate better than prostitu-
tion. Second, rumors of unfaithful wives deeply affected the morale of sol-
diers and in many cases resulted in their desertion. Third, the lack of protec-
tion for soldiers’ families, especially for women, discredited the propaganda 
of the Ottoman government during the First World War. For example, leaf-
lets dropped by British planes provoked soldiers by mentioning unfaithful 
wives and hungry children on the homefront.83 Of course, not all extramari-
tal relationships were the result of wartime hardship; there were consensual 
relationships in the absence of dominant males. The draft law on adultery 
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was aimed at preventing such voluntary relationships by charging the mili-
tary with the policing morality. 
The draft required approval of the Council of State to be enacted. The 
Council of State consulted with the Ministry of Justice on the feasibility of 
such a regulation. Eventually, the Ministry of Justice prepared a detailed in-
quiry into the possible consequences of the bill and concluded that it was not 
proper to issue it as a law. The statement of the Ministry of Justice argued 
that adultery offenses belong to the realm of private law, but the bill prepared 
by the Ministry of War would bring the issue into the purview of criminal 
law. This point was central to the issue of the legal and social status of sol-
diers’ female relatives. Is the promise to protecting families valid in cases 
where the woman was in a voluntary relationship with other man? If so, 
whose rights should be protected: those of the women or the soldiers? 
The Ministry of Justice listed two main arguments against the bill. The 
first issue concerned the elimination of the agency of husbands. Accordingly, 
if local military officials could be litigants, this would result in ignoring the 
rights of the husband to claim or disclaim charges made on his behalf. Sec-
ond, the statement emphasized the “nature of adultery” with reference to 
“moral degeneration.” It was asserted that moral degeneration does not ap-
pear suddenly; therefore, it needs to be observed over time. According to the 
statement, only the close relatives of a woman can ascertain moral degenera-
tion and take action accordingly. The only person to decide whether to file a 
complaint and consider it thoroughly is the husband, because he is the only 
one who knows the bitter consequences of accusing his wife of adultery. 
Thus, the husband was expected to behave meticulous enough to bring the 
case to the court. The statement bitterly criticized the adultery bill in the 
sense that it substituted litigators (husband or parents) with military authori-
ties, thus forcing prosecution offices to try women who had allegedly com-
mitted adultery. Under usual conditions, if someone other than the husband 
or parents informed prosecutors of adultery cases, their claims would remain 
as an act of informing, ihbar. However, if the draft were accepted and mili-
tary authorities gained the right to open cases on behalf of husbands or par-
ents, prosecution offices would have to charge the woman immediately. The 
military was seeking the right to be the sole authority over the control of ex-
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tramarital relationships, as if it were a party to – that is,  “victim of” – the 
crime. Accordingly, transferring adultery cases from private to criminal law 
would result in conflicts. The Ministry of Justice clearly noted that while pri-
vate cases can be dropped by the decision of the litigator, public cases remain 
open until a final decision is made. The statement also referred to the elimi-
nation of the power of civilian authorities. While a mechanism of denuncia-
tion was in effect for adultery cases in which prosecutors had discretionary 
power to decide whether a case should be taken to court, the draft law pro-
posed that the complaints – şikayet – of military officials were equivalent to 
those of husband or parents. Therefore, the discretionary power of civilian 
authorities would be eliminated. Another point of objection was that the bill 
contradicted the principle of “unity of law.” It would apply only to a certain 
social group in specific cases. For these reasons, the Ministry of Justice op-
posed the adultery bill. The Council of Ministers, deferring to the reports of 
the Ministry of Justice and the Council of State, rejected the draft law pro-
posed by the Ministry of War.84 For our purposes, the draft shows the will-
ingness of military authorities to regulate male/female relationships based on 
concerns about protecting morality so that these relationships would not 
harm mobilization efforts. 
My contention is that the authorization of military courts to try sexual 
assaults of soldiers’ female relatives was the beginning of subsequent inter-
ventions into the family during the First World War. It was followed by un-
successful legislation – the Adultery Bill – and continued with a more delib-
erate step: the Family Decree of 1917. The objections of the Ministry of 
Justice summarized above would partly be eliminated in the legislation on 
family formation and dissolution. 
§ 4.4  The Ottoman Rights of Family Decree of 1917 
The Ottoman Rights of Family Decree of 1917 (Hukuk-u Aile Kararnamesi) 
is among the most controversial legislation of the war. First, its content and 
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particularly its articles regarding women’s right to divorce constitute an on-
going debate in the literature.85 Second, the timing of the introduction of 
family reform raises an important question: why did Ottoman governments 
bypass family reform in the age of the Tanzimat and introduce it only during 
the turmoil of the First World War?86 The literature on the Family Decree has 
emphasized two dynamics in answer to this question: one, the ruling party 
benefited from wartime conditions and issued a family law that had long 
been on its agenda, and two – less emphasized in the literature –wartime 
conditions necessitated the profound change in state intervention in the 
realm of the family. To present a balanced view, it is possible to claim both 
are true. The family issue and reform had been on the agenda of intellectuals 
since the mid-nineteenth century, but the social conditions that war brought 
about constituted the foundation for family reform. The war affected many 
families, caused great disturbances in the formation and dissolution of fami-
lies, and diminished the basic functions of the family. A recent study by Ni-
han Altınbaş argues that social conditions were central to legislation on the 
family.87 She considers the modernist motives of the ruling party in addition 
to the expectations of Muslim middle-class women including the construc-
                                                      
 85 For instance, Judith Tucker concentrated on whether the Family Law was a step towards gender 
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tion of the nuclear family among the reasons for the introduction of a family 
law. She also mentions that the new family law allowed remarriage for lower-
class women who had lost their husbands, by which they could make a living, 
constituting another reason for the introduction of the family law.88 İlber 
Ortaylı’s article evaluates the Family Decree within the context of legal de-
velopments and the adoption of a modern legal system throughout the nine-
teenth century.89 He considers the Family Decree to be part of the attempts 
at standardization by the Ottoman government (since the decree embraced 
all subjects of the Ottoman Empire regardless of religious affiliation) starting 
from the time of Mahmud II.90 He emphasizes the role of modernist ideology 
in such institutional changes. “Changes in such institutions as marriage, di-
vorce and inheritance oftentimes were surprisingly far-reaching. The essen-
tial importance of these changes lies in the presence behind them of a mod-
ernist ideology and of a debate supporting that ideology.”91 Accordingly, the 
Family Decree was a “natural outgrowth” of other financial and administra-
tive reforms as well as social and legal changes initiated by the Tanzimat bu-
reaucracy which brought about a new perspective on the family as a financial 
unit to be controlled and inspected by the state.92 On the other hand, other 
scholars emphasize the religious nature of the decree – the articles were 
adapted from the four main Sunni schools – and claim that due to the relig-
ious underpinning of the legislation, it is misleading to evaluate it within the 
context of attempts at modernization. Fındıkoğlu argues against this line of 
thought and presents the abolishment of the decree in 1919 upon the opposi-
tion of both Muslims and non-Muslim religious scholars as proof that the 
decree was neither welcomed nor accepted as a “religious” text.93 The relig-
ious underpinning of the legislation, according to him, as well as to other 
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scholars, was just a means of eliminating religious opposition and legitimiz-
ing the legislation.94 
Instead of dealing with these questions, I direct my attention to aspects 
that situate family reform in the wider context of discourses of moral decline. 
To this end, the following pages answer two questions: How did critiques of 
dominant social values and norms play a role in the introduction of family 
reform? How were moral concerns and the idea of regenerating the family 
reflected in the legislation? To address the latter, I use the justificatory text 
(esbâb-ı mucibe lâyihası) together with the body of the legislation, while to 
answer the former, I present critical voices in the late Ottoman intelligentsia 
that paved the way for fruitful debate on the limits of Islamic Law and the 
role of social norms in Ottoman Muslim family formation. 
4.4.1  Mores and Laws 
As mentioned earlier, the discourse on moral decline was associated with a so-
called family crisis in the late Ottoman context. A close look at the works of 
late Ottoman intellectuals reveals narratives mostly centered on family and 
the relationships between men and women. The themes of the emancipation 
of women, family tragedy, critique of over-Westernization along with cri-
tique of backwardness were endemic to Ottoman literary works.95 The de-
structive effect of war was reflected in themes calling for urgent discussion of 
national revival. A national revival was only possible by modernizing the 
family; however, the social values and superstitions of the society stood in 
the way. The main point of this theme is as follows: The ways of forming 
families (segregating women and men until marriage is realized) weakens the 
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foundations of the family resulting in an unhappy marriage. Spouses remain 
bound to each other because divorce is not welcomed in the society. This un-
happy environment such couple’s children who reproduce this unhappiness in 
every sphere of their lives. The values of such families have no rational basis; 
roles and responsibilities of family members are not defined. The children are 
not sufficiently educated within the family (due to the early marriage or sim-
ple ignorance of the parents), and they reproduce the same problems in their 
own families. 
The crisis of family came to be associated with the crisis of morality be-
cause the foundations of the family as an institution are integral to the values 
of a given society. For instance, what prevented women and men from get-
ting to know each other before marriage? The answer is the moral codes of 
the society. What prevented women from taking an active role in Ottoman 
public space? Why did Muslim women not work outside their homes in the 
cities? These questions are multiple, but the answer is more or less the same. 
Eventually, norms had to change in order to regenerate the Ottoman family 
and strengthen the idea of family reform. The Family Decree is a result of 
these concerns attempting to change the perception of morality, recognize 
the “will” of women, and define duties and rights, both of which are strongly 
related to morality. The First World War revealed hideous realities and func-
tioned as an engine for legal and perceptional change in the realm of the 
family. But how does one change the norms that constitute the basis of law-
making? Islamic Law had claimed the realm of the family for hundreds of 
years; how could secular powers intervene in this sphere without provoking 
an enormous reaction? I believe two factors played important roles: first, 
new interpretations of lawmaking in Islam, and second, the discourse of the 
salvation of the nation. While the former enabled the possibility of reform in 
the family, the latter strengthened it by emphasizing wartime circumstances 
and linking the well-being of the family with that of the nation. The persis-
tence idea was that the degeneration of Muslim families – and thus the foun-
dation of Muslim society – had occurred to an extent that family reform was 
inevitable. 
Without intellectual debates challenging traditional sources of law, family 
reform was impossible. The advocates of family reform, most of whom were 
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Turkish nationalists, agreed on the superiority of Islamic Law and spoke 
within a theological framework. They took mores (örf) that had prevailed in 
old Turkish communities as significant inputs for lawmaking. This, indeed, 
increased the tension between the Islamists and nationalists. Both the Isla-
mists and nationalists shared the assumption that Muslim civilization was in 
decline. Both agreed on the need for reforms to overcome this problem. Ac-
cording to Berkes, the core of the debate was to identify the limits of Islamic 
Law so that areas for reform could be clearly defined. Berkes states that “in 
spite of their docility and progressiveness,” the Islamists opposed to limiting 
the areas covered by Şeriat because the “real Şeriat, they knew, was shielded 
by a thick cultural crust containing elements ranging from the form of gov-
ernment to the mode of cleaning one's teeth.”96 For Islamists there were no 
areas that Islamic Law excludes. Indeed, the debate was of fundamental im-
portance in critical years on which the fate of the empire depended. 
Ziya Gökalp, the chief theorist of the nationalists and a well-known ad-
vocate of family reform, formulated his thoughts on the idea that mores (örf) 
have an important place in the codification of Islamic Law.97 By giving ex-
amples from the history of the Islam (including its early years) as well as 
from the golden age of the Ottoman Empire, he emphasized the major role 
of mores upon which the rulers relied. Contrary to Islamists arguments on 
the need for a “pure” adaptation of Islamic Law, he reserved a space for mores 
in lawmaking in order to realize family reform. He claimed that mores 
should be regarded as equally important as classical sources of Islamic Law in 
order that the law be widely accepted in society. By attaching importance to 
the “words of the rulers,” he sought to eliminate the “divine” interpretation 
upon which Islamic scholars relied. Emphasizing the need for change, he 
stated the importance of new values for shaping the new codification. Inevi-
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tably, these values needed to be compatible with the modern world and the 
social realities of Ottoman society. Mansurizade Said, who was a professor of 
jurisprudence, strengthened the thesis of Gökalp regarding the authority of 
legislators over the sanction or prohibition of polygamy in Islam.98 It is possi-
ble to argue that this debate over the sources of law, the authority of legisla-
tors, and the compatibility of the law with modern times paved the way for 
the Family Decree. As the old moral order was in decline, progressive norms 
and values in the shape of mores acted as principles of lawmaking. 
On the other hand, discourses on the relationship between the regenera-
tion of family and that of the nation constituted another point of departure 
in the justification of family reform. Similar assertions were made during the 
Balkan Wars in the Ottoman press. Eyal Ginio’s work on the Ottoman cul-
ture of defeat in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars presents how feelings of 
revenge and loss of honor were combined with discourses on national awak-
ening and the renewal of the nation. 
Frequently aired in the Ottoman literature of defeat were the notions 
of awakening and renewal. These keywords involved a far-reaching 
reappraisal of Ottoman politics and society that would include a 
reformulation of the most basic definitions and categorizations of Ot-
toman community. Regeneration of the Ottoman nation seemed to 
many Ottoman authors the only way to emerge from the disaster. 
Under exceedingly difficult circumstances related to the catastrophe 
in the Balkans, they were now contemplating a new and better future 
for the Ottoman nation. To convince the people to regenerate it was 
necessary to awaken them (intibah).99 
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In the “Ottoman literature of defeat,” the regeneration of the nation was not 
independent of that of the family and of women.100 For commentators, so-
cial reform was necessary for political success. A contemporary woman 
writer, Mükerrem Belkıs, explicitly argued that remaining ambivalent about 
demolishing old customs – particularly insisting on the segregation of the 
sexes until marriage – amounted to treason.101 The discourses on “saving the 
nation” during both the Balkan Wars and the First World War were a pretext 
to demand state intervention in the family sphere. Serpil Çakır shows that 
contemporary women writers correlated defeat on the battlefield with des-
peration at home – that is, with the environment in which the soldiers grew 
up.102 In this line of thought, happiness in the family was key to success in 
battle. One of the major arguments Ziya Gökalp makes in his series of arti-
cles on the family morality was that the principle of equality in politics can 
only be realized if equality in the family is established.103 According to him, 
the Family Decree was an outcome of this concern. 
As discussed earlier, the war tested the vulnerability of Ottoman Muslim 
families to the burdens of war. Especially in the countryside, increasing 
numbers of adultery, abduction, and rape cases strengthened this view. A 
close look at the articles of the Family Decree as well as its justificatory text 
(esbâb-ı mucibe lâyihası) allows us to interpret the rationale behind the de-
cree and to establish links between discourses of moral decline and the need 
for family reform. First, a serious problem in the countryside regarding the 
formation of families was marriages made under coercion that were generally 
followed by abductions (particularly of minor girls). Tüccarzade addressed 
this problem which for him signified moral decline in the provincial areas. 
“We are aware of the conditions in the big cities. It is also not good what is 
happening in even the small towns of Anatolia. There, most cases [of moral 
decline] manifest themselves in the shape of abductions of girls and adul-
                                                      
100 Ibid., 121.  
101 “Vatanın selameti için yapılacak bu teşebbüslerde evham vatana hıyanetliktir.” Mükerrem 
Belkıs, “Muzur Adetleri Yıkmak Farzdır,” Kadınlar Dünyası, No: 83, 1329 (1913), 2. 
102 Çakır, “Meşrutiyet Devri Kadınlarının Aile Anlayışı.” 
103 Ziya Gökalp, “Aile Ahlakı-3: Konak,” Yeni Mecmua, No: 12-17, 1917.  
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tery.”104 Article 57 of the Family Decree attempted to prevent such marriages 
by invalidating marriage contracts signed under coercion. The justificatory 
memorandum (esbab-ı mucibe layihası) gives clues about how this article 
came to be introduced.  
Many Muslim women have been abducted and forced violently to 
marry unworthy people, and the attempts of families to save these 
girls have failed, thus resulting in huge disasters. On the other hand, 
the doctrine of İmam Şafii opposes such marriages; therefore, [it] was 
adopted in Article 57 to prevent such misconduct.105  
Previously, the Hanefi school accepted even marriages contracted under co-
ercion.106 
Second, the Family Decree addressed the problem of adolescent educa-
tion in the family. As the esbâb-ı mûcibe layihası puts it, early marriage was 
one main reason for the “degeneration of the Muslim community” (İslam 
unsurunun tedennîsi) in Ottoman society. “Less-educated” adolescents make 
a family and establish a lifestyle without being capable of controlling it. 
Strikingly, the esbâb-ı mâcibe lâyihası underscored wartime as the moment 
of breakdown when family formation and family life in Ottoman society 
became unsustainable. 
Although the authorities of Islamic law endorsed the marriages of 
children arranged by their tutors and such marriage contracts were 
conducted up to now, given the changing conditions in our era, a dif-
ferent attitude is deemed necessary. That is to say, in every era, and 
above all in this era in which the struggle to survive has become ex-
treme, the first duty of parents to their children should be to educate 
                                                      
104 “Büyük şehirlerimizde cereyan eden ahvâl meçhulumuz değil. Anadolu’da en küçük kasabalara 
kadar cereyan eden ahvâl de pek iyi değil. Ora mehâkiminde cereyan eden deavinin nısfından 
ziyadesi kız kaçırmak, fi’il-i şen’i vukûatı teşkil ediyor.” Tüccarzade, “Aile Hayatımızda 
Avrupalılaşmanın Tesiri,” 234.  
105 “Münakahat ve Müfarakat Kararnamesi Esbab-ı Mucibe Layihası.” See Appendix C, 
Quotation, 6.  
106 Aydın, İslâm-Osmanlı Aile Hukuku, 192.  
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them and raise them to be strong in this world of battles and to form 
a proper family, but our parents keep neglecting education and the 
instruction of their children, either to see them marry or – that they 
gain inheritance rights – to arrange marriage contracts when the kids 
are in the cradle. Eventually, these poor children who are ignorant of 
the world are married and their catastrophic future is determined in 
marriage ceremonies. These children who never attended a school, 
cannot read or write in their native language, do not know the prin-
ciples of religion, are establishing families that are born to die, con-
demned to decompose in the first months of the marriage. This is one 
of the reasons why families in our country are not established on 
strong foundations.107 
The esbab-ı mucibe layihası emphasized concerns for the marriage of minor 
girls in particular. 
The wife and husband, in constituting a family and managing it, shall 
act together. While boys are allowed to spend time playing in the 
streets, girls of the same age are overwhelmed by the greatest burden 
in human society: being a mother and the manager of a family. These 
poor girls, whose physical constitution is not yet sufficiently com-
plete to be a mother, live in misery all their lives and suffer anxiety. 
The children to which they give birth are vulnerable and nervous, 
causing the gradual degeneration of the Muslim community.108 
For the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire, the decree recog-
nized adolescents as new category. Previously, Sharia law acknowledged only 
two categories: childhood and adulthood. The law forbade the marriage of 
children under a certain age irrespective of the consent of their families. This 
age limit was twelve for boys and nine for girls, and the age for independent 
marriages without consent of the families was seventeen for women and 
                                                      
107 “Münakahat ve Müfarakat Kararnamesi Esbâb-ı Mûcibe Lâyihası.” See Appendix C, 
Quotation, 7.   
108 Ibid. See Appendix C, Quotation 8.  
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eighteen for men. In this way, not only were child marriages prevented, but 
an intended change in family norms was triggered. The family had to edu-
cate children and prepare them for the future. This was the formulation that 
was believed would improve the standards of Muslim families and thus of the 
Ottoman nation. 
The problem of remarriage was another issue that related the Family De-
cree to discourses on morality. Since marriages were not registered in Islam 
and were maintained only as a verbal promise, the only proof of marriage 
was the testimony of witnesses. In their absence, women or their families 
might claim that she was not married. The esbâb-ı mûcibe lâyihası particu-
larly emphasized the situation of women who remarried while she already had 
a husband. Women or their families might take advantage of the absence of 
husbands due to the war and establish (or in some cases be forced to establish) 
new marriage contracts for various reasons. By means of the decree, the gov-
ernment sought to control marriage contracts by charging courts with the 
task of announcing the marriage before judges and finalizing the marriage 
contract in the absence of objections. So far, scholars have interpreted this 
point in the legislation as an attempt to standardize marriage and control 
over population. However, as can be seen in the esbâb-ı mûcibe lâyihası, the 
real reason behind this measure was to prevent remarriages which had be-
come widespread especially in the countryside. “Many frauds have occurred 
due to the lack of a proper way of making such an important contract, thus 
resulting in the remarriages of women despite the Sharia’s orders. Therefore, 
the Article 37 is being introduced.”109 
Such remarriages binding women to another man in the absence of her 
husband were arranged by village elders or relatives.110 As far as I could find 
                                                      
109 Ibid. “böyle mühim bir akdin intizam dairesinde cereyan etmemesinden pek çok yolsuzluklu-
lar husûle gelmiş ve mevâni-i şeriyyesi olan nice kadınların icra-yı akd ile eşhas-ı sairenin 
ibtal-i hukuku cihetine gidilmiştir. 37inci madde bu yüzden konuldu.”   
110 Celal Nuri addressed this problem in his work Kadınlarımız (Our women) in 1911. 
According to him, the vast autonomy of the husband in Islamic Law contributed to the degen-
eration of Muslim families. As there were no legal impositions such as civil law limiting the 
authority of the husband in cases of divorce, remarriage, and illegitimate children, the family 
remained in disarray, see Nuri, Kadınlarımız.  
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in the archives, letters arrived to various offices from soldiers as well as their 
wives claiming that married women were forced to marry again (or some-
times willingly did so) in the absence of their husband during the Balkan 
Wars.111 In order to prevent this, marriages had to be registered so that the 
rights of the husband as well as those of the wife could be preserved in the 
circumstances of war. The registry would also include information about the 
mehr, the amount to be paid to the woman in case of divorce in order to 
guarantee her livelihood. Moreover, another article was introduced to allow 
the remarriage of those women who had lost their husbands at war or whose 
husbands had gone missing in the course of the war. Accordingly, if a hus-
band is lost during the war, the wife will be considered out of wedlock after 
the combatant countries sign the armistice and one year passes after the pris-
oners of war on both sides go back to their homeland. If a woman married 
without following this rule and her first husband reappeared, her second mar-
riage was invalidated. If she did follow the rule and the husband, who was 
considered to have died during the war, appeared later on, the second mar-
riage would still be invalidated. Those who married or witnessed the marriage 
of already married women would be sentenced to imprisonment of up to 
three years. 
Another issue signifying the relationship between morality concerns and 
the Family Decree was the prevention of temporary marriages. The Article 
55 of Family Decree strictly banned temporary marriage contracts (nikah-ı 
mut’a or nikâh-ı muvakkat). This practice was particularly common among 
Muslims. It was believed that if couples entered into a temporary marriage 
contract (in a religious vein) before having sexual intercourse, sex would not 
be considered a sin or as adultery. A madrasa teacher from Konya, Abdullah 
                                                      
111 For instance, on April 17, 1913 a certain Aişe wrote a petition from Kastamonu claiming that 
village elders were forcing her to marry someone else since she had not received news from 
her husband who had been in the military service for a while. Although this case was during 
the Balkan Wars, such instances presumably increased during the First World War, see DH.H. 
43/61 4 Nisan 1329 (17 April 1913). In another case, a soldier claimed that his fiancee had 
been forced to marry, and he asked an official investigation. The Ministry of the Interior Af-
fairs decided to investigate the roles of the imam, muhtar and village elders and to punish 
them, see DH.H. 47/63 27 May 1913.  
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Fevzi Efendi, who had joined the army during the First World War and also 
served as an imam, claimed that these contracts were quite common among 
the military ranks. In his memoirs which he wrote in Arabic, he titled one 
chapter Morality in the Army and started it with this sentence: “Damn the 
amorality of the members of the Islamic army and soldiers in this century.”112 
He claims that he witnessed many temporary marriages of military officers 
in Iraq: “In Hüseyinabad, a village near Hemedan, moral corruption and in-
stances of temporary marriage (mut’a) increased further.”113 He stated that 
official orders were introduced to prevent such cases and military command-
ers issued penalties to imams who took part in temporary marriages. These 
marriages, according to him, caused moral decay as well as the spread of ve-
nereal disease in the military.114 Article 55 of the decree might be related to 
concern about the practice of temporary marriages which had especially in-
creased with the mass mobilization of the army.115 
Finally, enabling women to divorce under particular conditions (which 
had to be indicated by the women in the marriage contract) can also be 
evaluated within the framework of regenerating the family. A woman’s right 
to divorce, adopted from the Maliki school, was a distinctive point of the de-
cree. In cases of disagreement, women gained the right to divorce with the 
consent of a “family council” appointed by the court. Women could also 
demand divorce on account of illness (including venereal disease), feeble-
mindedness, and impotency, but only after a one-year period of recovery. 
This, I believe, was designed to dissolve those families that had lost their 
function for society – such as “reproduction” – and to enable the reforma-
tion of new families by empowering women to do so. Among the articles on 
                                                      
112 “Vâ esefâ ale’l-ahlâk fî ceyşi’l-İslam fî hâze’l-asr! Yaşadığımız yüzyılda İslam ordusu ve 
askerinde mevcut ahlaka yazıklar olsun!” Koçkuzu, Çanakkale Cephesinde Bir Müderris, 156.  
113 “Hemedan’da Hüseyinabad köyünde iken ahlaki düşüklükler, geçici evlilikler (mut’a) daha da 
arttı.” Ibid., 179.  
114 Ibid., 182–183. 
115 On February 14, 1915, the Council of Ministers issued an official decree enacting mandatory 
retirement of amoral (suî ahlak) or incompetent (adem-i liyakat) members of the military. 
Although not expounded upon further in the document, such instances concerned immorality, 
see MV. 196/75 1333 Ra 29 (14 February 1915). 
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marriage, that on polygamy was the most debated. Although not forbidden, 
woman had the right to indicate whether she accepted polygamy. If she did 
not and the man insisted, she had the right to divorce. The Hanbeli school 
was taken as a basis for this article. Many Islamists opposed this point and 
claimed that at the end of the war there would be more women than men, so 
polygamy would be a social necessity.116 However, for lawmakers the impor-
tant thing was the regeneration of family, not the distribution of men and 
women according to the population ratio. In order to regenerate family, 
women first had to be empowered within marriage.117 
Can legislation change norms in society? Or does law reflect norms that 
already exist in that society? We tend to think lawmaking is the result of 
structural change, not the converse. However, it seems that Ottoman intel-
lectuals and reformers approached legislation as a way to introduce new fam-
ily values and thus a new understanding of morality. This point, in fact, was 
in line with Durkheimian sociology, Durkheim’s analysis of norms, and his 
pragmatic approach to science through which a prescription for the future is 
possible. According to this approach, an individual or group of people can 
solve the disparity between the rules of morality and the actual state of soci-
ety.118 
Morality and family reform were related in the sense that the problems of 
Ottoman family formation and dissolution were associated with moral decay. 
The advocates of family reform linked the wellbeing of adolescents, women, 
and men to those of the nation in order to legitimize the need for reform. 
On the other hand, that the Family Decree was inspired by these insights and 
concern about moral decline can be ascertained from its articles. 
                                                      
116 Aydın, İslâm-Osmanlı Aile Hukuku, 192. Also see Scott Rank’s article on the famous debate 
between Fatma Aliye and Mahmud Es’ad on polygamy in which Mahmud Es’ad defended po-
lygamy as a means of maintaining a balanced ratio of women and men in the population. He 
also argued that men instinctively tend to marry multiple women, which according to him 
prevents immorality in society, Rank, “Polygamy and Religious Polemics in the Late Ottoman 
Empire.”  
117 For instance, Tüccarzade stated that only “law” can save Muslim women from their inferiority 
in society. Tüccarzade, “Aile Hayatımızda Avrupalılaşmanın Tesiri,” 235. 
118 Stock-Morton, Moral Education for a Secular Society, 133. 
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§ 4.5  Concluding Remarks 
This chapter addressed the relation of moral decline discourses and discourses 
on the Ottoman Muslim family in the context of the First World War. By 
linking the circumstances faced by Ottoman Muslim families during the war 
and the discourses of moral decline on the Ottoman homefront, I argue that 
state intervention in family had reflected concerns about moral decline. In 
cases of rape, sexual assault, and abduction, the victims asked for active state 
protection in return for their contribution to the war effort. I consider the 
Adultery Bill of 1916 as a further instance of state intervention into the fam-
ily in order to protect homefront morality. Although the legislation was un-
successful, the content of the bill caused intense debate on the extent of 
state’s role in regulating sexual relationships. Finally, I evaluate the Family 
Decree of 1917 as part many attempts of the Ottoman government to pro-
tect families during the war. By establishing a close link between the well-
being of the nation and that of the family, Ottoman intellectuals and re-
formers attributed great importance to moral values for the formation, disso-
lution, and function of families. As Salim Tamari asserted, we tend to see the 
destructive effects of the war, but there was an “unanticipated emancipatory 
impact” of the war “that opened up new social horizons,” as well.119 Perhaps, 
the Family Decree of 1917 can be considered part of this side of the war. 
                                                      






orality was instrumental in discourses regarding the preservation of 
social and political order throughout the history of the Ottoman 
Empire. Political and social crises were often translated into concerns over 
morality making it the ultimate touchstone of whether the state was doing its 
duty. Morality came to be considered part of the principles of religion, and 
the role of the Ottoman ulema in maintaining moral order meant that their 
moral authority was established in legislation as well as in jurisdiction. In the 
course of the nineteenth century, with a shift in the perception of state 
power, public order, and the formation of a broad intellectual and public 
space, morality became a contested realm among several actors. 
This study analyzes the preconditions that led to emergence of moral de-
cay debates in the society and among the ruling elites together with dis-
courses of morality and moral decay in the context of the First World War. It 
focuses on how morality became instrumental for polemics on several issues 
around political, cultural, and social developments. Throughout this disserta-
tion, I argue that debates over morality had new political, social, and cultural 
implications closely associated with the circumstances of war. 
The approach of this study differs from previous ones to discourses of 
moral decline as it presents a multifaceted scrutiny of moral decline beyond 
debates about prostitution, on which other approaches primarily focus. Also, 
instead of taking moral decline as reality per se, I consider it as a discourse 
M 
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echoing important political and social implications. I study the discourse in 
juxtaposition with the historical context, and in this way, I demonstrate the 
vast space that morality occupied in various realms. I argue that moral space 
was highly politicized and was intermingled with several issues that were 
fundamental to the social and political transformation of the empire. 
Throughout this study, I sought to answer the question how morality related 
to the war. This simple question was crucial for shedding a light on the Ot-
toman experience of the First World War. 
Opinionated articles on morality in the Ottoman press lead one to as-
sume that prostitution and venereal disease should dominate a study on mo-
rality as these were considered and perceived as major threats to public moral-
ity. However, as demonstrated in this work, both morality and moral decline 
had wider definitions and implications in the period in question. The sense 
of moral decline was triggered not only as a result of war-induced anxieties, 
but also due to domestic and external developments. In their quest to save 
the state and form a new society, the Ottoman intelligentsia directed its at-
tention to morality which was the priority among realms to be reformed. It 
was crucial for the progress, regeneration, and revival of the nation. The 
problem of morality reveals a common anxiety regarding the national regen-
eration. As the First World War was a watershed event for envisaging the fu-
ture nation, debates on morality became urgent in discussions of the social 
and intellectual structure on which the nation should rely. From the stand-
point of morality polemicists, the system of values and social norms consti-
tuted obstacles to the advancement of the Ottoman Muslim society and con-
tributed to the decline of the empire.  
Similar to contemporary debates about morality, the issue of women was 
central to morality discussions. The war created a common anxiety about the 
consequences of the broader participation of women in social and economic 
life vis-à-vis the future of the patriarchal order. As most women had to fend 
for themselves during the war, concerns about the degradation of norms sur-
rounding the patriarchal family dominated morality debates. A common 
anxiety was evident in debates on what should replace the old moral order. In 
the highly politicized atmosphere of the war, nationalism met morality, 
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marking a moment of transformation between the old moral order and a 
new one. 
This study explores three major realms for the study of wartime morality, 
namely ideologies defended by the intelligentsia, official measures and poli-
cies implemented by political and military elites, and state interventions into 
the family and female sexuality. Undoubtedly, these three areas of inquiry are 
not mutually exclusive. As shown throughout this dissertation, these layers 
continuously feed one another. For the sake of the simplicity of presentation, 
I presented them under separate headings. 
First, I present intellectual discussions of morality through several jour-
nals representing different ideological standpoints among the Ottoman in-
telligentsia. Among the major publications covering morality and moral de-
cline, I evaluated İslam Mecmuası, Yeni Mecmua and Sebilürreşad. While 
Sebilürreşad represented the Islamist wing of the Ottoman political spec-
trum, Yeni Mecmua and İslam Mecmuası belonged to Turkish nationalists 
whose popularity was increasing at the time. Of these two journals, İslam 
Mecmuası was the instrument by which nationalists clarified their views on 
religion. Evaluating İslam Mecmuası from the point of morality is crucial to 
see how new interpretations of religion and Islamic law intersected with the 
reformists’ search for a new morality. The journal has a different theological 
approach to morality whereby Turkish nationalists developed to weaken the 
arguments of Islamists. The nationalist version of Islamic morality sought to 
establish a new morality based on collectivism, solidarity, and modern needs. 
On the other hand, Yeni Mecmua employed a more explicit sociological ap-
proach to morality and moral decline which thoroughly reflected the views of 
the nationalists. Moral decline as deliberately evaluated by Necmettin Sadak 
and Ziya Gökalp in this journal served the objectives of establishing a new 
life and envisaging a new future for the Turkish society. Gökalp’s ideas have 
been subject to several inquiries in various fields of research. However, his 
approach to the issue of morality has never been studied in detail. In this re-
spect, an analysis of Gökalp’s understanding of morality is vital to shed light 
on his intellectual and political legacy. In this study, I explore his concept of 
“national morality” and evaluate it as part of the nascent secular ideals of the 
intelligentsia. Adopting the Durkheimian morale laïque and the ideology of 
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the French Third Republic, the nationalists approached moral decline as an 
instrument to stress the need for political and legal change. They discovered 
that morality plays is a unifying power in society and incorporated it into 
debates around solidarism. Discussion of the new morality went hand in 
hand with emphasis on the need for reform in realms such as education, fam-
ily, and professional life. While reforms in education would establish the 
foundation of national morality, legal reforms would strengthen ties binding 
individuals to one another. A rational understanding of morality in profes-
sional life would solve war-induced problems such as profiteering. Similarly, 
the establishment of rational morality would regenerate Muslim families by 
eliminating the power of traditions and superstitions surrounding the forma-
tion and dissolution of family.  
The writers in Sebilürreşad, on the other hand, were exasperated by these 
comments on new morality. The main concern of Sebilürreşad’s writers was 
to underscore the facts that Islam is the only source of morality and that Is-
lamic practices are the instruments for reaching a higher moral standard. Ac-
cording to this line of thought, moral decline was the result of divergence 
from Islam because religion was the only source of morality. Accordingly, all 
calamities, including the loss of land, the dissolution of the empire, and social 
problems, stemmed from moral decline. For them, the strength of the Mus-
lims was their faith in the greatness of God and their respect of the Sharia; 
once religion lost its power, defeat was inevitable. The discourses of moral 
decline in this journal aimed to bolster critiques of European cultural influ-
ence. The main characteristics of the morality discussion in Sebilürreşad – 
which were distinctively different from those of the nationalists on morality 
– were the centrality of sexuality, opposition to the feminist movement, and 
critique of Western modernity. They harshly criticized the concept of “na-
tional morality” which they considered antagonistic to God’s orders. The edi-
tors of Sebilürreşad employed discourses of moral decline to attack national-
ists, asserting that they contributed to moral degeneration by advocating for 
the rights of women through the concept of a new life and freedom. In a 
time when spiritual ideologies were under attack by materialism, the writers 
of Sebilürreşad used the moral decline paradigm to reestablish a religious he-
gemony over lifestyles and public space. As the judicial and executive power 
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of the Ottoman ulema was at risk, the morality argument became an urgent 
means to reclaim these powers. 
Going through women’s journals shows how women responded to gen-
dered polemics on moral decline. Through the articles in women’s journals 
such as Kadınlar Dünyası, Genç Kadın, Bilgi Yurdu, and Seyyale I present an 
overview of the main discussions on moral decline and morality from the 
perspective of Muslim women. While some of the women writers in these 
journals expressed their discontent over the double standard of moral expec-
tations, others shared patriarchal approaches towards morality. For female ad-
vocates of family reform, the morality issue became a political tool for ques-
tioning traditional values in the society that constituted an obstacle to 
women’s participation in social life. The war context is crucial for under-
standing this point because these women established their ideas on the fact 
that during the war many Muslim women had to fend for themselves in the 
absence of men. 
In short, intellectual discussions about moral decline show how morality 
was politicized in the context of the war. The rise of materialism, the declara-
tion of jihad, ideological contests over political and public space, critiques of 
previous reforms, the search for a new life, the war-induced social problem of 
profiteering, and women’s labor and political rights constituted the major 
topics of polemics of moral decline. Moral decline debates offered several 
prominent intellectual figures an opportunity to discuss and question extant 
daily and social practices in their quest for social reform and a new spirit. 
Once an obstacle to progress, morality became an ideal starting point to 
penetrate in previously untouched institutions. This study deliberately puts 
the discussion in its historical political and social context in order to under-
stand the increased emphasis on morality. 
In a second layer of analysis, I focus on official approaches to the prob-
lem of immorality in manners that included the concept of public morality. 
By drawing attention to wartime regulations regarding the protection of 
public morality in combatant countries, I argue that moral anxieties created a 
common discourse intermingled with concern about both the practical and 
political implications of moral decline. In the course of the war, violations of 
public morality became part of the growing concern for national security; 
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meanwhile, the wartime rivalry among combatant countries constituted the 
backbone of a cultural opposition in which moral contestation played a sig-
nificant role. The Ottoman Empire prioritized moral considerations over 
other concerns, as evidenced by official propaganda underscoring the superi-
ority of Muslim identity. By exploring wartime developments such as the 
court martial orders regarding immorality and the role of the abolishment of 
capitulations in the fight against prostitution and the trafficking of women, I 
argue that there was an increasing emphasis on national security in response 
to “immoral” behavior. These findings underpin the initial claim of this dis-
sertation that morality reflects political and social change instead of being an 
independent set of cultural norms. I believe this approach enables an evalua-
tion of the First World War period as a moment of transition from an old 
moralistic discourse to the new medical moralism which gained momentum 
in 1930s eugenic thought in the Republic of Turkey. 
The analysis of foreigners’ applications for citizenship which were elabo-
rated on in chapter 3 underpins this basic finding. These applications were 
denied on the basis of moral quality of the applicant, corroborating the asser-
tion that moral judgments corresponded to national security concerns and 
wartime measures to rid society of “undesirable” elements. As discussed in 
chapter 3, the nationality of foreigners was important for identifying the 
“other” in the atmosphere of the war and labeling them as immoral. The basis 
of their exclusion was legitimized by using the etiquettes of morality. 
The present study examines an unexplored wartime measure against the 
violation of morality, namely that unregistered, illegal prostitutes and mor-
ally weak individuals were sent out from martial law territories to places 
where there were no railway connections. Using the archival documents from 
several departments of the Ministry of the Interior Affairs together with peti-
tions sent to them, I determine whether the “ostracism” of immoral indi-
viduals went beyond the military measures and became a social phenome-
non. Interestingly, Ottoman authorities did not stigmatize these people to 
the extent of leaving them unemployed. I contend that this was partly be-
cause the Ottoman government associated the violation of public morality 
with the violation of public order. I interpret this an indicator of the fear of 
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further moral decline and the deterioration of public order that could acceler-
ate due to poverty. 
In quotidian life, the protection of public morality was vital for maintain-
ing public order. However, this did not mean that Ottoman authorities, 
whether bureaucratic or military, established absolute authority over public 
morality. Entertainment, leisure activities, and “vices” such as alcohol and 
gambling constituted a source of revenue for the state. Therefore, the gov-
ernment had a pragmatic approach towards such expenses. Among the con-
servative public, such vices signified moral corruption as they symbolized the 
immorality of Western civilization. On the other hand, a second, new cri-
tique emerged out of nationalist sentiment that such places distract people’s 
attention from the war. In an effort to sublimate moral and financial inter-
ests, semi-governmental war relief organizations became dominant in the 
organization of entertainment. Eventually, moral instruction and war propa-
ganda conflicted with the need to increase revenue as the public showed little 
interest in regulated entertainment. 
A common trend was that many social, economic, and political problems 
were translated into the discourse of moral decline in the popular perception 
of morality. This was particularly valid for the problem of war profiteering, 
demonstrating that the collective memory of the war was shaped by the 
moralistic imagery of wartime inequality between the rich and the poor. The 
literary products of the postwar era explicitly reflect this tension through the 
representation of wealthy profiteers. The stories of debauchery of such charac-
ters attracted wider audiences than political critiques. 
When the object of analysis is morality in traditional societies, family is 
an inevitable subject. Ottoman society was no exception in this regard. 
Therefore, widespread concerns about morality, values, traditions, and norms 
vis-à-vis the wartime family is one of the major topics of this study. As de-
tailed in chapter 4, there was evident concern about family and women in 
many combatant countries, but the Ottoman case had its own peculiarities. 
In the Ottoman case, attention was directed not only towards the family per 
se, but to all forms of encounter between men and women. I consider the 
family in this wider context of gender, sexuality, and patriarchy. The relations 
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between men and women were surrounded by a set of norms interwoven 
with Islamic law and customs regulating sexual conduct. 
Legislations on family during the First World War sought to regenerate 
Muslim families while controlling sexual relationships on the homefront. I 
demonstrate how wartime legislation that targeted the family was driven by 
moral concerns, and I argue that morality discourses reveal the interaction of 
social and political conditions with ideas about the establishment of a new 
civic order. The latter was established on the basis of changing perceptions of 
the family, sexuality, and morality. 
This study is as much about the social circumstances in which Ottoman 
people lived as it is about intellectual discussions. Contrary to widespread 
contentions among researchers that prioritize the ideological motive of state 
elites to modernize the family, I analyzed the demands of the women and 
soldiers’ who asked for protection from the state, reminding it of the gov-
ernment’s duties and promises. In this respect, I consider the provisional law 
authorizing martial courts to try the cases of sexual assault of soldiers’ family 
members as a first step of legislative intervention in the family. As a com-
plementary, I explore another attempt to regulate sexual relationships on the 
homefront, namely the Adultery Bill of 1916. This proposal stipulated that 
high ranking military officials would be permitted to file complaints to initi-
ate legal processes on behalf of soldiers against their unfaithful wives. This 
attempt was futile due to debates on the nature of the law and the limits of 
the public and private realms. In this study, the Ottoman Rights of Family 
Decree is evaluated as one legislative attempt to regulate and protect the fam-
ily. Instead of considering state intervention in the family as a step towards 
modernization, I evaluate the preconditions of the Family Decree within a 
framework of social circumstances that triggered the profound change. The 
present study demonstrates that to understand family reform, one must con-
sider intellectual debates about the limitations of Islamic Law, the role of mo-
res and values in the foundation of Ottoman Muslim families and socioeco-
nomic conditions on the homefront. Furthermore, this study reveals how 
discourses on the regeneration of the nation coincided with discourses of 
moral decline, shaping the assertion of the need for social reform. The quest 
for a new family envisioned by the reformist intelligentsia was inherent to 
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the projects of new life and new morality which were based on secular and 
rational foundations. 
The sources used in this study reflect the wide scope of morality debates. 
Their variety also demonstrates how morality was incorporated into politics, 
lawmaking, daily life, and intellectual debates. Despite censorship of certain 
topics, it is possible to say that the morality issue was discussed at length in 
the Ottoman press. 
Morality and moral decline debates have been the subject of a few studies 
of the Ottoman Empire, albeit on a limited scale. In the scope of this study, I 
mainly focus on the central notion of ahlâk in the particular context of the 
First World War. However, further research covering the periods between the 
Tanzimat era and early republican Turkey will reveal the changing discourses 
of morality more comprehensively. Since morality is at the intersection of 
topics such as education, family, law, education, and social life, I believe fur-
ther studies on morality from historical perspective will contribute to the his-
toriography of the Ottoman Empire in several contexts and shed a new light 
on topics that have been studied previously. 
Morality still has a distinct place in debates over secularism, gender, and 
modernity reflected in different views on lifestyle, school education, male 
and female relationships, public order, and law making. Debates that took 
place over a hundred years ago are important for understanding the contem-







“Matbuat: Ahlâk-ı Umûmiyenin Islahı Lüzumu ve Hükümetin 
Vazifesi.” Sebilürreşad, no: 364 (August 1918): 265-266. 
Evet yalnız Dahiliye nezareti değil bütün heyet-i hükümet bu mes’eleye 
[ahlâk-ı umûmiye] çok ehemmiyet atf ediyor. Bilhassa sadrazam paşa, ahlak-ı 
umumiyenin gittikçe pek ziyade inhitat etmesinden müte’essir oluyorlar. Ve 
bu hale karşı mümkün olabilecek her türlü tedbiri el birliğiyle ittihaza karar-ı 
kat’i vermiş bulunuyorlar. 
Esâsen benim fikrimce ahlâk meselesiyle hükümet her vakit alakâdar 
olmuştur. Her memlekette hükümetler halkın ahlâkî, fikrî hareketi üzerinde 
icrâ-yı te’sir ederler. Hükümetin bu te’siri bilhassa bizden ziyadedir. Hükümet 
halka tarik-i müstakimi göstermeğe, bu hususda bizzat kendisi rehber olarak 
ahlâk-ı umûmîyenin harisi, zamini olmağa mecburdur. Her yerden ziyade 
bizim memlekette halk muhtâc-ı vesayit ve velayettir. Âdeta if’al ve hare-
ketini hükümetin hareketine tamamı tamamına tevfik eder. 
 
Quotation 2 
“Matbuat: Akşam Gazetesinden Ahlâk Telâkkîsi.” Sebilürreşad, 
no. 376 (December 1918): 231-232. 
Her halde dört seneden beri değişmiş birçok şeyler görüyoruz. Bunlar içinde 
en göze çarpan ahlâkdır. Aramızda birçokları ahlâk hakkındaki telakkîlerini 
“ahlâk” kelimesinden anladıkları mânâyı iyice değiştirmişler; ahlâk 
mefhûmunun hududlarını alabildiğine açmışlardır. Bu tahavvül ahlâkın her 
nev’inde gördük. Meslek ve vazife ahlâkı, kadın ve cinsiyet ahlâkı, medenî 
ahlâk, ilh. Hepsi yavaş yavaş iflasa doğru yürüdü. Ahlâkın böyle birden bire 
sükût ettiği bir memleket var mıdır bilmem.  
 
Quotation 3  
“Matbuat: Akşam Gazetesinden Ahlâk Telâkkîsi.” Sebilürreşad, 
no. 376 (December 1918): 232. 
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Bu kirliliklerin husûle getirdiği muayyen bir mahiyet ve o mahiyetin bugün 
ta’yin etmiş bir zihniyeti, hayat hakkında çirkin bir telakkisi var ki hergün 
etrafa daha ziyade taşmak, te’sirini daha ilerilere götürmek kudretini gösteri-
yor. Bir taraftan kolayca ve memleketin zararına olarak kazanılmış bol para-
ların te’min eder gibi göründüğü müreffeh bir hayat var ki harb zenginleriyle 
para çalmış ve el-an âsûde yaşayan adamlarda tecellî ediyor. Diğer tarafdan 
tavırları, serbest ve aşırı zevkleriyle Avrupa kadın hayatını temsil eder gibi 
gösterilen ve aile ahlâkı, cinsiyet ahlâkı kat’i rabıta etmiş olan bir kadınlık 
hayatı teşkil etti. 
 
Quotation 4 
“Matbuat: Akşam Gazetesinden Ahlâk Telâkkîsi.” Sebilürreşad, 
no. 376 (December 1918): 232. 
Yeni ve ahlâklı bir hayatın aks-ü âmelleri şimdiden kendini göstermezse, yani 
gerek şiddetli takbihleri aile ve mekteb terbiyemizin, matbuatın telkinleri bu 
ahlâk dizginlerini biraz kurub toplamazsa daha büyük ve kat’i bir iflas 
karşısında kalır. Ahlâk telâkkîsini hâl-i tabiîdeki mâkûl hudûdları dâhiline 
irca’a çalışalım. Memleketin âtisini ancak o zaman kurtarabiliriz. 
 
Quotation 5 
“Commentary by Sebilürreşad.” no. 376 (December 1918): 232. 
Dinî, millî, ictimâî, ahlâkî bütün esasâtımızı devirerek yerine nazari birtakım 
müessesât-ı mevhûme ikâme etmek isteyen ve eski hayat-ı diniyyeye tezyif 
ettikleri şi’ar-ı nezihemizin birer birer yıkıldığını gördükce ‘yeni hayat için 
saha açılıyor’ teraneleriyle ilân-ı şadmâni eden Yeni Mecmua’nın muhar-
rirlerinden velev birini olsun artık yola gelmiş, ahlâk telâkkîleri unvânı 





Quotation 6  
“Memleketimizde Ahlâk Meselesi.” Sebilürreşad, no. 387 (De-
cember 1919): 404-406. 
Şurasını iyi bilmelidir ki bu millet müslümandır. Ahlâkının menbâi din-i is-
lamdır. Fezâileti oradan almıştır. Rezâili de beden ve ruhuna yabancı ellerle 
aşılanmıştır. Ve giriftdar olduğu maraz ahlâk mikrobunun deva-yı acili kal-
bine kuvvetli bir ‘din’ şırıngası yapmaktır. 
 
Quotation 7  
“Kadınlarımız Hakkında.” Sebilürreşad, no. 444 (October 1919): 
19.  
Son senelerde hiç kimsenin inkar edemeyeceği vechile – kadınlarımız 
arasında fuhşun izdiyadi ve İslam kadınlarına gizli bir suretde ve sâik-i fuhş 
ve fücurun i’ta edildiği görüldü. Kadınlar hayat-ı aile ve vezâif-i bitiye-yi [sic] 
terk ve ihmâl ile sokaklara döktürüldü. Hayatlarını katiyyen te’min ede-
meyecek cüz’i meblağlar mukabilinde erkeğin vezâifi de onlara yükledildi. 
 
Quotation 8 
Ziya Gökalp, “Ahlâk Buhranı.” Yeni Mecmua, no. 7 (August 
1917): 122. 
İşte bugün ictimâî iş bölümüne zamime olarak, bir taraftan Avrupa medeni-
yetine gösterdiğimiz müfrit meclûbiyet diğer taraftan cihan harbinin husûle 
getirdiği mânevî tezelzüller, zühdî ahlâkı büsbütün sarsmağa başlamış ve 
bunun neticesi olarak ruhlar ve vicdanlar her türlü ahlâk endişelerinden boş 
kalmağa yüz tutmuştur.  
 
Quotation 9  
Nezihe Hamdi, “Ahlâkî Endişeler.” Kadınlar Dünyası, no. 191 
(December 1914): 2-3. 
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Kadının cemiyet hayatına dahil olmamasını ahlâkî endişeler nâmına taleb 
edenleri bir izâletin icrâsına davet etmek isteriz. Asırlardan beri kadınlar 
böyle mevhûm bir endişe nâmına kapalı ve esir bir hayat yaşadılar. Halbuki 
bugün kadının ayrı yaşamasından azâmî bir istifade te’min edilemediğini 
birçok misalleriyle herkes biliyor. Binâenaleyh, aynı usûlü bir de erkeklere 
karşı tatbik etmek mümkün olamaz mı? Lütfen birkaç asır da onların cemi-
yet haricinde yaşamalarını ve cemiyetin bütün teşkilâtını bizzat kadınların 
idaresine tevdî etmelerini taleb edebilir miyiz? Biraz da kadın ahlâkının meri’ 





Appendix B, Quotation 1 
“Niğde Mutasarrıflığı’ndan Dâhiliye Nezâreti’ne.” BOA. DH. 
EUM. ADL. 33/23 1335 Ş 25 (June 16, 1917). 
Dâhiliye Nezâret-i Celilesine 7 Mart 1333 
Kayseri sancağıyla bazı vilayetlerden birtakım fahişeler ahlâk-ı mahalliyeyi 
ifsâd ve bi’l-netice asâyiş-i memleketi ihlâl ve teğiyyide sebeb oldukları muta-
laasıyla Niğde’ye te’bid olunuyor. Bu te’bid keyfiyeti hiçbir vechile tehzîb-i 
ahlâk için muassır bir tedbir olamaz. Bu misüllü kadınların onda sekizinin bu 
yola selükleri mâhâzâ açlıktan neşa’et ettiği muhakkaktır. Şu halde teb’idden 
ise mahallerince bu kadınların birtakım zanaathanelerde istihdâmı ile 
mâişetleri te’min olunursa ve bir müddet bu sûretle eşgal edilirlerse tabîen bu 
mezmûm hareketten sarf-ı nazar edecekleri bedîhattandır. Halbuki bu yolda 
hiçbir tedbire müracaat edilmeksizin zabıtanın bir jurnali üzerine teb’id 
muâmelesinin icrâsı birçok kadınların ötede beride sürünerek mahvlarını in-
tâc etmekle beraber ahlâk ve asâyiş-i mahalliyi ifsâd ve teğiyyid etmeleri mu-
taalasıyla memleketlerinden çıkarılan bu gibi kadınlar gittikleri mahallerin 
ahlâkını ifsâd ve asâyişini ihlâl etmeyeceklerine ne gibi bir esbâb-ı makûle 
gösterilebilir. Hiçbir tedbir ve hükm-ü mahiyetini haiz olmayan bu nefy key-
fiyetlerini ta’dil ve mahallerince ıslahları çaresine tevsil edilmek ve daha 
mü’essir naki olacağı aşikardır. Ba’husus bir memlekette hane ve emlak ve-
saire suretle alakâları olanların te’bidleri herhalde muvafık bir muamele ol-
masa gerektir. Belediye veya mahalli hükümetlerce te’sis olunacak 
sınâîhanelerde işgalleri mümkün olmayanları da veli ve vâsîlerinin taht-ı 
muhafazalarına tevdî edilmeleri de bir tedbir diğer teşkil eder. Binâenaleyh 
artık bu gibi ahvâle nihâyet vermek üzere nezâret-i celilerince iktizâ-yı salık 




Quotation 2  
Petition by Dina Galaza [sic], Ağtiyana Gala Naka [sic], Sultana, 
and Viktorya, BOA. DH.EUM.ADL 12/31 1334 M 24 (December 
2, 1915). 
Cariyeleri öteden beri Galata’da umumhâneler isti’car edip şu zanaatla 
meşgûle idik. Ve cümlemiz de tebaa-yı Osmaniyeden ve Yahudi milletin-
deniz. Bu defa Dersaadet’ten idare-i örfîye ilan olunduğu esnada cariyelerini? 
Istanbul’dan kaldırırak Kayseri’ye menfî gönderildik. Cariyeleri erkek değiliz 
hiçbir zanaatla mükellef değiliz ki zanaatımızla medâr-ı te’min edelim. Kay-
seri’de havayîc-i zarûrimizden dahi aciz kaldık. ? şimdiye değin ahvâlimiz 
malûm ve meşhûd olup işletmekte olduğumuz hanelerde dahi hiçbir vukûat 
zuhûr etmediği alenen ve zahiren malûmdur. Kayseriye’nin havasıyla dahi 
imtizâc edemediğimiz şöyle dursun kendimiz burada çocuklarımız Der-
saadet’te zevclerimiz Sivas’ta perperişandırlar. Dersaadet’ten çıkalı tam 
beşinci aydır. Şimdiye değin çektiğimizi bir biz bir de Allah bilir. Eğer bizim 
Istanbul’da bu zanaatla meşgûl olmamıza müsaade buyurulmaz yahud buyu-
rulamayacaksa bizi kefaletle imza ile hükümet-i seniyyeyi temin etmekle 
bundan böyle bu işle meşgûl olmayacağız diye şu halde lütfen fakir halimize 
ve bir ? göz yaşlarımıza merhameten işbu istidâ-i cariyelerinizin lazım gelen-





“Başkumandan Vekili Enver Paşa’dan Dahiliye Nezâreti’ne.” 
BOA. DH.EUM.6.Şb. 31/29 1336 Ca 05 (18 Mart 1918). 
1 Cihe-yi harblerdeki kıt’aat-ı askerîmizin meşâkk-i harbe tahammüllerini kesr 
etmemek için bâ’dema matbûat-ı Osmaniyede harb muhtâcinini ve 
müessesatı harbiye menfaatine olanlardan başka tiyatro ve sinema ve konser, 
şarkı ve ziyâfetler gibi lubiyyata zevk ve israfa ve havayic-i zarûrîden olmayan 
müzeyyinata mütealik ilân ve mütalaatın neşri ve bunlara âid i’lânatın 
fürûhhatı ve sokaklarda tesallik ve teşhiri memnûdur. Bu ilânların yalnız 
oyun ve teşhir binalarında taslikine müsaade olunmuştur. 


























Quotation 1  
Petition by Asker Haremi Aişe, Asker haremi validesi Fatma, Şehid 
Haremi Medri [sic]. BOA.DH.EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1, (102) 12 
Kanunuevvel 1330 (December 25, 1914). 
Şehid düşmüş bir askerin haremi maaş yapacağız dediler İnegöl’den Bursa’ya 
aldırdılar. Belediye âzâsı Hacı Ahmed’in çiftliğine kapadılar. Irzına geçdiler. 
Orospu yaptılar. Hacı Ahmed frengi illetindedir. Bîçare asker haremi de frengi 
oldu. Hâlâ şimdi Hacı Ahmed’in yanında kapatmadır. 
 
Quotation 2 
Petition by Asker Haremi Aişe, Asker haremi validesi Fatma, Şehid 
Haremi Medri [sic]. BOA.DH.EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1, (102) 12 
Kanunuevvel 1330 (December 25, 1914). 
Hem asker namusu kırıldı hem din devlet ırz yıkıldı. Bu nasıl olur? Sizin na-
musunuz kabul eder mi. Memleket frengi illetinden olan bu adem ile kapat-
ması Müslüman için haiz midir. Allah aşkına Müslüman asker şehid na-
musunu arayınız merhametinize düşdük. Kazetelerde millet meclisinin 
verdiği sözleri görüyoruz. Sizi Allah bağışlasın. Namus kıran kâfirlerin şerrini 
tahkîk ediniz. Adalet isteriz efendimiz. 
 
Quotation 3  
Hüdâvendigar Vali Vekili’nden Dahiliye Nezâreti’ne, 
BOA.DH.EUM.2. Şb. 35/ 1, (104) 9 Şubat 1330 (February 22, 
1915). 
Belediye âzâsından Hacı Ahmed efendinin çiftliğinde kapattığının ihbâr 
olunduğu iş’ar buyurulan Aişe bint-i Meryemin zevcinin Balkan 
Muharebesi’nden avdet etmemesine ve kendisi kainvalidesi tarafından kabul 
edilmemesine mebni serseriyane dolaştığı ve hatta bir aralık Meryem isminde 
diğer bir kadınla Ankara ve İnegöl’e de giderek oralarda görülen 
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ahlâksızlığından dolayı Bursa’ya iade edildiği ve burada dahi sabıkalı sanıldığı 
polis ve jandarma dairelerince icra ettirilmiş tahkikatta anlaşılmış ve nihayet 
Hacı Ahmed efendinin nezdine hizmetçilikle dahil olarak kendisine evlâd 
gibi bakıldığı ifade edilib şu halde Hacı Ahmed efendinin mezbureyi 
fuhşiyata sevk etmemiş olduğu ve mamafih mezburenin şurada burada se-
filane ve serseriyâne dolaşmaktan ise Hacı Ahmed efendinin çiftliğinde bu-
lunması muvafık olacağı cihetle mumaileyhin bu babda dîvân-ı harbe sevkini 
mûceb bir hâl ve hareketi meşhûd bulunmadığı polis müdüriyetinden ba-
derkenar ifade olunmağla... 
 
Quotation 4 
Petition by Soldier Mustafa to the Ministry of Justice. 
BOA.DH.EUM. 2. Şb. 35/1, (92). 27 Kanunuevvel 1330 (January 
4, 1915). 
Meclisi Mebusan Reisi Muhteremi Vasıtasıyla Adliye Nezareti Celilesine 
 
Muhterem bey efendi hazretleri Meclis-i Mebûsan ve Âyân tarafından orduya 
hitâben göndermiş olduğunuz beyannâmeler 11 Kânûnuevvel 1330 tari-
hinde bölüklerde kıra’at edilmiş ve hatırımda birazını muhafaza etmiş 
olduğum sözleri aynen yazıyorum. 
“Milletin ihtiyarından gencine şehidlerinden dirilerine varıncaya kadar 
asırlardan berü beklediği intikam günü işte geldi. Osmanlılığın ve 
Müslümanlığın en büyük düşmanı olan Moskoflarla müttefikler yine karşu 
karşuya bulunuyorsunuz. Onları ? ve şimdiye kadar söndürdükleri ocakların 
ve açtıkları yaraların ve ayaklar altında bıraktıkları şehidlerin intikamını 
alınız. Arkanızda bıraktığınız evlâd ve ailenizi ocaklarınızı hiç düşünmeyiniz. 
Onlar bize vediatullahtır.” 
 Ey muhterem bey efendi hazretleri hükümet-i meşrûtî-i Osmaniyemizin 
adaletinden beklediğim ancak hemşiremin hukukunu muhafaza ve faillerin 




Quote 5  
Adultery Bill of 1916. BEO. 4430/332225 13 Nisan 1332 (April 
26, 1916). 
[k]ânûn-i cezânın 201. maddesi zeyli icabınca bir hatunun bir şahs-ı aher ile 
rızaen icra eylediği fi’il-i şen’iden dolayı aleyhinde tâ’kibat icrası zevcinin ve 
zevci olmadığı takdirde velinin iştikasına mütevakıf ve bu yolda bir iştika 
vuku’ bulmadığı halde dîvân-ı harbler tâ’kibat-ı kânûniye icrasıyla itâ-yı 
hüküm ve karardan memnu’ olub halbuki sahne-i harbde bulunan veyahud 
dûçar-ı esâret olan zâbitan ve efrâd ve mensûbin-i askeriyenin zevce ve evlâd 
ve saire mahreminden bi’l-rıza fi’il-i şen’i icra edenler hakkında zevc veya 
velilerinin hakk-ı iştikalarını isti’male ve ikâme-i da’vaya imkân bulamama-
ları hasebiyle tâ’kibat-ı kânûniye icra ve tertib-i mücâzat edilememesi zâbi-
tan ve mensûbin-i askeriye üzerinde te’siratı şedideyi mûceb olacağı gibi 
zâbitan ve efrâd-ı askeriyenin zevce ve evlâd ve mahreminden bi’l-rıza fi’il-i 
şen’i icra eyleyenler hakkında ne suretle ta’kibat-ı kânûniye ifâ olunacağının 
ta’yin eylemesi elzem bulunmasına ve bâis-i şübhe olan bu kâbil if’al-i 
zanaatkâraneyi irtikab eyleyenlerin cezasız kalmaları da min küll-il vücûh 
rûhiyye cevaz olamayacağına mebnî bu kâbil if’al mürtekebleri hakkında 
namus-u askeriyi muhafazaen bulundukları mahallin en büyük kumandanı 
veya ahz-i asker rüesası tarafından vâkî olacak talebin ahvâl-i muhâselede ma-
ba’d-tâkib olan zevce veya veli şikayeti makamına kâim olacağına dair bir 





Excerpts from the Official Justificatory Memorandum on the Ot-
toman Rights of Family Decree of 1917 (Münâkâhat ve Müfâkârat 
Kararnâmesi Esbâb-ı Mûcibe Lâyihası). 
Nice muhadderat kaçırılarak i’mal-i cebr ve şiddet ile eşirrâdan birine nikâh 
edilmiş ve muahharen ailelerin kızlarını kurtarmak için vukû bulan 
teşebbüsleri âkim kalıp bu hâl çok kere büyük felâketler intac eylemiştir. Hal-
buki nikâh-ı mükrehin adem-i sihhatine kail olan İmam Şafii rahmetüllahi 
aleyh hazretlerinin kavli kabul edildiği takdirde bu türlü fenalıkların önü 
alınmış olacağından 57inci madde müşarun ileyhin re’yine tevfikan tanzim 
edildi. 
 
Quotation 7  
Excerpts from the Official Justificatory Memorandum on the Ot-
toman Rights of Family Decree of 1917 (Münâkâhat ve Müfâkârat 
Kararnâmesi Esbâb-ı Mûcibe Lâyihası). 
Sâğîr ve sâğîrenin tezvîci. Sağir ve sağirenin velileri tarafından cevâz-ı tez-
vîcine amme-i erba’a rahimehümüllah hazerâtı kâil olduklarından şimdiye 
kadar mu’amele bu yolda cereyan etmiş ise de zamanımızda ahvâlin tebed-
dülüne binâen diğer bir usûl ittihazına lüzûm görülmüştür. Şöyle ki her 
zamanda ve bilhassa hayat için mücadelenin son derece kesb-i şiddet ettiği şu 
zamanda çocuklar hakkında ebeveynin ilk vazifesi onları tâlim ve terbiye 
ederek işbu alem-i cidalde nâil-i zafer olacak muntazam bir aile teşkil edebile-
cek bir hale getirmekten ibaret iken bizde ebeveyn ale’l-ekser çocuklarının 
tahsil ve terbiyesini bi’l-külliye ihmâl ederek mücerred mürüvvetlerini gör-
mek veya nâil-i miras kılmak maksadıyla onları daha beşikte iken 
nişanlayagelmişlerdir. Netice biçareler dünyalarını görmeksizin tezvîc ve 
âtiyen felâketlerine düğünlerle vaz’ı esas edilmiştir. Hiçbir mekteb yüzü gör-
meyen ve lisânını okuyup yazmaktan kat’i nazar emr-i dine dair bir kelimeye 
bile muttali’ olmayan bu türlü çocukların teşkil edegeldikleri ailelerden çoğu 
cenin-i mürdezâd gibi zifaflarının daha ilk aylarında infisaha mahkûm 
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Excerpts from the Official Justificatory Memorandum on the Ot-
toman Rights of Family Decree of 1917 (Münâkâhat ve Müfâkârat 
Kararnâmesi Esbâb-ı Mûcibe Lâyihası). 
Bu babda en ziyade nazar-ı merhamete alınması lazım gelen kızlardır. Zevc 
ile zevcenin aileyi teşkil ve idare hususunda müşterek oldukları derkâr iken 
erkek çocukların sokakta oyun oynamakla imrâr-ı vakt etmesi ma’zur 
göründüğü bir sinde kız çocuklara cemiyyet-i beşeriyyece en büyük bir vaz-
ife yani bir ailenin validesi ve müdir-i umuru olmak vazifesi tevdi’ ol-
unuyor. Henüz teşkilat-ı bedeniyyesi teşekkül etmemiş olan bir biçare kız 
valide olmakla asabı ilâ-âhiri’l-ömr perişan oluyor, ilel-i günâ gün iktisab 
ediyor, ondan tevellüd eden çocuk cılız ve pek asabî bir şey olup unsûre-yi 
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Dit onderzoek richt zich op de kwestie van een “zedencrisis”, wat een veelbe-
sproken onderwerp vormde onder de Osmaanse intellectuelen. Deze studie 
gaat voorbij aan de gebruikelijke visie dat de “zedencrisis” een hoogtepunt 
bereikte tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog, en onderzoekt hoe zedelijkheid gere-
lateerd was aan de oorlog en aan de randvoorwaarden die de perceptie van 
een zedelijkheidscrisis teweegbrachten. Het onderzoek weegt de belangrijkste 
referentiepunten waarop verhandelingen over zedelijk verval gestoeld werden 
en plaatst de debatten in de context van de oorlog.  
Deze studie betoogt dat zedelijkheid een betwist vlak was onder intel-
lectuelen en verklaart hoe rivaliserende ideologieën hun eigen politieke stel-
lingnames uiteenzetten op basis van verschillende opvattingen over zedelijk-
heid. Voor de staat, aan de andere kant, werd zedelijk verval een zaak van 
nationale veiligheid tijdens de oorlog. Het onderzoek laat zien hoe rivalitei-
ten tijdens de oorlog weerspiegeld werden op cultureel gebied door verhande-
lingen over zedelijkheid. In de publieke opinie en politieke kringen werd on-
zedelijkheid over het algemeen beschouwd als een sociaal probleem dat was 
geïmporteerd vanuit Europese landen. Op het sociale vlak richt het onder-
zoek zich op familie, vrouwen, en zedenmisdrijven met een nadruk op de 
invloed van oorlog op de traditionele gezinshiërarchie. Het proefschrift werpt 
licht op de plaats van zedelijkheid in processen van wetgeving, ideeën over 
hervormingen en vooruitgang, en plannen voor een nieuwe maatschappij. 
Het suggereert ook de historische achtergrond van contemporaine debatten 
over zedelijkheid ten opzichte van levensstijl, identiteit, en de invloed van 
zedelijke opvattingen op de vorming van politieke identiteit.   
 Het voor u liggende werk onderzoekt verhandelingen over zedelijk 
verval in de context van de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Deze oorlog breidde niet 
alleen de weg voor het territoriale uiteenvallen van het rijk, maar droeg ook 
beslissend bij aan de socioculturele transformatie waarop de Republiek Turkije 
zou worden gesticht. Ondanks de voortdurende debatten onder laat-
Osmaanse intellectuelen over zedelijkheid als een belangrijk aspect van de 
Osmaanse Moslim identiteit, is dit onderzoeksveld grotendeels onberoerd 
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gebleven in de Osmaans-Turkse historiografie, met uitzondering van enkele 
studies.  
 In dit onderzoek weerhoud ik mij ervan om een enkelvoudige defini-
tie te geven van “zedelijk verval”. Daarentegen betoog ik dat dit concept 
abstract is en slechts begrepen wordt als het wordt toegepast om zekere fe-
nomenen te definiëren. In tegenstelling tot de gebruikelijke visie dat zedelijk 
verval slechts een gevolg is van toenemende prostitutie, biedt dit onderzoek 
een brede opvatting over zedelijkheid en een nieuw perspectief, welke poli-
tieke, culturele, en sociale dynamieken omvat. Over het algemeen werd de 
term zedelijk verval vaak gebruikt om te verwijzen naar de ontaarding van 
sociale en morele waarden onder de Osmaanse Moslims. Naar mijn weten 
ontkenden geen van de intellectuelen, die commentaar leverden op zedelijk-
heid gedurende deze tijd, het bestaan van zedelijk verval. Echter, de definities 
van dat verval en de oplossingen ervoor varieerden. Overal in dit onderzoek 
evalueer ik deze ideeën door ze naast elkaar te beschouwen. Omdat de con-
text van de Eerste Wereldoorlog een diep inzicht geeft in speerpunten van 
de debatten, probeer ik sommige randvoorwaarden van zedelijk verval in de 
context van de oorlog te in te perken. 
 Hoofdstuk twee richt zich op debatten over zedelijke crises onder de 
Osmaanse intellectuelen met een bijzondere nadruk op de historische con-
text van de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Om deze reden heb ik gekozen voor perio-
dieken uit de oorlog die groots uitweiden over dit onderwerp. Dit onderzoek 
beschouwt zedelijkheid als een betwist vlak; daarom selecteer ik representa-
tieve en concurrerende ideologische perspectieven uit het Osmaanse politieke 
spectrum. The tijdschriften die ik evalueer brengen polemieken over zedelij-
ke crisis, en ook zedelijkheid, naar voren in verschillende edities en artikelen. 
Deze tijdschriften zijn, namelijk, İslam Mecmuası (Tijdschrift van Islam), 
Yeni Mecmua (Nieuw tijdschrift), en Sebilürreşad (Rechte weg). Gezien heb-
bende dat de overvloedige verwijzingen naar Moslimvrouwen en hun plek in 
de samenleving centraal stonden in discussies over zedelijkheid, heb ik ook 
onderzoek verricht naar vrouwentijdschriften uit deze tijd. Op deze manier 
onderzoek ik hoe vrouwelijke auteurs de zich op vrouwen richtende discussies 
over zedelijkheid benaderden, en hoe zij het probleem van zedelijk verval 
behandelden. Ik schets de belangrijkste punten van de debatten over zede-
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lijkheid in vrouwentijdschriften uit het begin en uit het einde van de oorlog, 
zoals Bilgi Yurdu (Het thuisland van kennis), Genç Kadın (Jonge vrouw), 
Kadınlar Dünyası (Vrouwenwereld), en Seyyale (Stromen). Dit hoofdstuk 
laat zien dat polemieken over zedelijkheid grote gevolgen hadden en niet 
slechts filosofische activiteiten betroffen. Het debat omvatte niet alleen de 
wet en wettelijke rechten, maar vormde ook een belangrijke aangelegenheid 
binnen de Osmaanse politieke en ideologische spectra. Terwijl Sebilürreşad 
stelling nam voor een eeuwige, onveranderlijke religie als de bron van zede-
lijkheid, betoogde Yeni Mecmua dat de samenleving (of in hun geval, de na-
tie) de enige bron was van zedelijkheid. Aan de andere kant stelde İslam Me-
cmuası voor om zedelijkheid te baseren op een opnieuw gedefinieerde religie 
bevrijd van haar historische nalatenschap. De auteurs in de vrouwentijdschrif-
ten zetten hun vraagtekens bij de ongelijke aard van de standpunten over 
onzedelijkheid, welke vrouwen verantwoordelijk hield voor onzedelijkheid, 
terwijl mannen buiten schot bleven. Aan de andere kant gebruikten vrou-
wen ook polemieken over verval om ruimte te openen voor hervormingen. 
Desalniettemin, sommige artikelen door vrouwelijke auteurs gaven duidelijk 
blijk van bezorgdheid over zedelijk verval, in het bijzonder onder schoolmeis-
jes. 
 Hoofdstuk drie presenteert een overzicht van regelgevende maatrege-
len en hun beperkingen met betrekking tot de bescherming van de openbare 
zedelijkheid aan het Osmaanse thuisfront. Dit hoofdstuk betoogt dat militai-
re en bureaucratische pogingen om de openbare zedelijkheid te beschermen 
zich over het algemeen richtten op twee vervlochten perspectieven. Ten eer-
ste werden gedurende de oorlog misdrijven die de openbare zedelijkheid 
schenden deel van de toenemende zorgen omtrent nationale veiligheid. Ten 
tweede manifesteerden rivaliteiten tussen de strijdende staten tijdens de oor-
log zich in de verharding van zogenaamde culturele tegenstellingen, waarin 
zedelijke twisten een belangrijke rol speelden. Terwijl de eerste dimensie 
meer de praktische en bestuurlijke zorgen betrof, had de laatste culturele im-
plicaties. Aanvankelijk gaat het hoofdstuk in op de publieke aandacht voor 
zedelijk gedrag in andere strijdende landen. Gedurende de oorlog waren er 
inderdaad vele voorbeelden die de bezorgdheid over zedelijkheid illustreerden 
in Groot-Brittannië, Duitsland, en Frankrijk, in het bijzonder met betrek-
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king tot de zedelijke normen van vrouwen en adolescenten. Nadat ik de 
Osmaanse terminologie over onzedelijkheid in staatsdocumenten heb opge-
somd, betoog ik dat Osmaanse gezagsdragers de bescherming van openbare 
zedelijkheid benaderden binnen het grotere kader van het bewaren van de 
openbare orde en veiligheid. Dit was deels vanwege de angst dat de publieke 
reacties, zoals bijeenkomsten en protesten tegen de schendingen van zede-
lijkheid, de verslechtering van de openbare orde zouden veroorzaken. Zoals 
ik heb laten zien in dit hoofdstuk, hadden sommige politieke en economi-
sche ontwikkelingen gedurende de oorlog in het Osmaanse Rijk aan de ene 
kant bijgedragen aan de pogingen van de regering om effectievere stappen 
te zetten om onzedelijkheid te elimineren, terwijl aan de andere kant tegelij-
kertijd deze pogingen werden ingeperkt vanwege de financiële behoeften 
van het land. In 1914 vormden de afschaffing van de capitulaties en het uit-
roepen van de staat van beleg bijvoorbeeld belangrijke momenten in de be-
strijding van prostitutie en vrouwenhandel. Zoals sommige gevallen illustre-
ren was zedelijkheid een concreet vereiste - een voorwaarde om in 
aanmerking te komen voor Osmaans burgerschap of de status van bekeerling 
tot Islam. Aan de andere kant, als we kijken naar de alledaagse werkelijkheid, 
werden de maatregelen tegen onzedelijkheid, onzedige handelingen, en za-
ken die zedelijk verval veroorzaakten, ingeperkt. In het bijzonder met be-
trekking tot de controle over uitgaansgelegenheden en de regulering van 
alcoholgebruik bestond er een spanning tussen de financiële behoeften van 
het land – oftewel de noodzaak om belasting te heffen – en het behouden 
van hoge zedelijke normen. Publieke aandacht voor zedelijkheid werd echter 
onthuld in de zedelijke kritieken op oorlog-gerelateerd winstbejag en op in 
het oog springende consumptie, welke een scherp contrast vormden met de 
armoede van het gewone volk en de kuisheid van de soldaten op het slag-
veld.  
 Hoofdstuk vier begint met een overzicht van de invloed van de oor-
log op het gezin, om te contextualiseren hoe het gezinsleven werd getroffen 
door oorlogsomstandigheden en om een achtergrond te geven van de veran-
derende percepties van het gezin. Daarna richt het zich op de vormen van 
staatsbemoeienis met gezinsaangelegenheden in de zin van controleneming 
over seksuele verhoudingen die potentieel het gezin als instituut bedreigden. 
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Ik laat zien hoe wetgeving tijdens de oorlog, die zich richtte op het gezin, 
voortgedreven werd door zedelijke zorgen. Deze wetsvoorstellen, welke tot 
nu toe in de historiografie apart behandeld zijn, worden dus in een breder 
kader samen geëvalueerd. Eerst kijk ik naar de de vormen van seksueel ge-
weld gericht tegen de vrouwelijke leden van de gezinnen van soldaten. Ten 
tweede onderzoek ik een tot nu toe genegeerd wetsvoorstel, de Overspel Wet 
van 1916, en de debatten eromheen. Ik onderzoek hoe het wetsontwerp de-
batten ontketende over de opvattingen over zedendelicten, de aard van het 
recht, en de grenzen van publiek en privaat recht. Tenslotte evalueer ik het 
Osmaanse Gezinsrechten Decreet van 1917 als onderdeel van de groeiende 
bemoeienis van de staat met het gezin. Ik betoog dat verhandelingen over 
zedelijkheid en nationale wedergeboorte een belangrijke rol speelden in het 
vormen van het lichaam van de wet. Niettemin, anders dan het beschouwen 
van deze bemoeienissen als een natuurlijk resultaat van toenemende seksuele 
geweldszaken, wijs ik op de rol van individuen – zowel mannen als vrouwen 
– in het vormen van de wederkerige verhouding tussen burgers en de staat. 
Door de staat aansprakelijk te houden voor een gebrek aan bescherming te-
gen seksueel geweld vroegen slachtoffers en getuigen van deze misdaden ex-
pliciet om verdere staatsbemoeienis om ervoor te zorgen dat de daders effec-
tiever bestraft konden worden.          
 Naast de huidige literatuur over de Eerste Wereldoorlog is dit onder-
zoek voornamelijk gebaseerd op documenten uit de Eerste Minister Osmaan-
se Archieven in Istanboel en op periodieken en kranten die gepubliceerd 
werden gedurende de periode in kwestie. Onder de catalogi in de archieven 
heb ik het meeste geprofiteerd van de documenten van het Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken (Dahiliye Nezareti), waaronder ook documenten van 
het Binnenlands Bestuur (İdare-i Umumiye) en het Politie Departement 
(Emniyet-i Umumiye) zich bevinden. Ik heb ook profijt gehad van de Eerste 
Wereldoorlog collectie in de Archieven van de Turkse Generale Staf 
(ATASE). Naast de archiefdocumenten van staatsfunctionarissen heb ik brie-
ven en petities van mensen die verbannen werden uit gebieden in centraal 
Anatolië onder staat van beleg geraadpleegd, om beter de levens te kunnen 
weergeven van mensen die het stigma van onzedelijkheid met zich mee-
droegen. Omdat petities een van de schaarse bronnen van sociale geschiede-
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nis vormen die de stemmen van gewone mensen laten horen, beschouw ik 
de brieven van soldaten en de vrouwen in hun gezinnen naar de verschillen-
de staatsdepartementen als primaire bronnen die onthullen hoe zedelijke 
zorgen een rol speelden in de staatsbemoeienis met het gezin. Naast archief-
documenten, helpen de krantenartikelen en de notulen van het Osmaanse 
parlement die geciteerd worden in dit onderzoek om de discussies over zede-
lijkheid in te kaderen. Artikelen van verschillende tijdschriften, die de ziens-
wijzen van de Osmaanse intellectuelen vertegenwoordigen, bieden details 
over hoe zedelijkheid betwist zou gaan worden te midden van de beroering 
van de oorlog.   
 Concluderend beschouw ik zedelijkheid als een betwist vlak waarop 
verschillende spelers betrokken waren, welke zowel de externe als de interne 
ontwikkelingen in de bredere context van de oorlog omvatten. De spelers 
omvatten intellectuelen, militairen, gewone mensen, staatelites en alles er-
tussenin. Als bijdrage aan de literatuur vestigt dit onderzoek de aandacht op 
de sterke parallellen tussen huidige en honderd jaar-oude debatten over zede-
lijkheid en werpt het licht op de sociale en culturele kanten van de Osmaanse 
belevenis van de Eerste Wereldoorlog.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
